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EDITED BY MARK T. CONARD
I
n 2008 No Country for Old Men won the Academy
Award for Best Picture, adding to the reputation of
filmmakers Joel and Ethan Coen, who were already
known for pushing the boundaries of genre. They had
previously made films that redefined the gangster
movie, the screwball comedy, the fable, and the film
noir, among others. No Country is just one of many
Coen brothers films to center on the struggles of complex
characters to understand themselves and their places in
the strange worlds they inhabit. To borrow a phrase
from Barton Fink, all Coen films explore “the life of the
mind” and show that the human condition can often be
simultaneously comic and tragic, profound and absurd.
In The Philosophy of the Coen Brothers, editor Mark T.
Conard and other noted scholars explore the challenging
moral and philosophical terrain of the Coen repertoire.
Several authors connect the Coens’ most widely known
plots and characters to the shadowy, violent, and morally
ambiguous world of classic film noir and its modern coun-
terpart, neo-noir. As these essays reveal, Coen films often
share noir’s essential philosophical assumptions: power
corrupts, evil is real, and human control of fate is an 
illusion. In Fargo, not even Minnesota’s blankets of snow
can hide Jerry Lundegaard’s crimes or brighten his long,
dark night of the soul.
Coen films that stylistically depart from film noir still
bear the influence of the genre’s prevailing philosophical
(continued on back flap)
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systems. The tale of love, marriage, betrayal, and divorce
in Intolerable Cruelty transcends the plight of the charac-
ters to illuminate competing theories of justice. Even in
lighter fare, such as Raising Arizona and The Big Lebowski,
the comedy emerges from characters’ journeys to the
brink of an amoral abyss. However, the Coens often
knowingly and gleefully subvert conventions and occa-
sionally offer symbolic rebirths and other hopeful out-
comes. At the end of The Big Lebowski, the Dude abides,
his laziness has become a virtue, and the human comedy
is perpetuating itself with the promised arrival of a new-
born Lebowski.
The Philosophy of the Coen Brothers sheds new light on
these cinematic visionaries and their films’ stirring
philosophical insights. From Blood Simple to No Country
for Old Men, the Coens’ films feature characters who
hunger for meaning in shared human experience—they
are looking for answers. A select few of their protagonists
find affirmation and redemption, but for many others, the
quest for answers leads, at best, only to more questions.
MARK T. CONARD, associate professor of philosophy at
Marymount Manhattan College, is the editor of the 
Philosophy of Popular Culture series and of numerous
books, including The Philosophy of Film Noir, The 
Philosophy of Neo-Noir, and The Philosophy of Martin
Scorsese.
Front cover: from Fargo, courtesy Gramercy Pictures/Photofest.
© Gramercy Pictures.
Back cover: from No Country for Old Men, courtesy Miramax
Films/Photofest. © Miramax Films. Photographer: Richard
Foreman.
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FILM/PHILOSOPHY
“The Philosophy of the Coen Brothers offers a very
smart, provocative, and stylishly written set of 
essays on the films of the Coen brothers. The
volume makes a convincing case for reading their
films within a wide array of philosophical contexts
and persuasively demonstrates that the films of
the Coen brothers often implicitly and sometimes
explicitly engage with central issues in the history
of Western philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle
to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre,
Baudrillard, and MacIntyre.”
—MICHAEL VALDEZ MOSES,  author of 
The Novel and the Globalization of Culture
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IntroductIon
Mark T. Conard
Since arriving on the cinematic scene in 1984 with Blood Simple, Joel and 
Ethan Coen have amassed an impressive body of work that has garnered 
them critical acclaim and a devoted following. Their highly original works 
include both comedies and dramas and cover various genres (neo-noir, the 
romantic comedy, the western, the gangster film). However, most, if not 
all, of the Coens’ films defy exact categorization, and they always bear the 
brothers’ unmistakable stamp. From the Irish gangster morality play Miller’s 
Crossing (1990) to the film blanc Fargo (1996), from the neo-noir comedy 
The Big Lebowski (1998) to the Odyssean O Brother, Where Art Thou? (2000), 
the Coens never fail to have something interesting to say and always say it 
in a unique and entertaining fashion.
As I’ve already hinted, much of the Coens’ work can be characterized as 
neo-noir, whatever other styles or genres the brothers are working in. For 
those unfamiliar with the term, “film noir” refers to a body of Hollywood 
films from the 1940s and 1950s that share certain visual features, such as 
stark contrasts between light and shadow and oblique camera angles meant 
to disorient the viewer, as well as particular themes, such as alienation, 
pessimism, and moral ambiguity. Classic noirs include The Maltese Falcon 
(John Huston, 1941), Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944), and Out of 
the Past (Jacques Tourneur, 1947). Any film coming after the classic period 
that displays these themes and has a similar feeling to it we refer to as “neo-
noir.” Later films, such as Chinatown (Roman Polanski, 1974), Body Heat 
(Lawrence Kasdan, 1981), and L.A. Confidential (Curtis Hanson, 1997), fall 
into this category, as do many of the Coens’ films. Blood Simple is a quite 
self-conscious neo-noir, for example, and The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001) 
is clearly an homage to classic noir. As we’ll see later, many or most of the 
brothers’ other movies can likewise be identified as noirs.
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This work investigates the philosophical themes and underpinnings 
of the films of these master filmmakers and uses the movies as a vehicle 
for exploring and explicating traditional philosophical ideas. It comprises 
sixteen essays from scholars in both philosophy and film and media studies. 
The essays are written in nontechnical language and require no knowledge 
of philosophy or media theory to appreciate or understand.
Part 1 of the volume, “The Coen Brand of Comedy and Tragedy,” begins 
with Richard Gilmore’s “Raising Arizona as an American Comedy,” in which 
he argues that the aspirations for improvement of the outlaw protagonist of 
the film, Hi McDunnough, are quintessentially American in nature. Next, 
in “The Human Comedy Perpetuates Itself: Nihilism and Comedy in Coen 
Neo-Noir,” Thomas S. Hibbs claims that the threat of nihilism, often promi-
nent in classic noir, becomes a working assumption in much of neo-noir, 
revealing the various quests of the noir protagonist to be pointless, absurd, 
and thus comic and that the most representative examples of this turn to 
the comedic in noir are the films of the Coen brothers. In “Philosophies of 
Comedy in O Brother, Where Art Thou?” Douglas McFarland claims that the 
film’s comic underpinnings can best be understood through concepts of the 
mechanical, the contradictory, and the absurd articulated in Henri Bergson’s 
Laughter and Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Richard 
Gilmore discusses the hubris and fatal flaws of Llewelyn Moss as he con-
fronts his fate in the form of the killer Anton Chigurh in “No Country for 
Old Men: The Coens’ Tragic Western.” Last, in “Deceit, Desire, and Dark 
Comedy: Postmodern Dead Ends in Blood Simple,” Alan Woolfolk argues 
that the Coens’ first film has many of the classic noir conventions and themes 
but is at the same time thoroughly postmodern insofar as it frustrates the 
characters’ attempts to make sense out of their lives and to communicate 
with one another.
Part 2, “Ethics: Shame, Justice, and Virtue,” opens with “‘And It’s Such 
a Beautiful Day!’ Shame and Fargo,” by Rebecca Hanrahan and David 
Stearns, in which they claim that the film can be read as a meditation on 
shame, insofar as the primary characters are repeatedly presented with the 
chance to look at themselves through the eyes of others. Shai Biderman and 
William J. Devlin, in “Justice, Power, and Love: The Political Philosophy of 
Intolerable Cruelty,” argue that the Coens’ tale of love, marriage, betrayal, 
and divorce can explain much about competing theories of justice within 
political philosophy. “Ethics, Heart, and Violence in Miller’s Crossing,” by 
Bradley L. Herling, avers that the brothers’ period noir is set in a gangster 
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world run by an ethics of power that is enforced by violence but in which 
the primary characters at times display “heart,” or attachment to one another 
based on positive emotions and sympathy. Matthew K. Douglass and Jerry 
L. Walls, in “‘Takin’ ’er Easy for All Us Sinners’: Laziness as a Virtue in The 
Big Lebowski,” examine the life philosophy of über-slacker Jeffrey Lebowski, 
a.k.a. “the Dude,” and find that, especially in contrast to the hedonism, 
nihilism, and rugged individualism manifested in the other characters, the 
Dude’s laziness is indeed a virtue. Last, Douglas McFarland, in “No Country 
for Old Men as Moral Philosophy,” discusses the ethical landscape of the 
Coens’ adaptation of the Cormac McCarthy novel set in a bleak and violent 
region of west Texas.
Part 3, “Postmodernity, Interpretation, and the Construction of History,” 
begins with my chapter “Heidegger and the Problem of Interpretation in 
Barton Fink.” In it I claim that the things and events in the life of the screen-
writing protagonist lose their sense and meaning because he lives the “life 
of the mind” as an isolated Cartesian subject cut off from practical engage-
ment with the world. Next, in “The Past Is Now: History and The Hudsucker 
Proxy,” Paul Coughlin discusses how the Coens in their meditations on the 
past don’t simply allude to or recreate history; rather, they cinematically 
investigate how history as a narrative is constructed and question the ideolo-
gies underpinning that narrative. Last, Jerold J. Abrams, in “‘A Homespun 
Murder Story’: Film Noir and the Problem of Modernity in Fargo,” argues 
that the Coen noir Fargo reveals the isolation and alienation of humanity 
within modernity and its social fragmentation and radical individuation. 
Part 4, “Existentialism, Alienation, and Despair,” kicks off with “‘What 
Kind of Man Are You?’: The Coen Brothers and Existentialist Role Play-
ing,” in which Richard Gaughran discusses the dilemma of existential self- 
creation—the problem of the need to create identities for ourselves coupled 
with the lack of any hope of success, given the lack of a human nature and 
values to guide us in that self-creation—which is at the heart of so much of 
the Coens’ work. Karen D. Hoffman, in “Being the Barber: Kierkegaardian 
Despair in The Man Who Wasn’t There,” uses Kierkegaard’s account of various 
types of despair to examine the life of Ed Crane, the barber protagonist of 
the brothers’ noir homage. Finally, in “Thinking beyond the Failed Com-
munity: Blood Simple and The Man Who Wasn’t There,” R. Barton Palmer 
discusses the alienation of the antiheroes of these two Coen films, which is 
a result of the failure of community that engenders in those protagonists a 
deep desire for connection to others. Palmer notes the influence of the great 
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hard-boiled author James M. Cain and existentialists Sartre and Camus on 
these two fine Coen noirs.
Whether you’re a longtime fan of the Coen brothers or have seen rela-
tively few of their movies, we hope and trust that you’ll find this volume 
engaging and insightful and that it will deepen and enrich your understand-
ing and appreciation of the work of these master auteurs.
Part 1
the coen Brand 
of comedy and tragedy

raIsIng arIzona 
as an amerIcan comedy
Richard Gilmore
We grew up in America, and we tell American stories in American settings 
within American frames of reference.
—Ethan Coen
Our American literature and spiritual history are . . . in the optative 
mood.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalist”
Raising Arizona (1987) begins with what sounds like the slamming of some 
prison doors. It is, to be sure, an ominous sound, and proleptic in at least 
two ways. First, it anticipates the sound that our protagonist is about to hear 
within minutes of our first meeting him, and second, it anticipates one of the 
major themes of the movie, which is, in the words of Ethan Coen, “family 
life versus being an outlaw.” That is, presumably, to the outlaw, family life can 
seem like some prison doors swung shut. Immediately following the sound 
of the slamming prison doors there is banjo music and an image of what we 
learn is a police height measure for photographing suspected criminals. A 
young man (Nicolas Cage) is thrown into the point of view of the camera 
so that we can take his measure against the height chart. In a voice-over 
we hear, “My name is H. I. McDunnough. Call me Hi.” I understand Hi’s 
name (constructed from his first two initials) to suggest a spatial metaphor, 
a description of his ambitions, which are, I want to say, very American am-
bitions. The banjo music in the background is Pete Seeger’s “Goofing Off 
Suite,” which, like America itself, is a fascinating medley of American folk 
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music, motifs from high European classical music (Bach and Beethoven), 
Russian folk music, and even yodeling.1
Hi is the central protagonist of the film and provides the voice-over nar-
rative that accompanies the regular narrative of the film. Although Hi is the 
main protagonist, it is Ed (Holly Hunter), short for Edwina, who engages 
the action of the plot of the movie with her strong sense of what she wants 
and what constitutes natural justice, as did Antigone (except in this case 
the natural justice takes the form of stealing a live baby from a family that, 
it could be argued, has too many, rather than burying one’s dead brother 
against the laws of the state).
Goofing off pretty much describes the sense one gets of what the Coens 
are doing in the opening sequence of the movie. There is one disjunctive 
discontinuity after another, each one constituting a kind of slapstick joke, and 
yet each one reverberates with a deeper truth. There is the overall structural 
discontinuity between Hi’s voice-over narrative and what we see him doing. 
Hi sounds, in the voice-over, like he speaks from a place of detached, even 
philosophical, wisdom, but what we actually see him doing shows him to 
be a not very bright repeat offender, a petty criminal with an enthusiasm 
for robbing convenience stores. That disjunction is funny. His enthusiasm 
for robbing convenience stores is funny in itself, as is his evident incom-
petence at it, which is why he goes to jail so often. He seems to accept jail 
time as just part of life, and it is a significant part of his life. That he uses his 
time between crimes, that is, his time being booked for the crimes he has 
committed, to woo Ed, who is a police officer and the photographer for his 
mug shots, is funny and ridiculous. Their marriage, “starter home,” “salad 
days,” infertility, despair, and kidnapping scheme are all a little ridiculous, 
and yet, even though they are presented as basically funny, there is a sort 
of underlying truth to all of it. America does have a fascination or love af-
fair with the image of the outlaw, so choosing to be an outlaw is not really 
that crazy. And it is hard starting a family in this modern world, even if, 
or especially if, you are an outlaw by trade. And starter homes sometimes 
are little mobile homes in the desert. And sometimes, in spite of your best 
efforts, nature does not cooperate; infertility is a fact of life.
When Hi says, for example, “I tried to stand up and fly straight, but it 
wasn’t easy with that sumbitch Reagan in the White House. . . . I dunno, they 
say he is a decent man, so . . . maybe his advisers are confused,” it is such 
a mishmash of deep political wisdom, weird, folksy compassion, and just 
raw, self-serving excuse that it is hard to find one’s way with it. It is funny 
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and true and crazy all at the same time. It also has a vaguely socialist ring 
to it, and of course Pete Seeger, the creator of the “Goofing Off Suite” we 
are hearing in the background, was a famous socialist and defender of the 
people, which further suggests some deeper political message behind the 
craziness. This, one might say, quoting the American poet Robert Frost, is 
“play for mortal stakes.”2
The Optative Mood and America
We, in America, are weaned on the milk of aspiration. This is what I un-
derstand Emerson to mean when he describes our spiritual history as be-
ing in the “optative mood.” “Optative,” from the Latin optio, meaning “free 
choice,” is Emerson’s slightly archaic word for the American sense of being 
free to determine one’s own life, to be whomever one wants to be. The great 
advantage of this spiritual history is the energy and the inventiveness it calls 
forth in American people. The downside of this ethos is how demanding and 
difficult it is on a person. There is very high expectation that everyone will be 
an “individual” and that a person will have high aspirations, but not much 
direction is given to us about what aspirations to have or how to achieve 
them, except that one should aspire to work hard. So much is expected of 
us to be something original and so little is given to us about how to do that 
that the problem of who we are to be can drive us a little crazy. We do not 
inherit an identity so much as find ourselves tasked with (to use a Coen 
expression from Fargo [1996]) creating an identity. That is an easier task 
for some than for others, and certainly there are some deep deceptions in 
the American mythos of self-creation, deceptions about the irrelevance of 
the conditions of one’s birth, the role of social class, or money, or race. So, 
on the one hand, we have more freedom than most in history to make of 
ourselves what we will. On the other hand, that puts a considerable burden 
on each of us as individuals to come up with a unique self to be.
Part of the American mythos, part of the sense of what is especially 
unique about America, is captured in the idea of “American exceptional-
ism.” This idea is usually traced back to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America 
(originally published in two volumes in French in 1835 and 1840), but it 
can be found even earlier in a famous sermon given by John Winthrop in 
1630, in which he describes a future for America in which “wee will be 
seen as a citty upon a hill.”3 This expression of American exceptionalism, of 
a future America as “a city upon a hill,” is aspirational in at least two ways. 
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It is aspirational in the sense that it is describing not only a hoped-for state 
of the country that can be achieved if we are true to certain principles but 
also what we should aspire to for our future country; it expresses a dream of 
what America could be. It is also aspirational in the sense that this hoped-
for state, once achieved, will itself represent an aspirational goal to the rest 
of the world.
The idea that there is something special about America, something not 
just unique but also superior, the idea of America as an idea of some kind of 
better possibility, seems to pervade our thinking about ourselves, as well as 
the thinking of others about us, and it is, as most things are, both a blessing 
and a curse. The blessing is the way the idea of America’s exceptionalism 
empowers us to pursue our own dreams of what we want to be. It is part of 
the American ideal that we are not necessarily limited by birth or class or 
race. On the other hand, the expectations of individual achievement are very 
high, and often we fail to measure up. It is not an incidental detail, I think, 
that the first image we see of Hi is of him thrown against a height measure, 
which, under the circumstances, indicates a certain failure to measure up 
to the high expectations of society.
Comedy
Raising Arizona is a comedy.4 I take it to be a comedy in at least two senses. 
First, it is a comedy because it is very funny. The second way that I see Raising 
Arizona as a comedy is in the classic sense of a comedy (which derives from 
Aristotle’s definition of a comedy) as a narrative that begins in a bad place 
but, in its narrative unfolding, ends in a good place.5 This is why Dante’s 
narrative of a descent into hell and subsequent journey through purgatory 
and paradise is called The Divine Comedy.6 It is not so much that it is a hu-
morous work, although there are some very funny passages in it, but that it 
follows the classic trajectory of a comedy as described by Aristotle.
This claim, that Raising Arizona is a comedy in this classic sense, depends 
on an interpretation of the ending of the movie as being an affirmation of a 
better future for Hi and Ed. The ending of the movie seems to be ambigu-
ous. Hi is having another one of his dreams (although all of his previous 
dreams in the movie have turned out to be connected with reality), and he 
is dreaming of a better and more fruitful future, but their actual situation 
seems to be worse: they are babyless, and Ed has pronounced, in her de-
finitive way, their (Hi and Ed’s) complete unsuitableness to each other and 
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her determination to leave him. Whether they stay together or not remains 
undetermined by the narrative of the movie. To affirm the movie as having 
the form of a classic comedy means finding in this very ambiguity some 
kind of affirmation that transcends the early hopefulness and excitement 
of their original courtship and marriage.
I interpret the title of the movie, Raising Arizona, to indicate the most 
fundamental theme of the movie, namely, the aspirational theme of self-
improvement that is so central to the American identity. The basic trope 
is the idea of height, so I take Hi’s name to be a kind of spatial metaphor 
of his aspirations. What constitutes growth, what constitutes the necessary 
change in condition, from a worse to a better condition (so that the movie 
can fulfill the form of a comedy), will be a change in one’s aspirations. At the 
beginning of the movie, I take Hi’s aspirations to be relatively uncomplicated. 
What he wanted to be was also what he was, an outlaw. The outlaw is a kind 
of American aspiration, an American ideal. The outlaw is just an extreme 
form of the American ideal of the frontiersman, the adventurer, the one who 
braves the wilderness and does so because of the excess of wildness still in 
him or her. The classic American movie genre of the western is filled with 
figures that straddle the line between law and lawlessness, so that the good 
westerner is just barely across the line on the side of the law and the only 
one wild enough to go after the bad westerner, the one who has slipped to 
the far side of the law and into a lawless wildness. The connection with the 
American movie genre of the western is made explicit with some allusions 
to westerns in Raising Arizona, as, for example, the location of the film in the 
Southwest, the long-coat dusters worn by Gale (John Goodman) and Evelle 
(William Forsythe) when they rob the bank, and the showdown between Hi 
and Leonard Smalls (Randall “Tex” Cobb).
The problem of creating an identity for oneself can be framed in terms 
of the relationship between universals (or generals) and particulars. That 
is, to be something is to participate in some form of a universal: one is a 
lawyer or a teacher or a fifth grader or an American. But to participate too 
much in a universal, to identify oneself too deeply with a general idea, is 
to lack any particular identity at all.7 On the other hand, to be too idio-
syncratically particular is, in a way, also to lack an identity; it is to have no 
continuous identity at all. We construct our identities, therefore, out of a 
combination of some kind of general or universal idea inflected by our own 
particular characteristics. In part, our particularity is constituted by just 
the particular array of general ideas that we participate in, so one way to 
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develop one’s identity is in choosing which combination of general ideas in 
which to participate. So, one is a midwesterner or a teacher, someone who 
drives a Ford or likes baseball, and so on—our identity being, more or less, 
just the complete list of these general descriptions. A way to improve one’s 
identity is to improve somehow on the complex array of universals that 
we participate in, making them all more harmonious or more beautiful or 
maybe just more complex.
Of course, many of the universals in which we participate we do not 
have a choice about, or not much of a choice. We do not choose (for the most 
part) our gender, whether we will be born rich or poor, in the Northeast or 
the Southwest. It seems clear that we make some choices, and it will be in 
those choices that such identity as we can make we do make.
Hi, at the beginning of Raising Arizona, has what seems to be a fairly 
simple identity structure. He seems to identify himself as an outlaw. He 
blames President Reagan (or his advisers) for his outlaw ways, but that really 
seems to be more a function of his outlaw ways than a real explanation of 
them. (When he really wants a job he seems to have no trouble getting one. 
When he wants a newspaper, he prefers to steal it than to pay the thirty-five 
cents, and that seems to be a matter of preference and principle rather than 
need.) The life of an outlaw is a kind of “primitive,” pre-Christian, precapital-
ist kind of existence. It is lived in the present moment much more than toward 
any particular future. It is cyclical, like the seasons. There is the excitement 
of doing the crime, and then the over-structured time of being in jail, then 
back to the crime and back to jail. As Hi says, “Now I don’t know how you 
come down on the incarceration question, whether it’s for rehabilitation or 
revenge. But I was beginning to think that revenge is the only argument that 
makes any sense.” We hear this voice-over as we watch Hi commit another 
crime after just seeing him being let out of jail. Furthermore, we see that he 
has pretty much botched this crime by accidentally locking himself out of 
his car, and the signs (we hear a police siren in the distance) indicate that 
he will soon be back in the slammer, and so his perspective pretty much 
mirrors his reality vis à vis the incarceration question.
In a sense, however, these simple primitive cycles and his relatively 
simple identity structure are already, for Hi, on their way to being things of 
the past, and they become that in, as it were, the blink of an eye. Heidegger 
speaks of how the possibility of a new encounter, a new way of encountering 
the world, will occur to us in the blink of an eye (an Augenblick in Heidegger’s 
German).8 The French philosopher Alain Badiou talks about a similar phe-
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nomenon as an “event.”9 An “event” is something that happens that does not 
quite fit into our established system of knowledge, and so it will appear to us 
as something unaccountable, something that we cannot quite get our minds 
around even as we recognize the great importance of the encounter. Badiou 
identifies four realms, four general categories, of events: politics, science, art, 
and love.10 If we consider the final category, then, an event in love will be 
an encounter with another person that, as it were, opens up possibilities to 
us that we had never understood were possibilities; it creates a disturbance 
for us that we do not quite know how to quell. We will always be tempted, 
in the presence of an event, to turn away from the event, to pretend it did 
not happen, because the event is always experienced as being beyond us, 
beyond what we have the capabilities for. Ethics, for Badiou, is about having 
the courage to be true to, to be faithful to, the event.
The Event
I consider the flash of light when Ed first takes Hi’s mug shot at the begin-
ning of the movie to signal, as well, the occurrence of an event. What is the 
event? If Hi’s identity is constituted according to the general idea of the out-
law, Ed’s identity seems to be constituted primarily in terms of the law. Her 
cold-sounding, apparently indifferent, and oft repeated “Turn to the right!” 
is a kind of pure expression of the law. In that flash of a light, however, a 
mutual recognition seems to occur. Hi and Ed see in each other the possibil-
ity of another narrative, another way of being that would supplement and 
reconstitute their present ways, and in ways that neither quite understands, 
but for which both feel an attraction and a need.
Indeed, their marriage generates such a powerful sense of love for both 
of them, during what Hi refers to as “the salad days” of their marriage, that 
they felt, in Hi’s words expressing Ed’s feelings, “that there was too much 
love and beauty for just the two of us and every day we kept a child out of 
the world was a day he might later regret having missed.” They feel, I want 
to say, the great potential of their marriage but do not yet understand how 
to unleash the power of this potential. The antilaw, joy-in-the-moment life 
of the outlaw has no future, and the pure form of the law is itself barren. 
The rocky road that Hi and Ed have to follow, then, is the road from the 
unworkable antinomy of trying to combine in their pure forms lawlessness 
and lawfulness, to a way of finding, for each, the virtue of the other that 
will unleash the potential powers of both. That is, Hi has to learn the value 
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of law, and Ed, the value of ad hoc life in the moment in a way that makes 
possible a shared future to which they can both aspire.
The plot of the movie is all about the beginning of this journey. The 
beginning of this journey turns out to be quite funny. Perhaps it should not 
be, involving as it does a recidivist criminal offender, the kidnapping of an 
infant, a brutal “warthog from hell” biker who kills small animals with an 
indiscriminate zeal, and two escaped criminals, among other miscreants and 
malfeasance. Yet, as bad as a description of the characters and acts involved 
sounds, what we feel for these characters doing these things is, as Georg 
Seesslen says, “tenderness.”11
This leads me to Plato’s not exactly explicit theory of humor. In Book 
VII of The Republic, in the section known as the allegory of the cave, Plato 
describes two different kinds of laughter.12 The first kind of laughter he 
describes is the laughter of the people who are trapped inside the cave, the 
people who take mere shadows for reality. They laugh at the people who 
return to the cave from outside because when those people return, from out 
of the bright light of reality back into the darkness of the cave, they stumble 
around, blinded by the darkness of the cave. To those inside the cave, those 
whose eyes are used to the darkness, this stumbling around looks like in-
competence, and the people inside the cave think it is hysterically funny to 
see such bumbling. The second kind of laughter, however, is quite different. 
The second form of laughter is the laughter of the people outside the cave as 
they watch each new person who escapes from the cave and tries to walk in 
the bright light of day (reality) before his or her eyes have gotten used to all 
of the light. They stumble too, and this makes the people whose eyes are now 
used to the light laugh. On the surface these two forms of laughter seem quite 
similar, but, in reality, they are completely different. What is the difference? 
The difference is that the first kind of laughter is a laughter of ridicule, of sup-
posed superiority at the expense of a supposed inferior. It is a laughter that 
separates and makes other. The second kind of laughter is like the laughter 
of parents seeing their child take her or his first wobbly step. It is a laughter 
of joy and love and inclusion. It is a laughter that welcomes and bonds.
Jokes
Raising Arizona is full of jokes. Some of the jokes are explicit. Although Hi 
woos Ed with a joke about a tipped cement mixer and some escaped hard-
ened criminals (a joke Ed had heard before), most of the explicit jokes are of 
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the “bad laughter” variety, and they are told by Glen (Sam McMurray). The 
rest of the jokes in the movie are implicit. They are not presented explicitly 
as jokes, but if you see them, if you get them, they are quite funny and also, 
generally, more or less tender, that is, including you and affirming our shared 
humanity rather than excluding or reinforcing a sense of otherness. Ted 
Cohen, in his book Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters, describes 
the purpose of jokes in terms of “relief from certain oppressions, and the 
attainment of a very special kind of intimacy.”13 With jokes, one has to do 
some work, do some thinking. Frequently jokes work by ellipsis—something 
is left out that has to be supplied by the hearer. So, at first, the missing ele-
ment occurs as just a sort of puzzling non sequitur, then you get it and see 
how the missing piece solves the puzzle. The result is an intimacy based on 
a shared understanding, based on “the sense held mutually by teller and 
hearer that they are joined in feeling.”14 So the philosophical importance 
of jokes has to do with the way they free us from things that oppress us, by 
giving us a certain distance, a certain detached perspective on those things, 
and by the way they foster intimacy and community between the teller and 
the hearer of the joke.
In a movie like Raising Arizona, the implicit jokes are frequently signaled 
only by an oddness, and one may laugh at them without being fully aware 
of what is funny, as though we got the joke subconsciously, if not quite fully 
consciously. Hi’s enthusiastic and energetic seduction of Ed from the posi-
tion of the one who is being booked and sent to jail is funny because it is 
a very odd situation in which to begin a seduction, since the very fact that 
one is a convicted criminal would seem to disqualify one as an appropriate 
partner, especially for a police officer. The tenderness, the good laughter 
of these sequences, resides in the way that it is in the nature of wooing to 
be, to feel, more or less unworthy, and yet we do it anyway. There is always 
something suspicious about wooing, a question of reliability and of motives 
that shades every wooer with a taint of criminality. The wooer understands 
this, as does the wooed, and yet we woo and are wooed. From inside the 
process, all of this causes anxiety, and from outside, it looks kind of funny. 
It is funny that Hi tells Ed that her ex-fiancé knows where to find him, “in 
the Munroe County Maximum Security Correctional Facility for Men, State 
Farm Road Number Thirty-One; Tempe, Arizona,” since it is at once gallant 
and ridiculous. It is funny the way words work as things outside of us, with a 
kind of logic of their own that can be confounding, the way “Well, okay then” 
can be both the words that set Hi free by the head of the parole board and 
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the identical words used to make him married. It is funny when someone 
says, “You’re not just tellin’ us what we wanna hear?” and you say, “No sir, 
no way,” and then they say “’Cause we just wanna hear the truth,” and you 
think, well, I am telling the truth, and so you say, “Well then I guess I am 
tellin’ you what you wanna hear,” and then they say, “Boy, didn’t we just tell 
you not to do that?” Okay then. I hate it when that happens.
All of these jokes seem to be doing just what Ted Cohen says about jokes. 
In our laughter at these scenes from the movie we feel ourselves getting some 
distance from, and some perspective on, the kinds of things that cause us 
anxiety and oppress us. In our laughter, we feel a certain tenderness for Hi 
and Ed, and maybe even for Dot (Frances McDormand) and Glen, as well as 
for ourselves, and this feeling of tenderness is a feeling of an intimacy with 
these characters. If we are in a movie theater and our laughter is shared by 
others in the audience, this feeling of intimacy and shared feeling, shared 
community, is created in the actual movie theater itself.
There is at least one Freudian joke in the movie: the way the gynecologist 
(Ralph Norton) is using his cigar—what Freud would call a phallic sym-
bol—as a pointer to the diagram of a woman’s reproductive system. In the way 
he manipulates the cigar against the diagram he seems to be simultaneously 
explaining the problem of Ed’s infertility and simulating sex. This is a doctor 
joke, a Freudian joke, and a joke on Freud (who famously said “Sometimes 
a cigar is just a cigar” and died, tragically, of oral cancer, suggesting that the 
great psychologist was not entirely in control of his own psyche).
Polysemousness
A narrative that has multiple levels of meaning can be called polysemous. 
Polysemousness not only characterizes the scene with the gynecologist but 
also is characteristic of Raising Arizona as a whole. Dante, in his famous 
letter to Can Grande, describes how his Commedia is polysemous. Dante 
says that each scene in the Commedia has four levels of meaning: first, the 
literal narrative, then the allegorical meaning, then the moral meaning, and 
finally the anagogical meaning (by which he means its spiritual significance). 
For example, the Commedia begins
Midway in our life’s journey, I went astray
from the straight road and woke to find myself
alone in a dark wood. . . . 15
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The four levels of interpretation for this opening scene would be, first, that the 
narrator, Dante, was literally sleepwalking and woke up after having veered 
off the road he had meant to be on, finding himself lost in a dark wood. 
The allegorical meaning is that this is a thing that has happened to virtually 
everyone and that many of us are, too, lost in a dark wood (of sin and er-
ror). The moral significance has to do with the recognition of this fact of our 
lostness and the need to recover our moral bearings and that the subsequent 
story may help us with this. The anagogical meaning is that this is not just a 
practical moral problem but also a spiritual problem and that our lostness is 
not just a reflection of our being out of sync with our own moral convictions 
but that we are also out of sync with the universe as whole, or with God, and 
that radical steps must be taken to remedy this dire condition.
Although the Coen brothers do not claim this kind of polysemous 
content for Raising Arizona as explicitly as Dante does for his Commedia, 
there are too many signs of it in the film to be ignored. I am not sure that 
Raising Arizona has the same interpretive levels as Dante’s Divine Comedy, 
but certainly, I would say, there is more going on than just a literal story. 
There are too many odd parallels and peculiar events within the movie that 
seem to require some kind of interpretation, that seem to indicate other 
levels of meaning. Some quick examples are the tattoo (of Mr. Horsepower, 
but it also looks a lot like Woody the Woodpecker) shared by Hi and the 
Lone Biker of the Apocalypse, Leonard Smalls. There is the similar gesture 
of dragging someone out from under something by the foot, committed first 
by Hi, with one of the Arizona infants from under the crib, and the same 
gesture performed by the lone biker on Hi (dragging him out from under 
a car). There are weirdly unbelievable sequences like the whole Pampers-
stealing, gun-blasting, dog-chasing sequence or just the strangely quiescent 
and unharmable baby who falls, twice (!), from the top of a moving car, yet 
survives untouched and unperturbed.
Take, for example, the polysemous character of the visit by Glen and 
Dot. The experience of their wayward undisciplined kids is a repetition of 
Hi’s first experience with the unruly Arizona quintuplets when he is trying 
to kidnap one of them. It is a subjectivized representation of Hi’s worst fear 
of what having a family will be like. It does not take a particular side on the 
nature versus nurture question, but it does definitely uphold the proverb 
about apples not falling far from the tree. Each of Glen’s children seems to 
be an active embodiment of Glen’s concept of a joke, a thing said or done 
at someone else’s expense that can be laughed at. Not only does one of the 
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children squirt Hi in the crotch with his squirt gun because he thinks it is 
funny but they also all laugh at their father’s broken nose because they think 
it is funny. Empathy is not part of the family ethos. All of this is surely also 
a comment on American child-rearing practices, since, I would guess, most 
of us have encountered such a family in the United States, but I have never 
seen such a one, nor would I expect to, in Europe. And we laugh at this joke, 
and this is a good laughter. It is a laughter that, as Cohen suggests, frees us 
from certain oppressions, the oppressions of families, our own and other 
people’s, the oppression of our guilt about feeling the oppressions of families, 
the oppression of anxiety about entertaining, which rarely turns out quite 
as badly as this experiment in entertaining turns out.
So there are many things going on simultaneously in this sequence, 
and all of them tie into different narrative levels that the movie sustains 
throughout. All of these narrative levels, however, address this question: 
how does one achieve happiness, how does one create a happy home, in this 
complex, wonderful, terrifying, maddening America? What is the answer 
to this question suggested by Raising Arizona?
The answer that this movie suggests seems to have something to do 
with the nature of comedy, something to do with the way seeing the comic 
can lead to a life lived as a comedy, that is, as ending better than it begins. 
This, it has to be acknowledged, would have to be the metanarrative lesson 
of the movie since no one in the movie itself seems to really pick up on the 
comic dimension of life.
Dreams and Freedom
An important and recurring theme in Raising Arizona is Hi’s dreams. 
Dreams, if Freud is right, are inherently polysemous. They have, at the very 
least, two levels of meaning, what Freud called the manifest and the latent 
levels of meaning. The manifest meaning is what we literally dream, while 
the latent meaning is what the dream means, what an interpretation of the 
dream will tell us about ourselves. At least one commentator on the movie 
has raised the possibility that some, or all, of the movie may be a dream, 
which would make Hi’s explicit dreams, dreams within a dream.16 Nietzsche 
claims that metaphysics begins with the fact of dreams.17 That is, with dreams 
we have a direct experience of a counternarrative, an alternative reality, to 
that of our everyday experience. This creates a need to determine which is 
the true narrative or the true reality, and that question calls forth metaphys-
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ics. If Nietzsche is right, this suggests a deep connection between dreams 
and philosophy. The idea of a counternarrative is what sets us free from the 
constraints of whatever narrative we happen to find ourselves in. This is the 
way in which philosophy can set us free, by empowering us to imagine other 
ways of being. Movies, in general, are very dreamlike—oneiric is the word 
for that—and, like dreams, seem to call for some interpretation and, also like 
dreams, can be a road to a new kind of freedom from what oppresses us.
“In dreams begin responsibilities,” wrote Delmore Schwartz.18 That is, 
in dreams we confront the pieces that are missing from the narrative that 
we are working with in our everyday lives. Hi’s dreams are important to the 
movie because the movie itself is a kind of working through the issues that 
are raised in his dreams. The two escaped convicts, Evelle and Gale, are like 
emissaries from Hi’s unconscious, come to remind him of his “true” nature. 
They emerge just as Hi is beginning to settle down into family life, and they 
can be seen as the part of his identity that he is not quite sure that he wants 
to give up yet. They are childlike, sloppy, and lawless, and they live only 
for the moment. They are literal and figurative remnants of Hi’s earlier life, 
when all he lived for was to be an outlaw and when time moved in cycles 
so that he always knew where he was in time just by knowing where he was 
in a particular cycle.
At the beginning of the first section of Dante’s Commedia, the “Inferno,” 
after Dante awakes in the dark wood, he sees a distant peak with the bright 
light of the sun, representing goodness, shining atop it. He turns to make 
his way toward it, but his way is blocked by three beasts: a leopard, a lion, 
and a she-wolf. These beasts are, allegorically, his own sins that he is not 
yet quite ready to give up, things that he cannot quite convince himself are 
really evil. Similarly, Hi has to confront his own outlaw ways, which have 
been at the core of his identity. In some sense, he knows that he has to give 
up those ways, but in another sense, he does not know that at all and really 
wants to hold on to those parts of himself. That is part of the conflict within 
himself that Hi has to work through during the course of the movie. When 
Hi does manage to work through some of his issues, these two emissaries 
from his unconscious go back down into the dark hole from which they 
escaped. We are never completely free of those desires we once nurtured 
but now suppress, but we can keep them in a prison so that they never see 
the light of day.
The prison escape is also a kind of a joke. Their emergence from a vis-
cous hole in the ground looks a lot like birth. As Gale explains in Hi and 
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Ed’s living room, “We don’t always smell like this, Miz McDunnough. I was 
just explainin’ to yer better half here that when we were tunnelin’ out we 
hit the main sewer,” which is a lot like what William Butler Yeats has Crazy 
Jane say to the Bishop in the poem “Crazy Jane and the Bishop”: “Love has 
pitched his mansion in / The place of excrement.”19 Life is a weird, messy 
business, and there is just no getting around that fact. Wisdom has to do 
with coming to grips with the messiness of it, the way it does not always go 
the way we would want it to go.
For Hi, something begins in that flash of light in which he first sees Ed, 
but that something takes an additional turn when Hi begins to process the 
remark by the prison counselor (Peter Benedek) about most people having 
a family at their age, that sets Hi to musing, then dreaming, then acting 
on an idea based on that remark. The hardest part of acting freely, if this is 
what freedom is, is staying true to one’s original choice, remaining faith-
ful, as Badiou says, to the event. The over-determining forces that would 
direct us along more predictable routes, including our own habits, do not 
suddenly vanish. On the contrary, they kick in with more force than ever. 
That is what Dante is talking about when he describes the three beasts that 
suddenly appear just as he tries to set off on a new direction in his life. The 
beasts overwhelm his resolve, and it is only with the intercessionary help of 
Virgil that he can go on. Hi will find himself driving past convenience stores 
on the way home from work, and, like Dante, he will find it too difficult to 
resist this particular beast in his own soul.
Andrew Pulver, writing for the Guardian about an encounter with Joel 
and Ethan Coen, identifies a passage from Ethan’s book of stories, Gates of 
Eden, that Pulver suggests may have some biographical relevance but, in any 
event, does seem to tie in to a recurring theme in the Coen brothers’ movies. 
In the story “I Killed Phil Shapiro” there is a summer camp director, Rabbi 
Sam, who says, as words of welcome to the new camp recruits, “If You Will 
It, It Is No Dream.”20 As Pulver mentions, this phrase occurs in The Big Leb-
owski (1998) when Walter (John Goodman) says to the Dude (Jeff Bridges), 
attributing it to Theodor Herzl, “If you will it, Dude, it is no dream.”21 This 
phrase captures the central metaphysical and narrative tension of Raising 
Arizona, which has to do with what is a dream and what is reality: are the 
two separable, or are they, somehow, intimately related?
To paraphrase Delmore Schwartz, reality begins in dreams. That is, in-
sofar as our reality is to be really ours, is to be a reality of our own choosing 
rather than what simply happens to us, then it will begin for us as an event 
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to which we will remain faithful. The act will have consequences, and those 
consequences will entail responsibilities. Our freedom, somewhat ironically, 
will depend on our being true to, upholding, our responsibilities. This strict 
notion of being responsible, however, is ameliorated by the fact that these 
responsibilities are our responsibilities, that is, our own chosen responsibili-
ties, rather than inauthentic responsibilities that are imposed upon us by 
others or by the system at large.
The Uses and Abuses of America
Raising Arizona does present a fairly piquant critique of America. The 
Pampers-stealing, gun-blasting, dog-chasing sequence is, for me, one of the 
funniest pieces in the whole movie. It is so funny to me, in part, because 
it captures something of the wild craziness of life in America, the way that 
the simplest acts, like getting something from the store, can become a kind 
of race for one’s life. It is also so funny to me because of the way it picks up 
on a particular fear that I have about my fellow Americans and their (our) 
love of guns and violence and their (our) desire to shoot and destroy things. 
The store clerk, his mouth full of braces, has a mad gleam in his eye at the 
opportunity to pull out the shotgun and start blasting away. The cops behave 
in the same way. Even the neighborhood dogs seem to pick up the scent of 
bloodlust and get into the chase.
All of this, also, reflects something deep in the nature of capitalism, 
which is at the very core of our democracy. Capitalism does foster a kind of 
Hobbesian war of all against all. On the surface all of us are (mostly) very 
polite and cooperative, but there is a kind of cutthroat competitiveness that 
lurks just below the surface and is deeply imbued in the spirit of capitalism 
itself. The Arizona family reflects many of the features of capitalism. Nathan 
Arizona’s (Trey Wilson) relentless commitment to selling himself and his 
furniture is a paradigm of what it takes to be successful in a capitalistic sys-
tem. The irony of his oft-repeated claim, “And if you can find lower prices 
anywhere my name ain’t Nathan Arizona!” is, of course, that his name ain’t 
Nathan Arizona, or it wasn’t before he changed it, so I guess it is Nathan 
Arizona but, as it were, barely, which does put kind of a spin on his famous 
claim for his prices.
Nathan Arizona is an example of someone who has literally created 
his own identity out of his own dreams of what he wanted to be. I would 
say that what he wants to be seems a little shallow, and this is part of the 
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movie’s critique of America and American life, but he has been remarkably 
successful at achieving it. Clearly, to achieve his dream he has had to adopt a 
basically antagonistic stance with respect to virtually everyone around him. 
As he says, “My motto is do it my way or watch your butt!” It is an excellent, 
even a necessary, motto for being a successful capitalist, although it’s less 
good for making friends. Nathan’s relationship with his wife seems to lack 
all intimacy, but we learn that there is a little more to Nathan Arizona than 
just pure capitalist.
There is a kind of fairness to capitalism and a kind of unfairness. There 
is a sense in which those who are willing to devote themselves to accumula-
tion deserve what they manage to accumulate. There is also a sense that in 
capitalism, some have much more than they need or deserve. The balance 
between these two notions associated with capitalism, of its fairness and its 
unfairness, is difficult to parse. Certainly, Hi and Ed feel the unjust side of it 
and decide to act to right it. Their act is a kind of underground socialism, a 
redistribution of the wealth from those with a surfeit to those with a dearth. 
Political scientists often remark that America has never had a really viable 
socialist movement, not, at least, in the ways Europe has. There are various 
speculations about why that is so. I see Raising Arizona as, as it were, raising 
the question of socialism and then turning in an ambiguous answer. The 
movie makes the idea of kidnapping another couple’s child seem almost 
reasonable, almost a fair redistribution of wealth, and yet it really does not 
work out for anyone.
The Double Plotline or: The Good of the Bad
Dante’s Commedia, much like Augustine’s Confessions, can be described as 
having a double plotline. That is, one could diagram the narrative of these 
works in either of two ways. The first way would be in the shape of a check 
mark, that is, the first part of the narrative seems to be a descent, but then, 
at the crucial turning point, there is a turn for the better and that would be 
shown as an ascending line. That is the structure of a comedy in the classic 
sense. The other way of diagramming such a narrative, however, would be 
as simply an ascending line because the subsequent ascent is completely 
dependent upon the prior descent. This is what Augustine means when he 
refers to “felix culpa” (happy or fortunate sin). That is, in the case of Augus-
tine, for example, he would not have reached his spiritual enlightenment if 
he had not fully experienced the degradation of his sin, so his sin was a great 
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gift, a great boon to him. Dante has to descend through hell, the Inferno, 
because it is only by seeing it that he will be able to understand Heaven. So it 
is not just that the good comes after the bad but that the good is completely 
dependent on the experience of the bad.
Hi and Ed unquestionably experience a narrative descent. Their hopes 
for having a family are dashed. They have lost their jobs. Even their marriage 
seems to be in danger. And yet, they have become real people, something 
that neither really was at the beginning of the film. At the end of the movie 
they are complex enough to see how complex the pursuit of happiness is, 
they are complex enough to understand other people’s pain and loss—even 
if those people do have a lot of babies already. To get to the way of thinking 
and feeling that leads Ed and Hi to return Nathan Jr. is an achievement, 
one that could not have been attained without all of the difficulties of their 
descent. Nathan Arizona, the unregenerate huckster and über-capitalist, 
reveals a surprising tenderness toward his returned son, toward Ed and 
Hi, and, most surprising of all somehow, toward his wife, Florence (Lynne 
Dumin Kitei). It is in this tenderness that I see the authentic aspiration of 
America, and maybe that is not just an American thing.
The real goal is not about money or fertility so much as about achiev-
ing this tenderness toward others. It may be that such tenderness can be 
achieved only through suffering and loss. Nathan Arizona expresses his 
feelings of tenderness for his wife in terms of his fear of losing her and sug-
gests that Hi and Ed may yet discover such tenderness for each other and 
that they “should sleep on it” before they do anything rash like breaking up 
their marriage. I take it that they do sleep on it and that Hi’s final dream is 
a dream of the tenderness made manifest in the world, specifically in Utah, 
the state above Arizona.
The Uberty of Liberty
There is some question about whether America really is exceptional and 
about the value of thinking about ourselves as exceptional. If there is some-
thing exceptional about us, it seems to me that it would have to do with 
the way we think of ourselves as being free, as having a right to our own 
opinions, as being both free to develop ourselves into the selves we want 
to be and responsible for what we become. It is quite true that, as a cynic 
might insist, many in America do not really have much freedom to develop 
themselves into anything other than what they were born to, that the idea 
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that we are “free” in America, that this is a “free country,” is a myth and a 
harmful one at that. Without denying that, I still want to say that there is a 
freedom that is not just granted, but in some sense honored, in America, 
and that is the freedom to dream.
“Uberty” is a somewhat archaic word for fruitfulness, for something that 
generates growth and abundance. The freedom merely to dream is, in one 
sense, no real freedom at all, but in another sense, in this philosophical sense 
in which any authentic choice must begin in something like a dream, then 
the freedom to dream is the only kind of real liberty that there is. Ultimate 
happiness may depend less on how much money we accumulate and more 
on having a sense that our life is our own life, that we have lived a life in 
which we have made some choices and lived according to the consequences 
of those choices. To accept responsibility for the consequences of our choices 
and actions is what makes us fully human, and it is what makes us tender. 
If there is any truth in that, then the stuff of comedy, the material to make 
the ends of our lives better than the beginnings, may be as accessible as our 
dreams. The most important thing, then, is to keep dreaming, and that is 
precisely what Hi is doing at the end of Raising Arizona, making it, in my 
estimation, a comedy not only because it is funny but also because it holds 
out the possibility, in the classic sense, that we can make our end better than 
our beginning. We can laugh in welcoming, like Plato’s philosophers, the 
new recruits to the realm of tenderness for each other. As Walter says in The 
Big Lebowski, “If you will it, Dude, it is no dream.”
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the human comedy 
PerPetuates Itself
Nihilism and Comedy in Coen Neo-Noir
Thomas S. Hibbs
Bunny Lebowski: Ulli doesn’t care about anything. He’s a nihilist.
The Dude: Ah. Must be exhausting.
—The Big Lebowski (1998)
From their inaugural film, Blood Simple (1984), through the film blanc 
Fargo (1996), to The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001), the Coen brothers have 
exhibited a preoccupation with the themes, characters, and stylistic tech-
niques of film noir. By the time they made Blood Simple in 1984, neo-noir 
was already established as a recognized category of film.1 Prior to Quentin 
Tarantino’s darkly comedic unraveling of noir motifs in Reservoir Dogs (1992) 
and Pulp Fiction (1994), the Coens were already making consciously comic 
use of noir plots and stylistic techniques. Lacking Tarantino’s penchant for 
hyperactive and culturally claustrophobic allusions to pop culture, the Coens 
focus, instead, on traditional noir character types and intricate plots whose 
complexity is bizarre.
Because it is so often characterized by self-conscious deployment of 
the techniques of classic noir, neo-noir evinces a strong inclination toward 
pastiche and the satiric. This makes comic themes more at home in the world 
of neo-noir than they were in the founding era of noir. Classic noir avoids 
overt moral lessons and leaves little room for well-adjusted, happy, virtuous 
types of Americans. The world of classic noir proffers a “disturbing vision . . . 
that qualifies all hope and suggests a potentially fatal vulnerability” against 
which no one is adequately protected.2 Classic noir has deeply democratic 
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instincts: no one wins because the unforgiving laws of the human condition 
apply universally to every individual. The grim pessimism of classic noir 
is hardly congenial to the sorts of comic films that flourished in America 
during the same time period.
This does not mean, however, that comedy is utterly alien to classic 
noir. The depiction of characters as trapped in a labyrinth at the mercy of 
a hostile fate can transform the tone of the action from the gravely tragic 
to the absurdly comic. What initially seems serious and ominous can, over 
time, come to seem humorous. Angst and fear can be sustained for only so 
long; endless and pointless terror becomes predictable and laughable. But 
the shift to a comic perspective involves more than the mere passage of time; 
comedy is more than tragedy plus time. What matters is the passage of time 
without any prospect of hope or intelligibility. Life in an absurd universe is 
rife with comic possibilities. Struggle and striving begin to appear superflu-
ous and foolish. A classic noir film such as Detour (Edgar G. Ulmer, 1945) 
toys with its main character to such an extent that his continued gravity 
can come to seem a self-inflicted farce. Similarly, the degradation of affec-
tion—the perverse erotic attractions in which noir often wallows—lends 
itself to wry, detached irony, the dominant tone in Sunset Boulevard (Billy 
Wilder, 1950).
The baroque sensibility of noir has always contained the seeds of stylistic 
excess, even of the celebration of style for its own sake. In neo-noir, the accen-
tuation of hopelessness and the overtly self-conscious deployment of artistic 
technique make the turn to dark comedy nearly inevitable. By contrast with 
classic noir films, whose style is reserved and less self-conscious, neo-noirs 
almost inevitably draw attention to their style, going so far in some cases 
as to make style itself the subject of the film. In the very act of recognizing 
the artifice, we are in on the joke, on the sleight of hand performed by the 
filmmaker. The result is amusement, even laughter.
As Foster Hirsch points out, one of the distinguishing features of neo-
noir is a “cavalier amorality” that can steep viewers in a “depraved point of 
view.”3 Jean-Pierre Chartier’s early and negative reaction to noir seems to 
apply more aptly to certain neo-noir films. Chartier lamented noir’s “pes-
simism and disgust toward humanity.” Devoid of even the most “fleeting 
image of love” or of characters who might “rouse our pity or sympathy,” 
noir, he felt, presents “monsters, criminals whose evils nothing can ex-
cuse, whose actions imply that the only source for the fatality of evil is in 
themselves.”4
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Nietzsche and Nihilism
There are, then, important links between neo-noir and nihilism. According 
to its most trenchant analysts, nihilism involves the dissolution of standards 
of judgment; for the nihilist, there is no longer any basis for distinguishing 
truth from falsity, good from evil, noble from base action, or higher from 
lower ways of life. Nietzsche thought that nihilism would be the defining 
characteristic of the twentieth century, an epoch in which “the highest val-
ues” would “devalue themselves” and the “question ‘why?’” would find “no 
answer.”5 Nietzsche is most famous for proclaiming the death of God. He 
certainly does not mean that a previously existing supreme being has sud-
denly expired; instead, he holds that the notion of God, created by humans to 
serve a variety of needs, is becoming increasingly less credible. But Nietzsche 
does not limit the effects of nihilism to religion; nihilism undermines all tran-
scendent claims and standards, including those underlying modern science 
and democratic politics. The great questions and animating visions—those 
regarding truth, justice, love, and beauty—that previously gave shape and 
purpose to human life no longer resonate in the human soul. All moral codes 
are seen to be merely conventional and, hence, optional.
For most human beings, decline, diminution, and despair accompany 
nihilism. The bulk of humanity falls into the category of the last man: “Alas, 
the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able 
to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. What is love? What 
is a star? Thus asks the last man and blinks. The earth has become small 
and on it hops the last man who makes everything small.” The contented, 
petty last men create a society that is ruthlessly homogeneous (“everybody 
wants the same, everybody is the same”) and addicted to physical comfort 
(“one has one’s little pleasure for the day and one’s little pleasure for the 
night; one has a regard for health”).6 These are the passive nihilists, the 
pessimists, the representatives of “the decline and recession of the power 
of the spirit.”7
But nihilism is “ambiguous.” If, in one sense, nihilism is the “unwelcome 
guest,” it is also an opportunity, clearing a path for “increased power of the 
spirit.”8 Active nihilists see the decline of traditional moral and religious 
systems as an occasion for the thoroughgoing destruction of desiccated 
ways of life and the creation of a new order of values. Active nihilists, the 
philosopher-artists of the future, will engage in the “transvaluation of values.” 
They stand beyond good and evil and engage in aesthetic self-creation, a 
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project that is an affront to society’s religious and democratic conventions, 
rooted, as they are, in moral absolutes or democratic consensus.
At times, Nietzsche’s remedy for the nihilistic epoch, his path beyond 
nihilism, promotes a particularly virulent form of aristocracy. As he puts it 
frankly in the chapter “What Is Noble?” in Beyond Good and Evil,
Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of 
an aristocratic society—and so it will be again and again—a society 
that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences 
in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some 
sense or another. With that pathos of distance that grows out of the 
ingrained difference between strata . . . keeping down and keeping at 
a distance, that other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown 
up either—the craving for an ever new widening of distances within 
the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rare, more remote, 
further-stretching, more comprehensive states . . . the continual 
“self-overcoming of man.”9
What Nietzsche calls the pathos of distance is at work in a variety of neo-noir 
dramas, from Body Heat (Lawrence Kasdan, 1981) and Cape Fear (Martin 
Scorsese, 1991) and Basic Instinct (Paul Verhoeven, 1992) to The Usual Sus-
pects (Bryan Singer, 1995).10 In these neo-noir films, certain characters rise 
above the noir labyrinth, not by passing through it or learning to navigate 
its shifting waters but by acts of diabolical will. Impervious to the laws of the 
human condition, these characters get away with lives of criminality. This 
shift constitutes a movement in the direction of nihilism and a recoiling 
from the fundamentally democratic world of classic noir. The human con-
dition is no longer universal; the noir trap is no longer seen as an indelible 
feature. Instead, it constrains only those who lack the willpower, or will to 
power, necessary to rise above, and control, conventions. Neo-noir’s greatest 
departure from classic noir consists in a turn to aristocratic nihilism. The 
most resourceful of these characters are in control of the noir plot, using 
their cunning and artistry to ensnare others. Were it not so cumbersome, 
we might call this the nihilistic myth of the American super-antihero.
Nihilistic comedy has no limits on the targets of its humor; it turns the 
most atrocious of human acts—rape and beating in Cape Fear, cannibal-
ism in The Silence of the Lambs (Jonathan Demme, 1991), and maiming in 
Reservoir Dogs—into quasi-comic expressions of exuberant amoral energy. 
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It mocks our longing for justice, for the protection of the innocent and the 
punishment of the heinous criminal, and for truth and understanding. The 
comic unraveling of the horror genre from within begins with the celebration 
of the evil antihero as beyond good and evil, as more interesting, attractive, 
and complex than the purportedly good characters in a story. Once this 
nihilistic move has been made, it is quite natural to repudiate and mock 
properly human longing for justice, truth, and love. Nihilism, as Nietzsche 
saw, entails the diminution of human aspiration to the vanishing point; it 
involves the death of man.
These are the consequences of the nihilistic turn in neo-noir, which 
repudiates justice, love, and truth in favor of aesthetic self-creation. Criti-
cisms of conventional conceptions of justice, truth, and other ideals are not 
necessarily nihilistic. Indeed, the very notion of a critique presupposes that 
one has, implicitly at least, an awareness that things are not as they should 
be, that it would be better for things to be otherwise. As Shakespeare writes 
in King Lear, “This is not the worst, so long as we can say ‘this is the worst’” 
(4.1). But thoroughgoing nihilism eviscerates any such standards or, what 
is more to the point, even the intelligibility of the quest for such standards. 
Gravity cannot be sustained. Audiences are entertained by the demonic 
superheroes who put on a good show and are much more clever and wittier 
than other, conventional characters. A character such as Hannibal Lecter 
(Anthony Hopkins) in The Silence of the Lambs is at first terrifying, then 
entertaining, and finally humorous as, in the film’s final frames, he responds 
to a question as to his plans by saying, wryly, that he’ll be having an old 
friend for dinner.
Noir, Nihilism, and Comedy in The Big Lebowski
The comic denouement of The Silence of the Lambs signals the unraveling 
of the hero genre from within, a point driven home with great gusto in 
such spoofs of the genre as Scream (Wes Craven, 1996) and Scary Movie 
(Keenan Ivory Wayans, 2000) and their sequels. If the gravity of the quest 
to understand and fend off evil produces no great insight about good or 
evil, just the surface aesthetics of the evildoer, then the audience, having 
become jaded, anticipates the aesthetics of evil and sees the whole drama 
as a farce. There is, thus, an opening for a democratic rejoinder to the sort 
of angst-ridden nihilism that celebrates the tragic heroism of the loner who 
faces the meaninglessness of life with gravity. The democratic and comic 
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response is: Why bother? What’s all the fuss about? If there is no meaning, 
then why get worked up about anything? And what, in a pointless universe, 
could possibly provide a basis for distinguishing, as Nietzsche wants to, be-
tween noble and base ways of facing the abyss? This sort of comedy mocks 
radicals of all sorts, whether they be nihilists or zealous reformers. Such is 
the inspiration for the Coen brothers’ comic leveling of nihilism in The Big 
Lebowski (1998).
The Big Lebowski begins and ends with the noir commonplace: voice-
over narration. As a tumbleweed blows down the streets of Los Angeles and 
over a beach, the narrator introduces “the Dude,” a name no one else would 
“self-apply.” “Our story,” he relates, is set in the early 1990s, at the time of 
our national “conflict with Saddam and the Iraqis.” Sometimes, the narrator 
continues, “a man is, I won’t say a hero, but sometimes a man is just right for 
his time and place.” That man is the Dude, the “laziest man in LA County,” 
an achievement that puts him high in the “running for laziest worldwide.” 
The camera turns to the Dude, wearing shorts and a bathrobe and shopping 
for groceries. A television in the store plays President George H. W. Bush’s 
speech about the Iraqi threat: “This aggression will not stand.”
Later that day, the Dude is attacked at home by intruders who call him 
Lebowski, stuff his head in the toilet, and demand that he repay the money 
his wife owes Jackie Treehorn. A perplexed Dude objects that no one calls 
him Lebowski and that he’s not married—gesturing to the raised toilet seat 
as confirming evidence. The intruders suddenly come to their senses and 
one of them asks, “Isn’t this guy supposed to be a millionaire?” In a parting 
gesture, they urinate on the rug—an act of defilement that the Dude regrets 
because “that rug really tied the room together.”
These opening scenes introduce readily identifiable neo-noir themes. 
There is the theme of the loner, certainly not the hero of the old westerns, 
but rather the uprooted drifter, symbolized in the tumbleweed blown by 
chance forces beyond its control or comprehension. Then there is the motif 
of a shallow and artificially constructed political culture, suggested in the 
television coverage of the Gulf War. As we shall see, the film replays 1960s 
themes of the establishment versus the antiestablishment, especially in the 
contrast between the two Lebowskis. Finally, there is the noir staple of the 
“wrong man,” the chance misidentification of an ordinary man as a culprit 
or criminal of some sort, a misidentification that sparks a series of trials on 
the part of the wrongly accused. Comic incongruity arises from the theme 
of the wrong man and from the repeated presence of the Dude in settings 
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where he clearly does not belong, what the Coens call the anachronism of 
incompatibility.
The Dude’s social life revolves around bowling with his friends Walter 
(John Goodman), a Vietnam vet and recent convert to Judaism, and Donny 
(Steve Buscemi), a pleasant, shy follower. Learning about the intruders, 
Walter insists that the issue is not the rug but the other Jeff Lebowski, whom 
the men were after. The Dude decides to visit the Big Lebowski (David Hud-
dleston), a man confined to a wheelchair as a result of injuries suffered in 
the Korean War. When the Dude asks for remuneration for his destroyed 
rug and proclaims, “This aggression will not stand,” Lebowski taunts him, 
saying that, when he lost his legs in Korea, he did not ask for a handout. 
He “went out and achieved”: “Your revolution is over. The bums lost.” Soon 
after this encounter, a humbled and weepy Lebowski invites the Dude back 
to the house and shows him a ransom note, indicating that his wife, Bunny, 
has been kidnapped. The Dude takes a drag off his joint and says, “Bum-
mer, man.” Lebowski offers the Dude twenty thousand dollars and his own 
beeper to act as a courier. An incredulous Dude asks Lebowski’s assistant, 
“He thinks the carpet pissers did this?”
Throughout much of the film, someone in a blue car follows the Dude. 
Late in the film, he runs up to the car and yanks out the driver, who explains 
that he is a “private dick,” working on the same case as the one the Dude’s 
working on. He then admits fawningly, “I admire your work. The way you 
play one side against the other.” Here, the Dude once again plays the wrong 
man role; this time he is misidentified as a professional, a private detective 
with the knowledge and cleverness to manipulate human character types 
for his own ends.
This is, of course, a complete illusion; to underscore the Dude’s impo-
tence, the Coens immediately shift to a scene in which a group of Germans 
break into his apartment and find him in his bathtub. As he complains that 
this is a “private residence,” they drop a marmot into the tub just between 
his legs and announce, “We want the money. We believe in nothing. If we 
don’t get the money, we will come back tomorrow and cut off your johnson.” 
Walter shares the Dude’s dislocation, but he, unlike the Dude, is troubled 
by his rootlessness. The Dude is often irked at Walter’s strange Jewish devo-
tion. When the Dude accuses him of living in the past, Walter responds, 
“Three thousand years of beautiful tradition from Moses to Sandy Koufax, 
you’re goddamn right I’m living in the fucking past!” Walter wants to have 
an identity, to define himself in relation to a way of life, a tradition larger 
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than himself. How badly he wants this is clear from his willingness to rate 
National Socialism above nihilism on the “ethos” scale. Yet his own embrace 
of Judaism, a result of his marriage to a Jewish woman from whom he is 
now divorced, serves to underscore the absurdity of attempting to intro-
duce an ethos into a fragmented contemporary culture. His Judaism is an 
incoherent mixture of various elements, dislocated from contexts in which 
they originally may have made a kind of sense. Walter ranks bowling on 
about the same level as his religious devotion. Concerned about the Dude’s 
preoccupation with the case of the missing wife, Walter exclaims, “We can’t 
drag this negative energy into the tournament.”
Without any direct contribution from the Dude, the case wraps up nicely. 
It turns out that Bunny was just on an unannounced vacation. Outside the 
bowling alley, the Germans, who think that Bunny is still missing, torch 
the Dude’s car and demand money, claiming that, if they are not paid, they 
will kill Bunny. A timid Donny asks: “Are these the Nazis?” Walter replies, 
“No, these men are nihilists. There’s nothing to be afraid of. . . . These men 
are cowards.” When the Dude tells them that Bunny is alive and there will 
be no financial transaction, one of the Germans complains, “It’s not fair.” 
Walter taunts them: “Fair? Who’s the fucking nihilist here? What are you, 
a bunch of fucking crybabies?” In the ensuing conflict, Donny has a heart 
attack and dies.
Walter here puts his finger on the problem of self-described nihilists 
and of the incompatibility between nihilism and human life, no matter how 
debased. Nihilism cannot, strictly speaking, be lived. An utterly amorphous 
and completely pointless life would deprive an individual not just of any 
inspiring sense of purpose but even of the basis for deliberating and pursu-
ing anything whatsoever. Moreover, everyone complains about something, 
and this is rooted in some sense, however misguided and self-interested, 
of injustice or wrongs suffered. Full-blown nihilism cannot be lived; it can 
only be approached asymptotically.
Although the Dude is not foolish enough to proclaim himself a nihil-
ist, his life borders on nihilism. He is skeptical of large-scale beliefs such as 
those to which Walter assents. He does not need an ethos, except insofar as 
that is mere style, which is about what the Jewish religion is for Walter. But 
the Dude has beliefs. He believes, for example, in private property, at least 
for himself. He thinks of himself as a respectable citizen; he is a low-class, 
minimally ambitious version of what the social critic David Brooks has 
called a Bobo, a bourgeois bohemian, someone who combines elements of 
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1960s counterculture with degrees of bourgeois conformity and standards 
of success.11 Brooks’s new social standard–bearers are much more bourgeois 
than bohemian; inversely, the Dude is more bohemian than bourgeois. He 
is little concerned with societal standards of success and insouciantly repu-
diates the work ethic. But, like Walter, he is also passionate about bowling 
and is deeply concerned with how his team will perform in the upcoming 
competition.
The Dude accepts the basic absurdity of the cosmos, of life in the most 
advanced civilization ever to grace the face of the earth. His way of life af-
firms the equal significance or insignificance of all human endeavors, but 
none of this stops him from judging certain things to be unseemly. The 
Dude has not so much an ethos as a style, a way of taking it easy, living 
lightly. Despite his lack of conscious planning and his absence of ambition, 
he manages to contribute to ongoing natural processes. At one point, he 
has sex with Maude, the Big Lebowski’s libidinous and artistically rebellious 
daughter. Afterward, she asks a number of questions about his life and his 
habits of recreation. The zenith of his life was organizing campus protests 
in the 1960s; his recreation consists in car cruising and the occasional acid 
flashback. He gets out of bed and notices that Maude remains on her back 
cradling her legs, a strategy designed to increase the chances of conception. 
“What did you think this was all about?” she asks. When he expresses wor-
ries about the responsibilities of fatherhood, she explains that a deadbeat 
dad is exactly what she wants.
The Dude is a kind of comic hero, at least for our narrator (Sam Elliott), 
who shows up onscreen in the final scene at the bowling alley, where he and 
the Dude exchange pleasantries. The cowboy matter-of-factly reiterates the 
Dude’s own self-referential proclamation, “The Dude abides,” and offers 
some reflective, concluding observations:
The Dude abides. I don’t know about you, but I take comfort in that. 
It’s good knowin’ he’s out there, the Dude, takin’ her easy for all us 
sinners. Shoosh. I sure hope he makes the finals. Welp, that about 
does her, wraps her all up. Things seem to’ve worked out pretty good 
for the Dude ’n’ Walter, and it was a purt good story, dontcha think? 
Made me laugh to beat the band. Parts, anyway. Course—I didn’t 
like seein’ Donny go. But then, happen to know that there’s a little 
Lebowski on the way. I guess that’s the way the whole durned human 
comedy keeps perpetuatin’ itself, down through the generations, 
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westward the wagons, across the sands a time until—aw, look at me, 
I’m ramblin’ again. Wal, uh hope you folks enjoyed yourselves.
The Dude’s abiding signals an escape, or at least a reprieve, from the world 
of noir; in spite of the threats to his life, the Dude emerges from the noir 
plot, from its labyrinth, unscathed. The tone of the ending, the sugges-
tion that the human comedy perpetuates itself through the ongoing birth 
of new humans, strikes a comic note different from that of mere satire or 
denunciatory cynicism. Here, the impulses and resources of nature toward 
reproduction and survival are seen as more powerful than the destructive 
forces of noir. As Pascal puts it (a sentiment later stolen by Hume), “Nature 
backs up helpless reason and stops it going so wildly astray.”12
Basic Familial Instincts in Coen Comedy
As one critic has noted, The Big Lebowski is about “friendship and surrogate 
families.”13 This strikes a note of comic affirmation absent in even the most 
complex noir films, wherein the family is nearly always a source of the noir 
trap, and marriages and the begetting of children provide no way out. If 
surrogate families are at the heart of The Big Lebowski, real families figure 
prominently in other Coen films, especially in the brothers’ most critically 
acclaimed neo-noir, Fargo. With a plot akin to that of A Simple Plan (Sam 
Raimi, 1998), Fargo features criminals undone by their own futile, criminal 
plans. The characters are blood simple, a phrase that the Coens borrowed 
from Dashiell Hammett, who borrowed it from police talk to describe the 
way criminals lose control of full rationality at the moment of committing 
the crime and, thus, inevitably leave incriminating clues behind. Apparently 
cold and calculating, they nonetheless act without adequate foresight; the 
consequences of their acts quickly swirl out of control. Called a film blanc 
because of the near-whiteout conditions that prevail in the film’s setting in 
the plains of North Dakota, Fargo features criminals who suffer “snow blind-
ness,” the self-deceiving illusion of infallibility.14 As in Blood Simple, here 
too criminals are subject to a comedy of errors. Yet Fargo is a very different 
film from Blood Simple; it inscribes the comedy of criminal error within 
a more traditional structure of the detective who affirms the goodness of 
conventional mores, a married and pregnant female detective named Marge 
Gunderson (Frances McDormand in an Oscar-winning performance).
In the final scenes of Fargo, Marge’s role as commentator eclipses in 
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significance her role as investigator. Indeed, the criminals seem destined 
to destroy themselves. Marge’s comments about her expected baby affirm 
a certain way of life as making sense, as bearing fruit, and as something 
worth preserving and handing on to the next generation. Her domestic life 
is void of the sort of calculating, radically individualist spirit that infects 
the families of the criminals in the film and the typical families that inhabit 
other noir films.
Despite its gruesome violence and somber tone, Fargo’s conclusion calls 
to mind certain features of classical comedy, which often ends with a wed-
ding, an affirmation of order, especially of the marital bond as the cornerstone 
of hope in society. Affirming the reasonableness of conventions, classical 
comedy mocks radicals—be they criminals or well-intentioned reformers. 
Marge does not seek deeper meaning beneath the surface; committed to a 
conventional understanding of justice, she is not on a great quest to discern 
the nature and causes of evil. The causes, if there are any discernible (greed 
for a “little bit of money”), are readily available on the surface of criminal 
action; yet, given the risks, the cost, and the affront to natural goodness 
(“It’s a beautiful day”), evil remains inexplicable: “I just don’t understand 
it.” Marge witnesses at close range the noir trap of criminality, but it does 
not destroy her—or even tempt her.
In a review of Fargo entitled “The Banality of Virtue,” Laura Miller 
observes the “dullness of the Midwestern characters” and the essential 
emptiness of their values. She wonders, “In the universe of Fargo, where 
virtue is a kind of ignorance and wickedness a nullity, where do real people 
fit in?”15 Indeed, the Coens’ alternatives to nihilists, the characters who 
avoid entrapment by the noir vices of lust and greed, seem not so much 
virtuous as incapable of the complexities of vice. They seem to suffer from 
a sort of Forrest Gump syndrome, a sort of banality of goodness, a strange 
and comic counterpoint to Hannah Arendt’s famous thesis concerning the 
banality of evil.16 If this line of interpretation were correct, then we might 
see the substance, or lack thereof, in the Coens’ films as a “knowing, highly 
allusive” form of filmmaking that is no more than “pastiche.”17
Yet the gentle levity with which the Coens treat these characters and 
the way the characters embody natural tendencies, which they cannot 
themselves articulate, suggest the presence of something more than mere 
banality. Foster Hirsch, for example, describes McDormand’s character as 
“a cockeyed optimist, wide-eyed but hardly stupid.”18 Indeed, the inter-
weaving of comedy and fertility harks back to pagan and Shakespearean 
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comedy, with the celebration of rites of fertility and marriage, of an order 
of nature that overcomes human vice and frailty and reconciles opposing 
forces and conflicting wills. No such complete reconciliation is possible in 
neo-noir, not even in the Coens’ comic neo-noir. Yet the Coens’ penchant 
for presenting fertility and, in some films, familial fidelity as ways of avoid-
ing entanglement in the noir traps of lust and greed points in the direction 
of such comic reconciliation.
The themes of family and procreation are the preeminent issues in the 
Coens’ early pure comedy, Raising Arizona (1987), the story of a recidivist 
petty thief, Hi (Nicolas Cage), and a female prison guard, Ed (Holly Hunter). 
Over a number of years and many return trips to prison, Hi falls in love with 
Ed, and she accepts his proposal of marriage. The film includes a number of 
noir themes—crime, repetition, entrapment, and the spoiling of the future 
by deeds committed in the past. Yet here those noir themes are, ultimately, 
inscribed within an overarching comic structure that contains both the 
theme of fertility and that of hopeful reconciliation. Throughout much of the 
film, Hi appears incapable of learning or altering his behavior. He admits in 
a voice-over that he is not sure where folks stand on the incarceration issue, 
whether it is about rehabilitation or just revenge. As we watch him being 
arrested yet again, he comments that he has begun to believe that revenge 
is the only possibility that makes any sense.
His marriage to Ed seems to have a salutary effect, at least until Ed is 
diagnosed as barren. Hi comments that her “insides were a rocky place 
where my seed could find no purchase.” Seeing the announcement of the 
birth of the Arizona quints, born to the wealthy Nathan Arizona and his 
wife, Ed suggests that they kidnap one of the boys since the Arizona family 
has more than it can handle. Hi scales a ladder, enters the boys’ bedroom, 
and takes Nathan Jr. In a surprise twist, Hi is the one who cannot live with 
the thought of their deed. His conscience exacts revenge in a dream where 
he is pursued by the “lone biker of the apocalypse,” a vengeful giant of a 
man sporting a tattoo: “Mama Didn’t Love Me.” The tattoo is a whimsical 
statement of the core theme of the film, that familial love is the essence of 
human life. The crimes that Hi and Ed commit are but a perverse pursuit 
of properly human goods, one in which there is a twisted acknowledgment 
of the primacy of familial bonds.
The few noir elements in the film are subordinate to a larger narrative, 
a story of fidelity and the hope for fertility. Hi and Ed eventually come to 
their senses and return the baby. Relieved of their burden of conscience, 
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Hi has another dream, which may, he concedes, have been just wishful 
thinking, a dream of the future in which Nathan Jr. is happy and successful 
and Hi and Ed gather around a dinner table with their numerous offspring. 
What the Coen brothers hint at in a number of their noir films they ex-
plicitly embrace in Raising Arizona: the resilience of human nature’s basic 
instincts, not the instincts for lust and domination of others, but those for 
love, affection, and procreation, instincts that steer human beings toward a 
happy ending, in spite of the damage done and the detours caused by their 
calculative misjudgments.
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PhIlosoPhIes of comedy In  
o Brother, Where art thou?
Douglas McFarland
It is said that upon a visit to Berlin in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II, Groucho Marx was taken to the mound of rubble that had been 
the site of Hitler’s bunker. Groucho stepped out of his jeep and climbed to 
the top of what constituted Hitler’s gravesite, where he unexpectedly pro-
ceeded to dance the Charleston. On one level, the gesture is meant to defy 
evil, to assert the celebration of dance over the horrors of Hitler’s madness, 
to demonstrate the irrepressible energy of the human spirit. Groucho, in 
short, thumbs his nose at the Führer. But his act of irreverence is also the 
staging of a radical and scandalous incongruity. Comedy is, as Kierkegaard 
asserted, “wherever there is contradiction.”1 In this case, the contradiction 
between a 1920s dance step and the perpetrator of the profound atrocity of 
twentieth-century Europe expresses the absurdity of the human condition. 
Groucho’s gesture is ultimately as unsettling as it is liberating.
Within the overarching narrative framework of O Brother, Where Art 
Thou? (2000) the Coen brothers have generated their own complex set of 
comic absurdities. Although it has been called the “least serious” of the Coen 
brothers’ oeuvre, the film is, in fact, one of their most thoughtful. With its 
fast-paced picaresque style and collection of zany characters, the film has 
undoubtedly delighted a wide audience, but its serious themes and at times 
disturbing contradictions also challenge that delight. The film has been 
fruitfully explicated in terms of pastiche, dissonance, and “engaged reinven-
tion,” but the film’s serious comic underpinnings can best be understood 
through the overlapping concepts of the mechanical, the contradictory, 
and the absurd articulated by Henri Bergson and Kierkegaard. According 
to Bergson, we laugh when we see a human as a “set-up mechanism . . . a 
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jointed puppet.”2 For Kierkegaard, the comic represents the unmediated 
contradictions of the human condition, incongruities that defy resolution 
but generate laughter. It is a blend of these perspectives that we experience 
in O Brother, as zany cartoon figures dance like mechanical marionettes 
across a landscape of existential incongruities, at times oblivious to their 
ontological status and at others struggling to resist the rigidity of law and 
the inflexibility of social roles and personal obsessions.
The philosophical explication of comedy runs its own comic risks. From 
Aristophanes to Rabelais and Swift, the scholar has been the natural butt 
and easy target of comedy. The philosopher’s rigid obsession with his or her 
system of thought, a “hobby horse,” as Sterne would put it, is potentially as 
laughable as Ulysses Everett McGill’s (George Clooney) obsession with a 
particular brand of hair pomade. And no doubt, the Coen brothers would 
be amused by my own exegetical method. But my intention is not to impose 
an artificial intellectual category on what is visceral and alive but to provide 
a means to engage the social, ethical, and existential complexities of laughter 
in O Brother, Where Art Thou?
Generic Incongruities
The title of the Coen brothers’ romp through Depression-era America comes 
from Preston Sturges’s film Sullivan’s Travels (1941). O Brother, Where Art 
Thou? is the title of the socially conscious film that Sullivan, after directing 
a series of successful musical comedies, now intends to make. He decides 
to move away from making films similar to Busby Berkeley’s Gold Diggers 
of 935, a celebration of sex, money, and dance, to ones similar to William 
Wellman’s Wild Boys of the Road (1933), an indictment of social inequality, 
economic depravation, and railroad bulls. But after experiencing a trans-
forming epiphany, Sullivan proclaims upon his return to Hollywood that 
there is as much, if not more, value in comedy as there is in working-class 
manifestos. On this “cock-eyed caravan” that we call life, laughter is a neces-
sary tonic for its many trials and tribulations.
The Coen brothers’ film, therefore, immediately confronts its knowledge-
able audience with a generic incongruity. Although the film bears the title 
of the gritty film Sullivan originally intended to make, and indeed it does 
chronicle the travails of those facing economic hardship, social injustice, and 
political corruption, it is also a madcap comedy, perhaps the very comedy 
Sullivan decided to make after returning to Hollywood. We are left with 
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an indecorous hybrid: I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang (Mervyn LeRoy, 
1932) filmed as screwball comedy. Rather than therapeutic, the Coens would 
seem to have made a film that elicits a potentially jarring incongruity. This 
unresolved contradiction in generic perspective provides the ongoing comic 
dynamic of the film. What results is not a traditionally mixed generic form 
such as tragicomedy or pastoral epic but a self-consciously contradictory 
artifact.
The incongruity between comic high jinks and social commentary is 
addressed in an early self-referential scene. Three escapees from a chain 
gang, encumbered by the manacles that fasten them together, are struggling 
to climb aboard a boxcar of a moving train. Ulysses McGill, the apparent 
leader of the group, is first to pull himself up. But at the very moment of his 
triumph, as he pauses to ask if anyone of those already riding the train might 
be a smithy, the chain that binds him to his fellow fugitives tightens, and he 
is suddenly and unceremoniously yanked off the train. Satisfied that he is 
free and mobile, he forgets that he remains chained to his two companions 
and as a result takes a comic pratfall. To put it differently, he remembers 
that he needs a blacksmith’s file to be unshackled, but he concurrently fails 
to remember that he is shackled.
The wide-eyed, exaggerated, and even goofy look on McGill’s face, as 
well as the automated movement of his body as it is jerked down and pulled 
across the floor of the boxcar suggests Bergson’s notion that we laugh when 
we see “something mechanical encrusted on the living.”3 The comic buffoon 
is one who has become a “lifeless automaton.” Bergson’s phenomenological 
understanding of comedy is an outgrowth of the contrast he makes between 
habit and recollection in Matter and Memory. He describes rote learning as 
a habitual type of memory: “Like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored 
up in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, 
in a closed system of automatic movements.”4 The comic figure is one given 
over to the “easy automatism of acquired habits.”5 This renders him a “jointed 
puppet . . . a set up mechanism,” and the “more exactly these two images, 
that of a person and that of a machine, fit into one another, the more strik-
ing is the comic effect.”6
In this context, it is important to note the twofold subtext that informs 
Bergson’s explication of laughter. Written at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, his treatment reflects his perception of a dehumanized culture, one in 
which the individual is increasingly enveloped in modern mechanization. 
This phenomenon was addressed as early as Marx’s Economic and Philosophic 
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Manuscripts of 844 and as late as Charlie Chaplin’s film Modern Times 
(1936). The regulation of labor, aptly depicted by Harold Lloyd in Safety Last 
(Fred Newmeyer, Sam Taylor, 1923), and the bureaucratic configuration of 
mass society, addressed in King Vidor’s The Crowd (1928), render man an 
automaton, not simply oppressed by a machine but transformed into one. 
Bergson’s comic figure, manipulated from the outside as if it were a toy pup-
pet and viewed as a depersonalized caricature, mirrors modern man caught 
up in social conformity, repetitive labor, and psychological habit.
This troubling side of Bergson’s vision is accompanied by the prefigure-
ment of an empowering one. Although Bergson wrote Laughter prior to the 
technological innovations of live-action animation, his understanding of the 
mechanized puppet looks forward to the cartoon figure. But the inherent 
sense of victimization in Bergson’s characterization of the comic is replaced 
in animation by a sense of omnipotence. The flexibility and plasticity, termed 
“plamaticness” by Sergei Eisenstein, of this animated figure suggests an 
almost redemptive quality.7 Its rubbery nature gives it the power to come 
back to life. As Steven Dillon puts it, “Cartoonism gives the impression of 
infinite repeatability. Cartoons tend to be serial, not singular. The cartoon 
world is cornucopian, overflowing, not empty.”8 This explains why an audi-
ence is not threatened by cartoon violence. Toons bounce back, immune 
from the physical violence perpetrated against them.
Both victimization and empowerment inform the opening scene on the 
train in O Brother. As I point out above, the freedom and autonomy that 
McGill believes he has attained once having pulled himself up onto the mov-
ing train is quickly proven to be not simply ephemeral but self-deceiving. 
McGill is a mere toy, not necessarily in the hands of modernity, but of the 
Mississippi state penal system. The chains, which bind the three prisoners 
together, are controlled by an external force, a puppet master who in this 
scene doesn’t simply limit their movement but controls it as well. Although 
the sense of unease, of the innate cruelty of a certain form of comedy, at this 
particular moment remains enveloped in a comic pratfall, it nevertheless 
runs throughout the film with varying degrees of emphasis.
What I have referred to as cartoon empowerment enters the scene in a 
much more subtle manner and through a self-reflexive device. Once McGill 
has climbed on board and pulls himself up, he peers into the recess of the car 
and perceives a group of men huddled together. It is from this group that he 
seeks a smithy. The scene sets up certain expectations in the audience. It is 
of a type that moviegoers would have seen before in films ranging from the 
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aforementioned Wild Boys of the Road to Hal Ashby’s Bound for Glory (1976) 
and Clint Eastwood’s The Gauntlet (1977), as well as countless other “road” 
pictures. The audience anticipates that McGill will discover a marginalized 
group of men and women, perhaps even sentimentalized as in a Frank Capra 
film, who will welcome McGill with the camaraderie of the road, or a group 
who will throw him off the train, hardened by their failures and unwilling 
to share with others what they have acquired for themselves.
McGill, however, faces neither friend nor foe. A collection of forgotten 
men with hollow looks simply stare back at him. Their faces express little 
more than indifference toward the new passenger. It is a disturbing com-
mentary on the effects of the Great Depression. More importantly, the scene 
is constructed within a theatrical framework. McGill stands up on the floor 
of the car as if he were on a fully lit stage, while those already occupying 
the car sit back in the darkness as if they were themselves an audience for 
McGill’s antics. The scene calls to mind the moment in Sullivan’s Travels when 
the prisoners are marched into a church to enjoy a cartoon. Although this 
set piece from Sturges’s film is used later in O Brother in an overt manner, it 
is here on the train that it raises serious issues concerning the comic nature 
of the scene. The prisoners in Sullivan’s Travels watch a Walt Disney cartoon 
in which Pluto is shown at his most elastic. In one sequence he becomes 
attached to flypaper and chases his own body around in a frustrated circle 
before flopping on the ground. In another he is wrapped up in a window 
shade and then spat back out. The prisoners laugh uproariously at Pluto’s 
mishaps, but Sturges does not seem interested in exploring why they laugh. 
One senses, however, that the laughter is therapeutic not because they are 
able to divert their victimization onto another entity but because violence 
itself has been relegated into the plastic world of animation, a medium in 
which elasticity and repeatability diffuse its threat to their bodies. Pluto is 
always restored to his original configuration.
The therapeutic empowerment of animation is conspicuous in its 
absence in the scene in the Coen brothers’ film. Unease is generated not 
simply through the evocation of Bergson’s automaton but in the inability of 
these men to respond to the animated caricature before them. It suggests 
that their apparent indifference to McGill’s pratfall is symptomatic of their 
despair. The film viewer recognizes the elasticity of McGill and the lack of 
a real threat to his body when he falls off the train. The audience within the 
film, however, seems deadened to the possibility of laughter and hardened 
to the salutatory effect of cartoons.
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One more aspect of the scene needs to be addressed. In his explana-
tion of what constitutes the comic in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
“Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaard asserts, “If the reason for people’s 
hustle-bustle is a possibility of avoiding danger, the busyness is not comic; 
but if, for example, it is on a ship that is sinking, there is something comic 
in all this running around, because the contradiction is that despite all 
this movement they are not moving away from the site of their downfall.”9 
Men scurrying about hopelessly trying to save themselves would not on 
the surface seem funny, other than in a sadistic way. But for Kierkegaard 
it represents the contradiction that is intrinsic to comedy and to life. This 
is expressed in Kierkegaard’s joke as the contradiction between freedom 
and necessity, between our infinite aspirations and the finite realities that 
confront those aspirations.10 The crew on the ship, striving to keep itself 
afloat and yet helpless in its attempt, illustrates the contradiction between 
our need to take action and the ultimate meaninglessness of that action. It 
is the existential conundrum of the human condition.
The three convicts attempting to climb aboard the moving train fall 
neatly into Kierkegaard’s comic scenario. They struggle for release and 
freedom but are bound to one another and in a sense bound to the earth. 
They reflect our innate belief in the need for action and the ultimate mean-
inglessness of action. Such a scene generates despair if one focuses on the 
frustration, but a comic understanding focuses on the absurdity of the mo-
ment. The utopian fantasy sung over the opening credits, “The Big Rock 
Candy Mountain,” expresses the human need to imagine the possibility of 
redemption, and its lyrics hover over the attempted escape. The incongru-
ity between the fanciful dream of a place where “bulldogs all have rubber 
teeth” and the frustrated cartoon characters of the film is precisely what 
Kierkegaard understood as comic. Perhaps Wylie Sypher best describes 
the dynamic at work in the scene: “Essentially our enjoyment of physical 
mishap or deformity springs from our surprise and delight that man’s ac-
tions are often absurd, his energies often misdirected.”11 In O Brother, Where 
Art Thou? a host of characters are seeking freedom. That their attempts are 
more often than not cast as “absurd” and “misdirected” does not diminish 
their sincerity and expressiveness.
The opening set piece of O Brother depicting McGill and his cohorts 
failing in their attempt to board the train that would take them to freedom 
is a multifaceted comic staging and previews the complex and overlapping 
subtleties of the comic gestures that inform the film.
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Challenging Postmodern Aesthetics
Although the climax of O Brother occurs with the Tennessee Valley Authority 
flooding the McGill ancestral “homeland,” the picaresque set of adventures 
turns toward its conclusion at the Klan rally that McGill and his fellow 
escapees have infiltrated in order to rescue Tommy (Chris Thomas King), 
the African American blues musician they had met and befriended earlier 
in the film. But more importantly, through its rich collection of allusions 
to other texts, the scene provides its audience with the most striking and 
most unsettling set of comic incongruities in the film. These incongruities 
not only satirize the hooded Klansmen but also challenge the audience to 
move beyond the aesthetic pleasure of the film’s postmodern wit. What has 
been called the “engaged reinvention” of popular mythologies that the Coen 
brothers demonstrate in The Hudsucker Proxy (1994) here takes on the form 
of a set of radical and disturbing contradictions.12
Allusions to The Odyssey, Busby Berkeley, Leni Riefenstahl, the Three 
Stooges, Robert Johnson, and The Wizard of Oz (Victor Fleming, 1939) 
all appear in the episode. Although these references play off one another 
in both obvious and subtle ways, the scene is grounded in a particular 
moment in American history: the activities of the Ku Klux Klan in the 
South in the 1930s. This is, of course, a particularly dark episode in the 
history of the republic and one that taken in isolation would generate 
some combination of outrage and guilt in the typically liberal audiences 
that the films of the Coen brothers might attract. The rich array of allu-
sions, in short, cannot be separated from a historical context that elicits 
moral condemnation.
It is this historical grounding that undermines a postmodern reading 
of the episode. The assemblage of popular mythologies, pop culture refer-
ences, and classical allusions does not, in this case, constitute what Fredric 
Jameson and others term “pastiche.” Unlike parody and satire, pastiche, ac-
cording to Jameson, is “the cannibalization of all styles of the past, the play 
of random stylistic allusion[,]” and thus constitutes a “neutral practice,” an 
artistic and cultural form that has been emptied of any ethical perspective 
and “amputated of satiric impulse.”13 The postmodern pleasure of pastiche 
is the pleasure of recognizing references, so that engaging a text becomes 
a game of identification. Moreover, through this consumption of cultural 
signs, there emerges in the audience a sense of belonging to an “exclusive 
community,” one detached from both traditional socioeconomic classifica-
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tions and conventional ethical codes.14 Membership in this sophisticated 
coterie group, which many in the audience of a Coen brothers film might 
expect, is sabotaged, I think intentionally, by the context of a Klan lynching 
of an African American. There is quite simply no possibility of avoiding the 
historical setting of the episode and the ethical response that that setting 
demands. Although the scene in question does expose the audience to a 
heterogeneous grouping of aesthetic styles and allusions, these do not oc-
cupy a neutral space devoid of normative values and of what Jameson refers 
to in this context as “real history.”15
The most obvious consequence of this grounding is that the engaged 
and directed point of view of satire replaces the neutrality of postmodern 
wit. The scene opens with McGill and his two fellow travelers looking 
down from under cover at a Klan ceremony, which they soon learn is a 
lynching. The members of the Klan are marching in synchronized patterns 
that immediately call to mind a Busby Berkeley set piece. The Klansmen 
are, therefore, being mocked as silly men, in silly outfits, and in silly dance 
formations. Like Satan’s band of devils in Paradise Lost who are compared 
to a swarm of insects, the self-importance of the Klansmen is deflated 
through a visual simile. The satire is reinforced through a Homeric parallel. 
The charlatan Bible salesman (John Goodman) who has robbed and beaten 
McGill and Delmar (Tim Blake Nelson) now shows up at the rally. His role 
as the uncultured and violent Cyclops of The Odyssey mocks the office of 
Grand Cyclops of the Klan.
The set of allusions taken together suggests, however, something more 
sophisticated than satire, something that relies on irreconcilable comic 
incongruities within that set of allusions. Perhaps the most outrageous and 
resonant reference in the set piece is to The Wizard of Oz. The rescue of 
Tommy from the hands of the Klan visually evokes the rescue of Dorothy 
from the Wicked Witch of the West. The three escapees take the parts of 
the Scarecrow, the Tin Man, and the Cowardly Lion. The Klan becomes 
the army of the Wicked Witch. This creates a jarring incongruity, one that 
is intensified by the contextualization of the allusion outside its original 
historical setting. Although The Wizard of Oz was made in the final years 
of the Depression and is in some sense a typical thirties “road” picture, its 
presence in the film will resonate with most of the audience in the context of 
the fifties, sixties, and seventies. For many years before the advent of home 
video technology, the film was annually shown on television and became 
an anticipated event, an almost ritualized staging in the living rooms of 
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American families. An allusion to the film generates not simply a memory 
but nostalgia for “a privileged lost object of desire.”16 In an impish and insidi-
ous manner, the Coens have uprooted this warm memory and relocated it 
to a 1930s Klan rally and execution.
The effect of the allusion on the audience is threefold. First, there is the 
pleasure in simply identifying the allusion, the sense of belonging to the 
sophisticated coterie group I mention above. Secondly, there is the pleasure 
in witnessing a childhood fantasy defeat evil. It is the Scarecrow, the Tin 
Man, and the Cowardly Lion who rescue Tommy from the clutches of the 
Klan and flatten its Cyclops. The innocence of a childhood fantasy proves 
stronger than racism. But thirdly, the allusion creates a disturbing and ironic 
incongruity: that between the dark recess of Mississippi in the 1930s and 
the living rooms of postwar baby boomers and their children.
Kierkegaard is instructive in understanding the effect if not the pur-
pose of this irony. He asserts in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that 
“irony is the confinium [boundary] between the aesthetic and the ethical.”17 
The relationship between these two stages and the role that irony plays in 
the advancement from the former to the latter is treated extensively by 
Kierkegaard in Either/Or. In part I, a young man argues for the aesthetic 
point of view in a series of heterogeneous papers on topics as diverse as 
music, drama, crop rotation, and eroticism. In discussing these subjects, he 
asserts that one must distance oneself from commitment to any one par-
ticular form of artistic expression or to one exclusive human relationship. 
The aesthete is dimly aware of the existential contradictions of life, but he 
would avoid them by continually seeking out new experiences, preoccupying 
himself with the surfaces of life, and generally playing “shuttlecock with all 
existence.”18 “Everything in life,” says the aesthete, “is regarded as a wager. 
The more consistently a person knows how to sustain his arbitrariness, the 
more amusing the combinations become.”19 The aesthete must constantly 
be changing his orientation to the world.
Part II of Either/Or consists of two letters written to the young man by 
a judge who represents the so-called ethical point of view. He challenges 
the self-styled aesthete not necessarily to adopt a specific ethical perspective 
but to act in the world, to overcome his indifference. “It is not,” he explains, 
“a matter of choosing between willing good or willing evil as of choosing 
to will.”20 The aesthete should, in short, cease to be the “plaything for the 
play of his arbitrariness.”21 The task of the ethicist is to make the young 
man confront the comic contradictions of the human condition, the ironic 
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incongruities between the body and the soul, the finite and the infinite, the 
necessary and the free, which inform the human condition.
Jameson’s understanding of the postmodern world and the individual 
enmeshed within its plethora of signs is uncanny in its similarity to Ki-
erkegaard’s understanding of the young aesthete and his need for new and 
changing experiences. Jameson asserts, “What has happened is that aesthetic 
production today has become integrated into commodity production gener-
ally: the frantic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming 
goods . . . at ever greater rates of turnover.”22 It is precisely this consumer of 
aesthetic commodities whom the Coen brothers confront in their staging 
of the Klan rally. They do it by fashioning a disturbing comic contradiction 
that defies the consumptive pleasures of their audience. The filmmakers’ role 
is that of the judge in Either/Or who demands that the young, sophisticated 
aesthete confront the ironies of the human condition. Unlike The Hudsucker 
Proxy, whose comic perspective interrogates socioeconomic conditions of a 
specific era, the ironic incongruities of O Brother act against its own audience. 
The Coens are mischievous boys; in this instance, their mischief challenges 
the complacencies of the postmodernist aesthetic.
Comic Endings
The audience is informed of parallels between O Brother and The Odyssey 
in the opening credits, when the invocation from Homer’s poem appears 
on the screen: “O Muse, sing in me and through me . . . that man . . . a 
wanderer, harried for years on end.”23 This is an invitation for the audience 
to search out specific references to the poem as the film progresses. And 
indeed, we do recognize versions of the Cyclops, the Sirens, the suitors, and 
others in the film. But the most significant borrowing from The Odyssey 
is an overarching narrative framework. The structural pattern of Homer’s 
poem is one of loss and recovery, of wandering and return. The narrative 
begins with Odysseus hidden away on Kalypso’s island and is set in motion 
with his decision to return to Ithaca. The tale reaches its conclusion with 
the recognition of the hero and the reordering of home and kingdom. The 
episodes of the poem are contained within an overarching narrative design 
that seeks and achieves closure. To the extent that the narrative reaches its 
conclusion with the reunification of the family unit and the reaffirmation 
of marriage, we might also say that its pattern is comic.
The Coen brothers’ version of The Odyssey shares this narrative pattern. 
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The film begins with the hero’s escape not from an exotic island but from a 
chain gang. It goes on to chronicle the “adventures” of our Odysseus as he 
makes his way back to home and family. Although he has told his cohorts 
that treasure awaits them, his real goal is to prevent his wife from remarrying 
and to restore his position as the true paterfamilias. Within this narrative 
structure we encounter others who are also seeking redemptive resolutions. 
When he learns that the wife of Pete’s (John Turturro) cousin has run off, 
McGill suggests that she might have been looking for answers. And when 
Delmar sees the mesmerizing procession of initiates moving ceremoniously 
to the baptismal waters, he impulsively hurls himself into the river, insist-
ing that he too be redeemed. And in something of an inversion of Delmar’s 
passionate gesture, Tommy seeks out the Devil to acquire another form of 
redemption: the gift of music. 
Unlike The Odyssey, however, the conclusion of O Brother is subverted. 
In the final scene of the film, McGill presents his Penelope (Holly Hunter) 
with the ring that he believes will reunite him with his wife and finally bring 
him the “repose” he has been seeking. But Penny refuses to acknowledge the 
symbolic value of the object and tells him that this particular ring, because 
it is not the original ring, lacks the magical charm that will restore their 
marriage. The ring, like her husband, is not bona fide. The family marches 
off across the screen with Penny in the lead and the aspiring paterfamilias 
tagging along behind. The comic resolution that the audience awaits and 
expects is undermined by the ironic representation of an uxorious Odysseus 
and of a family whose reordering remains in suspense.
Once again, Kierkegaard’s distinction between the aesthetic and ethical 
points of view is instructive in understanding this apparently unresolved 
comic conclusion. In Either/Or, the young aesthete rejects marriage and as-
serts that eroticism should not be expressed in the context of a commitment 
to “everlasting love.” He sees marriage as something “everlasting,” not in the 
sense that it is immortal but in that it entraps one in temporal longevity. In 
other words, the resolution of the tension between the desire to transcend 
time and the reality that one necessarily lives within time is attained in the 
immediacy of the moment. And so the aesthete argues that “poetic infinity 
. . . can well be limited to one hour as to a month.”24 It needs to be stressed 
that this represents something more than a desire for instant gratification. It 
is the attempt to resolve through the immediacy of an aesthetic experience 
the fundamental contradiction of life: we necessarily live within time but 
can concurrently imagine ourselves outside time.
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The ethicist responds that marriage is a means to “bind” time in a way 
that acknowledges longevity and mutability. The aesthete’s “poetic infinity” is 
a fool’s paradise, a vain attempt to gain release from the finite and material. 
Promiscuity, which the aesthete practices, is merely a form of consumption, 
a strategy to avoid the disturbing incongruities of life. These incongruities, 
however, are acknowledged in marriage: “The married man solves the great 
riddle, to live in eternity and yet to hear the cabinet clock strike in such a 
way that its striking does not shorten but lengthens his eternity . . . a con-
tradiction.”25 Marriage is comic, not because it brings closure but because 
it acknowledges contradiction. Marriage “binds” time but simultaneously 
acknowledges the vicissitudes of time.
At the conclusion to O Brother, McGill has not reached the state of 
“repose” that he had imagined would await him. As I pointed out earlier, in 
the final scene the family literally is in motion, passing across the screen in 
a direction unknown to the audience. McGill is still pleading with his wife 
to accept the ring, but we suspect that he will never be truly bona fide in her 
eyes. But although marriage has not restored the paradise McGill thought 
he had lost, it does provide a context for his journey, which he lacked on the 
road. The irony that confronts the audience at the end of O Brother is that 
the marriage, although in some sense restorative, is nevertheless mired in the 
commonplace quirks of human character. Perhaps the Coen brothers have 
not reached the heights of existential contradiction, but they have provided 
an ending to their narrative that acknowledges the incongruity between our 
very real aspirations and our equally real limitations. It is surely not coinci-
dental that the reconstituted family walks past a billboard announcing the 
introduction of electrical power to the Tennessee Valley and offering the 
implicit promise of a technological utopia. Electrical power may very well 
provide air-conditioning, but it does not end racism, purge us of crooked 
pols, eliminate difficult marriages, or resolve contradictions. Upon his return 
to Ithaca, McGill discovers no “Big Rock Candy Mountain,” where “the sun 
shines every day . . . and the barns are full of hay.” He encounters instead 
the inescapable comic ironies of life.
Comic Absurdities
I began with Groucho. Let me conclude with Joel and Ethan. In an interview 
in 1996, the brothers explained their understanding of comedy: “But it seems 
to us that comedy is a part of life. Look at the recent example of the people 
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who tried to blow up the World Trade Center. They rented a panel truck to 
use for the explosion and then, after committing the crime, went back to the 
rental agency to get back the money they left on deposit. The absurdity of 
this kind of behavior is terribly funny in itself.”26 The whims of personality, 
the odd relationship between mind and body, the ludicrous conjunction of 
the transcendent and the ordinary, the disturbing incongruities of evil and 
innocence, the comic ironies of good intentions and awkward missteps are 
some of the contradictions that inform the human condition and are aptly 
represented in O Brother, Where Art Thou? How fitting that the title of the 
film should be posed as a question and not an answer.
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no country for old men
The Coens’ Tragic Western
Richard Gilmore
The point is there aint no point.
—Cormac McCarthy, No Country for Old Men
Coen Irony
No Country for Old Men (2007) is, one might say, one more step in Joel and 
Ethan Coen’s cinematic effort to say something about this country and about 
being a member, a citizen of this country, the United States of America. No 
Country for Old Men feels like a very different kind of movie from every other 
Coen brothers film. It is more serious, or it is serious in a different way from 
their other movies. It is not unusual for the Coens to take on dark themes 
in their movies, but previous to No Country for Old Men there was always a 
level of what I will call meta-irony. That is, there was a level of detachment, 
a sense that their movies were meant to be taken as just stories, that you 
should not take them too seriously. To be offended by Fargo (1996) because 
it seems to be making fun of midwesterners is to take it too seriously. Irony, 
however, is a tricky business. People are suspicious of the ironic because 
those who are ironic never quite mean what they say. The ironic, for their 
part, are more or less invulnerable to attack, since to take them seriously is 
to miss the point, and not to take them seriously precludes an attack. With 
No Country for Old Men, the Coens have given up their ironic detachment 
and made a much more straightforward movie. Certainly, there is irony 
within the movie, but the movie itself lacks the sheen of ironic detachment 
that is a part of a movie like Fargo.
One reason for this change may be the fact that this is the first movie 
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that they have made based on a novel. It is not irrelevant to the tone of the 
movie that that novel was written by Cormac McCarthy. That the Coens 
chose this novel by this writer, however, also reflects an evolution in their 
cinematic and storytelling concerns. It is a sign of their willingness to give 
up some of their ironic detachment, to give up a posture of invulnerability, 
in order to say something more straightforward about their perceptions of 
how the world is. This, it seems to me, is a step into philosophy.
The previous Coen brothers movie that has the most in common with 
No Country for Old Men is, in fact, Fargo. In Fargo there is an older, wiser 
police chief, Marge Gunderson (Frances McDormand) and her less expe-
rienced or savvy deputy, Lou (Bruce Bohne), just as there is in No Country 
for Old Men. In both movies, a local police officer is confronted with some 
grisly murders committed by men who are not from his or her town. In 
both movies, greed lies behind the plots. Both movies feature as a central 
character a cold-blooded killer who does not seem quite human and whom 
the police officer seeks to apprehend. No Country for Old Men, therefore, is 
not completely new territory for the Coens, but no one in Fargo has much of 
a sense of irony, although the movie itself is ironic, whereas Sheriff Ed Tom 
Bell (Tommy Lee Jones), for example, certainly does have a sense of irony 
although the movie No Country for Old Men does not feel ironic at all.
A great moment of Bell-ian irony is when he is reading a story from 
the newspaper to his deputy, Wendell (Garret Dillahunt), about a couple in 
California who were taking in older people as tenants, then killing them for 
their Social Security checks and burying the bodies in the backyard. After 
Bell reads aloud from the paper, “Neighbors were alerted when a man ran 
from the premises wearing only a dog collar,” Bell comments sardonically, 
“You can’t make up such a thing as that. I dare you to even try.” Bell contin-
ues, appreciating the full irony of the story, “But that’s what it took, you’ll 
notice. Get someone’s attention. Diggin graves in the back yard didn’t bring 
any.” When Wendell fights back a smile, Bell says, “That’s all right. I laugh 
myself sometimes.” There is a bittersweetness in that confession that shows 
the deep humanity that may be part of the ironist’s position. His comment, 
“I laugh myself sometimes,” links, for me, this nonironic movie with all 
of the Coen brothers’ ironic movies, movies in which horrors (a Ku Klux 
Klan rally, a hooded kidnapped woman trying to run blindly from her killer 
kidnappers, the chopping off of a woman’s toe, for example) are treated as 
things to be laughed at. There is a sadness to their funniest movies, and 
humor in their grimmest.
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To Kill a Bird
O Brother, Where Art Thou? (2000) is another Coen brothers movie that 
is referenced in No Country for Old Men. The reference is indirect, as it 
originates in McCarthy’s novel, but it nevertheless works on another level 
within the Coens’ oeuvre. There is a sequence in No Country for Old Men 
in which we see Anton Chigurh (Javier Bardem) driving at night. He comes 
to a bridge and there is a hawk, a bird of prey, perched on one of the rail-
ing posts of the bridge. Chigurh picks up a pistol from the car seat, slows 
down, then, as he drives by, takes a shot at the bird. What is this about? On 
one level, it may be a foreshadowing: Chigurh, bird of prey to birds of prey, 
will ultimately miss his target, Llewelyn Moss (Josh Brolin). However, on a 
deeper level, the scene connects with other Coen brothers films.
In the movie Cool Hand Luke (Stuart Rosenberg, 1967) the über-boss, 
Boss Godfrey (Morgan Woodward) (with an ominously theocratic name), 
who oversees the chain gang working the Florida state back roads, is a mirror 
sunglasses–wearing, all but silent figure of ominous justice. There is a scene in 
the film when Boss Godfrey, standing in the middle of the road, raises the cane 
he uses over his head. One of the chain gang workers, Rabbitt (Marc Cavell), 
immediately runs over to the truck, grabs a rifle off a rack in the back window, 
hurries back, and hands it to Boss Godfrey. At first you think, “That’s a pretty 
risky move, entrusting his rifle to one of these hardened criminals,” but then 
you see Boss Godfrey take the bolt for the gun from his vest pocket. He slides 
the bolt home, raises the gun, and shoots a hawk flying just overhead. The scene 
begins with shots establishing a relationship between the chain gang workers 
and Boss Godfrey. One of the workers, Tattoo (Warren Finnerty), says, “Don’t 
he ever talk?” After Boss Godfrey shoots the bird, Luke (Paul Newman) replies, 
“I believe he just said something.” I take this scene to indicate how brutally 
and arbitrarily violent this man can be and that what he is saying when he 
shoots the bird is that he is the bird of prey to birds of prey. Just establishing 
the pecking order, as it were, so the members of the chain gang can see.
This figure of the lawman who is really beyond the law, beyond, even, as 
Nietzsche says, good and evil altogether, is picked up by the Coen brothers 
in O Brother, Where Art Thou? in the character of Sheriff Cooley (Daniel 
von Bargen). Sheriff Cooley wears mirror sunglasses just like Boss Godfrey 
in Cool Hand Luke, with the similar cinematic effect of showing reflections 
of the world in the glasses but never showing Boss Godfrey’s, or Sheriff 
Cooley’s, eyes. Sheriff Cooley is as relentless in his pursuit of the escaped 
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chain gang convict, Ulysses Everett McGill (George Clooney), as Boss God-
frey is of Cool Hand Luke. Sheriff Cooley seems to be a representative of 
the law, but when it comes right down to it, when the law pardons Ulysses 
and his friends, Sheriff Cooley remains implacable in his pursuit of his own 
conception of justice. When Sheriff Cooley is about to string up Ulysses and 
his friends, even though they had been pardoned by the governor, Ulysses 
pleads, “It ain’t the law!” To which Sheriff Cooley replies, “The law. Well the 
law is a human institution.”
In O Brother, Where Art Thou? Sheriff Cooley is a direct lifting from, 
or a direct reference to, Cool Hand Luke. I would not be surprised if Sheriff 
“Cooley” was not an intentional reference to the title of the earlier movie. 
Anton Chigurh’s arbitrary and violent shooting of the hawk (the bird of prey 
to birds of prey) on the bridge connects him to Boss Godfrey directly and 
to Sheriff Cooley, indirectly. To psychologize for just a moment, it seems 
clear that Cool Hand Luke made a powerful impression on the Coen broth-
ers when they first saw it. What seems to have especially impressed them is 
the figure of a putative lawman who is motivated by an apparent concept of 
justice that has nothing human in it. This figure is not always a lawman but 
has its counterpart in the Coen brothers’ Fargo, O Brother, Where Art Thou? 
and No Country for Old Men. There is a thin thread of allusion that connects 
these four films that is quite obvious once you see it but is invisible before you 
see it. Once you see it, this scene becomes richly allusive and deepens in mean-
ing. This is why one frequently has the sense after watching a Coen brothers 
movie that there was more going on than one quite got. One has that sense 
because there is more going on than anyone ever gets. The more I see in No 
Country for Old Men, the more I am convinced that there is much more that 
I am not seeing. This is a very important realization to have in order to begin 
to really get what is going on in a Coen brothers film. In this sense, their films 
are like the world: there is always more to understand; there is always more to 
get. The goal, then, is, in the words of Henry James, to “try to be one of the 
people on whom nothing is lost!”1 That is, perhaps, an unachievable goal, in 
life or in art, but it is that to which we should aspire, and certainly, the Coen 
brothers’ movies richly reward the attempt to find more in them.
Westerns and Greek Tragedies
The stories that the Coen brothers are interested in telling all seem to be 
very American stories. Their approach of choice is the genre of film. Their 
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favorite film genre is very American, a genre the French call film noir, but 
No Country for Old Men is of another classic American genre, the western. 
Genre is an interesting way to try to say something about something because, 
as Jacques Derrida has made explicit, the “law of the law of genre” is that 
every new member of a genre set will deviate from and violate the apparent 
established principles of that genre. This is how Derrida describes the “law 
of the law of genre”: “It is precisely a principle of contamination, a law of 
impurity, a parasitical economy. In the code of set theories, if I may use it 
at least figuratively, I would speak of a sort of participation without belong-
ing—a taking part in without being part of, without having membership in 
a set.”2 This description of each new member of a genre set sounds to me a 
lot like what it means to be a (new) member of the set of Americans. Just 
as each new Coen film that has genre elements adds to and transforms the 
genre it participates in, so too, each new American adds to and transforms 
what it means to be an American.
No Country for Old Men, then, is and is not a classic western. It takes 
place in the West and its main protagonists are what you might call western-
ers. On the other hand, the plot revolves around a drug deal that has gone 
bad; it involves four-wheel-drive vehicles, semiautomatic weapons, and 
executives in high-rise buildings, none of which would seem to belong in 
a western. There is a beautiful moment when Sheriff Ed Tom Bell and his 
sidekick, Deputy Wendell, are riding along, following a trail, and Deputy 
Wendell remarks on the tracks they are following in a way that recalls for 
me a moment in John Ford’s great classic (and revisionist) western, The 
Searchers (1956), when Ethan Edwards (John Wayne) and Martin Pawley 
(Jeffrey Hunter) are following some tracks that will be similarly fateful 
for everyone involved. It is an interesting connection (I won’t claim it is 
a reference) because in The Searchers, Ethan says, “We’ll find ’em. Just as 
sure as the turnin’ of the earth”—and they do. They find ’em, sure enough; 
but in an odd, somewhat inexplicable twist, there is no final confrontation 
between Ethan and Scar (Henry Brandon), the hated Comanche chief he 
has been seeking for seven years. Instead, it is Martin who kills Scar, and 
he appears to have done it while Scar was asleep in his tepee. Sheriff Bell is 
pretty dogged for a while, but he will give up the search altogether before 
he finds his adversary, Anton Chigurh.
Anton Chigurh might as well be Melville’s Moby Dick for all of the hu-
man compassion, or even human motivation, that can be found in him. It 
makes as little sense to speak of him as evil as it does to say that raw nature, 
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a blizzard or a flood, is evil. He has principles, the equivalent in a man to 
the laws of nature. Given his principles, he does not act irrationally or 
from passion; he is more of an inexorable force. He is not a rampaging 
killer on the loose; he has been summoned by a human will, a human 
desire, to achieve a desired end. He appears only because he was sum-
moned. The recognizable and clear evil lies with the one (or those, since 
there may be others involved; the film is not explicit on this point) who 
summoned him. He was summoned because of greed, lust for power, an 
indifference to the suffering of others, and personal gratification. He who 
summoned him will learn, too late, that, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, he 
has summoned a power that he cannot control, that it was pure hubris to 
think that he could control it.
That evil man is of little interest to either Cormac McCarthy, the au-
thor of the novel, No Country for Old Men, or to Joel and Ethan Coen, the 
makers of the movie.3 What is of interest to McCarthy and the Coens is 
rather what happens when a good, but flawed, man encounters this force 
of nature in human guise. In this sense, No Country for Old Men recapitu-
lates the patterns of ancient Greek tragedy. As in ancient Greek tragedy, a 
good but flawed man will become enmeshed in events that will prove to 
be his ruin. It will be what is good in him as much as what is flawed that 
will engage him in these events, and his ruin will be complete. Oedipus 
is a kind of paradigm of the way the ancient tragedies begin and end. It 
is because Oedipus is so smart, self-confident, competent, and passion-
ate that he ascends to the throne of Thebes and rules as a good and noble 
king. It is also because Oedipus is so smart, self-confident, competent, 
and passionate that he is able to complete the mysterious task sent him 
by the Oracle of Delphi and to find the murderer of the previous king of 
Thebes, King Laius.
Unfortunately, as it will turn out, it is Oedipus himself who killed the 
previous king, as predicted by the same Oracle of Delphi long ago. He has 
also married his mother and fathered his children/siblings. As a consequence, 
Oedipus’s wife/mother commits suicide, he blinds and exiles himself, his 
incest-produced children will fight and be responsible for each others’ deaths. 
Llewelyn Moss is similarly smart, self-confident, competent, and passion-
ate. His intelligence and competence lead him to the “last man standing” 
(as Moss puts it to the man he finds dying in a truck, saying, “there must’ve 
been one”) and to the money. His compassion compels him to return to the 
site of the drug deal gone bad to bring water to the dying man who asked 
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for it. It is not at all clear whether or not Chigurh or the Mexicans would 
have ever picked up the transponder signals if he had not gone back, but 
it is certainly clear that once they have found Moss and his truck at the 
scene, they will be on his trail wherever he goes. A fate similar to Oedipus’s 
disastrous ruin awaits Llewelyn Moss: both he and his young wife will be 
brutally murdered; all that he has will be lost.
Power, Hubris, and the Fatal Flaw
Anton Chigurh is a monster, in the sense that Emerson uses the word in 
his essay “The American Scholar,” that is, in association with “monitory” 
and “admonition,” drawing on its Latin derivation meaning a warning or an 
omen.4 The ancient Greek tragedies were meant to serve that same function, 
that is, warning about especially human temptations that would lead to disas-
ter. Tragedy was considered a source of wisdom as well as of entertainment, 
and the primary wisdom that the ancient Greek tragedies taught was also 
written on the wall at the famous and perhaps most holy of Greek temples, 
the Oracle of Delphi: “Avoid hubris.” Hubris is a difficult word to recover 
from the Greek, but it means something like arrogant ignorance, thinking 
that you are better or more powerful than you really are. The Greek gods 
hated hubris, and one of their primary occupations as gods was punishing 
humans for their hubris.
Hubris was such a problem for the Greeks not because they valued 
timidity or even humility but because they loved power, and they loved 
powerful, proud people. As Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, “The 
man is thought to be proud who thinks himself worthy of great things, be-
ing worthy of them.” The Greek ideal was to manifest all of your true power, 
and to be very powerful, without overstepping your own limits, without 
presuming to have more power than you really have. This is a very difficult 
ideal to achieve because one does not know what one is capable of until one 
tries to do things beyond what one has done before. And yet, the Greeks 
(Aristotle, for one) assumed that one could know what one is capable of and 
thereby avoid the calamities of hubris. The above quotation from Aristotle 
concludes, “for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous 
man is foolish or silly.”5 This Greek ideal, this wisdom, is, too, exhorted upon 
the wall at Delphi: “Know thyself.”
Llewelyn Moss is a man of considerable resources, but his powers have 
been lying more or less dormant. He has innate powers of intelligence and 
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determination as well as some acquired abilities learned while serving in 
Vietnam. Virtually all of these powers are banked, the way one banks a 
fire, because there is no way to exercise them in his day-to-day life. He has 
a good job as a welder that does not require all of either his intelligence or 
determination. He has a lovely young wife and a comfortable trailer home 
but no obvious way of improving his situation beyond this level of comfort. 
In many ways he seems to be happy and successful, but it is a difficult thing 
to have powers that you have no opportunities to use. Doing pretty well in 
America has never been the happiest of options if there is some chance that 
you could be doing better. Of course, that possibility of doing better becomes 
real for Llewelyn when he comes upon the briefcase full of cash. He barely 
seems to hesitate before he decides to go for it.
A key element of Greek tragedy is the idea of the protagonist’s hamartia, 
the fatal flaw. Hamartia is a term derived from archery and literally means 
“off the mark,” signifying that one’s aim has been slightly off. The protagonist 
of a classic Greek tragedy must be essentially a good person, a person whose 
intentions are good but who does not really or fully know himself or herself, 
and this lack of self-knowledge is mixed with a bit of hubris, which puts off 
one’s aim. This is quite literally suggested of Llewelyn at the beginning of 
the movie when he is hunting for antelope and ends up shooting one in the 
hindquarters. In a sense, the entire movie is prefigured in this scene. It is 
a scene that shows Llewelyn to be highly competent, an expert at hunting: 
the way he uses his boot for a barrel rest, the way he adjusts the sight for 
the distance of the shot, his patience in taking the shot, his picking up his 
shell after he takes the shot are all signs of his expertise. All are signs of his 
knowledge, his ability, his power, but the scene also shows his ultimate hubris, 
literally and figuratively. Instead of killing the antelope, he only wounds it, 
the worst possible outcome for a responsible hunter. He is clearly frustrated 
and annoyed with himself, and he heads out after the wounded antelope to 
try to finish what he has started.
It is a long shot that he thinks he can make. It is not a shot that he will 
make, but he is just good enough to actually hit the antelope at the distance 
of almost a mile. All of the elements of the movie are here, Llewelyn’s talents 
as well as his misjudgments, as well as certain implacable facts of nature; 
distance, heat, the movement of the antelope are the facts of nature that will 
undo his best intentions. His aim is good but not quite good enough, and 
the worst possible consequences eventuate because he was willing to try the 
difficult shot. His experience is a Greek tragedy in miniature.
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Our Place in the Universe
There is a problem in philosophy that is related to a problem in art and to 
one in science as well. The problem is, in part, epistemological, that is, it is a 
problem of knowledge, and it is, in part, a problem of communication. It is 
the problem of discovering and communicating new knowledge about the 
world. Take, for example, the phenomenon of gravity. Gravity is invisible. 
Before Newton, no one had thought of the concept of gravity to explain 
things as different as a falling apple and the movement of the moon. Of 
course, the signs of gravity were everywhere, but people did not know how 
to see them as signs of gravity. Then, once you have the concept of gravity 
and you see that this explains the movement of the moon, the movement of 
the planets, and even the movement of the earth, how do you explain it to 
someone else so that they can understand this new and powerful concept? 
Well, the way Newton did it was to talk about falling apples.
A more explicitly philosophical example can be found in the writings 
of Heraclitus. Heraclitus of Ephesus (585–525 bce) was one of the more 
famous of the pre-Socratic philosophers. He was known as “the Dark One” 
and “the Riddler” because what he had to say about human life and the way 
he said it were so pessimistic, puzzling, and elusive. He said, for example (and 
most famously), “One cannot step in the same river twice,” which seems to 
be factually false and yet strangely, provocatively true.6 The structure that 
Heraclitus developed for conveying his cryptic ideas is based on a model 
that Hermann Fränkel calls the “geometrical mean,” which has the form 
A/B = B/C. Using an example from Heraclitus—“Man is stamped infantile 
by divinity, just as the child is by man”—Fränkel notes that this would have 
the form divinity/man = man/child.7 This is a way of trying to convey some 
very abstract wisdom about our human position in the universe. What he is 
trying to convey is the very difficult, nonhuman knowledge that we may not 
be the ultimate things in the universe, that not everything in the universe is 
about or for us. This is hard knowledge for us to see because so much of our 
attention is devoted to getting what we think we want, to finding in the world 
the things that we need, that it becomes our primary frame of reference: the 
world as the source of what we need. The world, in short, appears to us to 
be about us. Heraclitus is trying to convey a wisdom, a knowledge, that re-
contextualizes our place in the universe for us. He is trying to communicate 
this to us so that we might understand ourselves differently, and having this 
knowledge will help us to live better, more satisfyingly, in this world.
64 Richard Gilmore
There is a similar structure in the movie, and, I think, a similar wisdom. 
That is, the scene shift from Anton Chigurh killing the nameless car driver 
with his cattle stun gun to Llewelyn Moss hunting antelope is bridged with 
a virtually identical piece of dialogue, first uttered by Anton to the driver 
of the car he has pulled over, then by Llewelyn to the antelope he has fixed 
his sight on: “Hold still.”8 They are the words of the hunter to his prey. The 
basic formula seems to be that Anton is to human beings (and to Llewelyn, 
in particular), as Llewelyn the hunter is to the antelope. Just as the antelope 
can have little or no understanding of the principles that govern and guide 
its hunter, Chigurh’s human victims can understand about as much of what 
governs and guides him. It is very hard to understand people who act from 
motives that are very different from our own. The default position is to label 
such people evil or morally reprehensible, but that is more or less just a throw-
ing up of one’s hands. It is more or less a confession of being confounded. 
The first step toward wisdom is an acknowledgment that there may be more 
going on than that of which we are aware. This has always been the central 
goal of philosophy, to figure out what the more going on might be.
Rules and Vulnerability
Anton Chigurh is like a walking abattoir. People are just cattle to him, which 
makes his weapon of choice especially appropriate. He is like a modern 
version, one updated for a heavily meat-eating American public, of the 
traditional figure of Death with his scythe. One of the most profound mo-
ments in the movie, or the moment that raises some of the most profound 
philosophical and, especially, ethical questions, is the moment when Chigurh 
asks Carson Wells (Woody Harrelson), “If the rule you follow brought you 
to this, of what use was the rule?” This is the great human question, the 
great philosophical question. It is the question that is central to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, where he frames it in terms of the problem of how 
to live a life without regret.9 It is what lurks under Camus’s claim that the 
only real philosophical question is the question of suicide.10 That is, is there 
a rule that we can follow and, in following it, be brought to a place where 
we can affirm our whole life? Are some rules better than others, and if so, 
which rules, or, what ultimate rule, is the best? The desideratum is to find 
a rule that will free us from the fear of death, because, following it, we will 
feel that we lived our lives in a way that left out nothing important. Wells 
seems, at the penultimate moment before his death, to regret the rule that 
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had brought him to that place. Llewelyn Moss, with increasing awareness 
of just where his rule has brought him, clearly has increasing anxiety about 
the rule he has been following. At the very end of her life, Carla Jean Moss 
(Kelly Macdonald) is forced to evaluate the rule she has followed that has 
brought her to be sitting in a bedroom across from Anton Chigurh. There 
is a moment when a shadow seems to pass over her face as she considers it. 
Even Sheriff Bell, who has some very specific ethical rules he follows, which 
have worked for him, seems to be undone by the end of the movie.11 It is 
as though Anton Chigurh comes as a kind of avatar of death, a remnant of 
the ancient Greek gods, and his function is to undo or to make irrelevant 
everyone’s rules.
What rule, then, does Chigurh follow? There are two scenes that mir-
ror each other and reveal something important about the rule that Chigurh 
follows. The first scene is the very powerful and very creepy one in which 
Chigurh gets annoyed with a friendly question from the proprietor of the 
gas station (Gene Jones): “Y’all getting any rain up your way?” What follows 
is a tense exchange that subtly escalates into what is clearly a life or death 
situation for the proprietor. Chigurh demands that the owner call a coin toss. 
After some resistance he does call it: “Heads.” Heads it is. Chigurh leaves the 
coin and walks out. The proprietor gets a reprieve. In a similar scene, with 
Carla Jean, although we do not see the toss, it is pretty clear that she loses 
the bet and is killed. (As he leaves her house, Chigurh checks his boot soles 
for blood, an obvious danger in his line of work.) What is interesting about 
these two scenes is that in them Chigurh has vaguely human desires. In the 
first of the scenes, he really wants to kill the gas station proprietor. In the 
second scene, one feels as though he would really prefer not to kill Carla Jean. 
In both instances, he subjugates his desires to the flip of a coin, to chance. 
That is his principle. It is the principle that keeps him from a certain kind of 
vulnerability. As he tells Carla Jean, in the novel, when she says to him that 
he does not have to kill her, “You’re asking that I make myself vulnerable 
and that I can never do. I have only one way to live. It does not allow for 
special cases. A coin toss perhaps.”12 That is, he recognizes that it is precisely 
his feelings, his desires, that make him vulnerable. His rule—that chance 
must trump any desire that he might have—is in the service of maximum 
invulnerability. I read the sudden and violent crash that occurs right after 
Chigurh leaves the house where Carla Jean was staying as a sign that there 
are higher laws yet in the universe than Chigurh’s principle. As Chigurh is 
to Carla Jean, so are the higher laws to Chigurh. What the nature of those 
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higher laws is I am not sure, but Chigurh’s principle is no defense against 
them. Since these laws are higher and counter to Chigurh’s principles, there 
is some reason to hope that they are also more sympathetic to human wishes 
and desires than Chigurh is, but that is a small hope indeed.
Apollo and Dionysus: Reason and Passion
The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophical movement 
known as existentialism can be understood, in part, as a reaction against 
the Enlightenment period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
Enlightenment was a period of great confidence in the human ability to use 
reason to shed light on the ways of nature. It is not that people thought they 
had all the answers but that they were convinced that all the answers would 
be forthcoming if methodological reason was applied to any given situation. 
This confidence applied to social contexts as well as to contexts of nature. 
The framing of the U.S. Constitution was an Enlightenment-influenced 
project producing a great Enlightenment document. Science produced 
technology, and technology created new industries, new factories, and 
new social structures. These industries and factories and social structures 
often resulted in new forms of abject poverty, human degradation, and 
war. The philosophical response to these unforeseen, unintended, but very 
real consequences of the Enlightenment was to question the very basis of 
Enlightenment ideals. Philosophers began to consider whether there might 
not be some fundamentally irrational principle in the world that will always 
evade rational accounting. Perhaps it is the very reliance on reason, at the 
expense of emotion and community and art, that is the problem.
Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), explicitly takes on 
the conflict between science and art, between reason and passion. Nietzsche 
saw these late eighteenth-century conflicts as a recapitulation of a similar 
conflict that occurred in Athens in the fifth century bce. According to 
Nietzsche’s narrative, the great Greek tragedians Aeschylus and Sophocles 
were philosophers with a wisdom to teach, and that wisdom had to do with 
the importance of balancing reason and passion into a perfectly propor-
tioned whole. Reason without passion was empty and meaningless, while 
passion without reason was chaotic and dangerous. Nietzsche invoked 
two Greek gods to represent the two sides of the equation: Apollo (for rea-
son) and Dionysus (for passion). The need to balance these two energies 
within us is what Nietzsche took to be the sublime wisdom conveyed in 
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the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Greek tragedy, however, became 
corrupted, according to Nietzsche, by a rather unexpected figure: Socrates. 
The Socratic demand, according to Nietzsche, was that everything we do be 
rational. When Socrates questioned people in the marketplace of Athens, 
his expectation was that the person he questioned should be able to give 
good reasons for all of his beliefs. If he could not, Socrates implied that he 
should not believe those things. This spirit of Socratism, as Nietzsche calls 
it, began to infect Greek tragedy, especially in the plays of Euripides, where 
the sublime elevations of feeling and passion—in the plays of Aeschylus 
and Sophocles—were reduced to much more ordinary, everyday sorts of 
scenarios that were well explained by the chorus and ended with the ratifi-
cation of some rational moral principle.13
For Nietzsche, dry Apollonian reason lacked all power of creativity. The 
Enlightenment emphasis on reason led to a kind of social sickness, a desic-
cated preoccupation with order and reason that made human life more or 
less pointless. His physicianly prescription was for a recovery of some of 
those lost or suppressed Dionysian energies. The Dionysian is associated 
with wild nature, which can be as violent as it is reproductively fruitful.
Wildness is a central tenet of our American identity. The word “wilder-
ness” is from the Anglo-Saxon wildëor, a wild animal or beast, so that “wil-
derness” means “where the wild things are.”14 Europe, on the other hand, is 
associated with civilization. As Roderick Frazier Nash explains in his book 
Wilderness and the American Mind, “The largest portion of the energy of 
civilization was directed at conquering wildness in nature and eliminating it 
in human nature.”15 That is to say, it is the progress of civilization that creates 
the idea of wilderness. Before there was an idea of civilization, there was no 
differentiation between civilization and wilderness. “Civilization severed the 
web of life as humans distanced themselves from the rest of nature. Behind 
fenced pastures, village walls, and, later, gated condominiums,” Nash writes, 
“it was hard to imagine other living things as brothers or nature as sacred. The 
remaining hunters and gatherers become ‘savages.’”16 Europeans were tamed 
by the social hierarchies of tradition, class, and family. To them, wilderness 
was something ugly. Americans, by contrast, had a wildness associated with 
them that came by way of the untamed land.
The history of the concept of wilderness is one primarily of opposition. The 
wilderness was considered a place both physically and morally perilous. The 
opposite of “wilderness” is “paradise,” which is Persian for “luxurious garden” 
(nature tamed). The Bible is full of references to the wilderness as an accursed 
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place. Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden into a desolate wilderness. 
Jesus experiences his trials with Satan in the wilderness. This was the attitude 
of the American pioneers as well. As Nash says, “The pioneers’ situation and 
attitude prompted them to use military metaphors to discuss the coming of 
civilization. Countless diaries, addresses, and memorials of the frontier period 
represented wilderness as an ‘enemy’ which had to be ‘conquered,’ ‘subdued’ 
and ‘vanquished’ by a ‘pioneer army.’”17 The commitment of the American 
pioneers was to convert wilderness into civilization, a paradise.
Where there are gains, there are also losses. This is part of the wisdom 
of Nietzsche, that the suppression of some part of our nature can have dire 
consequences for our natures as a whole. The central trope of American 
wildness is the wild West. Early on Thoreau recognized the dangers of 
suppressing our own wildness and of the loss of wilderness. In his essay 
“Walking,” he writes, “The West of which I speak is but another name for 
the Wild; and what I have been preparing to say is, that in Wildness is the 
preservation of the world.”18 I understand him to mean that, while rational 
Apollonian order and control are fine as far as they go, growth, creativity, 
and real human (and nonhuman) thriving depend on wildness, on a prin-
ciple of chaotic, raw energy. To lose our wilderness, to lose our wildness, is 
to lose the world and ourselves.
The Westerner, Blood, and Death
In the classic westerns, there tends to be a divide between easterners and 
westerners. Easterners tend to be more civilized, more religious, more 
concerned with moral rules, more talkative, and much less committed to 
outright action. The westerner, by contrast, tends to be closer to something 
wild than civilized; has, at best, a very rudimentary piety, or none at all; is 
concerned with a pretty straightforward conception of justice that is based 
on leaving him or her alone; and is suspicious of words and is committed 
to doing what needs to be done.19 Llewelyn Moss is a typical westerner in 
all these ways. His primary problem with Carson Wells seems to be that 
Carson Wells talks too much.
Peter French, in his book Cowboy Metaphysics: Ethics and Death in 
Westerns, says, “All westerners have something inside them that has to do 
with death.”20 Jane Tompkins, for her book West of Everything: The Inner 
Life of Westerns, takes the title from a passage in Louis L’ Amour’s Hondo: 
“the stark features of Lieutenant Creyton C. Davis, darling of Richmond 
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dance floors, hero of a Washington romance, dead now in the long grass on 
a lonely hill, west of everything.”21 Tompkins explains, “To go west, as far 
west as you can go, west of everything, is to die.”22 French refers to ours as 
a “death-denying” culture, while the westerner is “death-accepting.”23 Part 
of the power of No Country for Old Men, it seems to me, comes from the 
primal themes that it addresses head on. Llewelyn Moss is a man who is 
not afraid of, is not really even put off by, death. When he comes across the 
death scene in the desert, he does not shake or flee or weep; he is simply 
cautious. When he finds the last man standing (now sitting and no longer 
a man) and takes the money, he knows exactly what he is doing, what he is 
risking. Sheriff Bell, too, knows what he is doing, knows that to do his job 
he must accept the possibility of his own death. As he says, “I always knew 
you had to be willing to die to even do this job.”
There is, in No Country for Old Men, plenty of death and blood. In our 
culture today, we are as squeamish about blood as we are in denial about death. 
A skinned knee on a school yard is an emergency calling for rubber gloves and 
immediate containment procedures. There are reasons for this, to be sure. The 
omnipresent threat of AIDS is clearly one. For all that, however, such radical 
reactions to the sight of blood betoken an alienation from our own bodies and 
a terror of our own fluids. There is a sort of beautiful intimacy we see in the 
ways Llewelyn Moss attends to his own battered and bleeding body. There is 
a heroism, a revelation of his ferocious will, in his determination to continue 
to do what he intended to do, in spite of his severe and bleeding wounds. In 
a culture where our identities are largely determined by our shopping habits, 
where primary concerns have to do with what car we should buy, what televi-
sion or house we can afford, to watch these primal struggles of a person with 
his own bleeding body and the attention demanded to stay alive, with a killer 
like Anton Chigurh on his trail, promises a kind of immediate and pressing 
reality that is pretty elusive for most of us. We have lost something real in our 
loss of the experience of wildness. I am not exactly saying that I would prefer 
to have someone like Anton Chigurh on my trail or that we should be cavalier 
about blood spilled on school yards, but I am saying that something gets lost 
when we lose the risks that wildness presents to us.
Fate
A movie like The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (John Ford, 1962) can be 
thought of as an elegy for the loss of a certain kind of wildness. Tom Doni-
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phon (John Wayne) is all that a westerner can be, a man in his prime, big, 
strong, and capable, as capable of tenderness as of violence. He really has no 
problem with the outlaw Liberty Valance (Lee Marvin), at least not until the 
easterner Ransom Stoddard (Jimmy Stewart) shows up. Ransom (with the 
faint suggestion of something rancid, something that is a sign of the death 
of something) comes to the western town of Shinbone as a lawyer and a 
talker, decrying lawlessness, which, for the westerner, is basically the same 
thing as freedom. Tom recognizes a certain degree of truth in the things that 
Ransom is saying, but he also recognizes what Ransom’s truths will cost that 
country and especially the men like him who inhabit it. We, the audience, 
recognize the same things. We cannot deny Ransom’s claims for the need 
for law, for the need to put a stop to men like Liberty Valance, but we also 
feel the sadness of the loss of a man as spectacular as Tom Doniphon. To be 
left only with people like Ransom Stoddard is a loss indeed.
Ed Tom Bell, too, is a westerner. He is similarly clipped in his speech, 
preferring understatement when words are absolutely necessary. His voice-
overs, however, provide a whole new range to our understanding of the 
westerner. He sounds downright poetic in his thoughtfulness. This is not 
exactly new. It has always been an implied feature of the westerner that 
he is as sensitive as anyone to beauty and morality; it is just that talking 
about such things could pretty well ruin them. It is not so much that Bell is 
revealed to be a sensitive and thoughtful man via his voice-overs; rather, it 
is interesting to see the particular form his thoughtfulness and sensitivity 
take. The word that comes to mind to characterize the thoughts revealed in 
his voice-overs is philosophical: full of wonder and the attempt to put things 
together in the largest possible way.
There really are no easterners in No Country for Old Men. They are all, 
basically, westerners: tough, stoical, doers instead of talkers. There is one 
overarching wisdom that seems to be shared by Llewelyn, the old man Ellis 
(Barry Corbin), Bell, and even Anton Chigurh. It has to do with a sort of 
fatalism, which is very characteristic, I might add, of Greek tragedy. This 
fatalism is not quite a mechanistic inevitability, but it is definitely based on 
the idea that you are what you do and that what you have done cannot be 
undone, what decisions you have made cannot be unmade, and, finally, that 
what you do, what you have decided, will have its natural consequences in 
the world, and there is no avoiding or evading those consequences. This idea 
is conveyed explicitly and repeatedly in the novel, although it seems to be 
equally present in the movie, if somewhat more implicitly.
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In the novel, there is a sequence of scenes that does not occur in the 
movie. Llewelyn picks up a young female hitchhiker. Llewelyn actually does 
more talking here than he does in the rest of the story. The woman is very 
young and is headed, somewhat vaguely, for California. At one point she says, 
“I guess I ain’t sure what the point is.” To which Llewelyn replies, “The point 
is there aint no point.” After another short exchange, Llewelyn elaborates on 
a point he wants to make. “It’s not about knowin where you are. It’s about 
thinking you got there without takin anything with you. Your notions about 
startin over. Or anybody’s. You don’t start over. That’s what it’s about. Ever 
step you take is forever. You can’t make it go away. None of it.”24 Later, when 
Bell goes out to talk to his Uncle Ellis, Ellis expresses a somewhat similar 
opinion about things. In response to a question Ed Tom Bell asks Ellis about 
what he would have done if the convict who’d shot him had been released, he 
says, “I dont know. Nothin. There wouldn’t be no point to it. There ain’t no 
point to it. Not to any of it.” Ed Tom responds, “I’m kindly surprised to hear 
you say that.” Ellis explains, “You wear out, Ed Tom. All the time you spend 
tryin to get back what’s been took from you there’s more goin out the door. 
After awhile you just try and get a tourniquet on it.” Later, Ed Tom, in one 
of his ruminations, says, “I believe that whatever you do in your life it will 
get back to you. If you live long enough it will.”25 Anton Chigurh, explain-
ing to Carla Jean why he, in fact, does have to kill her, says, “Every moment 
in your life is a choice. All followed to this. The accounting is scrupulous. 
The shape is drawn. No line can be erased. . . . A person’s path through the 
world seldom changes and even more seldom will it change abruptly. And 
the shape of your path was visible from the beginning.”26
Each of these characters is expressing a twofold understanding about 
the world. On the one hand, there is an inevitability, a sense that the world 
goes on in its way and that it does not have much to do with our human 
desires and concerns. On the other hand there is a sense that we contribute 
to our own inevitable futures with every decision we make, with every act 
we commit, that what is perhaps hardest to live with is not the inevitabil-
ity that is the result of the turning of the earth but the inevitability that is 
associated with a future we are looking at that is the result of what we have 
done in the past. In biblical language, we reap what we sow.
There is a difference in the attitudes of the various characters to this 
wisdom. Uncle Ellis seems to be past guilt or shame or worry about what 
this wisdom means to his life. Llewelyn, who is still a relatively young man, 
seems to be pre-guilt, shame, and worry with respect to it. Ed Tom appears 
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both most hopeful, in spite of this wisdom, and most haunted by guilt and 
shame because of it.
No Country for Old Men
At one point, Ellis says to Ed Tom, “What you got ain’t nothin new. This 
country is hard on people. Hard and crazy. Got the devil in it yet folks never 
seem to hold it to account.” I take “this country,” first, to be a reference to the 
particular country that they are in at the moment, west Texas; then, second, 
to be a more general reference to the wild West; third, a reference to the 
United States; and, finally, to this world or even this universe, as a whole. 
There are several ways in which “this country” is no country for old men, 
although old men do inhabit it. It is a hard country, dry, hard ground, little 
water, not much there to keep a body alive without a lot of work. It takes the 
strength and resilience of youth to get on in such a landscape. That type of 
landscape is not just west Texas but the wild West in general, with its wild 
men, men who do not observe the social niceties and who grasp at what 
they want without asking and push others out of their way. Drug dealing 
is simply a more modern version of the lawlessness that has always been 
associated with the West, especially in Hollywood movies. Lawlessness is 
one way of conceiving freedom, and it is a very American way. The valence 
of a certain kind of freedom is a certain kind of lawlessness. The more laws 
there are, the less freedom. Such a freedom, however, is hard on the physi-
cally less robust. The wild West is indeed no country for old men.
The United States is a wild country in a similar way, not in being lawless, 
but in the way its laws are designed to encourage competition. The com-
petition fostered by the laws of the United States is mostly economic, but 
we love competition in almost any form. A Sunday afternoon professional 
football game is not for the faint of heart. As Oliver Stone makes clear in 
his film Wall Street (1987) with Gordon Gecko’s (Michael Douglas) paean 
to greed (the “Greed is good!” speech), Wall Street is, itself, a kind of wild 
West and no country for old men.
Senescence, the process of growing old, is part of every living species 
and has its evolutionary logic. August Weismann said, “I look at death as an 
adaptive phenomenon because an infinite duration of the individual would 
represent a very inopportune luxury. . . . Worn out individuals are of no value 
for the species; they are even harmful since they take the place of those who 
are healthy.”27 François Jacob continues this line of thinking: 
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In every species, the most important individuals are those which can 
reach sexual maturity, because they are the ones with the greatest 
capacity for propagation. Natural selection will, therefore, adjust 
the optimal state of animals to the time of their sexual maturity. In 
humans, for instance, maximal strength and resistance to disease 
is reached between twenty and thirty years. . . . Natural selection 
would tend to accumulate . . . harmful effects in the postreproduc-
tive period of the animal’s life, thus favoring deterioration of the 
body with age. In other words, vigor in youth should in a way be 
paid for by senescence.28 
Evolutionarily speaking, this is no country for old men.
Llewelyn Moss visits, as it were, the country of old men in the course 
of the movie. When the movie begins he is strapping strong, grown into his 
man strength, confident and at ease in his body. As the movie progresses, he 
is repeatedly shot and wounded, each hit diminishing his strength and bodily 
self-reliance. His bodily strength gets whittled away like Mr. Merriweather’s 
(Martin Balsam) in Little Big Man (Arthur Penn, 1970). By the end of the 
movie, much of his strength has returned, but he has had a good taste of 
what old age is like. And, in the end, his strength will still not be sufficient 
to save him.
The title of the novel, and of the movie, comes from William Butler 
Yeats’s poem, “Sailing to Byzantium.” The poem begins:
That is no country for old men. The young
In one another’s arms, birds in the trees
—Those dying generations—at their song,
The Salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas,
Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long
Whatever is begotten born, and dies.
Caught in that sensual music all neglect
Monuments of unageing intellect.
The theme here is certainly consistent with Jacob’s evolutionary evaluation 
of senescence. That is, the lament that can be heard in these lines is for no 
longer belonging to the country of the young. It is also a lament for the way 
the young neglect the wisdom of the past and, presumably, of the old. The 
poem continues in the second stanza,
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An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
For every tatter in its mortal dress.
The wisdom here seems to be that when one has outgrown the world of 
the young, the world aflow with sensual music, one must make one’s own 
music, presumably, as art; for Yeats, as poetry. The poem ends with the poet 
imagining himself, after he has died, being made into a golden bird by some 
ancient artisan, 
set upon a golden bough to sing 
To lords and ladies of Byzantium 
Of what is past, or passing, or to come.29
Yeats chooses Byzantium because it was a great early Christian city 
in which Plato’s Academy, for a time, was still allowed to function. The 
historical period of Byzantium was a time of culmination that was also a 
time of transition. In his book of mystical writings, A Vision, Yeats says, 
“I think that in early Byzantium, maybe never before or since in recorded 
history, religious, aesthetic, and practical life were one, that architect and 
artificers . . . spoke to the multitude and the few alike.”30 This idea of a bal-
ance and a coherence in a society’s religious, aesthetic, and practical life is 
Yeats’s ideal, and it seems to be the very same ideal that Nietzsche extolled. 
It is an ideal rarely realized in this world and maybe not even in ancient 
Byzantium. Certainly within the context of the movie No Country for Old 
Men, one has the sense, especially from Bell as the chronicler of the times, 
that things are out of alignment, that balance and harmony are gone from 
the land and from the people. It is Yeats’s vision, and certainly Nietzsche’s 
as well, that it is the artist/philosopher who is most needed to help restore 
the balance. It may not, in the end, be the doer as much as the thinker who 
is needed to help us see where our losses are and where we might find the 
gains to make us whole.
A Dream of Fire
The movie ends with Bell telling his wife Loretta (Tess Harper) about two 
dreams that he had had the night before. Both dreams have his father in 
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them. The first is about some money that Bell loses. The second has his father 
riding past him in the night, carrying fire in a horn. Bell ends his descrip-
tion of the dream by saying, “And in the dream I knew that he was goin on 
ahead and that he was fixin to make a fire somewhere out there in all that 
dark and all that cold, and I knew that whenever I got there he would be 
there. Out there up ahead.”
Prometheus stole fire from the gods to give to human beings in order 
to save them from extinction. To make a fire is an art. It is by the arts that 
human beings thrive, and I take that original art of making fire to stand, 
metonymically, for all the arts. Fire beats back the darkness, the darkness 
of fear, of ignorance, of hubris, of greed. I read Bell’s dream of his father 
to be a dream of carrying on the fire of memory, the fire of the stories that 
one has of what one has seen in this world. It is the fire of the wisdom that 
those stories can yield with the telling of them. This, too, is an important 
role to play, to be the bearer of this fire. It is less heroic in the eyes of the 
world than that of lawman or outlaw, but it is probably more important to 
human survival and thriving than either of those.
Bell is himself a storyteller. There is a wonderful, funny, slightly unnerv-
ing scene in which Bell is talking to Carla Jean. She has contacted him in 
order to tell him where Llewelyn is hiding. She has been influenced to do this 
by a story Bell told her earlier, a complicated story of a man Bell said he knew, 
one Charlie Walser, who worked at a slaughterhouse. One day, as the story 
went, Charlie was trying to slaughter a cow. First, he’d hit it with a mallet, in the 
standard way, but the cow didn’t die and started thrashing around, so he pulls 
out his gun and tries to shoot it. “But what with all the swingin and twistin it’s 
a glance-shot and ricochets around and comes back and hits Charlie in the 
shoulder.” The point of the story is that no matter how competent a person is, 
and Carla Jean has complete confidence in Llewelyn’s competence, things can 
happen, things can go wrong. Carla Jean understands the point of the story, 
and it persuades her to go back to Bell to tell him where Llewelyn is so that 
he might be able to help Llewelyn. But before she tells Bell where Llewelyn 
is, she says, “Sheriff, was that a true story about Charlie Walser?” To which 
Bell replies, in part, “It’s certainly true that it was a story.”31
To say that it is true that it was a story amounts to saying that the story 
is not true. But, of course, the story is true, as an allegory about an aspect of 
the way the world is, even if it is not literally true, even if there is no Charlie 
Walser, or if there was such a man, even if he never shot a cow and ended 
up with the bullet in his own shoulder. It is true that sometimes bad things 
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happen in this world to even the most competent of people. There’s no tell-
ing where that ricocheting bullet might end up.
Philosophy is full of stories that may not be literally true but are meant 
to be understood as pointing to deeper truths. Plato, especially, puts these 
kinds of stories into the mouth of Socrates in dialogues like the Gorgias, or 
the Republic, or the Phaedo, to name just a few. How true a story is allegori-
cally may even be the measure of a philosophy or of a work of literature, in 
general. This is very much, it seems to me, the measure of the value of the 
movies of the Coen brothers. Nearly all of their movies tell stories that are 
unbelievable at the literal level. It is certainly true that they are stories, but it 
is also true that they are in their own ways true stories, stories that reveal true 
things about the way the world is and about our ways of being in the world. 
It is precisely in this way that their movies function like philosophy.
If their movies are philosophical, the philosophy is very much about 
America. The ending of No Country for Old Men may seem unsatisfying to 
some and puzzling to others. One way to view the ending of No Country 
is as a mixing of the two great American movie genres, the western and 
film noir. These two great American film genres reflect the two sides of 
the American psyche. On the one hand, there is the western in which the 
westerner is faced with overwhelming odds, but between his perseverance 
and his skill, he overcomes the odds and triumphs. This allegorizes the 
optimism of the American psyche. In film noir, on the other hand, the hero 
is smart (more or less) and wily and there are many obstacles to overcome, 
the odds are against him, and, in fact, he fails to overcome them. He is 
overwhelmed by the juggernaut of other people’s evil or by the way the 
world just happens to go. This genre reflects the pessimism and fatalism of 
the American psyche. With No Country for Old Men, the Coens combine 
these two genres into one movie. It is a western with a tragic, existential, 
film noir ending. The western speaks to our youth (and nostalgically to us 
in our old age); film noir speaks to the sadder wisdom of age. No Country 
for Old Men speaks of both.32
At the end of the movie, Bell seems to be experiencing both regret and 
chagrin: chagrin at how the world is turning out, regret that he could not do 
more to have stopped it turning out so. Ellis refers to that regret as “vanity,” 
which it is, and, no doubt, Bell knows that too. In one sense, Bell has failed. 
He failed to protect Llewelyn and Carla Jean. He failed to capture Anton 
Chigurh. And he failed to persevere to the end. He just more or less gives 
up and retires from being sheriff. In another sense, however, there is great 
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wisdom in this apparent failure. Bell knows that he is no match for Anton 
Chigurh. What he has done, however, is bear witness to certain events. He 
has seen some aspects of the world, ways in which the world unfurls, that 
not many have seen. It is because he was, as it were, on the front line of those 
events, close enough to be killed, certainly, that he can see what he has seen 
about the world. This, too, is an important role to play, to play for the sake of 
humanity, the one who bears witness, the one who can tell the tales of what 
has happened in the past, of what is passing, and of what is to come.
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deceIt, desIre, and dark comedy
Postmodern Dead Ends in Blood Simple
Alan Woolfolk
Blood Simple proceeded in a more organized, more conscious fashion. We 
did not deal with the real Texas, but an artificial version of it, an assemblage 
of texts and mythologies. The subject is “murderous passion.” There have 
been so many cases of this sort that have occurred in Texas that it has 
become a part of the public imagination. But what resulted from that was 
important to us because the film was imagined as a slice of life, a deliberate 
fiction that it was normal to set within an exotic locale.
—Joel Coen, interviewed in Positif
We have seen that there is a way in which postmodernism replicates or 
reproduces—reinforces—the logic of consumer capitalism; the more 
significant question is whether there is also a way in which it resists that 
logic.
—Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society”
As the inaugural film of Joel and Ethan Coen, Blood Simple (1984) is a 
startling exercise in transgeneric filmmaking that is difficult to characterize 
accurately not only because it draws upon the genres of film noir, comedy, 
the detective film, and the thriller but also because it is almost too obvi-
ously and pejoratively postmodern in its self-reflexivity, the use of obvious 
symbolism, and what Fredric Jameson calls the “omnipresence of pastiche” 
to the exclusion of any genuine “historicity.”1 Indeed, there is a strong and 
compelling case to be made that Blood Simple is an innovative product of 
the culture industry’s postmodern neo-noir films, perhaps best exemplified 
by Lawrence Kasdan’s Body Heat (1981) with its nostalgic recycling of noir 
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motifs, compelling manipulation of seductive images, and persistent at-
tention to the mastery of technique over content. According to this view, 
the Coen brothers simply bring macabre and comedic twists to their 
recycling of noir motifs that are calculated to jar and disturb the viewer. 
Blood Simple is, after all, what R. Barton Palmer calls a “visceral” film 
that reshapes the standard noir themes of greed, lust, and corruption, the 
jaded private detective, and the femme fatale at least in part because it so 
effectively employs techniques from comedy and thriller films.2 Much like 
comedy and thriller films, this film works because it speaks to the body 
and is felt in the gut.
Nonetheless, Blood Simple is also arguably more deeply and resolutely 
postmodern in that it not only frustrates the attempts of its primary char-
acters to achieve a coherent personal narrative and interpersonal com-
munication, let alone trust in a saving metanarrative (all of which were 
already present in classic noir), but also lacks any significant intimation 
of resistance, however futile and self-destructive, to the corruption and 
profane ordinariness of late modernity that was present in classic film noir 
at its best.3 From this perspective, the film’s visceral quality may be seen 
as supporting a postmodern vision that connects with the history of our 
recent past precisely because it deconstructs and discredits prominent 
narratives of late modernity and what might be called late modernism 
that were exemplified in classic noir films. To be more precise, as a post-
modern neo-noir film Blood Simple is a camp, over-the-top “blood melo-
drama”—blood is everywhere in the film—that severs the earlier, tenuous 
link between high modernism and film noir.4 There is no implicit critique 
of modernity, no vestige of aesthetic revolt against the bourgeoisie, not 
even an allusion to the emptiness and corruption of conventional society. 
Rather, there is only the mundane, albeit comedic, present. Blood Simple 
ruthlessly burlesques the bourgeois myth of the self-made man to no other 
avail than affirming the healthiness of the clueless spouse/heroine. Instead 
of a detective with a questionable code of honor or perhaps an identity in 
conflict, it presents us with a low and venal parody of the corrupt Texas 
police detective Hank Quinlan from Touch of Evil (Orson Welles, 1958). 
Rather than charting the precarious and frequently fatal spiritual descent 
of a noir protagonist, Blood Simple gives us a hapless Marlboro Man 
who cannot even negotiate the flatlands of Texas. One looks in vain for 
a counternarrative, some evidence of the old tension between modernity 
and modernism, some remnant of the opposition between bourgeois and 
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bohemian, but there is none to be found.5 Blood Simple offers none of the 
authenticity of classic film noir because there is no gesture of rejection 
toward the extant society.
Yet Blood Simple advances beyond the inauthenticity of Fredric Jameson’s 
“blank parody.”6 For the Coen brothers this film is a beginning point in their 
move toward the historical engagement and “new sincerity” of such films 
as The Hudsucker Proxy (1994) and The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001).7 As 
a sort of point zero, Blood Simple subjects one of the most popular myths 
of late modernity that is embodied in film noir—the noir myth of a fate-
ful dark past and/or dark impulses intruding upon the conscious self and 
conventional society—to a merciless parody in order to move beyond it. 
In Blood Simple, the dark past becomes a dark and comedic present that 
casts no shadows. There is no “return of the repressed,” nor even a serious 
return of that which has been denied or consciously rejected (although the 
cuckolded husband does prove stubbornly and comically difficult to kill and 
returns in the nightmare of the spouse/heroine). The noir myth is necessary 
to the film but only so that it may be negated. Paradoxically, Blood Simple 
relies upon the myth of a dark past and dark impulses that aren’t there in 
any substantial form.
Minimal Philosophy and the Failure of Imagination
Blood Simple opens with a kind of common man’s disquisition on life by an 
as yet unnamed private detective (M. Emmet Walsh), who is named Visser 
in the film and Loren Visser in the original screenplay (as indicated by his 
lighter), in the form of a voice-over in a country accent set against a barren 
Texas landscape: “The world is full of complainers. But the fact is, nothing 
comes with a guarantee. I don’t care if you’re the Pope of Rome, President 
of the United States, or even Man of the Year—something can always go 
wrong. And go ahead, complain, tell your problems to your neighbor, ask for 
help—watch him fly. Now in Russia, they got it mapped out so that everyone 
pulls for everyone else—that’s the theory, anyway. But what I know is Texas 
. . . and down here . . . you’re on your own.” Visser’s disquisition is vaguely 
reminiscent of Eric Hoffer’s The True Believer (1951), a book notable for its 
articulation of a superficial sidewalk philosophy that gets nearly everything 
wrong. While the primary point of Hoffer’s book in the 1950s was to attack 
early Christianity as a social movement made up of the riff-raff of society, the 
aim of Visser’s comments is to articulate a crude philosophy of individualism. 
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Both present utterly profane views of the self, society, and world. Both bask 
in their anti-intellectualism, especially insofar as it supports a dismissal of 
any higher social philosophy.
Visser’s minimal, lower social philosophy is depicted in Blood Simple as 
a comedy of hapless selves driven by desires. Indeed, historian Jerrold Seigel 
argues that the modern intellectual history of selfhood revolves around 
three dimensions of selfhood: the material or bodily, the sociocultural, and 
the reflective.8 Defined in these terms, Blood Simple is an aesthetic experi-
ment in which the sociocultural and reflective dimensions of the self have 
been elided and the bodily self has apparently been reduced to the simplest 
of impulses. In the opening scenes, a taciturn bartender named Ray (John 
Getz) begins a casual affair with his boss’s wife, Abby (Frances McDormand), 
while driving her to Houston to escape from her marriage to Julian Marty 
(Dan Hedaya), a financially successful bar owner. From the beginning, the 
relationship between Ray and Abby is an exercise in failed communication, 
a series of misunderstandings and incorrect readings of each other. Initially, 
Abby has failed to recognize that Ray “likes” her. After the affair begins, both 
imagine that the other is involved with someone else. When Ray finds Marty 
shot and apparently dead, he imagines that Abby has committed the crime 
when in fact Marty has been shot and left for dead by Visser, who has been 
hired by Marty to spy on Abby. Later, Abby imagines that Ray is responsible 
for the death of Marty, for which he does share responsibility, but not for 
the reasons that she imagines. In short, the relationship between Ray and 
Abby is characterized by multiple failures of social imagination and misun-
derstandings, the inability to discern what the other person is thinking and 
feeling. If, as the American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley once wrote, 
“the imaginations which people have of one another are the solid facts of 
society,” then there are but few solid facts between Ray and Abby and many 
insubstantial and misleading fictions.9 
It is not an exaggeration to say that nearly every major action in the film 
is determined by unchecked passions—not just unchecked erotic impulses 
but raw motives of fear, greed, revenge, and anger that cause individuals to 
go “simple.” Failures of social imagination and lack of self-reflection seem 
to explain much of the haplessness of repeated impulsive actions. On the 
surface of the narrative, Ray is initially driven by sexual desire, Marty by 
revenge, Visser by greed, Abby by fear and desire, and yet this is not the entire 
story. Visser’s venality is intertwined with voyeurism (he takes pictures of 
Ray and Abby engaging in sexual acts and then gives the unsolicited pictures 
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to Marty), and Marty’s anger and vengeful motives are clearly inseparable 
from what he imagines other men are doing with Abby (which is made 
quite clear when he sees Visser’s photographs). In fact, Marty’s decision 
to hire Visser to kill Ray and Abby is the consequence of obsessive brood-
ing about Abby, which is triggered by his viewing of the photographs. 
But the implications of Visser’s photographs are even more complicated. 
Marty suspects Visser’s voyeurism and reveals his jealousy when he asks, 
“How long did you watch her?” (emphasis added). Visser, in turn, not 
only shamelessly acknowledges his voyeurism but clearly takes pleasure 
in taunting Marty when he responds, “Most of the night. . . . They’d just 
rest a few minutes and then get started again. Quite something.” In short, 
the imaginations Marty and Visser have of each other are the solid facts 
of their sordid relationship. In this closed postmodern universe, there is 
no glimpse of a moral society, not even the possibility of a genuine social 
relationship. Hence, there is not the sense of loss, the regret, about what 
might have been that is present in classic noir and even early neo-noir 
(e.g., Chinatown [Roman Polanski, 1974]).
The Complexities of Going “Simple”
On the one hand, the Coen brothers present us with a truncated view of 
individuals (who lack adequate social development, cultural context, and 
self-reflectiveness) that turns the major characters of the film into impulsive 
marionettes in a minimalist theater of the absurd placed at the mercy of a 
postmodern fate. On the other hand, the Coens have created an unpreten-
tious Texan working-class universe that lacks what René Girard calls an 
external mediating authority.10 There are no impersonal or sufficiently 
removed spiritual models regulating desire and emotion. Rather, desires 
and emotions run rampant. Jealousy and envy are unchecked among rivals 
in close social proximity to one another, with each imitating the other. For 
instance, Ray sexually desires his boss’s wife, Abby, who then in turn is 
desired by her husband, Marty, resulting in an attempted rape. But in the 
interval between Ray’s initial one-night stand with Abby and the attempted 
rape, Ray’s desire for Abby is fueled by his perusal of the old photographs of 
Marty and Abby together hanging in the den of their home (recall that Ray 
caresses Abby’s leg in one of the pictures). Consequently, Ray and Marty 
are jealous rivals whose desires for Abby each feed off the other. Moreover, 
Marty and Meurice (Samm-Art Williams), the African American bartender, 
84 Alan Woolfolk
are also to a lesser degree sexual rivals. Marty initially believes that Abby 
is having an affair with a “colored” man (quite possibly Meurice) and later 
unsuccessfully attempts to pick up Meurice’s newfound girlfriend, Debra 
(Deborah Neumann). Meurice, for his part, meets Debra while working 
at Marty’s bar and persists in bringing girlfriends back to Marty’s place to 
party after hours, a seemingly innocent action, but not without significance 
given Marty’s tendencies toward sexual jealousy and envy.
Photography obviously feeds the dynamics of what Girard calls “triangu-
lar desire” in Blood Simple and facilitates individuals going “simple” minded 
over more than just sexual objects. Visser’s later photograph of Abby and 
Ray is doctored to make it look as though they have been shot while asleep 
in bed, all for the purpose of convincing Marty that Visser really has killed 
the couple. As such, the photo becomes a means of deceiving Marty so that 
Visser may collect his ten thousand dollars from Marty before he attempts 
to kill him. (Visser does not trust Marty not to go “simple” on him and 
reveal the murders.) Visser covets Marty’s money more than his wife, but 
he is nonetheless the victim of his unchecked desires. Despite the fact that 
Visser is worried about Marty going “simple” on him, Visser himself goes 
“simple” out of greed, just as Ray goes “simple” out of desire and eventually 
affection for Abby, and Marty goes “simple” out of jealousy and rage. There 
is no room for self-reflection or self-critique. The unchecked desires of all 
three men simply and rather obviously lead to a dead end. Indeed, in a bit 
of self-conscious symbolism, the Coen brothers even have Ray living on 
a “dead end” street, which provides the setup for two humorous scenes in 
which Marty and Meurice angrily drive away from Ray’s going the wrong 
way, only to come to an abrupt halt and turn around.
The Uncertainties of Postmodern Fate
As a postmodern film, Blood Simple is a film of self-parody. Self-conscious 
symbolism abounds, drawing attention to the fact that the narrative is con-
structed and relies on the manipulation of symbols by the director/writers. 
Just prior to being shot and left for dead by Visser, for example, Marty returns 
from his fishing trip with a string of fish, which remain on his desk rotting 
even after Ray has removed his body, signaling that something is “fishy” or 
that something “stinks.” After seeing Visser’s pictures of Abby and Ray ap-
parently dead, Marty immediately vomits because he has “no stomach” for 
murder. And Visser himself is repeatedly depicted as a low and disgusting 
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man who in his tactless yellow leisure suit and shabby personal demeanor 
resembles the (Volkswagen) “bug” that he drives. (Indeed, Visser even ac-
knowledges that he is a repulsive creature, telling Marty that he can “crawl 
around” without his head if Marty wants to “cut it off.”) Such camp symbols 
both draw attention to themselves in their obviousness and directness and 
prompt the sophisticated postmodern viewer to recognize them as bits of 
self-conscious humor inserted into the film by the authors for the amuse-
ment of the audience.
Of greater significance is the Coen brothers’ self-conscious treatment 
of uncertainty and the irony of intentions, both bad and good, gone awry. 
As Palmer has argued, “What is most certain is uncertainty itself, the fact 
that ‘something can always go wrong,’ as the narrator wryly observes.”11 In 
the case of Visser, his criminal plans go awry on several occasions, most 
notably when he fails to kill Marty and leaves the photograph of Ray and 
Abby behind and when he disastrously underestimates the resourcefulness 
of Abby in the closing scenes. Likewise, Ray’s plan to dispose of Marty’s 
body in a misguided effort to protect Abby turns into a gruesome charade 
in which the mortally wounded husband is buried alive. But what is most 
important is not simply the irony of unintended consequences that runs like 
a red thread throughout Blood Simple and of course harkens back to classic 
noir films. Rather, it is the postmodern context within which these ironic 
consequences are set: the events of Blood Simple unfold within a universe 
of uncertainty, not fate, with the narrative of the film drawing attention to 
the sheer contingency of human action and events.
Blood Simple may be fruitfully contrasted with such classic noir films as 
Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944) and Detour (Edgar G. Ulmer, 1945), 
to which it bears a superficial resemblance. On the surface, all three films 
appear to emphasize the theme of an inexorable fate that is inseparable 
from the character flaws of the major characters. But the two classic noir 
films construct a modern notion of fate that, however contrived it might 
be, is set within the cultural context of a modernist critique of twentieth-
century capitalist civilization. In Double Indemnity, as James Naremore has 
argued, the insurance agent Walter Neff (Fred MacMurray) “is little more 
than a cog in a bureaucracy, and he cannot resist the blandishments of sex 
and money.” The film is “pervaded with grimly deterministic metaphors of 
modern industry: the lovers promise to remain committed to one another 
‘straight down the line’; Walter devises a clockwork murder involving a train, 
and when he puts his plan in motion he remarks that ‘the machinery had 
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started to move and nothing could stop it’; later, looking back over his crime, 
he claims that fate had ‘thrown the switch’ and that the ‘gears had meshed.’” 
Even the femme fatale, Phyllis (Barbara Stanwyck), is “visibly artificial . . . a 
soulless, modernized female” who is “affectless.”12 Similarly, Ulmer’s Detour 
is clearly influenced by the Frankfurt school and may be read as a critique 
of the American wasteland in which the lives of the major characters are 
dominated by cultural and economic forces embodied in Hollywood. As 
Paul Cantor explains, “The characters in Detour seem incapable of generat-
ing authentic desires; they are always setting their goals on the basis of the 
models that American society offers them.”13 Consequently, as in the case of 
Double Indemnity, the theme of fate is specifically linked to a critique of late 
modern capitalist civilization. The grim fatalism of Walter Neff in Double 
Indemnity and Al Roberts (Tom Neal) in Detour is a manifestation of the 
sickness of American society.
Blood Simple presents no such modernist critique. While the three 
male characters of Visser, Marty, and Ray all go “simple,” the contingency 
of human action and events is unrelated to the context of late modernity; 
rather, contingency is universal, a fundamental fact of human existence. 
The rampant desires of a society created in the image of Visser’s minimal 
social philosophy presuppose an uncertain world in which anything can and 
does happen by chance. “Something can always go wrong” is a primordial 
principle that precedes the social and cultural context. This uncertainty 
becomes explicit with regard to events associated with Abby’s pistol, which 
Visser steals with only three bullets remaining in the six chambers. One 
bullet is fired when Visser shoots Marty with the gun in what appears to be 
an attempt to incriminate Abby. A second bullet is discharged when Ray 
accidentally kicks the gun upon entering Marty’s office to find his apparently 
dead body. And the third bullet is not fired until Abby shoots Visser (think-
ing that he is Marty) in self-defense. During the time between the firing 
of the second and third bullets, Marty attempts to discharge the gun three 
times when he shoots at Ray from the grave, but in a stroke of remarkably 
bad luck he hits an empty chamber each time. Abby, on the other hand, has 
the remarkably good luck to fire the single remaining bullet on the first try 
exactly when she must to save her life. In Blood Simple, the universe is ruled 
by chance, not fate. Life is a gamble. Individual purpose and social order 
are fictions that may dissolve at any moment in the face of uncertainty to 
reveal not the bleak determinism of late modernity but the dark humor of 
the postmodern absurdity of life.
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Multiple Burlesques
The postmodern humor of Blood Simple cuts more deeply because comedic 
inversions run throughout the film that not only parody and subvert the noir 
myth but also assume some familiarity with it. As a private detective, for 
instance, Visser retains none of the heritage of the dandy’s impeccable self-
control and aesthetic sophistication that classic noir drew upon beginning 
with The Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941).14 Instead, Visser is clearly a 
villain and an inverted image of the dandy, an antidandy, a theme to which 
the Coen brothers return in The Big Lebowski (1998). As a postmodern cross 
between Hank Quinlan in Touch of Evil manufacturing evidence and Jake 
Gittes in Chinatown telling bad jokes, Visser possesses no sign of either the 
former’s genius for framing the guilty nor the latter’s unsuccessful aspiration 
to coolness and self-possession. In fact, going “simple” implies a complete 
lack of coolness and self-possession.
In contrast, Ray initially seems to be cool and self-possessed, but once 
he is confronted with the brute reality of Marty’s body and concludes that 
Abby is responsible for the murder, he panics. From this point on, the whole 
dark comedy of cleaning up the seemingly endless blood and disposing of the 
body that is not dead unfolds. Ray’s presentation of himself as the taciturn, 
laid-back Marlboro Man, contemporized with unlit cigarette, is exposed as 
a sham as he discovers how difficult it is not only to get rid of a body (à la 
Hitchcock in The Trouble with Harry [1955]) but also, more importantly, 
to dispose of one that is not dead. The disturbing farce of Ray’s dance-of-
death struggle with the nearly dead Marty on the highway and the ordeal of 
burying him alive are a brilliant, literal representation of the macabre with 
comedic twists that completely unnerve him. After these ghastly experiences, 
Ray never recovers his former composure as he seems to move inevitably 
toward his eventual death at the hands of Visser.
If Visser is rather obviously depicted as a lowly bug and Ray is exposed as 
a Marlboro Man overcome with panic, then Marty is mercilessly burlesqued 
as a conventional self-made man who is a “hard ass” and “anal retentive.” 
Aside from the fact that Dan Hedaya bears a definite resemblance to Richard 
Nixon (the quintessential self-made man of American politics), Marty is 
repeatedly depicted as an uptight businessman who is obsessed with pro-
tecting his money and possessions (including Abby) to the point that he is 
deranged and “sick.” Not only does Visser’s scatological joke about anality 
and love seem especially appropriate for Marty but Abby explains later in 
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the film in an unintentionally mock-serious scene at Ray’s bungalow that 
Marty has confessed to her that he is mentally “anal.” Here, it seems not 
unreasonable to conclude that the Coen brothers are burlesquing the pop 
psychology of the classic noir era (e.g., The Accused [William Dieterle, 1949]), 
as well as throwing in a bit of pop Freudianism that is incongruous for the 
time period of the film, once again drawing attention to the postmodern 
pastiche of Blood Simple as they subject the myth of the self-made man to 
a carnivalesque deflation.
The Triumph of the “Funny” Girl
In contrast to the three leading males who meet with their respective dead 
ends, Abby is a model of health and normality, and not simply because she 
tells Ray that the psychiatrist to whom Marty has sent her has told her that 
she is the “healthiest” person he has ever met. Despite the fact that she is 
driven by fear, desire, and loneliness, Abby is the only major figure in the 
film who does not lose her cool and go “simple.” Even so, aside from the fact 
that she does not go “simple,” Abby is still haplessly impulsive and clueless 
as to what is going on around her to the point that her misunderstanding of 
Ray’s intentions results in his killing by Visser when she turns on the light 
in her new apartment, making her an unintentional femme fatale. Nonethe-
less, Abby’s cluelessness is the key to her survival in this sordid society. As 
an unintentional femme fatale, she seems immune to the guile that leads 
others to their dead ends. In fact, Abby’s lack of guile becomes an asset in 
a society in which most individuals are too clever for their own good, in 
which there is no working definition of the good.
Although Abby fails to understand and communicate with Ray clearly, 
her claim that “I ain’t done nothing funny” is ironic precisely because it 
should not be read negationally. One should not assume that she has done 
something funny that needs to be revealed by removing or rejecting her 
denial (i.e., her “ain’t”), despite her betrayal and humiliation of Marty (e.g., 
her adultery with Ray, the kick in the groin to Marty), which are openly car-
ried out and not denied in the course of the film. The line is funny precisely 
in its straightness, given the deceit and paranoia that surround her. Abby 
is above suspicion.
Yet one must ask what “healthiness” means within the closed post-
modern universe of Blood Simple. Noir films such as Double Indemnity and 
Detour offer bleak portraits of a sick society in which health is by implication 
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dependent upon the rejection of late modernity. Fate may rule, but there is 
the possibility of a way out. Blood Simple, as stated earlier, presents no such 
modernist critique. There is no way out; there are only those who somehow 
keep from going “simple” and are momentarily lucky. Abby is lucky. In a world 
of uncertainty, she gambles and wins and, thus, is temporarily empowered.
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“and It’s such a BeautIful day!”
Shame and Fargo
Rebecca Hanrahan and David Stearns
The drama of Fargo (1996) begins with a conversation in a bar. There, 
Jerry Lundegaard (William H. Macy) negotiates the kidnapping of his 
wife with two unsavory characters, Carl Showalter (Steve Buscemi) and 
Gaear Grimsrud (Peter Stormare). Carl asks Jerry, incredulously, “You 
want to have your wife kidnapped?” Jerry confirms his desire with an un-
hesitant, untroubled, and unashamed “Yah.” Carl, though, is concerned. 
And though his concern is primarily directed at the financial wisdom of 
the venture, he isn’t mollified when Jerry reassures his two associates that 
the plan is “real sound. It’s all worked out.” The ransom, Jerry explains, 
will be paid by his father-in-law, Wade Gustafson (Harve Presnell), and 
Jerry will provide the two with a car. This isn’t enough for Carl. He wants 
to know why Jerry would need to resort to such a scheme. Jerry feebly 
explains that it is “personal.”
At this point in the conversation, Carl goes up to the edge of his concerns 
but can’t seem to find his words. He stammers, “Okay, Jerry. You’re tasking 
us to perform this mission, but you, you won’t, uh, you won’t—aw, fuck it, 
let’s take a look at that Ciera.” What is Carl grasping at, why can’t it be said, 
and how is it that the Ciera is such a distraction?
The key to answering these questions, we contend, lies in the relation-
ship between shame and friendship as put forth by Aristotle. In this movie, 
those who lack an appropriate sense of shame don’t have the capacity to form 
friendships. Thus, each of the co-conspirators, to differing degrees, tends to 
relate to others merely instrumentally. They think in terms of what advantage 
they can get from the people around them and not in terms of the merit of 
those people on their own terms. Consequently, they don’t have the regard 
for others that is needed for them to feel shame and hence regulate their 
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behavior accordingly. The only character in the film who is morally upright 
is the sheriff investigating the kidnapping, Marge Gunderson (Frances 
McDormand). Her behavior gives her no cause to feel shame, for she has 
the ability to assume the good of others as her own, as demonstrated by her 
deep friendship with her husband. Moreover, this ability gives her a moral 
orientation that enables her to locate times when others should be ashamed. 
And with this knowledge in hand, she tries gently to instruct others as to 
how they should behave and feel.
To begin, we will consider Aristotle’s theory of shame and its relationship 
to moral character. Next, we will draw parallels between Aristotle’s theory 
and the various characters in the movie. Finally, we will show how shame 
and friendship are related both in the film and in Aristotle’s work. There, 
we will argue that those characters who have the proper regard for others 
have the capacity for both shame and friendship, and those who lack this 
regard lack these capacities.
Aristotle on Shame
Shame, for Aristotle, is a feeling that accompanies one’s recognition of 
having done something that would result in disgrace or discredit: “Shame 
may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether 
present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit; and 
shamelessness as contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad 
things.”1 Because shame is associated with disgrace, it necessarily involves 
our recognition of others as morally significant. Thus, to properly feel 
shame, we must care about our standing in relation to those who matter, 
specifically, those “persons whom we admire, or who admire us, or by 
whom we wish to be admired, or from whom we desire some service that 
we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good opinion.”2 We do not want to 
do wrong in front of these people, for when we do, we will be disgraced. 
We will have lost our honor and good reputation. Such a loss is felt as a 
pain, and this sort of pain is shame. Of course, these feelings of shame 
do not arise only in those contexts in which our bad actions are actually 
witnessed by those whom we respect. It also occurs when we imagine how 
such people would respond to that which we have done or that which we 
are tempted to do. In addition, we need not have any particular person 
in mind when engaging in these imaginative exercises. Merely imagining 
what respectable people would think of our poor behavior is enough to 
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induce shame. For these reasons, Aristotle at times describes shame as 
“the imagination of disgrace.”3
Now, this sort of pain is not something found in the most excellent 
people, “since it is consequent on bad actions,” which the excellent do 
not do, nor are they even tempted to do.4 But even so, there is still a way 
in which shame plays a role in moral goodness. For though the feeling of 
shame is not in and of itself praiseworthy, since it indicates either that you 
have done wrong or are tempted to do wrong, having a capacity for shame 
is. “But shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man 
did such actions, he would feel disgraced.”5 If someone does something 
bad, we expect him to be disgraced by it. Conversely, we judge someone’s 
character negatively if we observe him doing awful things and not feeling 
the slightest bit ashamed by it.
But though a capacity for shame is praiseworthy, it is obviously not a suf-
ficient condition of moral excellence. “If shamelessness—not to be ashamed 
of doing base actions—is something bad, that doesn’t make it decent to do 
such things and be ashamed.”6 In addition to a sense of shame, the morally 
upright individual must possess the disposition to act in accordance with 
what shame has taught him. For this reason, Aristotle thinks that shame 
is fitting “only for youth. For we think young people should be prone to 
shame because they live by passion and therefore commit many errors, but 
are restrained by shame; and we praise the young people who are prone to 
this passion.”7 By a “passion” (pathos), Aristotle simply means an emotion 
or desire. Some passions are directed at satisfying one’s bodily appetites, but 
others are not. Anger and, as we can see from the quote above, shame are 
passions as well. Importantly, these feelings need not be particularly strong; 
they can be weak and still be considered passions.
Now, men of moral excellence have their passions in line with their 
right reason.8 But the young are morally inchoate. While they may know 
right from wrong, their passions are too strong and draw them away from 
right action. Hence, there is no way to keep the young from acting poorly 
on occasion. Shame then allows the young to recognize bad actions, both 
those they have engaged in and those they are intending to do. And this 
knowledge can, of course, aid them in properly altering their behavior in the 
future. Moreover, if they properly alter their behavior, that is, if they correct 
their behavior to accord with shame’s lessons, the young will in time master 
their passions and eventually bring them in line with right reason, thereby 
developing the disposition for good. But if they don’t correct their behavior, 
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they will develop the habit of doing shameful things, and in the end they 
will lose the capacity for shame.
From this short discussion, we see the outlines of a moral hierarchy 
emerging in Aristotle’s works. The ideal is the man of excellence, whose 
passions accord with right reason, who never feels shame, but would if he 
ever did something deserving of it. The next step down is to those whose 
passions are out of sync with right reason. Both the morally continent and 
the morally incontinent in some sense know what is right. They reason well 
and to the good. But both have passions that tempt them to do what they 
know they should not. “We praise the reason of the continent and of the 
incontinent, and the part of their soul that has reason, since it urges them 
aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them also another 
natural element, which fights against and resists it.”9
The morally continent person has the self-control to do what is right, and 
shame has a hand here. For, again, our feelings of shame can be activated, not 
just by our doing wrong but by our imagining ourselves doing wrong. And 
our imagined disgrace can impel us to do what right reason demands. The 
morally incontinent can’t overcome his passions. He knows what is right but 
only in the sense that “a man asleep, mad, or drunk” has such knowledge.10 
His passions preclude him from fully realizing his knowledge and acting as 
he should. He instead acts poorly and feels regret as a consequence.
Finally, the least moral are the shameless: they do shameful actions as 
they please and yet do not recognize that their actions are shameful. This 
morally self-indulgent person is one who is “led on in accordance with his 
own choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure.”11 
This person does not know what is right. Instead, he thinks that the right 
always accords with his own pleasures and hence he always chooses to act 
for his pleasure. Such a person, again, might have failed to heed the lessons 
of his youth, acted contrary to his feelings of shame, and hence lost his 
capacity for shame.
Interestingly enough, the principal characters of Fargo fall rather nicely 
into these categories. Gaear performs acts of utter brutality and cruelty with-
out a hint of shame. Jerry lacks self-control. He exhibits moments of moral 
awareness, some sense of shame, but acts reprehensibly nonetheless. Finally, 
as we have explained, Marge is the paradigm of excellence. Her behavior is 
beyond reproach, and her sense of shame allows her to feel the shame that 
others cannot. Let us now look more closely at these characters to discover 
the source of their differences.
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Gaear Grimsrud
Gaear kills five “poor souls” in the course of this movie, and he does so 
with complete affective neutrality. He manifests no signs of any sort of in-
ner conflict with regard to his violent behavior. With a wave of his hand, he 
explains why he killed Jean Lundegaard (Kristin Rudrüd), his kidnap victim: 
“She started shrieking, you know.” This untroubled approach to violence 
points to Gaear’s moral self-indulgence. The self-indulgent man “craves for 
all pleasant things or those that are most pleasant, and is led by his appetite 
to choose these at the cost of everything else.”12 The pleasure of Jean’s silence 
is, in Gaear’s estimation, worth her life.
Gaear is, thus, motivated solely by the most basic of human appetites: 
money, sex, and pancakes.
Gaear: We stop at Pancakes House.
Carl: What’re you, nuts? We had pancakes for breakfast. I gotta go 
somewhere I can get a shot and a beer—and a steak maybe. Not 
more fuckin’ pancakes. [ . . . ]
Gaear: [Stares at Carl]
Carl: Okay, here’s an idea. We’ll stop outside of Brainerd. I know a 
place where we can get laid. Wuddya think?
Gaear: I’m fuckin’ hungry now, you know.
The only enticement Carl can muster to shift Gaear’s focus away from 
pancakes is sex. His body takes precedence, while the needs and interests 
of others hold no weight for him. Gaear ignores Carl’s protests that ciga-
rettes are noxious and injurious, and he smokes throughout the drama. 
The two crooks never form any kind of true friendship. In fact, the two 
never make any personal connection whatsoever. And not for lack of try-
ing on Carl’s part. Carl explicitly rebukes Grimsrud for being reluctant 
to say anything in the way of conversation, despite extremely long hours 
on the road together.
A striking example of Gaear’s indifference is seen when Carl returns to 
the cabin after shooting and being shot by Wade Gustafson. Gaear doesn’t 
differentiate between his blood-soaked associate and the fuzzy soap opera on 
TV. Carl’s injury is completely unremarkable in Gaear’s opinion: he doesn’t 
even ask if Carl is all right. His only concern is discussing how to split the 
ransom money and the car. And when the two disagree, Gaear resolves 
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their dispute with the swing of an axe and puts his former associate in the 
wood chipper.
Gaear’s indifference to others and consequent apathy toward social 
norms is further illustrated in the interactions between Gaear and Marge. 
Marge is not just the sheriff in charge of investigating Gaear’s crimes but 
also an expectant mother. Thus, she occupies two roles that lend themselves 
especially well to bringing shame to bear on moral transgressors. As Marge 
approaches Gaear feeding Carl into the wood chipper, she identifies herself 
several times as a police officer. Her voice, though, is drowned out by the 
noise of the machine. The law, society’s norms for governing behavior, is not 
able to make itself known to Gaear. He is deaf to Marge’s invocations.
When Gaear is riding in the back of Marge’s prowler, we see a more 
direct depiction of the incommensurability of the two characters. Marge 
tallies up the people that Gaear has killed, then remarks sorrowfully that 
it was all “for what? For a little bit of money.” She continues, “There’s more 
to life than money, you know. Don’t you know that?” Her second iteration 
of the question seems more a recognition that, indeed, he might not know 
that. Gaear displays no reaction to her entreaty. Instead, he exhibits the same 
stony unresponsiveness during Marge’s honest and sensible admonishment 
as he has throughout. Thus, the two seem alien to each other; her simple 
pronouncements about the moral corruption of his materialism and vio-
lence fail to move him in any way. Hence, Gaear’s complete shamelessness 
is manifest. We watch him as his reprehensible actions are recounted to him 
by the best of people, and he is not affected at all.
Jerry Lundegaard
In his professional life, Jerry is a less than reputable car salesman. He has 
the habit of cheating not just his customers but his company as well. One 
of his schemes, which the movie indicates he regularly pulls, involves 
“TruCoat Sealant.” During the bargaining, Jerry concedes that the car in 
question doesn’t need sealant. Then when he calls the customer to come in 
for delivery, he nevertheless includes—and of course charges them for—the 
TruCoat. This obviously leads to angry customers. In the hyper-polite milieu 
of Minnesota, one of these customers even calls Jerry a “fucking liar.” Jerry 
does not disagree; he concedes that he settled on a price that did not include 
paying for the TruCoat. Nevertheless, he sits in front of them, “talking like 
[they] didn’t go over this already,” and charges them four hundred dollars 
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for it anyway. In general, Jerry seems untroubled by what he is doing, 
even leaving his office once in order to trick his customers into thinking 
that he is trying to get them a better deal from his boss. Only when he is 
sworn at does Jerry’s facial expression reveal his shame. When the man 
accuses him of being a liar, Jerry’s head drops and his eyebrows rise in 
unspoken assent.
The fact that the customer can bring Jerry—reluctantly—to some sort of 
realization of his shameful behavior shows that Jerry in a way understands 
what is wrong, that he has the correct rule somewhere in mind. But he acts 
without regard to the moral reasoning he seems at least capable of. In this 
way, Jerry fits Aristotle’s description of the incontinent. Aristotle thinks 
that the incontinent knows right from wrong, but his knowledge is not put 
into action. Aristotle likens the incontinent to “a city which passes all the 
right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them.”13 Jerry in some 
sense knows what he is doing is wrong. But in another sense, he doesn’t. His 
knowledge is shallow and hence it cannot counteract his desire for money. 
In fact, the money is, for Jerry, an incentive to ignore his shame. It is an ac-
ceptable compensation for his discomfort. Thus, he cannot and maybe even 
doesn’t want that shame to shape his behavior.
Consider Jerry’s interaction with his son, Scotty (Tony Denman). Jerry 
doesn’t think about how the kidnapping of his wife is affecting Scotty until 
Wade’s accountant, Stan Grossman (Larry Brandendurg), asks after Scotty’s 
well-being. Crestfallen, Jerry responds, “Yeah, jeez, Scotty, yeah, I’ll talk to 
him.” Walking into Scotty’s room, Jerry has an unconcerned grin on his face; 
no hint of angst registers in his voice. We are very much confronted by the 
fact that Jerry has put aside any shame he briefly felt.
Jerry: How ya doin’ there, Scotty?
Scotty: Dad, what’re they doing? Wuddya think they’re doin’ with 
Mom?
Jerry: It’s okay, Scotty. They’re not gonna want to hurt her any. These 
men, they just want money, see.
Scotty: What if—what if sump’n’ goes wrong?
Jerry: No, no, nothin’s goin’ wrong here. Granddad and I, we’re—
we’re makin’ sure this gets handled right.
[ . . . ]
Jerry: We’re gonna get Mom back for ya, but we gotta play ball. Ya 
know that’s the deal. Now, if Loraine calls, or Sylvia, you just say 
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that Mom is in Florida with Pearl and Marty. . . . That’s the best 
we can do here.
Scotty is the first one in the movie who expresses genuine concern for Jean’s 
well-being. Even Wade, Jean’s father, worries more over the money he will 
lose in paying the ransom. He goes so far as to entertain the possibility of 
offering the kidnappers half of what they asked for. But Scotty values his 
mother absolutely, not as an exchangeable or quantifiable good. He values 
her as one should value a member of one’s family, for herself. Jerry witnesses 
the care Scotty has for his mother, and when he leaves his son’s room, his 
body language conveys that he just might feel a modicum of shame.
It is worth noting here that for Aristotle, it is via the mediation of others 
that shame is felt. This fact is illustrated in these scenes. Stan Grossman is 
one of the few people in the movie who is respected by others. Thus, he is 
morally positioned to make Jerry recognize what he has done. And Jerry is 
for a moment shamed. Via his son, whom he loves, Jerry sees not just how 
he has harmed him but also how he has failed to properly value and care 
for his wife.
It is also worth noting what Jerry comes to recognize in these moments 
of shame. Through both Stan and his son, he recognizes the particularities of 
his wrong. He is made to confront the pain of his one and only son, who loves 
his mother, for herself, intrinsically. These are the people he should value in 
their singularity but hasn’t, and for a moment he seemingly recognizes this 
fact. This illustrates Aristotle’s conception of how the morally incontinent 
person comes to do wrong. For Aristotle, the incontinent person fully grasps 
universal moral truths, such as the truth that kidnapping is wrong. And he 
even has some vague sense of how that universal principle is applicable to 
the situation in question. But he doesn’t fully grasp its application. Passions 
keep him from understanding in the moment the specifics of his wrong. 
Thus, he does wrong. Jerry’s shame reveals to him what he didn’t understand: 
how specifically he was harming his son, his wife. But his need for money 
doesn’t allow him to act on his shame, and so he continues on with his plan, 
working now to ensure that he gets the ransom money he needs.
Thus, Jerry is close to becoming immune to the lessons of his own 
shame. He still feels shame, and it still points him to what he isn’t sufficiently 
attending to, namely, the needs, values, and interests of particular others. 
But it doesn’t affect his behavior. It is in this way that Jerry’s shame is inert. 
Nothing in Jerry is preventing him from doing wrong.14
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Two objections might be offered against this reading of Jerry’s character. 
First, some might balk at the notion that Jerry could be overcome by his 
passions, for he is such a dull and tepid character. But is he really all that 
tepid? Jerry goes to his father-in-law for a loan that he would apparently 
use to both set up a small business, a parking lot, and get himself out of the 
trouble he has gotten himself into. Though Wade acknowledges that the 
deal looks good, he denies Jerry the loan, offering him only a “finder’s fee.” 
Afterward, alone in the parking lot as he scrapes ice from his car, Jerry is 
overcome by his emotions, and he feebly but violently attacks his windshield. 
Jerry doesn’t often express strong emotion, but there is evidence here that 
he feels such emotion.15
Moreover, keep in mind that passion for Aristotle refers to one’s emotions 
or desires, and these emotions can be either strong or weak. Consider also 
that for Aristotle a person can even be overcome by what would otherwise 
be thought to be a weak emotion: “It is possible to be in such a state as to be 
defeated even by those of them which most people master, or to master even 
those by which most people are defeated.”16 Thus, even if Jerry is considered 
tepid, even his weak emotions can lead him toward doing what his shame 
has taught him is wrong.
The second objection concerns shame’s role in motivating Jerry’s be-
havior. We argue above that Jerry is morally incontinent. He knows what is 
wrong and feels shame for the wrongs he does and intends to do, but this 
shame doesn’t move him to behave as right reason demands. Instead, he acts 
on his passions. But might Jerry instead be doing wrong to avoid shame? He 
has gotten himself into trouble, so he has hatched this kidnapping scheme 
to get the money he needs to avoid the shame that will follow if his wrongs 
are discovered.
In response to this objection, note that avoiding public disgrace isn’t the 
same as avoiding shame. For shame arises even when others don’t know of 
your wrongs. To review, shame can arise either when others learn of your 
wrongdoings or when you merely imagine what would be thought of your 
bad actions or intentions by those whom you respect. Thus, Jerry can’t avoid 
shame by doing more wrong; he can only avoid shame by avoiding wrong.
That said, avoiding public disgrace might, of course, be one of Jerry’s 
motivations. But there is evidence that indicates that it isn’t his primary 
motivator. Consider the money. Jerry is asking for $1 million in ransom 
money, yet he needs only $320,000, plus the cost of the kidnapping, to cover 
up his wrongdoing. If public disgrace is what he is seeking to avoid, he 
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need not have asked for so much. Clearly, Jerry’s greed is driving him here. 
Consider as well the last scene in which Jerry appears. He has fled, but the 
police have found him in a motel. If Jerry’s primary motivation were to avoid 
public disgrace, once found he would try to explain away his crimes or he 
would at least try to lessen his disgrace by carrying himself with dignity. He 
would quietly and willingly surrender himself and confess his crimes. But 
this is not how Jerry is taken. Instead, he is found in his underwear trying 
to scramble out of the bathroom window. He is forcibly thrown on the bed 
and handcuffed, all as he screams and cries pathetically. His fear is moving 
him here, not his sense of right or wrong nor how his behavior will be seen 
in the public eye. Jerry, as we have shown, feels shame, but as we see in this 
scene it is his other passions—fear, greed, and pride—that move him.
Marge Gunderson
The first shot of Marge in the movie is preceded by the camera slowly pan-
ning over her husband’s painting supplies. Marge is thereby introduced to 
us through Norm’s interests. A phone call then awakens Marge, informing 
her of a triple homicide that she has to investigate. It is before dawn, but 
Norm (John Carroll Lynch) insists on cooking her eggs. She, though, wants 
him to stay asleep. He wins this battle and cooks her eggs that she begins to 
eat but which he finishes. Later, Marge discusses the crime scene with her 
partner Lou (Bruce Bohne):
Marge: I guess the little guy sat in there waiting for his buddy to 
come back.
Lou: Yah, it would have been cold out here.
Marge: Heck, yah. Ya think, is Dave’s open yet?
Lou: Dave . . . You don’t think he’s mixed up in—
Marge: No, no, I just wanna get Norm some night crawlers.
In this moment, Marge transitions from her own ends to her husband’s ends 
fluidly and seamlessly. Though she intently inspects the crime scene, her 
interests never stray too far from Norm’s interests, which include fishing. 
His interests and well-being are of concern to her, as hers are to him.
In these brief scenes, we see that between Marge and Norm there exists 
what Aristotle would call a friendship of the good. Aristotle distinguishes 
three kinds of friendships; two of them—the friendships of utility and plea-
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sure—are deficient, while one—the friendship of the good—is excellent. 
Friendships of utility and pleasure are relationships in which the parties 
involved seek for themselves some benefit from the other. Either the one 
can provide some useful service to the other or he is merely entertaining 
company. Of course, those who are in a friendship of the good will similarly 
benefit from this relationship. The two will enjoy each other’s company and 
find the other’s counsel helpful. But, importantly, these friends don’t seek 
out these benefits from each other. Instead, each wants only what is in the 
best interest of his friend and thinks not of himself.
This excellent type of friendship consists of “those who wish well to 
their friends for their sake.”17 Now, to want what is best for another for his 
own sake, you have to understand who that person is and what he values. 
In addition, you also have to respect him and his values. For if you do not 
and yet you still want what is best for him, you would end up contradicting 
your own values.
Thus, to be in a friendship of the good is to have someone in your life 
who matters to you, not because of what he can do for you but because of 
who he is. You value and respect him and, for his sake and his sake alone, 
you want what is best for him. This is how Marge and Norm care for each 
other. Each wants the best for the other. The one needs food and the other 
needs sleep, and they both want for the other what the other needs. Each 
supports the other in their respective daily tasks. Norm provides Marge 
with sustenance while she fights crime, and Marge provides Norm with 
encouragement as he makes art.
So, valuing and respecting others is central to friendship. It is also 
central to shame. It is only with regard to people we respect that we feel 
shame when we do wrong. To review: I feel shame when I recognize that 
those whom I respect would judge my actions (or even my intended ac-
tions) in such a way that would lead to my disgrace. Thus, I need to value 
others in order to feel shame. And I need to value them not in terms of 
what they can do for me but in terms of who they are: their opinions, 
values, characters. It is with regard to these people we so value that we 
fear our disgrace. Thus, we can now see the link between friendship and 
shame. To have friends is to have others matter to you, and it is only when 
others matter to you that you can be disgraced. Of course, we are not say-
ing here that only those with friends can feel shame.18 Rather, our point is 
that regard for others as goods in themselves is necessary both for having 
friends and feeling shame.
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How, though, does this relate to Marge? As we have said all along, she 
does no wrong, so she has no cause to feel shame. She, though, is the one 
who in large part mediates other people’s shame. In both big and small ways, 
she tries to get others both to see where they have gone wrong and to have 
the appropriate response to what they have done. We have already seen her 
do this with Gaear. She lists his crimes, trying to elicit in him some remorse, 
but to no avail. In an earlier scene, when Lou incorrectly deduces that the 
kidnapper’s vehicle has a license plate that begins with the letters DLR, 
Marge confesses that she is not sure that she “100 percent agrees” with his 
police work, figuring instead that the letters DLR indicate dealer plates. Even 
with respect to her husband, she performs this function. Norm enters his 
paintings in competitions in which the winner’s painting will be reproduced 
on a postage stamp. One of his paintings does win such a competition but 
only for a three-cent stamp. His main rival wins the larger denomination. 
Norm feels some sense of failure over this. But Marge soothes Norm by 
explaining to him how the little stamps are important when the post office 
changes the price of mail.
Fargo is peppered with scenes in which Marge gently cajoles others. 
In this way Marge is the moral center of the movie. She knows right from 
wrong and acts accordingly. She has the capacity to feel shame. She knows 
how one should feel if one has done wrong. And she tries to get others to feel 
and do as they should. Consider how Marge goes about correcting others. 
In most cases, she works to save face for those she instructs. Lou is embar-
rassed (and maybe a wee bit confused) by his failure to have figured out what 
“DLR” stands for, and Marge, recognizing this, lightens the moment with a 
joke. When an old high school friend makes a pass at her by changing seats 
so that he can touch her, Marge figuratively and literally puts him back in 
his place. But she explains that she is doing so only so that she won’t need 
to twist her neck in order to talk to him. Marge has just rejected this man, 
and such a rejection is, of course, humiliating. Marge, knowing this, works 
to ameliorate her friend’s embarrassment.
Some will say that Marge’s behavior here is merely a product of her being 
“Minnesota nice,” but her care for others shouldn’t be dismissed so easily. 
It involves her empathizing with these people and wanting what is best for 
them while not compromising herself. Consider again how she treats her 
husband’s loss. She doesn’t inflate his ego. She doesn’t deride the competition. 
She instead gives Norm honest reasons for feeling good about winning the 
three-cent stamp. She again is ameliorating his disappointment, and maybe 
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even his slightly bruised ego, but in a way that shows that she both supports 
and respects herself and her husband.
Thus, Marge has the capacity for shame. And this capacity is shown not 
just in her ability to locate when one should feel shame but in the way she 
gently instructs others in how they should feel and behave. This capacity 
reflects the respect she has for others, and this respect is also what enables 
her to have the best kind of friendship with others.
In contrast, the other characters in this movie have at best only friend-
ships of utility with the people in their lives. The co-conspirators each want 
something (money, sex, food), and they see others primarily in terms of 
how they will serve that end. And when these characters try to acknowl-
edge another possible dimension of a particular relationship, a dimension 
beyond the bounds of utility, the attempt always fails. Carl hires an escort 
to accompany him to hear José Feliciano. At the concert, he tries to engage 
her in a conversation about her work:
Carl: Find that work interesting, do you?
Prostitute: What are you talking about?
Carl is trying to treat this prostitute as if he weren’t paying her, as if she were 
instead his date. And her response to this inquiry reveals that the nature 
of their relationship—he and she are exchanging money for sex—can’t be 
gotten beyond. Consider again the scene in which Jerry seeks to comfort 
his son. Jerry’s ability to care for him as he should is crippled by his desire 
to get what he needs from his son. Thus, as much as he wants to assuage his 
son’s fears, he also wants his son not to jeopardize his scheme. So he gets 
Scotty to agree to lie for him about his mother’s whereabouts. Jerry here 
can’t do what is in his son’s best interest because he instead needs his son to 
serve his own interests.
When our primary relationships with others are friendships of utility, 
we lose the ability to see others as selves worthy of our respect. Instead, we 
view them solely as instruments. That is, if we habituate ourselves to seeing 
other people (our spouses, our children, our coworkers, etc.) as possible 
means to ends, our sense of our place among other human beings becomes 
our place among potentially usable things. Now, one does not fear disgrace 
in the eyes of things, even when those things are people. Thus, such friend-
ships of utility undermine the proper functioning of shame. Again, shame 
cannot work independently of the thought that people, and their opinions 
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and values, actually matter to us. Thus, if we base our relations with others 
around their potential usefulness, their regard becomes more and more 
irrelevant.
Conclusion
Thus, the essential difference between Marge, on the one hand, and Jerry, 
Gaear, and Carl on the other is that the co-conspirators’ actions flow from 
their appetites while Marge’s actions flow from the concern and respect she 
has for others. The wellspring of Marge’s basic decency is the part of herself 
that knows how others should be valued and treated. She knows not to treat 
others as mere instruments but instead to treat them with respect. And 
when she and others don’t get the respect they deserve, she expects those 
in the wrong to feel shame. And if they don’t, as is the case with Gaear, 
she is mystified.19 On the other hand, by acting from their appetites, the 
co-conspirators isolate themselves from their sense of shame. Either they 
lose their capacity for shame, as is seemingly the case with Gaear, or this 
capacity persists, as is the case with Jerry (and it seems Carl as well), but 
the feelings of shame produced are inert. They no longer impel these men 
to act better.
With all of this in mind, return to the opening scene in the movie. Carl 
wants to know why Jerry would want to kidnap his wife. What would lead 
a person to do such a thing? But he can’t bring himself to ask this question. 
Why not? To ask such a question is to acknowledge that Jerry’s wife and in 
fact Jerry himself are worthy of moral concern, concern that outweighs what 
he will get if he agrees to this plot. But he doesn’t want to acknowledge this, 
nor does Jerry want him to acknowledge this. Each has needs that won’t be 
fulfilled if they do. Jerry needs the ransom money, and Carl needs the tan 
Ciera. So they let this question go unasked. They don’t let themselves fully 
consider what they are about to do, thereby avoiding the shame that might 
have prevented them from moving forward.
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14. In defense of Jerry, consider that for shame to function properly there must 
be the possibility of altering one’s behavior in such a way as to avoid further shame. In 
Jerry’s case, this requirement is not always met. Wade emasculates Jerry at every op-
portunity he gets. When Jerry approaches his wealthy father-in-law for money to invest 
in a parking lot that “could work out real good for me, Jean, and Scotty,” he is abruptly 
shot down. Wade snidely asserts, “Jean and Scotty never have to worry.” With these 
words, Jerry is overtly and unmistakably relegated to irrelevance. Even when Wade and 
Stan realize that Jerry’s proposal is “pretty sweet,” Wade offers Jerry a mere finder’s fee 
rather than control of the project.
It is clear that Jerry is a disgrace in Wade’s eyes. No matter what Jerry does, he does 
wrong. Worse yet, Wade is the family patriarch, so his judgment holds special weight. 
All this makes shame’s call to change ineffectual. When no matter what an agent does, 
he is shamed, that shame loses its relevance as a moral guide. That is, a person might 
want to avoid feeling that shame (as Jerry clearly does), but since there is seemingly no 
way to do that, what one does or doesn’t do no longer matters. Moreover, once shame 
loses it relevance in one context, the door is open to it losing relevance in others.
15. It is worth noting that expressions of strong emotions are condemned within 
the confines of the community depicted here. The husband whom Jerry cheats with his 
TruCoat scheme and who calls Jerry a “fucking liar” is quietly and clearly chastised by 
his wife for his display of emotion. Emotions are high but not to be expressed.
16. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1150a11–13.
17. Ibid., 1156b10.
18. Those who don’t have a capacity for shame also lack a capacity for friendship, 
for the capacity for shame depends on our respecting others, and respecting others is 
a necessary component of being someone’s friend. But for Aristotle the reverse of this 
equation does not hold. Those who have a capacity for shame don’t necessarily have the 
capacity for friendship. Having friends involves more than merely respecting others; 
it also involves having affection for them. Thus, there could be a person who respects 
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others and hence can experience disgrace yet has no affection for humanity. Such a 
person can be shamed yet can’t have friends.
19. All of this might help put into context a comment from Marge that might seem 
otherwise mystifying. Consider again Marge’s final scene with Gaear. After she lists his 
crimes, she wonders why he would do such a thing for mere money. She is even more 
incredulous, for after all “it’s such a beautiful day.” As she says this, she looks out onto a 
snow-covered landscape and appreciates the beauty that maybe only she can see. Why 
does Marge make this comment? Should it just be taken as a meaningless platitude? We 
don’t think so. Consider a line from Nabokov’s Lolita: “The moral sense in mortals is 
the duty / We have to pay on mortal sense of beauty.” Vladimir Nabokov, The Annotated 
“Lolita” (New York: Vintage, 1970), 31. To appreciate beauty, one must be able to value 
that beauty noninstrumentally. You have to consider it, not for what it can get or do 
for you, but for itself. But, of course, this ability to value noninstrumentally is the very 
ability that one must have in order to treat others with the respect they deserve. Thus, 
Marge’s ability to appreciate the beauty of the day is a reflection of her ability to show 
others proper moral concern.
09
JustIce, PoWer, and loVe
The Political Philosophy of Intolerable Cruelty
Shai Biderman and William J. Devlin
What Is Justice?
What do we mean when we say that “justice must be served”? What is the 
difference between a “just act” and an “unjust act”? What is it that makes 
our relationships—whether they concern a family member, a loved one, or 
even a stranger—just and fair? Is it the case that justice is merely rooted in 
power, control, and domination, so that those who have the power determine 
what justice means? Or is justice rooted not in dominance but in agreement, 
where, through a sense of love, care, and concern toward others, we seek a 
balance of shared interests between the parties of the just relationship?
In Intolerable Cruelty (2003), we find that the Coen brothers tackle the 
question of justice in relation to the drive for power and the power of love. 
Ultimately, the film suggests that the strongest account of justice is one in 
which there is a sense of equality that obtains between both parties, irrespec-
tive of power and contracts. Miles Massey (George Clooney) is a successful 
and arrogant Los Angeles divorce attorney who is most famous for creating 
an ironclad and impenetrable prenuptial agreement known as the “Massey 
pre-nup.” After completing a long list of victories in the courtroom, Massey 
endeavors to achieve a challenging winner-take-all battle against Marylin 
Rexroth-Doyle-Massey (Catherine Zeta-Jones), a beautiful and ambitious 
femme fatale whose goal is to con a man out of his money so that she can 
have her own financial independence. Though Miles leads the charge for 
the annihilation and destruction of Marylin, he succumbs to the taboo in 
the world of divorce attorneys, as he falls in love with her. Marylin, in turn, 
seeks revenge and her independence, as she dupes Miles into believing she 
married the oil tycoon, Howard Doyle (Billy Bob Thornton), so that she can 
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marry Miles, using his own Massey pre-nup as a ploy to get half of his estate. 
However, we find that the struggle for power and complete independence 
is outweighed by the power of love as Miles and Marylin remain together, 
with all contracts and fear of deceit apparently left behind.
Through the adventures of Miles and Marylin, we see several interpreta-
tions of the notion of justice. The first interpretation, what we call “justice as 
power,” suggests that justice is merely the manifestation of the Machiavellian 
sentiment that “might makes right.” A second interpretation, “justice as 
compromise,” maintains that justice is grounded in negotiation and agree-
ment. A third interpretation, “justice as fairness,” holds that justice is a bal-
anced social system, which promotes equality for all members. These three 
interpretations reflect distinct philosophical traditions that illustrate the 
notion of justice. As we trace Miles and Marylin’s journey from the notion 
of justice as power to justice as fairness, we explore how Intolerable Cruelty 
addresses these interpretations.
Justice as Power
When Bonnie Donaly (Stacey Travis) is caught cheating on her husband, 
Donovan Donaly (Geoffrey Rush)—the Hollywood producer of the soap 
opera, The Sands of Time—she turns to the services of the famous (and infa-
mous) divorce attorney, Miles Massey. Upon learning that Donovan caught 
Bonnie with Ollie Olerud (Jack Kyle), the pool salesman, Miles is willing to 
serve as her legal counselor in the divorce. He explains to her that the “truth 
is so self-evident” that he’ll “be able to make it equally as transparent to any 
jury.” But Miles hasn’t decided upon which “transparent truth” to give to 
the jury. Is it the case that Donovan’s alleged spousal abuse drove Bonnie to 
have an affair? Or is it that Donovan mistakenly believed Bonnie was having 
an affair while Bonnie rescued Donovan from killing Ollie? Maybe it’s the 
case that it is actually Donovan and Ollie who are having the affair. Miles, 
the legal counselor who is prepared to make a case in court (a place where 
one typically locates the proper administration of justice), is less concerned 
with what really happened and more concerned with victory. He will choose 
the “truth” that is most likely to promise him victory and even goes so far 
as to guarantee Bonnie that her spoils of this war will include the rights to 
The Sands of Time.
While it may come as no surprise to see a lawyer in a film depicted as 
being heartless, ruthless, and indifferent toward the notion of justice implicit 
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in the law, Miles seems to be doing something more here. Rather than simply 
ignoring the idea of justice in the law, Miles rejects it and replaces it with an 
alternative account. Miles endorses the theory that justice is equivalent to 
power. This theory of justice can be found in Plato’s Republic, where Thra-
symachus (ca. 459–400 bce) defines justice as that which “is nothing other 
than the advantage of the stronger.” That is, justice serves the interests of 
those who are in power and is dictated by the powerful to maintain control 
and dominance over others.1
But what do we mean by those who are “powerful”? The most natural 
sense of being in power is understood as those who are superior in physi-
cal strength. That is, one can control and dominate others through brute 
strength, a large army, or having stronger weapons. But in order to be pow-
erful, one need not necessarily have superior physical strength. One can 
maintain power by outsmarting others so that they will succumb to one’s 
superior intellect. Or, one can wield power through the use of rhetoric and 
the knowledge of how to manipulate others and convince them to accept 
the conclusions of specious reasoning. Furthermore, one can control and 
dominate others through political strength in the form of legislative power. 
As Thrasymachus maintains, the rulers of each type of government set up 
laws that are in their own interest. The tyrannical ruler sets up tyrannical 
laws for his self-interest, the democratic rulers set up democratic laws for 
their own interests, and so on. Meanwhile, the citizens who are ruled by the 
given government uphold such laws, thereby enabling the laws to benefit 
the rulers, who are able to maintain their power, control, and dominance 
over those who are ruled.2
The view that justice is power can thus be implemented in various ways. 
What underlies these ways is the idea that justice is self-interested; it is the 
outcome of the perspective of the person who has subjective interests and 
wields power to achieve those interests. As such, supporters of this notion 
of justice find that justice is best achieved through the use of persuasion, 
rather than through truth telling. We see this to be the case with the ancient 
Greek group known as sophists. A sophist was an educator who, for a large 
fee, provided students with instructions on how to manipulate others, win 
debates, and achieve political success. Thrasymachus himself was one of 
the more dominant sophists of his time. As a sophist, Thrasymachus was 
less interested in finding genuine knowledge or truths about the world and 
more interested in defeating and dominating his opponents and accumulat-
ing wealth in the process. The practice of sophistry embodies the notion of 
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justice as power, as it takes advantage of rhetorical and intellectual strengths 
to promote the self-interested desire for control over others.
Destruction of One’s Opponent
As Miles puts the view of justice as power into practice, he is not concerned 
with the truth but with victory. In his pursuit of justice, Miles’s methods 
and legal tactics mimic those of a military campaign. He treats his office as 
a “war room” for planning victorious strategies and evaluating the “enemy” 
(other lawyers, unlucky plaintiffs, etc.). Accordingly, he sees the courtroom 
as the ultimate battleground, where the warriors (i.e., lawyers) will engage in 
battle in pursuit of victory. But, as Miles points out to his associate Wrigley 
(Paul Adelstein), he doesn’t simply want a victory where both parties com-
promise and find an equilibrium point based on the skill of the individual 
lawyers. Such compromises are more indicative of death than life. No, for 
Miles, life (and so also justice) is understood as the “struggle and challenge 
and ultimate destruction of your opponent.” Miles lives for the battle—he 
lives for the struggle and the challenge of utterly annihilating, controlling, 
and overpowering his opponent in the courtroom. Like the sophist, Miles 
holds that such victories are based on a successful manipulation of the truth 
rather than the truth itself. They are rhetorical triumphs that indicate the 
superior power of the one who argues them.
Furthermore, Miles’s own endeavor to maintain justice as power is 
not through physical strength. Rather, Miles’s strategy is to dominate and 
control others through his superior skills of rhetoric. Whether it’s his slip-
pery slope reasoning in trying to establish an affair between Donovan and 
Ollie, his misuse of the “Kirshner precedent” in negotiations, his “arty-farty” 
introduction to cross-examining Marylin Rexroth, or his defenses against 
Freddy Bender’s (Richard Jenkins) objections (such as “what’s good for the 
gander”), Miles manipulates language to set up his opponents for defeat. 
His strength is not found in an ability to put together logically coherent 
arguments or an ability to deduce a valid conclusion from solid premises. 
Instead, his strength lies in his ability to construct dazzling, but fallacious, 
lines of reasoning, which persuade the judge and jury that he is correct, so 
that he is able to attain his victory.3
Miles’s firm endorsement of the account of justice as power is most 
notably symbolized through the ongoing appearance and mentioning of 
teeth throughout the film. Miles is constantly preoccupied with his teeth, 
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from the first time we see him on screen (through the ultraviolet light at a 
dentist appointment), to the point where Marylin’s poodle sinks his teeth 
into Miles’s hand. Also, Marylin’s rottweilers bare their fangs when ordered 
to keep Rex and Miles out of her house(s). So does Elisabeta, the spoiled pet 
dog of Heinz, the Baron Krauss von Espy (Jonathan Hadary), whose teeth 
become the main concern of the baron during his testimony. In short, we 
find that teeth serve as a metaphor for power in Intolerable Cruelty. But while 
the dogs’ teeth suggest that their power is in their physical bite, Miles’s teeth 
do not indicate brute strength. Rather, as Marylin’s friend, Sarah Battista-
O’Flannagan-Sorkin (Julia Duffy), warns her, Miles is “no schnauzer”—he is 
rather renowned for his impressive skill and record of victories in divorces. 
Ever focused on how his teeth look, Miles is able to use his bright and hand-
some smile as a way to enhance his own appearance and the appearance 
of his arguments on his road to victory. Thus, Miles does have a bite, but 
this bite is characterized by his calculated presentation and manipulation 
of arguments. He sinks his teeth into his opponent in order to “nail his ass” 
and gain total victory.
Nailing Someone’s Ass
Miles isn’t the only one who espouses the notion of justice as power. Marylin 
shares this definition of justice as well. Marylin is introduced to us as a calcu-
lating, deceptive, and powerful woman who sees marriage as a “passport to 
wealth, freedom, and independence.” That is, she enters marriage and plays 
the role of supportive wife as a means to achieve control over her husband’s 
net worth. She manipulates her husband, deceiving him into believing that 
he is safe with her when, in fact, all she intends to do is “nail his ass.”
While Miles’s strategy to obtain domination and control is implemented 
through his skills of rhetoric in the courtroom, Marylin’s strategy toward 
achieving justice as power is implemented through her ability to manipulate 
the notion of love in marriage. Love, for Marylin, is not a feeling of equal-
ity and care toward another. Rather, it is a commodity or a tool that can be 
used to mislead others into believing that she shares their feelings of equality 
and care. This deception allows her the opportunity to betray her husband’s 
emotions in such a way that she is able to walk away with his fortune.
We can see Marylin’s implementation of power come into play in her 
marriage to Rex Rexroth, the real estate mogul. Prior to their introduc-
tion, we discover that Marylin schemes with Baron von Espy to find a very 
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rich husband. As the baron explains to Miles, this husband must be “a silly 
man . . . a man, though clever at making money, would easily [be] duped 
and controlled.” Furthermore, this man must be “a man with a wandering 
pee-pee . . . a philanderer whose affairs would be transparent to the world 
. . . a man whom [Marylin] could, herself, brazenly cuckold.” Marylin thus 
targets a wealthy but naïve husband who enjoys extramarital affairs out in 
the open. Marylin, in turn, would play the serving and loving wife who, 
in reality, maintains control over her naïve husband as she bides her time 
waiting for the right moment to “make hammer on his fanny.” Given these 
criteria, the baron introduces her to Rex. Marylin proceeds to play the role 
she designed for herself. She proclaims that she loved Rex since they first 
met, as she cleverly steals Miles’s earlier quote from Shakespeare’s As You 
Like It: “Whoever loved that loved not at first sight?”
By duping Rex into thinking that she has fallen in love with him, she 
is able to marry him without any prenuptial agreement. Shortly thereafter, 
Marylin hires a colorful and tactless private eye, Gus Petch (Cedric the 
Entertainer), to catch Rex in an extramarital affair with another woman. 
Although Rex was under the impression that his relationship with Marylin 
does not preclude occasional affairs, he has no corroborating evidence to 
support this understanding. Moreover, as already mentioned, he also has 
no prenuptial agreement. As a result, Rex is completely exposed, “a sitting 
duck,” and Marylin has unlimited access to his wealth. With the overwhelm-
ing evidence (supplied by Gus Petch), Marylin believes her plan will come 
to fruition: “I’ve invested five good years in my marriage to Rex and I’ve 
nailed his ass fair and square. Now I’m going to have it stuffed, mounted, 
and have my lady friends come over and throw darts at it.”
Justice as Compromise
While Rex’s ass was not stuffed and mounted, his victory in court and ut-
ter annihilation of Marylin was not by his own doing. Rather, in the war 
between Rex and Marylin, it was Miles who led the charge to victory in 
spite of Rex’s ignorance. Particularly, regardless of Rex’s wandering ways 
in extramarital affairs, one could point out two potentially fatal errors 
that Rex made in his marriage to Marylin. First, as mentioned earlier, Rex 
and Marylin did not have a prenuptial agreement that would allow Rex 
to leave the marriage with the amount of wealth with which he entered 
it. Second, though he and Marylin had an arrangement or understanding 
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that they each could see other people, this arrangement was only ver-
bally acknowledged and not put into writing. Rex, who—it is generally 
agreed—is easily duped and controlled, may have naïvely believed that 
justice would be served in a fair and appropriate manner should there be 
a divorce. But Miles immediately recognizes that this is not the case, as 
signed contracts would have been the only way for Rex to guarantee the 
security of his own estate.
The emphasis on signed agreements for the sake of security introduces 
another theory of justice known as the social contract theory. The social 
contract theory generally maintains that a just relationship is one in which 
both parties’ obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement made 
between them prior to entering the relationship. Both parties must honor 
the specified obligation to ensure that justice remains intact. In short, jus-
tice, according to this account, is rooted in a compromise that is typically 
exemplified by a contract.
One well-known social contract theorist is the British philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Hobbes’s presentation of the social contract 
theory of justice can be divided into two stages: the state of nature and the 
contract. The state of nature is the hypothetical scenario of the human con-
dition prior to the formation of a governed society. For Hobbes, the state 
of nature is very unpleasant, insofar as it is a “war of all against all.” For 
Hobbes, all human beings, by nature, are self-interested, and, since there is 
no government to enforce any rules or regulations in the state of nature, it is 
as if each individual has a right to possess all things. This right to all things 
invites war among all people. Such a war can be characterized in three dif-
ferent ways. First, individuals must compete against one another to attain 
and preserve the basic human needs for survival: they “use violence to make 
themselves masters of other persons’ wives, children, and cattle.” Second, on 
the opposing end, individuals who have secured such goods must defend 
them. Thus, for the safety of their goods, they must engage in wars against 
any who would steal them. Finally, individuals in the state of nature fight 
for glory as they take pleasure in exercising their power over others: they 
engage in battle “for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any 
other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in 
their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.” 
Because of the constant battles for possessions, security, and glory in power, 
Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is characterized as a state of “con-
tinual fear and danger of violent death.” He concludes that such a life is not 
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worthwhile; rather, human beings should avoid it since life in the state of 
nature is “nasty, brutish, and short.”4
Given the danger and violence that permeates the state of nature, the 
inhabitants are in great fear. But though they are self-interested, Hobbes 
maintains, they are also rational. Through the use of self-interested reason, 
they find that this state is a no-win situation and that they must seek an al-
ternative scenario in order to prevail. This alternative scenario is the creation 
of a civilized society, which is founded upon the construction of a social 
contract. Inhabitants of the state of nature become members of a civilized 
society by entering into an agreement with one another whereby members 
renounce their originally perceived right to all things in exchange for a 
contractually based right to some of the things. A legislative sovereignty 
(in the form of a government) is established as the authoritative body 
whose role is to supervise and enforce the social contract. Members of 
society thus agree to live under common laws that are enforced by a gov-
ernment. All members have self-interested reasons to uphold the contract 
insofar as obedience to the law will ensure their own safety from others 
and from punishment. For Hobbes, then, the notion of justice is rooted in 
a compromise for the sake of security. The social contract creates justice 
for the civilized society in the sense that each party gives something up: 
members honor the agreement with one another to give up their original 
right to all things in the state of nature for the sake of safety and the security 
to pursue their self-interests.5
The account of justice as compromise seems to play an ambiguous 
role in Intolerable Cruelty. On the one hand, it underlies most of the social 
encounters in the film and is supported by the mere existence of a stable 
legal system, to which Miles and his firm owe their wealth and success. On 
the other hand, we can see that the notion of compromise does not play out 
well in the various opportunities in which it is presented. All of the players 
involved seem to prefer total annihilation over compromise whenever given 
the chance. That is, in Hobbesian terms, they prefer the disastrous state of 
nature to the civic state. This approach can be found in the various litiga-
tions and contractual negotiations that take place in the film, most notably 
the negotiation period before the trial between Rex and Marylin and in the 
father of all contractual agreements—the Massey pre-nup.
On the surface, the pretrial negotiation between Rex, Marylin, and 
their lawyers has the misleading appearance of being a congenial and open-
minded discussion between parties who are willing to make a compromise 
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in terms of an official contract between Rex and Marylin. The interaction is 
lightly referred to as an “ice-breaker,” where everyone is friends and pastries 
are served. But this lighthearted spirit is just a ploy, as we soon come to un-
derstand that there will be a serious battle in the courtroom. The negotiation 
becomes a series of quips and rejoinders between Miles (Rex’s lawyer) and 
Freddy (Marylin’s lawyer):
Miles: . . . At this point my client is still prepared to consider 
reconciliation.
Freddy: My client’s ruled that out.
Miles: My client is prepared to entertain an amicable dissolution to 
the marriage without prejudice.
Freddy: That’s a fart in a stiff wind.
Miles: My client proposes a thirty-day cooling-off period.
Freddy: My client feels sufficiently dispassionate.
Miles: My client asks that you not initiate proceedings pending his 
setting certain affairs in order.
For Miles, however, such negotiations are nothing but idle chatter. Upon 
hearing that Marylin is willing to settle for 50 percent of the marital assets, 
Miles balks with disbelief, closing the negation period by saying, “Why only 
50, Freddy? Why not 100? While we’re dreaming, why not 150 . . . ?” Here, 
we can see that Miles balks not only at Freddy’s offer but also at the very 
idea that justice is meted out through compromise. As seen earlier in the 
film, Miles maintains that compromise is indicative of death, not life, and 
so he has no intention of serving justice through negotiations: for justice to 
be served for his client, Miles must carry out the annihilation of Marylin. 
Miles thus dismisses the conception of justice as compromise. He does not 
believe that justice is properly served through a social contract in which one 
compromises his or her rights for the sake of security and safety.
Furthermore, we find that, throughout the film, the role of contracts 
is really a means for domination and control over others, which therefore 
implies that the notion of justice as compromise doesn’t work. That is, the 
film suggests that the theory of justice as compromise is not the correct 
account of justice since it is ultimately parasitic on the theory of justice as 
power. The dismissal of the notion of justice as compromise can be seen 
through the famous marital contract, the Massey pre-nup, which “provides 
that, in the event of dissolution of the marriage for any reason, both parties 
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will leave it with what they brought in and earned during.” It is an impen-
etrable, ironclad, and romance-less agreement that protects the wealthier 
party insofar as “no one can profit from the marriage.” The strict defense of 
the wealthier and more powerful party stands in direct opposition to the 
“everybody wins” agenda of a contractual compromise.
Now, the Massey pre-nup is presented in the film in two different ways: 
the signing of the contract and the tearing up (or, at times, the eating) of the 
contract. Both ways support the idea that the theory of justice as compro-
mise is just a mask for the theory of justice as power. First, the signing of 
the contract indicates that the wealthier party wants security for his or her 
net worth. As Miles explains, the Massey pre-nup ensures that there is “no 
wiggle room” for compromise—it keeps the wealthy party from becoming “a 
sitting duck,” naked and exposed. It helps the wealthy party “cover his ass,” 
as it were, and so prevents the other party from nailing his ass during the 
struggle for power. Thus, when Howard signs the pre-nup before his marriage 
to Marylin, and Marylin signs the pre-nup before her marriage to Miles, it 
suggests that each one wants to maintain his or her power and control. In 
this sense, then, the contract ceases to be an instrument of compromise and 
reveals its true nature as a mask for justice as power.
Likewise, the tearing up of the contract reveals that the theory of jus-
tice as power underlies the theory of justice as compromise. When the 
prenuptial contracts are being torn (or eaten), it is a sign that power once 
more has overcome compromise. When Howard eats the pre-nup at the 
wedding reception, we are led to believe that Marylin has conned him 
out of his money by pretending to love him. That is, it appears as though 
Marylin has successfully achieved her own justice as power. Meanwhile, 
when Marylin tears up her pre-nup with Miles, we discover that she ma-
nipulated him, too, and deceived him into giving up the security of his 
fortune. This suggests that Marylin has used the contract as a means to 
dominate and control Miles. In other words, the justice that will be served 
is justice as power.
Thus, though the theory of justice as compromise is presented in In-
tolerable Cruelty, it is ultimately regarded as a conventional way to prevent 
the theory of justice as power from arising. This prevention continually 
fails, as is exemplified by the use of the Massey pre-nup: whether it is the 
signing or tearing up of the contract, in most cases the prenuptial contract 
becomes just another tool for maintaining control and domination over 
the other party.
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Justice as Fairness
During Howard and Marylin’s wedding reception, Howard gives an early 
wedding present to his bride: he eats the Massey pre-nup. Howard explains 
that he wants to prove wrong the priest’s claim that “in today’s cynical world, 
it’s so hard to take that great leap of faith aboard the ship of love and caring.” 
He wishes to show the audience that he and Marylin are “taking that leap . 
. . that they do have faith . . . that they do love.” Thus, in order to prove that 
there is real love and trust between them, he tears up the contract, literally 
eats the pre-nup, and metaphorically eats the words that exemplify the no-
tion of justice as power.
Though Howard’s act of eating the pre-nup is part of Marylin’s overall 
scheme to deceive and control Miles, this act allows us to conceive of a re-
lationship that is not characterized by the drive for power or by contractual 
agreements of compromise. Rather, relationships can be carried out through 
love and equality. Such relationships reveal a third conception of justice: 
justice as fairness. This theory of justice is famously endorsed by the con-
temporary philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002). Following Rawls’s account, 
the theory of justice as fairness can be presented in two steps. The first step 
examines what Rawls labels the “original position,” an imaginary situation 
in which people who are free, rational, and equal come together to create a 
society and decide upon a proper theory of justice. We are to imagine that 
people in this position are “mutually disinterested” (i.e., only self-interested), 
that they put forward conflicting claims over who gets what, and that they 
have only a moderate scarcity of goods at their disposal. Furthermore, 
according to Rawls, we are to imagine that members of this position are 
operating under what Rawls calls the “veil of ignorance” as they determine 
the proper theory of justice. Under the veil of ignorance, people in the origi-
nal position do not know where they will fall in society. They do not know 
what occupation or career they will have. They have no knowledge of their 
talents or skills. They do not know where they will fall in the distribution of 
income (if they will be better or worse off than others). This veil guarantees 
equality through ignorance: all members of the original position are equally 
ignorant of their characteristics and abilities, and they are equally unable to 
predict how they will be able to achieve what they want.6
Now that the scope and limits of what the members of the original 
position can know are defined, Rawls moves to the second step: finding out 
what such people would choose as principles of justice. Rawls presents two 
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principles of justice that would be agreed upon by members of the original 
position. One principle is that each person has an equal right to the most 
extensive liberty. That is, each person has the right to do what he or she 
wants up until it impedes another person’s freedom to do the same. The 
second principle, which is the heart of the theory of justice as fairness, is 
called the “difference principle.” Rawls explains the difference principle as 
holding that socioeconomic inequalities of goods (such as income, wealth, 
opportunities, etc.) are just if and only if they attach to positions open to 
all, and if and only if they benefit all. In other words, inequalities are just, 
so long as everyone has a fair opportunity to achieve the available social 
goods. Given the characteristics of the original position, it is only fair for 
people to compete for and obtain scarce goods through the use of their 
natural talents. Legal inequalities and birth status inequalities are unjust. 
Furthermore, inequalities of goods must “benefit all” in the sense that they 
benefit the least advantaged. One must survey the inequalities across the 
field, and if one finds that a certain inequality does not benefit those on the 
lower end, then that inequality is unjust.
The theory of justice as fairness is exemplified in Intolerable Cruelty cen-
trally through the love between Miles and Marylin. Though Miles endorses 
the view of justice as power initially, we find that once he meets Marylin, his 
attitude begins to change. Under the notion of justice as power, he finds great 
success: he has all the money and material goods he could want or need, he 
has a brilliant track record of court victories, he has earned the respect of 
Herb Myerson (Tom Aldredge), the senior partner of his law firm, and he 
has successfully achieved his dream of a victory through utter annihilation. 
But despite all of this success, he finds that he is still unhappy, and the reason 
for this despondency is that he does not have Marylin. Miles has fallen in 
love with Marylin and so dreams of marrying her.
Once Miles’s dream comes true as he marries Marylin in Las Vegas, 
we find that his conception of justice drastically changes. In his speech to 
the National Organization of Matrimonial Attorneys Nationwide (ironi-
cally abbreviated as NO MAN), entitled “Nailing Your Spouse’s Assets,” 
Miles tears up his planned speech (another symbolic gesture of tearing 
up a contractual understanding) and instead “talk[s] to [them] from the 
heart because today, for the first time in [his] life, [he] stands before [them] 
. . . naked . . . vulnerable . . . and in love.” He explains to them that, though 
matrimonial lawyers avoid the word “love” because they are afraid of this 
emotion, he is here to tell them that “love is good.” He continues to say that 
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the cynicism employed as “a cloak that advertises their indifference” is a 
cloak that “destroys everyone and everything.” Under the notion of justice 
as power, Miles explains, he sought to “extinguish the flame” of love that 
his clients had so that he could “sift through the smoldering wreckage for 
[his] paltry reward.” But now, he wishes to “fan this precious flame, this 
most precious flame, back into loving, roaring life” and to counsel trust 
between the disagreeing parties so that they can build or rebuild the love 
they have between them.
Miles’s speech to NO MAN shows his new endorsement of the theory 
of justice as fairness. Miles’s love for Marylin becomes his veil of ignorance. 
Though he thinks he knows Marylin’s net worth after her divorce from 
Howard, he does not care about it. The self-interested drive for power in 
terms of the distribution of goods is irrelevant to him. He has no interest 
in nailing Marylin’s assets because his love for her has blinded him toward 
such things. He thus signs the Massey pre-nup, acknowledging that a divorce 
would lead to an unequal, but just, distribution of goods. Though Marylin 
would retain her net worth from Howard’s estate, Miles accepts this unequal 
distribution since she earned it through her talents of manipulation and 
Miles would not be worse off, given his own net worth. Thus, through the 
power of love, Miles discards the notion of justice as power in favor of the 
notion of justice as fairness.
While Miles’s initial leap of faith into love and trust of Marylin becomes 
part of a clever dupe by Marylin to nail Miles’s assets, we come to find that 
Marylin alters her theory of justice as well. Under the notion of justice as 
power, she too seems to have it all: she has achieved revenge upon Miles 
who utterly annihilated her in the courtroom, she has secured half of Miles’s 
net worth, and she now has her “passport to wealth, freedom, and indepen-
dence.” But like Miles, she finds herself longing for something else. Even 
after the back-and-forth hiring of the hit man, Wheezy Joe (Irwin Keyes), 
Marylin finds that the love she pretended to have for Miles was not simply 
a manipulative tool for power. On the contrary, the love she has for Miles 
is real.
Her feelings of love and trust toward Miles come to fruition during 
the negotiation period after the dissolution of their short marriage. With 
Marylin’s net worth now larger due to her inheritance of Rex’s estate, Miles 
once again professes his love to her by signing another Massey pre-nup 
(once again indicating his endorsement of justice as fairness). Marylin, 
in turn, takes the pre-nup and tears it up. This act of tearing up the con-
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tract is different from previous occurrences as it reveals Marylin’s sudden 
turnaround as she metaphorically tears up the notion of justice as power 
and instead endorses the notion of justice as fairness. In Marylin’s case, 
her love toward Miles is also her veil of ignorance. But here, Marylin’s 
love shows that she doesn’t care about her financial estate. In the original 
position, her love made her blind to her assets. Instead, her love for Miles 
drives her to wish for a fair and equal distribution of goods between them, 
regardless of what they entered with. Thus, through the power of love, 
Marylin also rejects the notion of justice as power in favor of the notion 
of justice as fairness.7
All’s Fair in Love and War
In Intolerable Cruelty, the separate and joint journeys of Miles and Marylin 
provide us with an exploration of the various theories of justice. This ex-
ploration ultimately centers on the tension between the theory of justice as 
power and the theory of justice as fairness, as brought out in the relation-
ship between Miles and Marylin. And while it appears that, through their 
love for each other, the theory of justice as fairness prevails, this victory is 
not guaranteed.8
First, Miles and Marylin are now partners in the new television series, 
Funniest Divorce Videos, hosted by Gus Petch, with the tagline of  “We gonna 
nail your ass!” Such a show, exploiting infidelities and broken hearts, suggests 
that while Miles and Marylin may endorse justice as fairness toward each 
other, they still embody justice as power toward others. But even though 
they share a love for each other, it is not certain that they will live happily 
ever after under the notion of justice as fairness. Given that both have been 
driven by their yearning for power most of their lives, we are left wondering 
whether or not either one will revert to treating justice as power. Since there 
is no Massey pre-nup between them, how do we know that Miles won’t seek 
a divorce that earns him half of the new net worth, enabling him to walk 
away a richer man than before? Or, perhaps Freddy was actually able to tape 
up the torn pre-nup, allowing Marylin the opportunity to divorce Miles 
and keep her assets, including Funniest Divorce Videos, for herself. Since no 
reassurance is given, the ending of Intolerable Cruelty thus ironically sug-
gests that, though three interpretations of justice have been presented and 
explored, no single account of justice is completely endorsed as the kind of 
justice that will always prevail.
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Notes
 1. Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 
338c.
 2. Ibid., 338d–339a.
 3. Furthermore, Miles’s ability to manipulate language en route to achieving power 
and domination is not limited to his opponents—it even extends to his clients. We find 
a humorous back-and-forth banter among Miles, Wrigley, and their client, Rex Rexroth 
(Edward Herrmann), as Rex questions whether or not Miles has sat before the presiding 
judge in their case. The following clever and witty discussion leaves Rex all the more 
confused, which helps to keep Rex in his place—under the control of Miles:
Rex: Have you sat before her before?
Miles: No. No, the judge sits first. Then we sit.
Rex: Well, have you sat after her before?
Wrigley: Sat after her before? You mean, have we argued before her before?
Miles: The judge sits in judgment. The counsel argues before the judge.
Rex: So, have you argued before her before?
Wrigley: Before her before, or before she sat before?
Rex: Before her before. I said, before her before.
Wrigley: No, you said before she sat before.
Rex: I did at first, but . . .
Miles: Look, don’t argue.
Rex: I’m not. I’m . . .
Wrigley: No, you don’t argue. We argue.
Miles: Counsel argues.
Wrigley: You appear.
Miles: The judge sits.
Wrigley: Then you sit.
Miles: Or you stand in contempt.
Wrigley: And then we argue.
Miles: The counsel argues.
Rex: Which you’ve done before.
Miles: Which we’ve done before.
Rex: Ah.
Wrigley: But not before her.
 4. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651; Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 2006), 68–72.
 5. Ibid., 72–80.
 6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 118–19, 127, 131.
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 7. It should be noted that the love between Miles and Marylin only partially 
represents Rawls’s veil of ignorance. Miles and Marylin are well aware of each other’s 
occupation, skills, and talents—in fact, it may be the case that that is part of the reason 
they have fallen in love. However, their love represents the veil of ignorance insofar as 
neither one is concerned about their financial wealth. Thus, because their love has led 
them to disregard the financial wealth of each other, this love helps to represent, in a 
limited scope, Rawls’s veil of ignorance.
 8. It is important to point out that while Rawls’s conception of justice is a universal 
conception of justice that applies to all rational beings, justice as fairness in Intolerable 
Cruelty applies only between Miles and Marylin. That is, Miles and Marylin exhibit 
the conception of justice as fairness only toward each other and not necessarily toward 
others. Though the scope of justice here is narrower than Rawls’s version, justice as 
fairness still adequately explains the new conception of justice that Miles and Marylin 
have when they are with each other.
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ethIcs, heart, and VIolence In 
mIller’s crossIng
Bradley L. Herling
Writing Miller’s Crossing (1990) was no easy task. According to their own 
reports, the Coen brothers started with a set of images: big hats, men in 
overcoats, and—the woods. These glimpses, along with their fascination 
with Dashiell Hammett, led the Coens to a hard-boiled scenario involving 
crime, corruption, and thuggery, with a hero who is caught in the middle. 
But progress on the screenplay was fitful, and at one point it halted altogether. 
The brothers decided to take a break to work on something else and clear 
their heads. The result of this hiatus was Barton Fink (1991). As Joel Coen 
later said, apparently without irony, “That sort of washed out our brain and 
we were able to go back and finish Miller’s Crossing.”1 It turns out that John 
Goodman’s character “Madman Mundt” (“I’ll show you the life of the mind!”) 
helped three authors get over their writer’s block: Barton, Joel, and Ethan.
We have to wonder about what made composing Miller’s Crossing so 
difficult, beyond its complicated plot. Part of the answer, we might suppose, 
lies in the careful attention that the Coens paid to their film’s genre-based 
world. If this was to be their take on gangster films, with a heavy dose of 
noir sensibilities, then it had to be true to form.2 But Miller’s Crossing is more 
than an ironic, technically proficient homage. When the brothers opted to 
infuse their genre-based tale with substantive concerns about the nature of 
its protagonist, a hero who is largely borrowed from cinematic convention, 
things must have gotten all the more difficult.
In this essay, I consider three central themes in the film—ethics, heart, 
and violence—and argue that the Coens weave them together to achieve a 
significant effect: we as viewers are compelled to reflect on the ethical status 
of the noir-style protagonist. From the outset, “ethics” is an explicit concern 
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in Miller’s Crossing. In the opening scene, Johnny Caspar (Jon Polito), “a 
brute posing as a philosopher,” articulates the harsh code of conduct that 
dominates in the film.3 But the Coens also return again and again to “heart,” 
which signifies the capacity for positive attachment based on sentiment 
(sympathy). Finally, Miller’s Crossing would not be complete without surreal 
and magisterial eruptions of Coenesque violence. These moments epitomize 
the deployment of an “ethics” of power, with sympathy-crushing results.
These features come together to make a cinematic proposal about a 
form of agency that is easy to be drawn to, that of the noir-style hero. As we 
will see, in Miller’s Crossing, Tom Reagan (Gabriel Byrne) is very much in 
this mold, and we might see the resolution of the film as a dramatic success; 
Tom is autonomous, composed, stoic, and (admittedly) riveting—ready, in 
a Hollywood sense, for his next adventure. But the Coen brothers are care-
ful not to allow his success to become this kind of cinematic apotheosis: 
he has succeeded in extricating himself from a bad situation in a corrupt 
moral universe, but he is also more alone than he was at the beginning. His 
impressive mix of reason and sentiment, it turns out, has been matched blow 
for blow by the disruptive effects of betrayal and violence.
In pursuing this reading of Tom Reagan’s outlook I am influenced by 
David Hume’s moral psychology, which pits “passion” and “reason” against 
each other but in the end affirms the inescapability of sentiment in moral 
deliberation. “Passion,” Hume writes, “is a violent and sensible emotion of 
mind, when any good or evil is presented. . . . By reason we mean affections 
of the very same kind . . . but such as operate more calmly . . . Which tran-
quillity . . . causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual 
faculties.”4 Deborah Knight has followed Hume’s lead in suggesting that 
emotion can be seen as a stable foundation for moral reasoning, even in noir 
films.5 But the twin-headed problem for Tom, which leads inevitably to his 
solitude at the end of the film, is both the deceptive coldness of reason and its 
reducibility to the dangerous instability of sentiment. In the face of passion’s 
violent surpluses, whatever “heart” he has left at the end is vestigial—and no 
longer serviceable as an instrument of positive human connection.
Ethics: “I Ain’t Embarrassed to Use the Word”
In the opening scene of Miller’s Crossing, Johnny Caspar, the volatile Italian 
crime boss, informs Leo O’Bannon (Albert Finney), an Irish politico who 
is currently “runnin’ things,” that something needs to be done about Ber-
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nie Bernbaum (John Turturro). Bernie has been selling Caspar out, taking 
his bets but also revealing to “out-of-town money” which fights are fixed. 
Bernie makes a tidy little profit from this inside information, while Caspar’s 
take is diminished. The complication: Bernie pays Leo protection money, 
so Caspar has to notify Leo about his intention to take action. Tom Reagan, 
Leo’s adviser, observes.
Caspar makes an interesting argument for his proposal. The reason that 
he fixes fights is that he likes “sure things.” But as soon as money starts flow-
ing in, the cat is out of the bag, and the odds go down. What is the world 
coming to? “Now if you can’t trust a fix, what can you trust?” If everyone has 
to revert to betting on chance, Caspar argues, “then you’re back in anarchy. 
On account of the breakdown of ethics. That’s why ethics is important, what 
separates us from the animals. . . . Whereas Bernie Bernbaum is a horse of 
a different color, ethics-wise. As in, he ain’t got any.”
It is of course comical that Caspar, a crime boss, invokes “ethics” in this 
exchange, but this is a common move for the Coens: deeper reflection (or 
fancier elocution) often comes from an unexpected source in their films. In 
fact, this particular “brute posing as a philosopher” seems to start by taking a 
page from Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes posited a “state of nature” within which 
all human beings are created equal and free, yet these very qualities breed 
tension. Nature is in fact “a warre . . . of every man against every man,” and 
life in it is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”6 To keep things from 
spiraling downward, we enter into a primordial agreement that regulates our 
behavior toward one another. This “social contract” is the implicit founda-
tion of morality and law, so when individuals break this contract, they are 
subject to reprisal. Because he breaks trust with Caspar, Bernie Bernbaum 
is subject to such punishment. If everyone started violating social covenants 
and conventions (e.g., the tacit ones surrounding bookmaking), then, as 
Caspar suggests, we risk descending into anarchy.
The reason for Leo’s resistance to this argument is clear: he also has a 
contract with Bernie, one that is even more explicit. Because of this com-
mitment, Leo engages in skeptical questioning. How does Caspar know that 
Bernie is the one leaking the information? Don’t others know about Caspar’s 
bets? Couldn’t someone else be the grifter? In response, Caspar reverts to 
his premise: “this question of character . . . that’s how we know it’s Bernie 
Bernbaum. The Shmatta Kid. Because ethically, he’s kinda shaky.”
Caspar is unconcerned with the particulars of the case. Instead, he is 
intent on who “has ethics” and who does not, and with a little help from 
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Plato’s Republic, his statements continue to reveal the dominant ethos in 
the world of Miller’s Crossing. On one level, Caspar bases his judgments on 
a concept articulated very early on in Plato’s text: justice is “doing good to 
friends and harm to enemies.”7 Later in the film, in fact, this notion proves to 
be central to Caspar’s worldview. “Everything above board, that’s how I like 
it,” he proclaims, “so everybody knows who’s a friend and who’s an enemy.” 
But as Socrates points out (and as Miller’s Crossing constantly demonstrates), 
this is an unreliable foundation. Don’t we confuse friends and enemies? 
And what constitutes a “friend” and an “enemy” anyway? Is a friend a good 
person? If so, then how do we know what a good person is, if we haven’t 
already determined what justice is? Caspar wants to harm Bernie because 
he is perceived as an enemy, and that characterization depends on a prior 
judgment about Bernie’s character. But Caspar doesn’t articulate any criteria 
for what makes a bad character as opposed to a good one besides upholding 
contracts, and that indictment would require a convincing argument for 
Bernie’s guilt in this particular case, which he does not present.
Of course the overarching irony of Caspar’s reflections is that he wants 
to kill Bernie because Bernie is cheating him, or, to be more precise, Caspar 
wants to kill Bernie because Bernie is preventing Caspar from cheating the 
way Caspar wants to. When Caspar talks about “ethics,” then, he is talking 
about a code of conduct that serves those powerful enough to influence 
the outcome of fights—people like him. Once again recalling Book I of The 
Republic, Thrasymachus offers the groundwork for this ethical view: jus-
tice, he says, “is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” In other 
words, whoever is in charge dictates what’s wrong and what’s right, so all 
ethical systems are relative to who is in power.8 This relativistic principle, 
supplemented first by making and enforcing contracts and second by helping 
friends and harming enemies, dominates the ethical landscape in Miller’s 
Crossing. Bosses like Caspar and Leo are above the law; in fact, they make 
the law as they see fit.
As Plato suggests, this overcoming of conventional morality is a factor 
that leads to the tyrant’s downfall. Everything for him is permitted, in a sense, 
so the tyrant is prone to being consumed by the rawness of his lower nature. 
This is true of Leo and Caspar from the outset. On the one side, Leo admits 
to being a man who does what his heart tells him—even if it isn’t smart. In 
fact, as we later find out, his resistance to Caspar’s initial proposal comes from 
passion: he is in love with Verna (Marcia Gay Harden), Bernie’s sister, which 
influences his judgment. Caspar, on the other side, explodes with anger when 
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Leo rejects his proposal. When Caspar receives the “high hat” from people, 
we see the driving force behind his actions, which is pure, unadulterated 
rage. Any high falutin’ talk about “ethics” among characters like these, as 
Hume would remind us, is window dressing for their passions.
Tom, our hero, knows the score, though as the “thinker” in the film, 
he may put more stock in the distinctiveness of reason—at the beginning, 
at least. After Caspar storms out of the room, Tom says, “Bad play, Leo.” In 
his role as the hard-boiled, stoic adviser, Tom senses that Leo is not acting 
rationally, that is, in a way that will preserve his power. Leo has in fact intro-
duced “heart” into the system, which leads to his attachment to Verna and 
thus attachment to her brother. It also makes him ready for a fight, anywhere, 
anytime. These outcomes are not advantageous in a world where Bernie has 
violated a contract with Caspar, where the increasingly powerful rival will 
now become a clear enemy, where actions have not been thought through 
dispassionately. Tom foresees trouble ahead, and it comes—but not quite 
in the way that he expected.
“Ethics” with a Twist
It doesn’t take long for the plot to thicken. Leo appears at Tom’s door very 
late one night because Verna is missing, as is the man who was supposed 
to keep an eye on her. From his desperation it is clear that Leo is smitten, 
but Tom sees Verna’s “angle”: she has seduced him for the sole purpose of 
gaining protection for her brother. Leo absorbs Tom’s chiding for being such 
a “sap” and then departs.
So where is Verna? As we quickly learn, she is in Tom’s bed, in the next 
room. He has also given in to her charms, in spite of (or perhaps because 
of) the transparency of her motives. “Did you put in a good word for my 
brother?” she asks, after hearing that Leo came and went without incident. 
“No,” Tom says; instead, “I told him you were a tramp and he should dump 
you.”
At this point, Tom’s foothold in the world of Caspar’s gangster/noir 
“ethics” is intact. He has used Verna for his own pleasure, knowing that 
he could manipulate her attempt to exploit a new angle for protecting her 
brother, namely himself; he is in the stronger position, so what is right has 
been dictated by his own advantage. Both have attempted to utilize each 
other as a means to a self-interested end, thus violating a basic prohibition 
within Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy, but that is a different world.9 
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The key at this stage in Miller’s Crossing is that Tom has been successful in 
his manipulation, which determines the value of his action, whereas Verna 
has not. It should not be forgotten that Tom has also violated the trust of his 
friend Leo, because he is even more relativistic than Johnny Caspar. Who 
is a friend and who is an enemy anyway? As Tom says in one of his more 
nihilistic moments, “Nobody knows anybody.”
Moral flexibility and unfeeling cynicism are markers of Tom’s noir 
heroism early in the film, but his outlook starts to shift after Rug Daniels 
(Salvatore H. Tornabene), the man trailing Verna for Leo, turns up dead in 
an alley—sans his hairpiece.10 In a meeting at his club, Leo quickly decides 
that Caspar was responsible and orders a reprisal. Tom disagrees, this time 
angrily, and he urges that Leo give up Bernie to keep the peace. Once again, 
Leo’s attachment to Verna leads him to reject this proposal, and Tom storms 
out. Soon after this exchange, Tom barges into the ladies’ room in search of 
Verna. After some snappy verbal sparring, she comes clean to Tom: sure, 
she’s cozying up to Leo to protect her brother, so what of it? Tom claims that 
he is simply looking out for Leo, who is getting “twisted” around by Verna. 
Tom grabs her. “You’re a pathetic rumhead,” she says. He responds, “And I 
love you, Angel,” before giving her a rough kiss.
Verna answers by punching Tom in the mouth, but now it seems that 
“heart,” the marker of positive emotional attachment, has broken through 
Tom’s tough exterior. Soon after this episode, the two of them stop dancing 
around the issue. After getting beaten up by Caspar’s henchmen, Tom forces 
his way into Verna’s apartment and accuses her of killing Rug. Verna denies 
the charge and changes the subject: “That’s not why you came. . . . Admit 
you don’t like me seeing Leo because you’re jealous. Admit that you’ve got 
a heart—even if it’s small and feeble and you can’t remember the last time 
you used it.” Tom responds blithely, “If I’d known we were going to cast our 
feelings into words I’d have memorized the Song of Solomon.”11 Yet he once 
more gives in to her (after she flings his hat across the room), despite the fact 
that there is no “angle” to getting involved with Verna; there is only further 
vulnerability to becoming one.
“Jesus, Tom”: Violent Interlude (1)
One of the most distinctive elements in the work of the Coen brothers is 
their staging of violence. Many of the most memorable scenes in their films 
depict violent struggles that oscillate between choreographed slapstick and 
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grisly realism. Pacing is often slow and unnatural, and the gore is thick and 
gruesome, heightening the immediate, uncanny effect that violence has on 
us. At the same time, the sheer constructedness of these scenes makes us 
self-consciously aware that we are watching violence on film, that it is artifice 
meant to achieve some aesthetic purpose, even if that purpose is merely the 
impish delight of the directors themselves.
The violence in Miller’s Crossing fits into this pattern with precision. In 
the first stylized staging of violence in the film, for example, Tom is subject 
to a beating by Caspar’s henchmen. The doors of a warehouse close as Cas-
par departs, and Tom is left with an “ape” of a man, Frankie (Mike Starr), 
who is supposed to work him over. The Coens film Frankie from below in a 
long, wide shot that places him at the far end of the warehouse interior. Shot 
from below, the man should look huge and imposing, and in some sense he 
does, but he is also diminished by the empty space of the warehouse, and he 
comes off as comical and pathetic as he marches forward, toward Tom (and 
the viewer). As soon as he draws near, Tom asks him to wait as he takes off 
his coat, and he picks up a chair and breaks the thug’s nose with it. Frankie 
looks like he is about to cry as he says, “Jesus, Tom.”
Frankie turns around and marches away, giving Tom a quick, hurt glance 
before he heads out the door. Tom stands like a statue, still poised with the 
chair in its follow-through. After a couple of beats, the door opens again, 
and Frankie’s much shorter partner, Tic-Tac (Al Mancini), strides right up 
to Tom, with the behemoth in tow. Tom again tries to use the chair, but 
Tic-Tac blocks the blow and subdues him. Now the two begin to beat Tom 
viciously—but they are stopped as one of the police raids instigated by Leo 
breaks down the warehouse doors, just in time.
Tom’s exchange with Frankie is comical: the “ape” strides up to Tom 
like Citizen Kane but is hurt like a child when hit with the chair. When he 
mutters, “Jesus, Tom,” he is saying, implicitly, “Aww, you didn’t have to do 
that,” suggesting that beatings like this are routine, businesslike, almost 
collegial in the film. In fact, Tom is never seriously hurt, though he is 
beaten down again and again. Yet this is a real, visceral pummeling that 
he absorbs and that we absorb with him. It is Tom taking punishment, in 
this case, because he adheres to Leo, to whatever moral force binds him to 
Leo’s side. It may be arbitrary, but this loyalty has consequences. Heartfelt 
attachments always do.
The hurt that comes as a result of this positive attachment needs com-
fort and care, so Tom finds it and, in some sense, pays Leo back. He goes 
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to Verna again, and they solidify their bond, as discussed above, with the 
Song of Solomon hanging in the air.
How to Philosophize with a Chisel: “Look in Your Heart”
The scene depicting Tom and Verna’s second romantic encounter moves 
smoothly into one of the most memorable sequences in the film. Armed 
men sent by Caspar invade Leo’s home, and he defends himself brilliantly 
with a tommy gun to the strains of “Danny Boy.” Leo has escaped this time, 
but the attack reveals weakness. The power of the tyrant/boss is a matter 
of perception, as Tom affirms: “You don’t hold elected office in this town. 
You run it because people think you run it. Once they stop thinking it, you 
stop running it.”
So what should Leo do? Once again, Tom recommends giving Bernie 
up, kicking back, and waiting for Caspar “to show a weakness.” Leo hesitates 
again—and then reveals his plan to marry Verna. His obligation to Bernie 
now has become all the more intense. Tom can’t stand to see sentiment 
blind his boss any longer. He accuses Verna of killing Rug Daniels and then 
explains why: “Rug knew something she didn’t like him knowing. . . . He 
knew where she was sleeping, and who with.” “Maybes don’t make it so,” 
Leo says, but this is no “maybe.” Tom confesses to Leo that Verna was at his 
place the night that Rug was killed, the night that Leo came by, looking for 
advice from his trusted adviser.
Tom’s willingness to come clean manifests a dichotomy in the outlook 
of this character. On the one hand, Tom lays bare his violation of the trust 
between the two men, revealing that he is in fact a “son of a bitch,” not only 
in his relationship with Verna but also in his friendship with Leo. Because 
he has broken this covenant, he is subject to a vigorous response. Leo gives 
Tom another beating and then banishes him. “It’s the kiss-off,” he proclaims. 
“If I never see him again it’ll be soon enough.” At the same time, Tom has 
made a persuasive point by sleeping with Verna; he has shown empirically 
that she is receptive to advances from men besides Leo. Perhaps she is not 
worth his trust and should be guarded against. In this sense, Tom’s disclosure 
maintains a fundamental obligation to protect Leo, even against Verna, and 
even against himself. In response, Leo does take forthright action, suppress-
ing his “big heart” in favor of realism: he also banishes Verna.
Tom and Verna are now out in the cold, and it appears that this “kiss-off” 
drives our hero into full-blown cynicism and amorality. After first tricking 
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Verna into telling him where Bernie is, Tom goes to Caspar to offer his 
services—and the first piece of information he serves up is Bernie’s where-
abouts. Tom thinks that this will be enough to get him in with Caspar, but 
a further test is demanded. Tom must kill Bernie himself, out in the woods, 
at a place called Miller’s Crossing.
What ensues is one of the most striking scenes in the film and, indeed, 
within the entire Coen brothers corpus. Frankie and Tic-Tac drive Bernie 
and Tom out to a deserted spot in the woods; Tom receives a gun and is 
instructed to “put one in his brain.” As the two of them wander deep into 
the trees, Bernie, played brilliantly by John Turturro, begs for his life:
Tommy, you can’t do this. You don’t bump guys. You’re not like those 
animals back there. It’s not right, Tom. They can’t make us do this. 
It’s a wrong situation. They can’t make us different people than we 
are. We’re not muscle, Tom. I never killed anybody. I used a little 
information for a chisel, that’s all. It’s in my nature, Tom, I couldn’t 
help it. Somebody hands me an angle, I play it. I don’t deserve to 
die for that. Do you think I do? . . . [now weeping] I’m praying to 
you! I can’t die! Out here in the woods! Like a dumb animal! I’m 
praying to you! Look in your heart!
Turturro improvises and repeats these last few lines to great effect, yet the 
cuts to Tom reveal a stoic demeanor, eyes barely visible beneath the brim 
of his hat, gun mechanically pointed at the pleading con man. In the end, 
however, the appeal works: Tom fires two shots—but not into Bernie. Tom 
instructs him to disappear, to leave town and never show his face again.
Why does Tom refrain from eliminating Bernie, something he has been 
advocating for the entire film? What makes Bernie’s appeal so powerful? 
Perhaps because it includes some rationally persuasive arguments. Bernie 
first speaks to Tom’s sense of character and identity. In undertaking this 
action, Bernie asks him to consider who he is and whether this self-concept 
is compatible with executing other human beings. If it is not, Bernie argues 
implicitly, Tom should not perform this act. If Tom subscribes to the char-
acter-based theory of ethics that grounds this argument, Bernie has a point; 
Tom is an adviser, not “muscle.”12 In fact, when it comes to his own dealings, 
Tom rarely harms anyone himself—but he is subject to beating after beating. 
In a world that trades on thuggery, Tom has always been a “thinker,” so why 
would he start resorting to violence now?
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Bernie also argues that his own character and actions should mitigate 
the response. On the one hand, “chiseling” is a fixed disposition in his char-
acter, to use Aristotelian language, because he simply can’t help “playing an 
angle” if it is presented to him. To his mind, this makes him less culpable 
for his violations of others. While this is an unconvincing attempt to shirk 
responsibility, it does represent a substantive response to Caspar’s vendetta 
against him.13 If everyone knows that “ethically speaking, he’s kind of shaky,” 
and that he’s a “horse of a different color, ethics-wise,” as Caspar argues at the 
beginning of the film, then why did Caspar lay bets with Bernie in the first 
place? In light of Bernie’s “nature,” doesn’t Caspar also implicate himself? 
Bernie makes an even stronger claim, now about his actions. Does grift-
ing—skimming a little extra off the top—warrant a death sentence? Here, 
as a simple matter of retributive justice, the punishment does not seem to 
fit the crime.
Bernie quickly abandons these arguments because Tom remains un-
moved, and the death march continues; it seems that reason will not win 
the day. The register of Bernie’s voice changes once again, and he slumps to 
his knees. He identifies the incongruity of the scene: Tom is a man in a hat, 
suit, and overcoat, standing in the woods, and he is about to shoot Bernie 
“like an animal.” The connection with Caspar’s opening argument, which 
proposed that behavior like Bernie’s could lead down a slippery slope to “the 
state of nature,” is transparent. “Ethics,” it was claimed, was what separated us 
from the animals, but at Miller’s Crossing, Bernie presents a counterappeal. 
Caspar’s ethical vision, the dominant system of ethics in this world, is actu-
ally the one that leads to barbarity and subhuman behavior. This emotional 
appeal is meant to repel Tom from the action he is about to undertake.
But Tom’s capacity for deliberation still resists. In the realm of binding 
agreements and contracts, benefits to friends and harm to enemies, might 
makes right, and cool calculation, “whacking” Bernie makes sense, or, at 
worst, it is a matter of relative indifference. So what should Tom rely on to 
guide his actions, in lieu of these conventions? Bernie’s proposal: “Look in 
your heart. I’m praying to you.” This final, desperate call for mercy forces 
Tom to confront both the vulnerable humanity of the man before him 
and his own basic moral intuitions, which do not turn out to be rationally 
calculable, as Hume famously argued.14 Even if Tom refrains from killing 
Bernie because in this moment he thinks of Verna, he still has recourse 
only to his “heart,” not to any sensible, realistic, deliberate foundation for 
this (lack of) action.
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Tom’s decision is a “bad play.” He knows that it will come back to bite 
him, and we can well imagine that he has surprised himself with this sudden 
rush of sympathy.15 Bernie is also surprised—and a bit embarrassed—by his 
pathetic appeal, as he later admits. It represents, after all, the interruption of 
a very different kind of ethics from the one that constitutes the premise of 
the film (and so many others that it emulates), for it suggests that genuine 
sympathy is an option in the midst of gangsterism.
Out in the woods, this heartfelt moral orientation is in radical surplus, 
right up front, pressing the issue, almost uncomfortably so. It is, the Coen 
brothers seemingly admit, too much, for they quickly allow this aperture 
into the “heart” of the two characters to be closed as their film heads toward 
its conclusion.
“An Artist with the Thompson”: Violent Interlude (2)
We should recall that the middle act of Miller’s Crossing, leading up to the 
striking episode in the woods, is kicked off by a small masterpiece of cin-
ematic mayhem: the attempted hit on Leo at his mansion.
The Coens open this scene with a gesture that presents violence as the 
explicit counterbalance to “heart.” Tom and Verna start kissing and “doing 
plenty” for the second time, and Tom’s hat enters the shot as it is tossed across 
the room and lands on a chair. Then the camera directs the viewer’s gaze to 
the window, which is framed with two lace curtains. The opening strains of 
“Danny Boy” come up, and the shot fades into curtains surrounding one of 
the windows at Leo’s mansion. His guard is killed off camera, and then the 
shot catches up to his body on the floor as blood pools around his head and 
his cigarette ignites the newspaper he was reading. In this series of shots, 
passion literally leads into violence.
Upstairs, Leo is in bed, listening to the plaintive Irish air on the Victrola 
as the hit men make their way up the stairs. Leo notices a wisp of smoke 
making its way through the floorboards, and he sits up, dons his velvet slip-
pers, and grabs the pistol on his nightstand. Just then, the killers burst in, 
machine guns blazing. Leo rolls under the bed; he shoots one of the men 
in the ankle and then in the head when he hits the floor. Now the other 
one retreats, and Leo scoops up the dead man’s tommy gun. He races out 
of the bedroom and across the hall, dodging bullets as he goes, and makes 
his way out a window.
Now on the front lawn, looking up, he trains the machine gun on the 
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window, in which the thug soon appears. Leo unloads his weapon, and in 
the cuts to the man being hit above, we witness the “Thompson jitterbug,” “a 
gruesome dance performed involuntarily by a hood who’s being riddled with 
bullets while his dead fingers continue to squeeze the trigger of a Thompson 
submachine gun.”16 Now a car careens around the corner, and someone inside 
opens fire on Leo, who stands his ground, unfazed, in front of his burning 
mansion. Framed by the flames, he starts marching deliberately toward the 
car as it speeds away from him down the avenue, firing his machine gun 
the whole way. Eventually he hits the vehicle, and it slams into a tree, bursts 
into flames, and explodes. Leo stands in the street in his brilliant red robe 
and slippers, the weapon still smoking, and he reaches into his pocket and 
retrieves the cigar that he put there just before the attack began.
The brilliance of this episode stems largely from Leo’s composure, con-
veyed so fantastically by Albert Finney. As one of his retainers says later, 
“The old man is still an artist with the Thompson.” Leo is “an artist,” an artist 
of power politics, as this sequence is meant to illustrate. As he unloads the 
bullets from the tommy gun, the Coens cut to him, sometimes from below, 
reinforcing his mastery and authority, and sometimes from above, zooming 
down on his position in front of the house, while also cutting to the victim 
inside. This zoom magnifies the center of force that is tearing the hit man 
to shreds—Leo.
But we must notice that the premise for all of Leo’s brilliance and artistry 
is his being dislodged from a position of strength. First he is forced to roll 
out of the bed, then he must leave his own house (which burns), and he 
ends up in the street. While masterful in its orchestration, this eruption of 
violence signifies his dislocation and vulnerability. The presence of the clas-
sic Irish tune, which makes the sequence so effective, renders this explicit. 
The song, after all, is written from the perspective of the one who has been 
abandoned, who expects death before reunion with the prodigal beloved. 
Leo has in fact been abandoned by the police and mayor who are supposed 
to prop up his authority—and, more importantly, by Verna and Tom, as the 
previous scene has revealed.
The attempted hit on Leo, in the end, stages the next act in the film, 
leading up to Tom and Bernie’s scene at Miller’s Crossing. Like Tom after 
his beating at the hands of Caspar’s men, Leo seeks comfort in the face of his 
suffering and weakness; his “heart” expands and he decides to ask Verna to 
marry him. But this turns out to be a surplus of sentiment, an overcompen-
sation for the brush with death that Tom just cannot abide. Reading Leo’s 
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vulnerability from his own perspective, Tom confesses to his relationship 
with Verna. This act repels all three characters from each other, suppressing 
the “heart” in/of the middle of the film, until it makes it appearance again, 
out in the woods.
“Mr. Inside-Outsky”: Tom’s Play
Tom’s decision to spare Bernie does in fact go sour. Bernie said himself, “It’s 
in my nature, Tom. . . . Somebody hands me an angle, I play it.” Now he has 
an angle, so instead of leaving town, as he agreed to do, he decides to stick 
around. If he leaves, he has nothing, but if he stays, he has Tom, whose sur-
vival now depends on Bernie being dead. So his first demand turns the tables: 
Tom is to kill Caspar, or else Bernie threatens to “start eating in restaurants.” 
But he wants more than Tom’s services. He wants Tom, who “put the finger” 
on him in the first place, to “squirm,” to “sweat a little bit.”
So why does Bernie turn on Tom so viciously? This is not just a simple 
business decision, Bernie acting on his “nature” to get rid of a threat (Cas-
par); it is also driven by malice. “I guess I made kind of a fool of myself out 
there,” Bernie says, “bawling away like a twist. I guess I turned yellow. . . . It’s 
a painful memory. And I can’t help remembering that you put the finger on 
me.” Now the energetic “vivacity” of Bernie’s appeal (to use Hume’s term) 
is channeled in a different direction. His vulnerability has degenerated into 
pain and embarrassment, which in turn leads him to play his angle with an 
edge of sadistic pleasure. In this sense, Bernie urges the film to return to its 
dominant ethical mode, the “ethics” articulated by Caspar in its opening scene. 
Because of the betrayal Bernie is perpetrating on him, Tom is only too happy 
to join in this effort, and the Coen brothers oblige the both of them.
In fact, even before Bernie reappears, our hero has been doing some 
maneuvering to undermine Caspar’s right-hand man, “the Dane” (J. E. Free-
man). The Dane is closely linked with Mink (Steve Buscemi), who makes 
only one brief appearance very early in the film. Mink is “the Dane’s boy,” but 
unbeknown to him, Mink has recently gotten mixed up with Bernie also.17 
This triangle turns out to be central to the action of the film. Mink, because 
he is vouched for by the Dane, has inside information about Caspar’s fixed 
fights, and Bernie has apparently colluded with Mink (extorted him, more 
likely) to engage in the swindle that got everything started.
Tom has figured all of this out, and he places a call to Mink in which 
he lies and suggests that he has spilled the beans to Caspar and the Dane. 
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Tom urges Mink to disappear. Later, after Mink is nowhere to be found, 
Caspar reaches the conclusion that Tom wanted him to: Mink and Bernie 
were in on the swindle together. Now it’s only a small leap to assuming that 
the Dane was also betraying Caspar, and Tom plants the seed of this idea, 
but Caspar is not yet sold. He wants to talk to Mink first, and he orders 
Tom to find him.
Before Tom can get much further, however, the Dane intervenes. Re-
alizing that his colleagues never actually saw Bernie’s execution, he picks 
Tom up and takes him for a “little ride”—out to Miller’s Crossing. This was 
an eventuality that Tom had to foresee; he perhaps thought that the Dane 
could be taken care of before he became skeptical. But now Tom is in Bernie’s 
former position as the Dane marches him out into the forest. There is no 
pleading this time. Tom for the most part maintains his cool exterior, but 
at a certain point he vomits, which is all the Dane needs to see. Just as he 
is about to execute Tom, one of the men calls out. They have found a fresh 
body, a body with the face shot off. This corpse, for the moment anyway, 
satisfies the Dane. “I said put one in his brain,” says Tic-Tac, laughing, “not 
in his stinking face.”
In his next meeting with Caspar, Tom uses this episode to press his case. 
The Dane’s plan, according to Tom, was to miss the corpse, kill Tom for not 
doing the deed, and then blame another fix on Bernie. Caspar continues to 
hesitate, but the stress is getting to him: “Since last we jawed, my stomach’s 
been seizing up on me. The Dane saying we should double-cross you; you 
double-cross once, where’s it all end? An interesting ethical question.” Caspar 
is uncomfortable knowing that his tyrant’s power cannot help him clarify 
who is a friend and who is an enemy. In fact, his position makes things 
worse. “Runnin’ things,” he laments, “it ain’t all gravy.”
Meanwhile, Tom is also working on his Bernbaum problem. He man-
ages to track Bernie down through a hulk of a man named Drop Johnson 
(Mario Todisco), a boxer who has placed a suspiciously large bet on another 
fighter, a terrible hack. Tom confirms that Drop placed this bet for Bernie.18 
Soon Bernie calls Tom, and the mystery of the miraculous corpse is solved: 
Bernie killed Mink and dumped him at Miller’s Crossing to give Tom “some 
insurance”—and to keep his own “play” with Tom alive. But Tom has had 
enough. He tells Bernie that he’s leaving town and demands payment to keep 
quiet until he’s gone. Bernie must come to Tom’s apartment at 4:00 a.m. to 
complete the transaction.
Tom inches ever closer to resolving his problems, and the next step is 
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finishing off the Dane. In a remarkable scene (discussed further below), Tom 
enters the great room of his mansion, and the Dane is there, lying in wait. 
Tom is on the short end of a violent struggle until Caspar rises and beats the 
Dane mercilessly, for Tom has in fact convinced Caspar that the Dane was 
double-crossing him all along. Now Caspar wants a piece of Mink too, and 
Tom tells him that the Dane’s supposed accomplice will be at his (Tom’s) 
apartment at 4:00 a.m. Then Caspar finishes off his loyal henchman with a 
pistol shot to the head.
Tom has finished his setup. At four o’clock, Caspar goes to Tom’s apart-
ment, with Tom hanging back to avoid the fireworks. After Caspar enters 
the building (which is called the Barton Arms, by the way), shots ring out, 
and Tom slowly makes his way up the stairs. Caspar hasn’t even made it 
into the apartment: he lies splayed out in the hallway, shot, his bloody bald 
head wedged into the banister. And of course Bernie is there, waiting in the 
doorway. Tom’s plan has worked. Bernie arrived early, “looking for blood,” 
and he shot Caspar, mistaking him for Tom. Now everything is smoothed 
over. The Dane, Tom proposes, can be blamed for everything, including 
Caspar’s death, and it turns out that there’s enough money in the boss’s wallet 
to wipe out Tom’s gambling debt.
There’s only one problem, Tom suggests, once he has the money and all 
of the guns. “We can’t hang this on the Dane,” he says. “The Dane’s already 
dead, halfway across town. . . . It’s got to be you.” For the second time, Tom 
turns a gun on Bernie, but this time there will be no reprieve. Bernie slumps 
down, pleading once again: “So what’s in it for you? There’s no angle! You 
can’t just shoot me like that! Jesus Christ! It don’t make sense! Tommy! Look 
in your heart!” Tom responds, “What heart?” and he shoots Bernie through 
the forehead (“one in the brain”), planting the gun that killed him on Caspar 
and the one that killed Caspar on Bernie.
“A Deep, Dark Place”: Violent Interlude (3)
The climactic and most surreal staging of violence in the film is the scene in 
the great room of Caspar’s mansion. This scene seals the fate of the Dane, but 
more importantly, in the hands of the Coen brothers, it is a vivid demonstra-
tion of the sympathy-crushing effect of passion gone wrong, which consti-
tutes the true foundation of the “ethics” of power in Miller’s Crossing.
When Tom enters the room, he walks with Caspar toward a chair by 
the fireplace, and a relatively tight shot follows them, so we as viewers have 
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no sense of the space behind them. Tom’s vision is narrow, too. Because he 
is fixated on making his case to Caspar, he fails to notice that the Dane is 
there. A shot now follows the Dane from right to left as he announces his 
presence and traverses the previously unnoticed space behind Tom. The 
Dane directs Tom’s (and the viewer’s) attention to the fact that Drop John-
son is also in the room, in the space he just vacated, on the right. A zoom 
now takes us straight up to Drop’s bludgeoned, swollen face, and his eyes 
widen horribly as he gazes at Tom. Now the next shot zooms in on Tom in 
the same manner, mirroring the way we have just seen the “gorilla” sitting 
in the corner. These sudden directorial interventions are disorienting. For 
much of Miller’s Crossing, the Coens have avoided the careening shots that 
their other films (like Raising Arizona [1987], for example, the film that 
preceded Miller’s Crossing) lead us to expect, but now that we have arrived 
at the violent core of the film, the stable, stately subjectivity bestowed on 
the viewer for much of its duration is disrupted.
The Dane begins to assault Tom by choking him, and now the shot 
from below has its standard effect: the thug is diabolical and imposing as he 
announces, “I am going to send you to a deep, dark place. And I am going to 
have fun doing it.” The Coens cut to a hideous close-up of Johnny Caspar’s gi-
gantic bald head; he sits by the fire, seething, the very manifestation of the rage 
behind the Dane’s violence. But this rage, the viciousness of the tyrant behind 
the “ethics,” is greater than the film, qua “nostalgic gangster/noir homage,” can 
bear. Johnny suddenly smashes the Dane’s face with the fireplace shovel. Like 
his friend, Mink, the Dane is now faceless as he covers his shattered visage, 
hat knocked off and blood streaming between his gloved fingers.
Meanwhile, Drop Johnson begins screaming, howling like a wounded 
animal. Caspar approaches him, ready to pummel him too, demanding 
that he shut up. The camera again zooms in on his horrible, howling face. 
Tom nods to him to make him shut up—and he does—and now the shot 
strangely, artificially zooms out on a silenced Drop, the reversal of the earlier 
shot. Tom convinces Caspar to come to his apartment at four, supposedly 
to take care of Mink, and meanwhile the Dane begins to stir. Drop begins 
to scream once again, and Caspar strides up to the Dane and shoots him in 
the head. The terrifying, final zoom brings us right up to Caspar’s bloody 
mug as he says, “Always put one in the brain.”
In Miller’s Crossing, we have come to recognize this statement as the 
mantra of thoughtless, businesslike violence. It also manifests the gravely 
negative effect (thoughtlessness) of excessive passions gone wrong—the 
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passions that form the true basis of Caspar’s “ethics,” which dominate the 
world of the film. But Caspar’s rage (like Bernie’s pleading at Miller’s Cross-
ing) is, in the end, too much for this genre-based tale to absorb, even though 
it is about crime and gangsters. Drop’s terrible howl is at once both so Coen 
brothers and so out of place in the world they have created: it bears witness 
to the indecipherable force that drives Caspar’s brutality and, when rational-
ized, that pulls itself together in codicils of gangster/noir “ethics”—which 
are, as Tom now fully understands, consumed in an instant by the horrifying 
passion that is their premise.
The overarching effect of this episode is to steel Tom forever against the 
dangers of the “heart,” which completes his journey toward noir stoicism 
and autonomy. In Leo’s love for Verna and his readiness to fight, in Tom’s 
own desire for Verna and sympathy for Bernie, and in Caspar’s demented 
rage, our hero has witnessed a downward spiral into confusion and cruelty 
that is conditioned on the instability of passion and sentiment. But cool 
Machiavellian calculation has hardly saved the day. The smooth surface of 
Caspar’s “ethics”—indeed, Tom’s job as a thoughtful adviser—was always 
premised on the raw deployment of mastery, punishment, and power, the 
force that manifests itself in a disorienting swirl of shots and surreal howl-
ing of a “gorilla” of a man.
But the real nightmare here is the implication of this protagonist in the 
traumatizing violence to which he is constantly subjected. Can Tom control 
this horrible, howling force, the origin of all power politics, in himself? The 
pairing of shots that ends in Tom silencing the beast suggests that he can. 
But does Tom in fact have this animal within him? The mirrored pairing 
of shots, with Drop on one end of a zoom and Tom on the end of the next, 
suggests that he does. These ambiguities resolve in Caspar’s blood-streaked 
face, which is the emblem of the madness behind this corrupt world. Cas-
par too will soon be dead as a result of his own rage, which seems all too 
appropriate, but Tom kills Bernie himself, without mercy, not only because 
it makes sense: it also satisfies his own bloodlust. It is, we might assume, a 
“deep, dark place” that Tom never wants to visit again.
Conclusion: “Do You Always Know Why You Do Things?”
When questioned about the character he played in Miller’s Crossing, actor 
Gabriel Byrne observed, “All through the picture, Tom is battling with the 
idea of love and idea of giving himself to another person. The turning point 
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for Tom is at Miller’s Crossing—Bernie gets through to his heart and he lets 
go. From then on, everything goes haywire, and he is determined never again 
to be ruled by his heart.”19 As this essay has suggested, Byrne was largely 
right: Bernie’s betrayal of Tom’s heartfelt sympathy sends him down a path 
that, in the end, leaves him steely and alone.
To gather the impact of the film’s conclusion, however, we have to render 
Byrne’s observation with further precision. Despite his last words to Bernie, 
the latter stages of the action are in fact driven by Tom’s “heart” and, in par-
ticular, his abiding sense of loyal, sentimental attachment to Leo. Toward 
the end of the film, for example, Tom tells Verna that he had to give Bernie 
up to Caspar because it was the only way he could “straighten things out for 
Leo.” Verna responds, “You said you didn’t care about Leo.” Tom’s answer is 
telling: “I said we were through. It’s not the same thing.”
A job, a duty, an obligation determined at first on contractual grounds—
or founded on random contiguity and mutual need—can move us toward 
heartfelt connection. That is surely the case with Tom and Leo, who share 
ethnicity, experience, and a longstanding relationship. “Care” for Leo in 
fact drives Tom’s play all along, even his illicit affair with Verna. Following 
through on this impulse in the last half of the film, Tom repairs the original 
covenant by enacting Leo’s interest; he aims to return Leo to the advantages 
of power; he upholds their friendship while destroying Leo’s enemies; and he 
does most of this through careful, dispassionate calculation. Thus Tom proves 
to be quite adept at maneuvering within the confines of Caspar’s “ethics” 
while maintaining some measure of his own character and identity. Like the 
tyrants themselves, however, Tom’s “passion” (in Hume’s sense) is the ultimate 
foundation of his decision making, as rational as it often is. In particular, his 
heartfelt, organic connection with Leo is the compelling interest.20
But Tom swears off this connection in the final sequence of the film. A 
significant factor in this decision, of course, is the revived betrothal of Leo 
and Verna. Even if he began the affair with Verna to make a point, Tom feels 
for Verna, and now it would be impossible for him to restore his friendship 
with the man who is married to her. In this sense, Tom has become the 
archetypal hero who has lost the girl, which evokes our pity and sympathy. 
At the same time, we as viewers secretly wish this misfortune upon him, so 
he can continue to be the cynical, wisecracking free agent that the conven-
tions of his genre dictate. We would rather that characters like Tom not live 
happily ever after, so we can imagine them as they are, ready to get into and 
out of trouble again and again with dexterity, humor, and aplomb.
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But in the hands of the Coen brothers, it is difficult to imagine Tom 
Reagan as reproducible and serialized—it is difficult to see his noir-style 
stoicism and freedom without thinking of the trauma that made it. Leo and 
Verna’s mutual attachment cancels out Tom’s feelings for both of them, surely, 
but the deeper, darker journey in the last half of the film is truly what places 
a seal—an unassailable closure—on Tom’s heart (to make creative use of the 
phrase from the Song of Solomon). How can one make heartfelt connections 
when they are so brutally punishing? How can one adhere to a system of 
“ethics” when we know that its origin is always shifting passions, often hor-
rifyingly negative ones? And what about action based on cool calculation 
of interest or even on higher dictates, arrived at through reason? These too 
mean nothing in a world where love, greed, fear, or rage—or “one in the 
brain”—can blow away the “tranquillity” of our “intellectual faculties” (to 
invoke Hume once again) in an instant.
Our celebration of this hero, which is conditioned by our expecta-
tions surrounding genres so precisely invoked by the Coens, swells in the 
last shot of the film. We see Tom leaning up against a tree in the woods 
where Bernie’s funeral has taken place, and he gazes off into the distance, 
watching Leo walk away. Now he tilts his head down slightly, so his eyes 
are obscured by the brim of his hat, which he adjusts in a highly stylized 
gesture. This would be a great place for the film to end, with Tom’s freedom 
and composure vividly symbolized by his hat being on just right. But the 
Coens take a brilliant next step, insisting that we look at this figure again. 
Slowly Tom removes his hands from the hat, he raises his head so his eyes 
become visible, and we zoom in on his face, which continues to gaze—sadly, 
we realize—into the distance.
We may treasure the first Tom Reagan who stares out at us at the end 
of the film and adjusts his hat, as well as all the heroes he so closely re-
sembles—and the gangster/noir stoic in all of us. But in offering a second 
look, the Coen brothers remind us about the traumatic excesses that go into 
this kind of lonely autonomy. We should probably hesitate before it, even as 
we continue to engage the “struggle of passion and of reason” that is at the 
center of our moral life.21
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“takIn’ ’er easy for 
all us sInners”
Laziness as a Virtue in The Big Lebowski
Matthew K. Douglass and Jerry L. Walls
“Drifting along with the tumbling tumbleweed”
The opening scenes of The Big Lebowski (1998) portray a lonely tumbleweed 
as it rolls aimlessly down the streets of Los Angeles. The tumbleweed, once 
verdant and firmly planted, has long since surrendered to the wind and now 
goes wherever it blows. Immediately thereafter we see an unabashed loafer, 
a man whom the narrator describes as “quite possibly the laziest [man] in 
Los Angeles County, which would place him high in the running for laziest 
worldwide.” Like the tumbleweed, this man has long since taken the path of 
least resistance. He may have once been vigorous and idealistic, but blithe 
resignation has replaced all of that. Now this man is content to let life carry 
him along wherever it wills.
Although this man’s real name is Jeffrey Lebowski, he insists that people 
call him “Dude.” Apparently, laziness for the Dude (Jeff Bridges) is not a 
simple habit. It is a distinct, chosen ethos—“dude-ism,” to give it a name. 
Naturally, the Dude never develops his philosophy, nor does he proselytize. 
That would take too much effort. Hence, if we are to understand the Dude’s 
philosophy, we must speculate somewhat. Even so, the tumbleweed imag-
ery provides a guiding metaphor, and the Dude’s actions and conversations 
should allow us to infer the basic doctrines of dude-ism.
The tumbleweed metaphor and its link with the driving wind lead us to 
recognize the first tenet of dude-ism: Reality is inherently chaotic and pur-
poseless. The wind has no will and thus no reason to push the tumbleweed 
around; it is simply the effect of trillions of tiny, chaotic molecular interac-
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tions. Yet these interactions, when added together, create a mighty force 
that the tumbleweed is powerless to resist. In the same way, life is blind and 
purposeless, the effect of billions of (mostly) mundane yet chaotic events. 
Yet, when added together, these events create a force that no individual can 
resist. Additionally, it is easy enough to describe how the Dude got to where 
he is today, just as it is easy to explain how the tumbleweed got to Los An-
geles. However, just as it is absurd to wonder why the wind has brought the 
tumbleweed to its current location, it is absurd to wonder why the Dude is 
here or even why he exists at all.
The second tenet of dude-ism is: One should expend effort only on simple, 
short-term goals. This follows from the first tenet, for if life is irresistibly 
chaotic, one’s effort might bring order to life, but only for a short time. At-
tempting anything too grand will ultimately end in frustration. In addition, 
there is no way to know if a seemingly mundane decision might have drastic 
effects. For example, the Dude’s decision to get justice for his urine-soaked 
rug sets the rest of the film’s plot in motion. Things continue to get worse 
and worse for the Dude, who eventually complains, “I could be sitting here 
with just pee stains on my rug.” In the Dude’s mind, all of this trouble stems 
from his audacious decision, which he made against his better judgment.
Along these lines, the “laws” of chance dictate that each person will 
have a mixture of good and bad experiences. As the Stranger (Sam Elliott) 
explains to the Dude, “Sometimes you eat the bear. And sometimes the bear, 
well, he eats you.” The third doctrine of dude-ism follows from that fact: 
Since one can do very little to affect this mixture of good and bad, one should 
accept life as it is and learn to be content. Granted, a little effort is sufficient 
to solve some problems. Hunger, for example, can be eliminated simply by 
eating. Other problems are either unsolvable or they take more effort than is 
worthwhile. A successful dude-ist is one who can tell the difference between 
these two types of problems.
The fourth dude-istic dictum runs as follows: The purpose of life is to be 
as happy as possible in any situation. If life (like the wind) is blind, chaotic, 
and purposeless, then the purpose of life does not come from anything 
metaphysical or external to the individual. If life is to have purpose, therefore, 
each individual must decide what that purpose is. The other characters in 
The Big Lebowski find meaning in various things: sensual pleasures, money, 
and duty, to name a few. Yet the Dude reacts with detached amusement to 
each of them. These things are fine, he seems to say, but none of them is 
essential to make life worth living. Nevertheless, while it might be tempting 
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to say that the Dude does not value anything, it is more accurate to say that 
he values everything, but no particular thing is supreme.
Dude-ism’s practical implications can be summarized as “principled 
laziness” or in a pithy motto: “Why chase the wind when it will carry you 
to the same place?” As an ethos, dude-ism simply describes an easy way to 
be happy. Since it does not appeal to external, universal standards, it has 
very little to say about what is morally good or bad. Even so, dude-ism is a 
benign philosophy; kindness is much more pleasant and much less disturb-
ing than rudeness or selfishness. When other people act like jerks, the Dude 
reacts the same way as if someone had spilled a drink: he is frustrated by 
the needless unpleasantness of the situation more than the “immorality” 
of someone’s actions. Life would be so much easier, the Dude believes, if 
everyone would just relax.
In short, laziness is a virtue for the Dude—that is, laziness is a trait that 
ultimately leads to happiness and fulfillment—and it has been working for 
him until we first meet him in a supermarket. However, from the moment 
two thugs mistake him for another Jeffrey Lebowski (that is, “The Big Leb-
owski”) and urinate on his rug, his principled laziness faces a series of trials. 
As the film unfolds, the Dude encounters several alternative worldviews and 
increasingly difficult situations, each testing his basic assumptions about 
life. Our goal, then, will be to evaluate dude-ism in light of these trials and 
to determine whether, according to The Big Lebowski, laziness can be truly 
virtuous.
“We believe in nothing, Lebowski. Nothing!”
The Dude’s apathy toward pretty much everything places him in the same 
philosophical neighborhood as The Big Lebowski’s principal villains, the 
nihilists (played by Peter Stormare, Flea, and Torsten Voges). In general, 
nihilists agree on three points. First, there are no standards with which to 
distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, beautiful from ugly, and so 
on. Second, life has no intrinsic meaning, value, or purpose. Third, “truth” 
is ultimately incomprehensible, and thus our quest for ultimate knowledge 
is pointless. Most nihilists are atheists, but this is not necessary, so long as 
“God” remains a thoughtless, impersonal entity.
The nihilists’ thick German accents suggest a kinship with Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844–1900), whose reputation as a nihilist is due largely to this 
famous declaration: “God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still 
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be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.—And 
we—we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.”1 God’s “death”—clearly a 
metaphorical pronouncement—refers to society’s loss of faith in God. In 
other words, God was “alive” only while people believed in God, but now, 
as Nietzsche put it, “We have killed him—you and I.”2
As the first quote shows, Nietzsche’s goal was not simply to announce 
God’s demise; he wanted to eradicate all evidence that God ever existed. 
These traces, or “shadows,” refer to the values that humanity inherited from 
its belief in God—free will, moral obligation, the value of life, and so on. 
If God does not exist, Nietzsche argued, humanity must accept that such 
cherished ideals are nothing but comforting illusions.3
With the abolition of humanity’s past cherished values, it is easy to see 
why Nietzsche is often called a nihilist. Yet Nietzsche detested that title and, 
ironically, accused almost everyone else of nihilism. Granted, Nietzsche did 
not believe that life has intrinsic value; however, for Nietzsche this did not 
imply that life has no meaning whatsoever. Whereas true nihilism must 
reject all values, Nietzsche attempted to create values that correspond to a 
God-less reality.
In place of God’s decrees, Nietzsche built his values system on what he 
considered the first principle of reality: the will to power. Simply put, the 
will to power refers to an eternal struggle that drives all things, even natural 
laws.4 Because the will to power is a brute fact of nature, Nietzsche believed 
that anyone who rejected it was rejecting reality itself and was, therefore, 
a nihilist.5
It should be clear now that Nietzsche was not, in fact, a nihilist, even 
though sometimes he is regarded as such. Consequently, if The Big Lebowski’s 
“nihilists” are genuine nihilists, they are not philosophical heirs of Nietzsche. 
They claim to care about nothing and attempt to prove it by smashing things, 
torching cars, and cutting off toes. This sort of disdain for the physical world 
is in line with what Nietzsche considered nihilism, but it is antithetical to his 
own tastes. In addition, the self-proclaimed “nihilists” do not live according 
to the will to power. Instead of exerting power over those around them, these 
characters are little more than inept thugs who make impotent threats.
In The Big Lebowski’s final altercation, the nihilists confront Walter Sob-
chak (John Goodman), the Dude, and Donny (Steve Buscemi), demanding 
the money that they feel is due them. Walter, completely fed up and unafraid 
of these “nihilists,” calls their bluff and refuses to give them anything. How-
ever, the nihilists, who had been counting on the money, strongly protest:
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Nihilist #1: His girlfriend gave up her toe!
Nihilist #2: She thought we’d be getting million dollars!
Nihilist #1: It’s not fair!
In this moment, Walter identifies the nihilists’ hypocrisy.
Walter: Fair?!?! Who’s the fucking nihilist around here, you bunch o’ 
fucking crybabies!
As it turns out, these “nihilists,” who value money and appeal to “fairness,” 
are not true nihilists. However, we should not be too hard on them. While 
nihilism is possible in theory, it is not possible in practice. If life truly has 
no purpose or meaning, why keep living? It seems that, to avoid suicide, 
nihilists must willfully deceive themselves: they must live as if something 
makes life worth living, even while preaching that life is worthless.
The Dude, meanwhile, seems even more apathetic than the nihilists, and 
if one equates “nihilism” with “apathy,” then the Dude is even more nihilistic 
than they are. Yet the Dude is less extreme in his views, so no self-delusion 
is necessary. Even if he does not find intrinsic value in life, he does not go 
so far as to reject all values. The Dude finds purpose in whatever life gives 
him, and the fact that there is no transcendent, metaphysical reason to live 
is irrelevant.
“Viva Las Vegas!”
Whether by personal choice, fortuitous heredity, or years of drug use, the 
Dude is able to enjoy the simple things in life: bowling, White Russians, 
smoking weed, a good, long bath, and a nice little rug that “really ties the 
room together.” Such simple pleasures, however, are not enough to satisfy 
Bunny Lebowski (Tara Reid), the beautiful trophy wife whose disappear-
ance drives the film’s plot. Her only purpose in life is to experience as much 
pleasure as possible.
This philosophy, known as “hedonism,” is generally attached to the 
Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 bce). According to Epicurus, our 
sensations arise from perturbations of the “atoms” that compose our bod-
ies, and it is only reasonable to make these atoms interact in a pleasurable 
way.6 The highest form of pleasure, Epicurus taught, was intellectual, 
not sensual. Thus, Epicurus’ sophisticated hedonism might suit Maude 
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Lebowski (Julianne Moore), the Big Lebowski’s feminist daughter, but 
certainly not Bunny.
Instead, Bunny follows the original form of hedonism, founded by Aris-
tippus of Cyrene (ca. 435–366 bce).7 Ancient historians describe Aristippus 
as a scandalous figure, supposedly the first of Socrates’ disciples to charge for 
his teaching.8 After garnering a measure of notoriety, Aristippus infiltrated 
the court of Dionysius of Syracuse where, like Bunny, he lived luxuriously 
at another’s expense.9
Unlike Epicurus, Aristippus’ hedonism celebrated sensual delights and 
denigrated intellectual pursuits. For him, anything that was not immediately 
practical was a waste of time. Aristippus argued that the psyche, which moti-
vates the body, naturally strives for pleasure and avoids pain. Further, since 
the psyche naturally inclines itself toward the good, it follows that pleasure 
is the good. Actions are thus moral if they work to increase pleasure and 
bad if they either reduce pleasure or cause pain.10
The problems with this type of hedonism are easy to identify. First, it 
is very easy to indulge oneself in excess, causing desensitization or addic-
tion. Bunny suffers from both effects. As Maude Lebowski points out to the 
Dude, “There are some people—it is called satyriasis in men, nymphomania 
in women—who engage in [sex] compulsively, and without joy. . . . These 
unfortunate souls cannot love in the true sense of the word. Our mutual 
acquaintance, Bunny, is one of these.” As the law of diminishing returns 
states, any pleasurable experience, if repeated often and mechanically 
enough, will eventually lose its appeal, making ever-increasing forms of 
stimulation necessary.
Second, Bunny’s hedonism is expensive, but one who slavishly seeks 
pleasure lacks the restraint and foresight necessary to make money. Bunny 
consistently finds herself in debt, and since she depends on the kindness of 
others, her lifestyle is sustainable only while she has something to offer in 
return. Once the effects of partying take their toll on Bunny’s appearance, 
she will not be worth supporting, and she will be forced either to change 
her lifestyle or find another way to make money.
The Dude is a hedonist insofar as he strives for ephemeral pleasures; 
however, he successfully evades hedonism’s pitfalls. Because he is too lazy 
to chase after pleasure, the Dude has learned to enjoy every moment as it 
happens to him. He has not developed an addiction, and his experiences 
are mild and varied enough to keep him from jadedness.11 His simple tastes 
allow him to enjoy life even though he is unemployed and has almost no 
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money. Finally, because the Dude finds pleasure in leisure, he is able to live 
a consistently slothful life, no matter how old and frail he becomes.
“I went out and achieved anyway.”
Standing in stark contrast to the Dude, the nihilists, and Bunny is the Big 
Lebowski (David Huddleston), a crippled Korean War veteran whose sen-
sibilities are steeped in capitalism and the American dream. His worldview 
has several euphemistic aliases—“rugged individualism,” “egoism,” or “social 
Darwinism,” to name a few—though in his case, “pitiless, selfish bastardism” 
may be more accurate. Not surprisingly, very few philosophers have been 
audacious enough to espouse egoism, even the pitiless and selfish ones. One 
notable exception is Nietzsche, whose “master morality” was a classically 
informed defense of egoism and who claimed that it was the ethics of the 
noble class.12 Drawing inspiration from classical Greek and Roman culture, 
Nietzsche stated that aristocrats respect only those qualities that they prize 
in themselves. Thus, pride, ambition, and power are “good” in the noble 
mind, while their opposites are dubbed “bad.” Importantly, Nietzsche wanted 
to move beyond our common ideas of “good and “evil.” Consequently, the 
terms “good” and “bad” for Nietzsche and the noble class are aesthetic terms, 
not moral ones. In other words, “good” and “bad” in master morality mean 
“noble” and “vulgar,” not “right” and “wrong.”13
The Big Lebowski, with his exquisitely decorated mansion and wall of 
plaques, faithfully demonstrates master morality. Brandt (Philip Seymour 
Hoffman), Lebowski’s personal assistant, reverently describes some of 
Lebowski’s most notable awards to the Dude: a key to the city of Pasadena, 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce Business Achiever Award, and a 
picture of Lebowski taken with Nancy Reagan, “when Mrs. Reagan was First 
Lady of the nation . . . not of California.” The most prized picture shows 
the Little Lebowski Urban Achievers, “inner city children of promise” who 
receive college money from Mr. Lebowski.
Since pity is “vulgar” in master morality, Lebowski’s charitable acts might 
seem odd. However, Nietzsche conceded that aristocrats will sometimes 
give to the poor but only from an excess of power, not from pity.14 In other 
words, as Lebowski’s wall of awards demonstrates, rich people give money 
precisely to show how rich they are. In place of compassion, Lebowski values 
self-sufficiency. As he explains to the Dude, “Every bum’s lot in life is his 
own responsibility, regardless of who he chooses to blame.”
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Despite his noble talk, Lebowski’s egoism fails in many ways. First, very 
few people are bold, talented, and ambitious enough to build their own 
wealth. The Big Lebowski, Maude reveals to the Dude, is not as self-made 
as he sounds. He is an incompetent businessman who inherited his wealth 
from his late wife and even steals money from the Little Lebowski Urban 
Achievers, ostensibly to pay Bunny’s ransom, though in reality Lebowski 
keeps the money for himself and tries to pin the theft on the Dude. Although 
his wealth is unearned, Lebowski admires all the “noble” traits of master 
morality; however, because he is too impotent to gain his own power, he 
exhibits none of these traits in his own life.
Since master morality proceeds from the will to power, an egoist will 
always be in conflict with those around him, even when the other person 
is not looking for a fight. In their first encounter, all the Dude wants from 
Lebowski is compensation for his ruined rug. Lebowski, meanwhile, takes 
the Dude’s request as an attack and erupts into a paint-peeling tirade. Real-
izing that a heated confrontation is not worth the effort, the Dude calmly 
puts on his sunglasses and walks out. Sensing victory, Lebowski hollers after 
the Dude, “Your revolution is over, Mr. Lebowski. Condolences! The bums 
lost! . . . The bums will always lose! Do you hear me, Lebowski? The bums 
will always lose!”
Because the Dude cares nothing about power, he is generally at peace 
with the world around him, and because he cares nothing about awards or 
legacy, he is content even when no one takes notice of him. In fact, he seems 
to prefer being left alone. Overall, therefore, the Dude’s attitude makes him 
much happier than the Big Lebowski, and often he prevails, even without 
putting up a fight. For instance, despite Lebowski’s declaration of victory, 
it is the Dude who prevails. Leaving Lebowski behind, the Dude informs 
Brandt, “The old man told me to take any rug in the house,” and he even 
has a servant carry the rug out for him.
“Smokey, this is not ’Nam. This is bowling. There are rules.”
Of all the major characters in The Big Lebowski, only Walter Sobchak fol-
lows a philosophy that is not fundamentally individualistic. Instead, Walter 
defines himself in relation to larger groups: he is at once Jewish, American, 
a veteran, and part of a bowling team, and he finds his purpose in following 
each group’s rules. For Walter, it is the rules themselves that determine right 
and wrong, and nothing else.
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The philosophical term for rules- or duty-based morality is deontological 
ethics. The epitome of deontology is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who said, 
“If any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform 
to the moral law—it must also be done for the sake of the moral law.”15 Like 
most Enlightenment philosophers, Kant believed that objective reality ex-
ists beyond individual human experience and that the human mind could 
apprehend this reality through reason alone. For Kant, objective reality in-
cluded a universal “moral law,” which applied to all people in all situations. 
Since this law could be discerned through reason, Kant argued that every 
rational person has a duty (or, as Kant called it, a “categorical imperative”) 
to obey this moral law for its own sake, regardless of that individual’s per-
sonal interests.16
According to the categorical imperative, an action is morally good only 
if everyone else should act the same way.17 Suppose, for example, that you are 
tempted to break an oath. According to Kant, you can break an oath only if 
you want every person to break his or her oath as well. Clearly, this would be 
absurd, for if everyone broke their oaths, there would be no point in making 
oaths in the first place. Thus, breaking oaths is immoral, and by implication, 
if we make an oath, we are obligated to keep that oath no matter what.
With the categorical imperative in mind, many of Walter’s outbursts start 
to make sense. During the league bowling tournament, Smokey (Jimmie 
Dale Gilmore), a member of the opposing team, knocks eight pins down, 
but Walter insists that since Smokey crossed the line, no score should be 
entered. As the situation escalates, Walter produces a gun from his bowling 
bag and declares, “[If] you mark that frame an eight, you’re entering a world 
of pain.” The other characters are dismayed at his fanaticism, but according 
to the categorical imperative, Walter cannot tolerate Smokey’s transgres-
sion: if everyone crossed the line, it would be pointless to have a line at all. 
Granted, the line’s distance from the pins is arbitrary, but it must be placed 
somewhere, and it must be respected. Otherwise, a bowler could stand as 
close to the pins as he or she wants.
This example and others that could be cited notwithstanding, Walter’s 
sense of duty differs markedly from the categorical imperative. Rather than 
universal maxims, Walter follows specific rules that are, in most cases, 
simply a matter of convention.18 Apparently, what these rules are about is 
irrelevant for Walter; all that matters is that the rules are rules. This raises a 
serious question: if the rules are not universal truths, and if Walter did not 
help write the rules, why is he so devoted to them?
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Some examination of another deontological ethicist’s views might be 
helpful here. The British philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), in his Second 
Treatise of Government, stated that rules express a “social contract” among 
members of a group. These rules, he continued, are necessary to keep the 
group stable. His reasoning began with humanity’s “state of nature,” a state 
characterized by perfect liberty and equality. Importantly, however, while 
people in their natural state have liberty, they do not have license to do what-
ever they will. The state of nature is governed by natural law, which humans 
can discern through reason. Among other things, people in the natural state 
have a duty to preserve themselves and, since all people are equal, to preserve 
others as well, whenever possible. Lastly, in the state of nature, each person 
has the right to punish those who harm another’s life or property, in order 
to bring the wrongdoer to repentance, deter others from acting wrongly, 
and to rectify the injustice that the victim has suffered.19 However, it is often 
difficult for one person to execute punishment, especially if the perpetrator 
is stronger than the victim. Thus, while life in the state of nature is free, one’s 
rights are best defended with help from a society.
In order to enter into a society, Locke continues, each person must give 
up his or her right to enforce the natural law. When conflicts arise, each 
person’s judgment is inevitably clouded by personal interest, so an impartial 
third party must adjudicate between disputing parties, and everyone must 
agree that this decision is final. To be fair and consistent, the group must 
also agree upon standards (that is, “rules” and “laws”), and everyone must 
agree to follow them.
Walter defines himself according to the groups to which he belongs, 
so it is not surprising that he would fervently defend their rules. However, 
because Walter belongs to multiple groups, problems arise when Walter 
must choose between conflicting rules. For instance, when Walter points 
a gun at Smokey, he is defending the rules of the game, but he is breaking 
the rules of society.
The Dude’s attitude toward Walter reveals another critique of rules-
based ethics. Each time Walter feels that a rule has been broken, he quickly 
erupts into fits of righteous indignation, spewing torrents of obscenities and 
terrifying everyone around him. Meanwhile, the Dude futilely attempts to 
calm Walter down. According to the Dude, rules-based ethics overestimates 
the law’s contribution to social order. Allowing a minor transgression here 
and there will not destroy society. In fact, since forgiveness often prevents 
conflict, it can actually promote unity. Nevertheless, Walter always responds 
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the same way: “Am I wrong? Am I wrong?” Realizing that Walter has the 
rules on his side, the Dude can only reply, “You’re not wrong, Walter. You’re 
just an asshole.”
“Takin’ ’er easy for us sinners”
Throughout The Big Lebowski, the Dude encounters several alternative 
philosophies, but as we have seen, the Dude abides in his dude-ism. This 
does not imply, however, that dude-ism is vindicated. To determine whether 
laziness is a virtue, at least according to The Big Lebowski, we must consider 
whether the Dude’s philosophy is compatible with The Big Lebowski’s over-
all message. To this end, it may help to review the tenets of dude-ism and 
evaluate them according to The Big Lebowski’s plot.
 Reality is inherently chaotic and purposeless. Like the tumbleweed that 
seems out of place as it rolls down the streets of Los Angeles, the Dude con-
sistently finds himself in awkward situations, and, like the tumbleweed, there 
does not appear to be any reason why he should be there, though it is easy 
to see how he got there. The Dude is, after all, the wrong man for just about 
any job, yet each character attempts to use him.20 Unlike most movies, which 
are predictable because of a clear sense of purpose, The Big Lebowski can 
be confusing and unpredictable. The action does not seem to work toward 
a particular goal. Instead, the action grows ever more complicated, and the 
Dude’s situation grows increasingly dire as the film progresses.
One should expend effort only on simple, short-term goals. This tenet fol-
lows from the assumption that if life is chaotic, then one’s efforts will only 
temporarily succeed; eventually, chaos will frustrate any person’s attempts 
to determine his or her fate. The Big Lebowski clearly affirms this belief. 
As the plot unfolds, each character attempts to take advantage of Bunny’s 
supposed abduction and the million-dollar ransom. Yet, for all their strug-
gling, perhaps because of their efforts, things deteriorate. Granted, peace 
is restored by the end of the film, but only because Bunny gets bored and 
decides to return home.
One should accept life the way it is and be content, and the purpose of 
life is to be as happy as possible in every situation. The Stranger’s wisdom, 
as he expresses it to the Dude, confirms these final tenets: “Sometimes you 
eat the bear. And sometimes the bear, well, he eats you.” When the Dude 
sees the narrator again in the final scene, it is clear that he has taken this 
wisdom to heart:
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Stranger: How’s things been goin’?
Dude: Well, you know, strikes and gutters, ups and downs.
At this point in the film, the principled laziness that sustained the Dude 
throughout his trying ordeal continues to make him happy. Insofar as a 
“virtue” is a trait of the soul that provides happiness, The Big Lebowski 
concludes that laziness is indeed a virtue, and thus a lazy person is, oddly 
enough, righteous. Conversely, as the rest of the scene attests, work can be 
a vice, and those of us who work too hard are “sinners.”
Dude: . . . Well, take care, man. Gotta get back.
Stranger: Sure. Take it easy, Dude. I know that you will.
Dude: Yeah, well, the Dude abides.
Stranger: The Dude abides. I don’t know about you, but I take 
comfort in that. It’s good knowin’ he’s out there—the Dude, takin’ 
’er easy for all us sinners.
Of course, laziness is not truly virtuous just because a comedic film 
says so. Indeed, The Big Lebowski is humorous precisely because it departs 
so dramatically from real life. We would be remiss, therefore, to endorse 
laziness without considering its real-world implications. Not surprisingly, 
philosophers condemn laziness almost unanimously.21 Aristotle, for example, 
wrote that virtues are traits of the soul, cultivated by habits of the body. In 
other words, to become a “good” person, one must work for it, consistently 
acting in a way that leads to happiness and fulfillment. However, according to 
Aristotle’s own definition, a virtue is something that brings about happiness, 
and thus the true test of one’s virtue should be one’s overall happiness.22 If 
a slacker is truly happy to work part-time menial jobs and relax for the rest 
of the day, then, arguably, laziness could be virtuous for that person.23
Kant would argue that laziness cannot be virtuous, for if everyone were 
lazy, very little would ever get done and our economy, which depends on 
labor, would soon collapse. However, dude-ism is a personal ethos, not a 
worldwide movement. Since most people want more than just bare neces-
sities and simple diversions, our society is safe from the ills of universal 
laziness. According to dude-ism, if hard work makes one happy, then work 
is a virtue for that person, just as laziness is a virtue for a dude.
Ironically, this individualism is dude-ism’s greatest flaw. Because 
dude-ism has little to say about how other people should act, it provides 
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no objective standard for right and wrong behavior. As we have seen, the 
Dude evaluates particular actions according to pleasantness. This standard 
is acceptable in most situations, but it fails when confronted by true evil. 
When Walter ruins the ransom transaction, the Dude is convinced that 
Bunny is in grave danger. Certainly, Bunny’s murder would be much worse 
than “unpleasant.” Yet without an objective standard (such as God’s will, or 
Kant’s categorical imperative), it is difficult to see how dude-ism can say that 
murder (or rape, or slavery, etc.) is genuinely wrong. Granted, this flaw stems 
from dude-ism’s assumption that life is purposeless, not from laziness itself. 
Since murder requires either meticulous planning or intense passion—both 
of which dude-ism flatly rejects—whether to murder or not should never 
be a problem for a dude-ist. However, making a decision over whether to 
struggle to prevent someone’s murder is a serious problem. In the end, the 
Dude chooses to do what he can to save Bunny, but his decision probably has 
more to do with assuaging his conscience (since guilt is terribly unpleasant) 
than doing the right thing.
If a dude-ist can avoid such sticky moral dilemmas, laziness can have an 
aura of virtue. Furthermore, if dude-ism is correct about the nature of life and 
reality (and this is a very important if), then it seems like a plausible middle 
ground between nihilism, which arguably leads to suicide, and hedonism, 
which ultimately leads to addiction and desensitization. Suppose, on the 
other hand, that there is something external to us that provides purpose 
and meaning to life. For example, one might argue that natural selection has 
instilled in us a simple command: be fruitful and multiply. By implication, 
the purpose of our lives is to create future generations and to be the best 
parents we can so that our children have the best chance at success. Natural 
selection could also explain how we have developed inclinations toward 
friendship, cooperation, and so on: people who are likeable “team players” 
are more likely to survive. A problem with this notion is that natural selec-
tion is a blind, though complicated process, much like the wind that blows 
the tumbleweed. Likewise, since natural selection has no intention, it does 
not “want” us to survive any more than the wind “wants” the tumbleweed 
to roll through Los Angeles. In short, like the wind, it can explain how we 
inherited feelings like parental love and cooperation, but it cannot explain 
why or if the human race is worth perpetuating.
A more traditional philosophical move is to appeal to God to give mean-
ing and purpose to life. If God exists (this, too, is a very important if ), then 
our purpose would follow from God’s purpose in creating us. If, for example, 
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God simply wants to watch us, then our purpose is nothing more than to be 
entertainers. If God simply wants us to be happy, we could live much like 
the Dude and find as much happiness as possible in whatever comes our 
way. On the other hand, if God has some purpose for us—being stewards of 
the earth, loving partners with God and others, working to manifest God’s 
will, and so on—then laziness is unacceptable.
“Well, that about does ’er.”
While The Big Lebowski suggests that laziness can bring happiness, a closer 
look at “quite possibly the laziest [man] in Los Angeles County” leads us to 
the ultimate questions: Is life actually purposeless and meaningless? And if so, 
is it up to each of us to find our own purpose? According to The Big Lebowski, 
we must answer “yes.” Unless we can identify some objective or transcendent 
source of purpose or meaning, we may be hard pressed to disagree.
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no country for old men 
as moral PhIlosoPhy
Douglas McFarland
Amid the eruptions of violence and carnage in their adaptation of Cormac 
McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men (2007), the Coen brothers address 
fundamental questions concerning the place of duty, responsibility, neces-
sity, and luck in human affairs. These questions are addressed in a rich and 
what one might call philosophical manner through a fictional narrative 
charting the interactions among three principal characters and their in-
volvement in a drug deal gone murderously wrong. The film maintains an 
austere tone without references to popular culture and the self-conscious 
reimaginings of traditional genres that one normally associates with a Coen 
brothers film. Perhaps its salient formal characteristic is the absence, with 
one telling exception, of a musical soundtrack, creating a mood conducive 
to thoughtful and unornamented speculation in what is otherwise a fierce 
and destructive landscape.
Sheriff Bell and the Moral Imperative
The film opens with the voice-over narration of Ed Tom Bell (Tommy Lee 
Jones), who in 1980 is the sheriff of a west Texas county. His voice will ap-
pear throughout the film in reflective conversations, providing a point of 
reference and raising questions to which the film repeatedly turns. The voice 
that initially speaks to the audience is a weary one, concurrently express-
ing nostalgia for what has passed and dread of what lurks on the horizon. 
When he was younger, Bell felt pride in being part of a family of lawmen. In 
those days a sheriff did not need to wear a gun and would know everyone’s 
phone number by heart. But now that world and its communal standards 
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have collapsed. Sheriff Bell has lost the means to “measure” crime. Violent 
acts are inexplicable, defying reason and moral categories of assessment. 
He quite simply does not “know what [crime] is anymore.” While he is able 
to understand how things happen, and this aids him in catching criminals 
(“my arrest, my testimony”), he has no categories for understanding why 
things happen. He has always been ready to die in the line of duty, but he no 
longer understands the basis of duty, the source and meaning of obligation. 
Before the opening narration ends, Bell goes one step further to declare, “I 
don’t want to know. A man would have to put his soul at hazard . . . he would 
have to say, okay, I’ll be part of this world.” For the remainder of the film, 
Bell will be preoccupied with the boundary he has set between himself and 
the world, oscillating between reluctance and duty.
In terms of moral philosophy, we might say that Bell has found himself 
in a post-Kantian predicament. For Kant, ethical conduct is not based on 
a transcendent set of rules—Platonic, Christian, or otherwise—but rather 
on reason, which he believes is the essence of human nature. Kant identifies 
in his system of morality universal a priori laws based on rationality that 
provide a basis for judging human actions. As Kant puts it in Groundwork for 
the Metaphysics of Morals, “The law is the objective principle valid for every 
rational being, and the principle in accordance with which he ought to act, 
i.e., an imperative.”1 The obligations that are derived from the categorical 
imperative require the suspension of self-interest in favor of rational moral 
law. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly for Bell’s situation, Kant makes 
a fundamental distinction between reason that can explicate a causal chain 
of events to show how things happen and reason that can judge why ac-
tions are taken by individuals. At the crime scene, the sheriff is able to sort 
through the evidence and establish a narrative of what has transpired. His 
deputy Wendell (Garret Dillahunt), in fact, compliments him for his “linear” 
thinking. But Bell self-deprecatingly responds, “Old age flattens a man.” Bell 
cannot draw upon a set of moral categories to understand the carnage he 
encounters. It is not simply that individuals have violated an ethos, acted 
immorally, and broken a rule but that there are no boundaries of demarca-
tion. Bell cannot apply the clarity of linear reconstruction to the “why” of 
human affairs. The miasma of the crime scene, littered with decomposing 
bodies, is something that he cannot “measure.”
As I point out above, Bell is continually confronting the boundary 
between action and inaction. Hovering throughout the film is the tempta-
tion for him to retire, to insulate his soul in a protected enclave of home, 
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overseen by his wife, Loretta (Tess Harper), and her seemingly unambiguous 
set of moral imperatives. As Bell is preparing to go to the scene of the crime, 
Loretta tells him, “Don’t get hurt . . . don’t hurt no one.” These commands 
are expressed as generalized rules, apparently applicable to any situation. 
She imposes a sense of duty and obligation to a shared code of conduct. Bell 
confirms their universality by responding that he “always” does obey them, 
but there is another implied obligation that is a personal one. Loretta es-
sentially asks him to promise that he will take care of himself. And this can 
be turned into something conditional, not universal: if you care about me, 
you won’t get hurt. She forces him to weigh his duty to his job as an enforcer 
of the law against his duty to her as a husband. And subtly woven into this 
moment is another conditional: if you stay with me, you will be safe. As if 
she had heard his words to the audience earlier in the film, she tells him 
that here at home his soul will not be at risk. As the film progresses, Bell 
will discover himself to be ensnared in increasingly intricate and overlap-
ping obligations.
The first of these occurs when Bell decides to go to Odessa to meet with 
Llewelyn’s (Josh Brolin) wife, Carla Jean (Kelly Macdonald). After it has 
become clear to Bell that Llewelyn is in possession of the drug money and 
that at least two groups are trying to find him, he arranges to meet Carla 
Jean in the hope that she will tell him her husband’s whereabouts. As he is 
leaving his office, he tells the secretary that “I think I’m goin’ to commence 
dedicatin’ myself twice daily” to “truth and justice.” But in his conversation 
with Carla Jean his dedication to universal imperatives becomes something 
else. In his attempt to persuade Carla Jean to reveal Llewelyn’s location, he 
promises, “I can make him safe.” These words are the most significant Bell will 
utter in the film. They propel him across a threshold and he becomes “part 
of this world.” His promise to Carla Jean rests on his ability to bring about a 
particular end. As Kant puts it rather succinctly, duty rests “in the principle 
of the will without regard for the ends that can be brought about by such an 
action.”2 In High Noon (Fred Zinnemann, 1952), Will Kane (Gary Cooper) 
decides that staying in town and confronting the tide of lawless revenge that 
is about to arrive is the right thing to do. His duty does not depend on the 
success or failure of his attempt; it is enough that he chooses to stay. Bell, 
however, links duty to a specific outcome and by so doing brings into play 
another set of categories: responsibility, intention, trust, and shame. The is-
sue becomes not whether he is willing to sacrifice himself in the line of duty, 
as it is for Will Kane, but whether he can fulfill a promise to bring about a 
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particular outcome. In some real sense, it is at this moment that he puts “his 
soul at risk.” Once he makes this promise, there is no turning back.
Eventually Carla Jean reveals to Bell that Llewelyn is in El Paso. By 
the time Bell arrives, however, Llewelyn has already been killed. He fails, 
therefore, to keep his promise to Carla Jean. He becomes accountable for 
an outcome for which he is not directly responsible. It was his intention to 
make Llewelyn safe, and he set out to fulfill that obligation without doubt 
or hesitancy, but intention is overshadowed by outcome. To put it another 
way, he has fallen short of what he hoped and intended to accomplish. For 
Bell, shame and guilt now rear their heads. The moral imperative for Kant 
stipulates that one be freely willing to choose duty. The outcome does not 
undermine, threaten, or qualify that choice. But because Bell has made his 
promise dependent on what he had hoped to accomplish, and because that 
hope has not been fulfilled, he fails in fulfilling his duty. He has stepped out 
of Kant’s system of categorization and made himself vulnerable in a way 
that Will Kane, who simply chooses to follow his duty, does not. As a result, 
when Bell faces Carla Jean, he feels ashamed. It is written in his face. Shame 
is a quality that defies rational and quantitative measurement. Moreover, 
as Bernard Williams has argued, shame does not simply reflect how one 
is seen by others but also how one sees oneself.3 Bell has fallen short of his 
own expectation of himself. Near the end of the film he laments that God 
has ignored him in his old age and then adds that he expects he would do 
the same. His self-deprecation is genuine. In his  eyes, he has tainted himself 
with his own failure, and thus his promise, contingent on his ability to enact 
an outcome, has put his soul as risk.
After viewing Llewelyn’s body, Bell makes a decision to return to the 
crime scene. His reasons are not explicitly stated. He may feel a sense of 
obligation to the dead; earlier he had admonished a truck driver for not 
properly tying down the corpses that had been removed from the site of 
the massacre. But I believe that there is also the desire to bring about a 
quantifiably just conclusion and to establish, in Kantian terms, a means 
to restore “an intrinsically just conception of responsibility.”4 He wants, in 
short, to make an arrest. He knows there is someone out there apart from 
the Mexican drug dealers and that someone may be returning to the motel 
in order to gather evidence. But human motives are invariably complex. 
He needs not only to “measure” the crime but also to assuage his shame, 
as if apprehending Chigurh (Javier Bardem) could mitigate his failure in 
making Llewelyn safe.
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When he arrives at the entrance to the motel room where Llewelyn 
was killed, he sees that the lock has been blown out and understands that 
Chigurh may be in the room. Bell is now confronted with the choice of 
crossing a literal threshold. He does decide to enter the room but does so 
in an unexpected manner. Throughout the film, the danger of entering such 
rooms and the necessary precautions are repeatedly shown. But rather than 
kicking the door open, holding himself out of sight, and then entering cau-
tiously with gun drawn, Bell opens the door and pauses on the threshold. 
The camera looks up at him from inside the room, and we see him perfectly 
framed and back lit, offering a ridiculously easy target. Is this a gesture of 
sacrificial atonement? Is he momentarily addled? Perhaps it is more plau-
sible to think that for a brief moment he does not care whether he lives or 
dies. It is ultimately not the tide of inexplicable evil that frightens him. He 
is simply weary of living with himself. Bell stands on the threshold of the 
room caught in a moment of utter vulnerability.
In the final scene of the film, Bell recounts two dreams he has had during 
the previous night. In each dream he has been infantilized and made vulner-
able. The first dream is only briefly described but suggests a sense of shame 
in the eyes of his father. The second is longer and given in more detail. In it 
his father passes on horseback carrying with him into the darkness fire in a 
horn. He is telling this to Loretta, but at some point it takes on the quality 
of a soliloquy. You can read in his eyes that he believes there will be no fire 
in the darkness, that his father will not be waiting. It is too easy to say that 
west Texas in 1980 is no place for an old man. Bell’s recognition is deeper 
and more disturbing than that.
Llewelyn and Moral Authenticity
If Bell struggles to maintain a set of normative values, Llewelyn Moss is 
searching for authenticity in the context of betrayal and moral hypocrisy. 
But unlike other so-called existential heroes, who attempt to create meaning 
in a meaningless world, Llewelyn remains entangled in ethical categories 
and will ultimately be judged according to those categories. The distinction 
between Abraham and the tragic hero made by Kierkegaard in Fear and 
Trembling is helpful. Kierkegaard argues that in choosing to obey God’s 
command to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham suspends the ethical obligation he 
has toward his son. Once he has decided, therefore, to carry out God’s will, 
he has “transgressed the ethical altogether and [has] a higher telos outside 
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of it.”5 Maintaining an ethical standard, in short, is the temptation. As an 
example of the tragic hero, Kierkegaard offers, among others, Brutus, who 
as consul of Rome must order the execution of his two sons for their part 
in a conspiracy against the state. When he does have them put to death, 
he carries out his duty to Rome but violates, not suspends, his duty to his 
sons. He is tragic because he remains entangled in two horribly conflicting 
obligations. For the tragic hero, Kierkegaard concludes, “there can be no 
question of a teleological suspension of the ethical.” Similarly, Llewelyn is 
unable to avoid the entanglements of a situation that has a “dialectic in its 
relation to the idea of moral conduct.”6 In his need to authenticate himself 
by asserting his freedom and autonomy, he overlooks the demands of ethi-
cal obligation.
As the film progresses it becomes clear that the trauma and betrayal 
of Vietnam hover over Llewelyn. He is first encountered taking aim with 
a long-range rifle on a herd of antelope in the dry and open landscape of 
west Texas. The position of his body and the routine he goes through sug-
gests, however, something other than recreational hunting. He lies on his 
stomach, apparently keeping himself hidden from the herd, and carefully 
judges distance and wind speed in preparation for taking a shot. He has the 
appearance of a sniper and the aura of a military veteran. And, indeed, later 
in the film we learn that he had served two tours of duty twelve years earlier 
in Vietnam. His commitment to a collective national ethos has proven in the 
aftermath of the war to have been wasted. His sense of futility is figuratively 
reflected in his failure to hit the antelope. As he walks across the landscape, 
apparently in the general direction of the scattered herd, he seems aimless 
and without bearing.
Llewelyn, however, soon crosses the path of a wounded dog and is 
confronted with a choice. He decides to follow the blood trail back to what 
will later be called the “goat fuck.” In McCarthy’s novel the scene of carnage 
that Llewelyn discovers is explicitly compared to Vietnam by Bell’s deputy: 
“It must of sounded like Vietnam out here.”7 Llewelyn has stepped into what 
remains of a firefight, a miasma of blood. And before he knows any of the 
reasons for the massacre, before he knows anything of drugs and money, and 
before Chigurh comes onto the scene, Llewelyn becomes part of this world. 
One senses that what hunting antelope has not provided, this spectacle of 
violence does. This Hobbesian nightmare quickly provides Llewelyn with 
purpose. This will never be about the money per se but about who controls 
the money. It will become his chance to hit the mark.
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The contest, however, almost immediately shifts to a moral one. Llewelyn 
discovers a lone survivor who pleads for water. Llewelyn has no response 
other than to disarm him and to ask in which direction the last man standing 
went. That the dying man asks for water “por Dios” is conspicuously under-
scored by a crucifix hanging on the dashboard, a deeply ironic reminder 
of another context for the spilling of blood. Although Llewelyn steps into 
a cradle of violence in a bleak and indifferent landscape, he must confront 
almost immediately an obligation to a transcendent set of moral values, 
based not on an Enlightenment faith in reason but on a faith in the redemp-
tive power of Christ’s sacrifice. His cool indifference to human suffering 
casts a shadow over his need to authenticate himself in what he perceives 
to be a valueless world. At this moment, he seems to be contributing to the 
shortcomings of that world.
The audience’s perception of Llewelyn as the existential loner, an under-
standing perhaps conditioned by literature and film, is contradicted once 
he returns home with the guns and money he has taken. It is almost as if 
he had stepped into another fictional space, another genre. After hiding 
the case of money in the bedroom, Llewelyn sits on the couch with Carla 
Jean, and they begin to banter flirtatiously back and forth. They generate an 
atmosphere of ease and familiarity. Llewelyn’s role as a marginalized figure 
is qualified by his duty and obligation to another part of his life. Against her 
will and without her knowledge, Carla Jean has been drawn into the killing 
field that he has discovered in the barren landscape of west Texas. Whether 
he immediately recognizes it or not, Llewelyn’s apparent compartmentaliza-
tion of his identity now begins to break down. He has defiled his home and 
put his family at risk.
The film’s insistent exploration of moral imperatives is taken up again in 
the ensuing scene. The camera is looking down on Llewelyn as he suddenly 
starts up out of sleep. The film cuts to the kitchen, where he is filling a gallon 
container with water. Carla Jean enters and asks him what he is doing. He 
replies, “I’m fixin’ to do somethin’ dumber ’an hell, but I’m goin’ anyways.” 
It is clear that he means to return to the scene of the killings with water for 
the survivor. Two aspects of his decision are important. First, he does not 
base it on self-interest. And secondly, it is not conditional on the outcome. 
It is not a question of “If I do not go, the Mexican will die,” but rather, “If 
I do not go, I will not be able to live with myself.” Like Will Kane, he puts 
himself at risk because of his duty to a set of values.
Llewelyn’s decision making in the context of ethical choices is not 
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finished. As Kierkegaard might put it, he is unable to suspend the ethical 
in order to assert his own set of meanings in a context that seems absurd. 
Moreover, in the end he will be judged through the perspective of the ethi-
cal. The first of these choices is made during his telephone conversation 
with Chigurh in the hospital. Chigurh tells him that he will not harm Carla 
Jean if he brings him the money. The offer carries with it the implicit under-
standing that Llewelyn will be killed. There is nothing to be done about that, 
but Llewelyn does have the choice of saving his wife. If he doesn’t comply, 
Chigurh promises that he will kill Carla Jean, regardless of recovering the 
money. It will, in fact, be his duty to do so. Llewelyn chooses to have his 
cake and eat it too. He will keep the money, but he will take steps to protect 
Carla Jean. His critical error is to link his need to authenticate himself with 
a particular moral obligation.
Llewelyn fails on both counts. He and Carla Jean will both die. Along 
with Bell, the film audience first sees the Mexicans frenetically fleeing the 
crime scene and then the body of Llewelyn sprawled on the threshold of a 
motel room. Here, the filmmakers have significantly departed from the novel 
by deleting a lengthy exchange between Llewelyn and a girl he has picked up 
hitchhiking. He recognizes her naïveté and her vulnerability and gives her 
money so she can make her way to California without hitchhiking. Although 
she offers herself to him several times, he is never tempted, maintaining an 
almost parental relationship to her. The most telling difference comes in the 
shoot-out in which Llewelyn and the girl are killed. In the novel, the reader 
is told that one of the Mexicans grabs the girl by the hair, points his gun at 
her head, and tells Llewelyn that he will kill her if he does not lay his weapon 
down. He does put down his gun, and immediately the Mexican shoots the 
girl and then turns and shoots Llewelyn. Surely he knows he cannot save the 
girl regardless of what he might do with his weapon. And surely he knows 
that he will die if he does put it down. His act becomes a gesture of impotent 
responsibility; it will have no effect in preventing the death of either himself 
or the girl. Although the drug dealer sets a conditional (“If you put down 
the gun, I will not kill the girl”), Llewelyn acts knowing there is really no 
conditional at all. He knows that no matter what he does, she will die. He 
does not sacrifice himself to save another life. He acts purely out of duty. 
A moral imperative orders him to do this. It is the defining moment in the 
novel for Llewelyn.
The filmmakers have chosen to alter this scene significantly in their 
adaptation. The sixteen-year-old hitchhiker becomes an older woman (Ana 
No Country for Old Men as Moral Philosophy 171
Reeder) who is sunbathing and having a beer alongside the pool of a two-
star motel. She is clearly experienced in picking up men. The scene is shot 
in harsh light, giving it a hard and glaring look. When she first begins to flirt 
with Llewelyn, he tells her that he is married and lifts up his hand to show 
her his wedding ring. She persists, telling him he can stay married and that 
beer only leads to more beer. Llewelyn looks up with a half smile on his face, 
and at that moment the camera pans up into the sky, and the light fades to a 
blur. The film immediately cuts to a point-of-view shot of Bell’s arrival on the 
scene. Like the novel, the deaths of Llewelyn and the woman are reported to 
Bell. Unlike the book, however, the film shows nothing of Llewelyn’s gesture, 
and the audience is left to surmise what transpired between the woman 
and Llewelyn in that missing interval. Although the location of the bodies 
suggests that nothing did follow the beers, there is the impression that at 
the very least Llewelyn has let down his guard. When one considers what is 
at stake—the life of Carla Jean—it is difficult not to recognize some degree 
of a moral failing. In an earlier scene in which Llewelyn calls Carla Jean to 
tell her to meet him in El Paso, as he is speaking to her, he turns his head to 
follow a woman almost as if he were involuntarily distracted. The filmmak-
ers have deliberately chosen, at the very least, to suggest that Llewelyn has 
compromised himself, that his need for authenticity, his need not to back 
down, is entangled with his own shortcomings. Llewelyn exits the film as 
he entered. He takes aims and then misses his mark.8
The Philosopher Who Fell to Earth
In an interview published in the New York Times upon the release of No 
Country for Old Men, Joel Coen describes his conception of Chigurh: “He’s 
like the man who fell to earth. . . . He’s the thing that doesn’t grow out of the 
landscape.”9 This rings true as far as it goes. Chigurh does seem to be some 
alien menace who operates outside categories of human understanding, 
certainly ethical categories. And although he bleeds and his bones can be 
broken, he exudes a certain physical invulnerability. He is almost robotic 
in his single-minded focus on completing his agenda. There is also some-
thing perversely alien in his choice of weaponry: a device for slaughtering 
cattle that resembles a portable oxygen tank. The characters within the film 
have a frustrating time pinning him down. At various times he is called 
a “psychopathic killer,” a “homicidal lunatic,” and a “ghost.” It is said that 
he “lacks a sense of humor” and is a “man of principle.” He eludes clinical 
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and ethical categories of human understanding. But more importantly, in 
a series of dialogues with other characters, Chigurh raises fundamental 
philosophical questions concerning choice, necessity, chance, and justice 
in human affairs.
The proprietor of a gas station where Chigurh stops asks a simple, 
offhanded question concerning the weather in Dallas. He has noticed the 
license plate of Chigurh’s car and is completely unaware that it has been 
stolen. It almost immediately becomes clear that Chigurh means to kill the 
proprietor over what he thinks is meddling. Their encounter offers a quick 
lesson in the violent contingencies of modern life. A chance remark can 
change one’s life forever. After instilling terror in the heart of the proprietor, 
Chigurh shifts his focus. He flips a coin and asks his would-be victim to call 
it, clearly meaning that if the proprietor wins the coin toss, Chigurh will 
spare him. Chigurh has almost sadistically transferred responsibility from 
himself to chance. In an instant he has created a world with its own arbitrary 
and simple rules that exclude ethical categories. The proprietor pulls back 
in disbelief and refuses to make his life dependent on the flip of a coin. If 
he is to save his life, he must abandon the world he knows and enter a space 
that, if not absurd, is at least arbitrary. If he is to live at all, it will be at the 
behest of luck. Categories of justice and assumptions of responsibility cease 
to have meaning. But of course, he has no choice but to call the coin flip. It’s 
his only chance. After the proprietor has won the toss, Chigurh mystifies 
the coin. He tells the proprietor that he must keep it separate from other 
coins and that he and the coin were destined to meet at this crossroads. The 
coin is, in short, his talisman. As Chigurh leaves, however, he pauses at the 
door, cocks his head back, and with a wry and mischievous curl to his lip, 
takes it all back. The coin could be special, but then again it may be just a 
coin. The gesture belies the notion that Chigurh has no sense of humor. In 
a masterful manner and in the space of a few minutes Chigurh has shat-
tered complacency, dispatched categories of ethical and religious belief, and 
catapulted the proprietor into a realm of contingent circumstances, random 
eruptions of violence, the dehumanized face of chance, the grim necessity 
of luck, and the quirkiness and perversity of life. It is a sudden and succinct 
tutorial in that world which Bell fears will put his “soul at risk.”
In Chigurh’s encounter with Carson Wells (Woody Harrelson), differ-
ent questions are raised. Wells understands that Chigurh now means to kill 
him, and he argues, “We don’t have to do this.” Wells means, of course, that 
Chigurh can have the money without killing him. But there is the more 
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subtle point that Chigurh is under no mandate, that he is free to act in any 
way that he desires. Wells does not raise moral concerns by asserting that 
it would be unjust to kill him. Perhaps he recognizes that there would be 
some justice in it since Wells has himself been paid to hunt down Chigurh. 
Chigurh then suddenly asks a question that initially feels inappropriate. 
He says to Wells in an almost pensive manner, “What good is a rule, if it 
got you here?” The question explicitly addresses the value and purpose of 
codes of conduct and ties them directly to “good” outcomes. That “good” 
would seem to be based on self-interest. It is, of course, a direct refutation 
of Kant’s understanding of the unconditional moral imperative. Although 
the question is addressed to Wells, it speaks also to Chigurh’s decision to 
kill Wells. He implicitly dismisses ethical considerations in his decision. He 
also suggests a criterion based on simple assessment of what can be gained 
in choosing one way or another. By doing so, he creates a necessity based 
not on ethical obligations but on pragmatic ones. He will kill Carson Wells 
because it is necessary. It is in his self-interest to do so. His position is eerily 
similar to that of the Athenians when they ask the Melians to tell them why 
they should not be destroyed. When the Melians claim that the Athenians 
have unfairly required them to “speak of expediency apart from justice,” 
the Athenians respond that justice is never an issue unless the two sides are 
equal in power.10 It is the same cool and perverse rationality that informs 
Chigurh’s relationship to Wells.
The final dialogue takes place between Chigurh and Carla Jean. She 
finds herself in the same bind as the gas station proprietor, having the 
chance to save her life by calling the flip of a coin. Before that offer is made, 
she tells Chigurh what Carson Wells had told him: “You don’t have to do 
this.” Chigurh perversely responds that he must fulfill a promise that he 
has made to Llewelyn: if Llewelyn did not give himself up, he would kill 
Carla Jean. He has hunted down Carla Jean to make good on his promise. 
Chigurh has perversely taken us back to Kant’s ethical system. A promise 
must be kept, Kant argues in the Groundwork, for no other reason than that 
it is a promise. It is kept out of duty, and so it is Chigurh’s duty to kill Carla 
Jean. He is obliged to her husband; it is necessary that he do this. Chigurh 
is being deeply ironic and in so doing problematizes human categories of 
morality based on a priori imperatives. He mischievously contradicts his 
earlier understanding of obligation based on self-interest and instead sug-
gests that his obligation is to keep a promise no matter what the outcome. 
In this instance, Chigurh is less a man of principle, as Wells describes him 
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to Llewelyn, than a man of irony. He seems to have dropped out of the sky, 
with the purpose not to espouse a philosophical position but to bedevil hu-
man attempts to construct their own philosophical models.
After this exchange, Chigurh does give her the chance to call the coin 
flip. Unlike the gas station proprietor, however, Carla Jean ultimately refuses 
to do so. Her decision is one of the most significant moments in the film. 
As he did earlier, Chigurh not only provides her with a chance to live but 
also relinquishes responsibility for his act. Carla Jean, however, recognizes 
what is at stake and refuses to participate in his game. She will not give her 
life over to chance and insists that the responsibility for her death lies with 
Chigurh, not the coin. She forces him to make the choice. In so doing she 
restores moral judgments to the situation. She will not, in short, speak of 
“expediency apart from justice.” She defies the irrational flip of a coin and 
retains her integrity. She hurls Chigurh’s ironic perversity back into his face: 
“I knew you was crazy.” Although Carla Jean is neither an existential nor a 
tragic hero, she is, nevertheless, heroic in her unwillingness to abandon the 
human need to construe the world in moral terms.
Coda
Minutes after leaving Carla Jean’s house, Chigurh has his own bad luck. A 
driver runs a red light and smashes into the side of Chigurh’s car. Ironically, 
Chigurh has been following a basic rule of interaction: stop on the red, go on 
the green. Issues of responsibility, intention, accident, and chance converge 
at the intersection. Perhaps later Chigurh will ponder the implications of 
the collision, but for now he does what he needs to do in order to survive 
and go on to the next task. The accident suggests that justice may eventually 
assert itself into human affairs. During the time Chigurh has been torment-
ing Carla Jean, this accident was waiting to happen. One might wryly ask 
him, “What good is a rule, if it got you here?” But as I said, he does not 
contemplate the philosophical implications of the moment. He seems to 
be philosophical only when he interrogates others. It is ultimately left to 
human beings to struggle with the moral and ethical complexities of their 
condition. And it is that struggle the filmmakers have chosen to explore in 
No Country for Old Men.
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heIdegger and the ProBlem of 
InterPre tatIon In Barton fInk
Mark T. Conard
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a “signification” over 
some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on 
it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the 
thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our 
understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid 
out by the interpretation.
—Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
Contrary to present tendencies to think of the reading of texts as the 
paradigm case of interpretation, Heidegger’s paradigm cases are everyday 
activities like opening a door or hammering.
—David Couzens Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger
The Coen brothers’ Barton Fink (1991) is the story of a New York playwright 
who desires to create a new, living theater about and for the common man 
and who sees it as his job “to make a difference.” The year is 1941, and upon 
the success of his (presumably) first produced play, Fink (John Turturro) 
is lured into a Faustian bargain to go to Hollywood and write for the mov-
ies. Upon arriving in Los Angeles, however, and despite his newly formed 
friendship with his next-door neighbor and common man Charlie Meadows 
(John Goodman), and despite counsel from another writer, W. P. Mayhew 
(John Mahoney), whom Fink considers to be the “finest novelist” of their 
generation, Fink finds himself blocked up on the B wrestling picture he’s 
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supposed to be scripting.1 The situation goes from bad to utterly bizarre as 
events unfold: Mayhew’s secretary and lover, Audrey Taylor (Judy Davis), 
turns out to have authored the great writer’s books; in attempting to be 
Fink’s muse, Audrey seduces him and then ends up dead in his hotel room; 
Charlie helps Barton dispose of Audrey’s corpse; supposed common man 
Charlie turns out to be a homicidal maniac who may have murdered Audrey; 
and Charlie entrusts Barton with a box that may very well contain Audrey’s 
head. Despite, or more likely because of, these events, Fink overcomes his 
block and is able to write his wrestling picture, which ends up sounding an 
awful lot like his New York play. As Fink’s descent into hell is complete, the 
hotel where he is staying bursts into flames, and Charlie shotguns to death 
the police detectives who are investigating Audrey’s murder. Barton escapes 
the inferno as Charlie disappears back into his flaming room. In the closing 
scenes, Barton enters another sort of purgatory as the head of the movie 
studio refuses to release him from his contract and thus retains the rights 
to all of Barton’s writing. Finally, Barton winds up on a sunny beach and 
becomes a part of the picture that throughout the movie has decorated the 
wall of his hotel room.
The movie is clearly about the nature of creativity and art, the deceiving 
nature of appearances, compromises in the creative process, and the problem 
of an artist who is cut off from reality while he is attempting to create. But 
there is much about the film that seems to resist interpretation.2 What’s the 
significance or meaning of the box that may contain Audrey’s head? Or of 
the picture of the girl staring at the ocean that becomes real at the end of 
the movie? Or of the emphasis on shoes (feet, and other body parts) in the 
narrative? Or of the mosquitoes that seem to plague Barton? In this essay, 
I use the film as a springboard into a discussion of Heidegger’s theory of 
interpretation. I then use that theory to shed some light on these puzzling 
elements of the movie.
A Day or a Lifetime
Certain elements and themes of the film are clear. As I note, the movie is 
about creativity and the relationship between art and life. Indeed, it is a jab 
at artists and intellectuals who remove themselves from real life. Barton is 
supposedly writing about the common man, but any time Charlie—a com-
mon man himself, at least as far as Barton knows—tries to tell him about the 
life of the working stiff, Barton refuses to listen. When Charlie attempts to 
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relate to Barton some experience or other he’s had, he begins with “I could 
tell you some stories,” and Barton always cuts him off. Consequently, alien-
ated from his supposed subject, Barton really only has one story to tell: the 
B wrestling picture he writes seems to be exactly the same narrative as his 
Broadway play. (We don’t know the details of the story, but both the movie 
script and the play are set on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, both at least 
mention fishmongers, and both end with the line: “We’ll be hearing from 
that kid, and I don’t mean a postcard.”)
Further, Barton Fink is clearly a Faustian tale. Barton makes his deal with 
the devil (he sells his soul in agreeing to go to Hollywood and write for the 
movies) and ultimately descends into hell. There are clues to this descent in 
the Hotel Earle, where Barton is residing. Recall, for example, that the motto 
of the hotel is “A day or a lifetime,” a reference to eternity. When Barton first 
enters the hotel, he rings for the attendant, and the bell seems to chime on 
forever. Only when Chet (Steve Buscemi), the desk clerk, emerges out of the 
floor like some imp or demon from the underworld and lays a finger on the 
bell does it stop ringing. The hotel’s elevator operator (the only other person 
we see inside the hotel) is named Pete (Harry Bugin), a probable reference 
to St. Peter, and Barton’s room is on the sixth floor, perhaps a reference to 
the number of the beast. Of course the conflagration in the hotel at the end 
of the movie is confirmation that Barton has reached the fiery depths of 
the underworld.
To get a little more philosophical, the movie also seems to be a fuzzy 
sort of meditation on the relationship between mind and body. Note that 
there are several references to the mind and many references to the body. 
First, Barton says he lives the life of the mind, and at the end of the film, in 
the inferno, Charlie shouts, “I’ll show you the life of the mind!” In addition, 
as an insurance salesman, Charlie says that he sells “peace of mind.” It’s also 
pretty clear that Barton’s hotel room resembles the inside of a skull, with the 
two windows acting as eye sockets, and so it’s likely that we’re to think that 
we’re inside Barton’s head (or mind). There seems to be an ambiguity in this 
metaphor, however. Recall that Charlie’s ear leaks pus, and this clearly echoes 
the wallpaper glue that melts in the heat in Barton’s room. So, are we inside 
Barton’s head or inside Charlie’s head?3 Or is Charlie a figment of Barton’s 
imagination? These seem to be further issues that resist interpretation.
There are also, as I mentioned, lots of references to the body. These 
include references to feet and shoes. Shoes line the hallways of the hotel, 
waiting to be shined; the studio head, Lipnick (Michael Lerner), kisses 
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Barton’s foot; and Barton realizes that he’s been given Charlie’s shoes when 
he tries them on and they’re much too large for his feet (clearly meaning 
that Charlie’s shoes are too big for Barton to fill). In addition, there are a 
number of references to the head. Charlie claims a few times that “things are 
all balled up at the head office.” Remember that the serial killer decapitates 
the bodies and that we suspect it’s Audrey’s head in the box Charlie leaves 
with Barton. When Charlie mentions his ear infection, he says that “you 
can’t trade your head in for a new one.” Charlie misquotes a cliché when he 
says, “Where there’s a head, there’s hope,” and Barton corrects him: “Where 
there’s life, there’s hope.” The cops say that Madman Mundt (Charlie’s real 
identity) is a little funny in the head. In other mentions of the body, at the 
beginning of the film, Barton claims that a writer’s gut tells him what’s good, 
and when Barton talks about the phoniness of the theater, Charlie says, “I 
can feel my butt getting sore already.”
The Life of the Mind
At this point it would be helpful to discuss René Descartes and Cartesian 
dualism, the idea that the mind and the body are two different substances, 
since, as we’ll see below, Descartes will make a nice foil for Heidegger.
With his famous “I think, therefore I am,” Descartes revolutionizes phi-
losophy insofar as he institutes what’s known as the “subjective turn.” This is 
not “subjective” in the negative sense that we use it, meaning just a matter 
of opinion (as opposed to being objective and valid). Rather, it refers to the 
subject of thought or perception (I who am thinking or perceiving, as op-
posed to the object being perceived). In other words, Descartes in a radical 
way brings the subject into the picture. Prior to Descartes it was possible to 
do metaphysics and talk about the world and the nature of reality without 
talking about the knower or the perceiver who’s grasping the world. After 
Descartes and his revolution, that’s no longer possible. Now we have to take 
the subject into account and discuss how it is that we know, perceive, and 
understand the world that we’re talking about.
Descartes constructs his metaphysics as you would a mathematical 
system, by starting with one necessarily true axiom and then deducing 
everything else he knows from that one principle. But how do you find 
that one truth, the one axiom that’s beyond all doubt? Descartes does it by 
postulating, for the sake of the argument, an “evil genius,” a being who’s all-
knowing and all-powerful (like God) but who’s malicious and whose sole 
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intention is to deceive Descartes about everything. The genius can implant 
perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and memories directly into his 
mind. Thus, Descartes’s entire life, everything he thinks he knows about 
the world, could be a fiction.
Given the thesis of the evil genius, Descartes’s skepticism is so radical 
that he claims he can even doubt the existence of his own body (as part of 
the physical world). But now we get to the ultimate skeptical question: is it 
possible that he, Descartes, too, doesn’t exist? Could the evil genius make him 
believe he exists when he really doesn’t? And the answer is no. Descartes can 
doubt his existence, but he must exist in order to do the doubting and thus, 
“I think, therefore I am.” Doubting is an act of thinking, and for thinking 
to be going on, there must be a thinker. This is Descartes’s one indubitable 
axiom (from which he intends to deduce everything else he knows about 
reality). Now, what he concludes from this is that, because he can doubt the 
existence of his body but not the existence of his mind, he is essentially his 
mind. I am a mind, says Descartes; I have a body.
From this Descartes further concludes that mind and matter (the body 
is material or physical) are radically different substances (types of stuff). The 
body is material and takes up space, for example; the mind is immaterial and 
doesn’t take up space (thoughts and ideas have no physical or spatial dimen-
sions). This is what’s known as Cartesian dualism. Further, this substance 
dualism (the idea that the universe is made up of two radically different 
kinds of stuff) leads ultimately to what’s called the mind/body problem, 
the question of how the mind and body interact, if they’re of such radically 
different natures. If the mind is immaterial and has no physical dimension, 
then it has no physical location either: it can’t be anywhere in the sense 
of being located in space. Consequently, it’s difficult to see how the mind 
could interact with any part of the body, since it can’t physically be there 
in the presence of that part. Descartes didn’t have a satisfactory solution to 
this problem. Further, substance dualism also leads to the problem of other 
minds. That is, I have direct and immediate access to my own mind and my 
own thoughts, but I have no such access to yours. I directly perceive your 
physical body, but I can’t think your thoughts. So how do I know that you 
even have a mind? How can I be certain that there are in fact other minds, 
that mine is not the only one in existence?
So Descartes’s revolutionary beginning seems to turn us into atomistic, 
detached mental substances, unsure of whether we’re all alone in the universe. 
Indeed, this seems to be the situation in which Barton finds himself. Living 
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“the life of the mind,” an artist and an intellectual cut off from reality, Barton 
lives inside his head, symbolized by his hotel room. His isolation is so complete, 
in fact, that there are no other guests at the hotel (besides Charlie, who, as I 
note, may just be a figment of Barton’s imagination).4 As we’ll see below, this 
is quite important for my Heideggerian interpretation of the film.
The Dream and Its Interpretation
As I note above, what we’re interested in here is an interpretation of the 
film or at least of those puzzling elements of the film that I mention. The 
branch of philosophy explicitly concerned with the theory of interpreta-
tion is known as hermeneutics, which originally referred specifically to 
the interpretation of scriptural texts but which is now used in philosophy 
to refer to the interpretation of any text whatever. Now, the fact that I’m 
talking about hermeneutics and interpretation may suggest that I’ve drifted 
far from Barton Fink; however, there’s a suggestion in the film that this is 
not at all so. First, recall that Mayhew presents Barton with a signed copy 
of one of his novels, which is entitled Nebuchadnezzar. Subsequently, in 
his hotel room, Barton opens the Bible to a passage in the Book of Daniel, 
“Nebuchadnezzar’s Dream.” The passage reads:
In the second year of Nebuchadnezzar’s reign, Nebuchadnezzar 
dreamed such dreams that his spirit was troubled and his sleep left 
him. So the king commanded that the magicians, the enchanters, 
the sorcerers, and the Chaldeans be summoned to tell the king his 
dreams. When they came in and stood before the king, he said to 
them, “I have had such a dream that my spirit is troubled by the 
desire to understand it.” The Chaldeans said to the king [in Ara-
maic], “O king, live forever! Tell your servants the dream, and we 
will reveal the interpretation.” The king answered the Chaldeans, 
“This is a public decree: if you do not tell me both the dream and its 
interpretation, you shall be torn limb from limb, and your houses 
shall be laid in ruins. But if you do tell me the dream and its inter-
pretation, you shall receive from me gifts and rewards and great 
honor. Therefore tell me the dream and its interpretation.”5
The dream is told and interpreted correctly by Daniel and concerns the fate 
of the kingdom and several kingdoms that will follow it.
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Barton subsequently turns to the first lines of Genesis, and (at least 
in his imagination) they have been transformed into the beginning 
of Barton’s story: “Fade in on the Lower East Side,” and so forth. This 
seems to be further evidence of what I note above: because Barton is cut 
off from real life, he has only one story to tell. An artist is supposed to 
draw inspiration from real experience, and because Barton is living in 
his head and is alienated from that real experience, he has no inspira-
tion or motivation and thus can conceive of no other story (the biblical 
story turns into his story).
The fact that the Coens reference this passage in Daniel, with its focus 
on dreams and interpretation, could be a hint that much of the film is ac-
tually a dream of Barton’s.6 This is certainly an interpretive possibility and 
one way to read the film (I’d suggest, if one were to go in this direction, that 
everything after the first shot of California, the waves of the Pacific crash-
ing against a rock, should be read as the dream). This would certainly solve 
all the questions and problems about the film, since in our dreams nothing 
has to make sense.7 The head in the box, the photo that becomes reality, the 
hotel that spontaneously bursts into flames—all of this might just be the 
illogic of a dream world.8 On the other hand, the fact that the Coens make 
reference to this biblical story could be a clue (likely with a definite wink) 
that they’re aware of the difficulties of interpreting the movie. In any event, 
this scene in the film at least hints that we’re not too far afield in discussing 
theories of interpretation.
The Metaphysics of Presence
Before discussing Heidegger’s radical take on interpretation, it would be 
helpful to describe briefly what it is that he’s arguing against, what he calls 
“the metaphysics of presence.” Most of us tend (unreflectively) to believe 
that the beginning of philosophy and of science is when someone takes 
a look at the world, or things in the world, from an objective, theoretical 
viewpoint. That is, the philosopher or scientist becomes disengaged from 
practical concerns and from his or her own subjective interests and examines 
something objectively; only in doing so does he or she really understand 
that thing, and only then does he or she get it right.
This way of thinking goes back at least to Aristotle, who claims that the 
real is the actual. That is, if you want to know what’s real, what reality is, 
the answer, according to Aristotle, is: what’s real is what’s actually existing 
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here and now. In other words, traditional metaphysics takes the world to 
be an aggregate of objects that are present, both in the sense that they are 
really existing now in the temporal present and in the sense that they are 
spatially present here before us. Hence, the metaphysics of presence. His-
tory (and thus reality) is a series of “nows”: the past is gone forever, and the 
future doesn’t yet exist.
In addition to a physical object present in the here and now, there is, 
set over and against it, the subject who knows and perceives that object. As 
we see above, Descartes is an important proponent of the metaphysics of 
presence. He divides the universe into two substances: the material and the 
mental. We are isolated, individual mental substances separate from each 
other and from the physical objects that surround us. Again, this is the po-
sition in which Barton finds himself: living in his room at the Hotel Earle 
is symbolic of his retreat into his own mind and his alienation from others 
and indeed from reality itself.
Now, note importantly that if we conceive of the reality of things in 
this “objective” fashion, and we’re committed to the scientist’s picture of 
the world, then things are really just brute collections of atoms and mol-
ecules and thus they can have no meaning or sense in and of themselves. 
A hammer, a typewriter, a great work of literature—these are all simply 
clusters of atoms, which are themselves mostly empty space (so the physi-
cist tells us). Thus the only meaning these things could possibly have is 
that which we, as mental subjects, foist upon them. In other words, in this 
view, meaning in the world is only a subjective, mental construct. The 
world in and of itself, and things within the world, are inherently without 
meaning and sense.
Heidegger completely rejects this traditional view of human subjects and 
their relationship to the world. He argues that the metaphysics of presence 
is derivative of a more fundamental way to understand human nature and 
the universe in which we find ourselves.
Dasein
Part of the difficulty Heidegger faces in laying out his understanding of hu-
man nature is that we’ve become so accustomed to thinking of ourselves, and 
talking about ourselves, in the traditional way that it’s difficult to conceive 
of ourselves in any other fashion. Consequently, Heidegger believed he 
needed to coin new words and create new expressions in order to discuss 
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his revolutionary way of thinking. To designate human beings, then, he uses 
the term Dasein, which is the ordinary German word for “being.”
One of the fundamental characteristics of Dasein, according to Hei-
degger, is that it is constituted by potentiality. That is, as opposed to objects 
like tables and chairs that have fixed natures or essences, human beings do not 
have a determinate essence or nature.9 We are our own possibilities. What’s 
definitive of Barton is not that he is a writer, a friend, happy, or sad. No one 
is a writer or is joyful in the way that a table is a table (Barton could certainly 
take on another profession if he wished, and his moods change from moment 
to moment). What’s definitive of him as a human being is rather that he can 
be these things and many more besides. Thus Heidegger completely rejects 
the idea that the real is the actual. At least for human beings, potentiality is 
more fundamental than actuality. We are what we can be.
What’s more, Heidegger further rejects the metaphysics of presence by 
arguing that the other two temporal dimensions, past and future, far from 
being nonexistent (as the tradition would have it), are in fact constitutive 
of the being of Dasein. That is to say, in no way is it the case that everything 
that’s present here and now, in this spot and in this moment, is definitive of 
who and what I am. My past is an essential part of me; it defines and limits me 
in certain important ways, and thus I am my past.10 My decision to go to grad 
school and study philosophy, for example, and my decision to become a college 
professor provide the context in which my current decisions and actions make 
sense. I teach and write about Heidegger in a university setting in order to 
make a living, for example, rather than write movie scripts, wrestle big men in 
tights, or run a movie studio. Further, my future is also a part of me; it makes 
sense out of my present. I am always projected out into the future. I’m work-
ing toward finishing this essay, anticipating meeting a friend later for lunch, 
and thinking about what I have to do to prepare for the beginning of the fall 
semester, and so on. These projections give sense and meaning to the present 
and to my actions and decisions in the present (I have to read a few pages of 
Heidegger, go to the ATM to get cash, and revise my syllabi, for instance). 
Thus I am also my future.11 “We shall point to temporality as the meaning of 
the Being of that entity which we call ‘Dasein,’” says Heidegger.12
“A Tourist with a Typewriter”
In addition to the new conception of human beings outlined above, Hei-
degger also has a novel understanding of nonhuman things in the world, 
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which he refers to as “equipment.” As I said, he claims that this understanding 
is more primordial than the theoretical or “objective” view of those things. 
Rather than being at bottom clusters of atoms, things in the world are what 
they do, what they’re used for. Heidegger’s favorite example is the workshop 
and the tools within the workshop. The hammer that the carpenter uses just 
is its function of hammering. To be more explicit, in Heidegger’s view, the 
workshop is a meaning-filled context, and the equipment’s very existence is 
constituted by the role that it plays within that workshop in fulfilling some 
project or another: building a bookshelf, a table, or a chair, for example. 
When you look around the workshop at the equipment, you don’t see pieces 
of wood and metal, much less collections of atoms and molecules. What you 
see are hammers, screwdrivers, and saws, which are for hammering nails, 
screwing in screws, and cutting wood, in order to build a bookshelf.13 The 
tool or piece of equipment is its own meaning (what it is for) and nothing 
more, and again it takes this meaning from the context of the workshop. 
Thus meaning is not something subjective that we arbitrarily foist upon 
some brute, meaningless object. It is already a part of the world and a part 
of the equipment within the world.
Given the nature or essence of equipment, then, our most primordial 
“understanding” of things is when we use them in our normal, everyday 
activities. The carpenter understands the hammer best when he uses it fluidly 
to pound nails, without thinking about it. This mode of the hammer is what 
Heidegger calls “ready-to-hand.”14 A thing is ready-to-hand when we use 
it expertly to fulfill our projects: I use the pen to take notes on Heidegger 
to write this essay, I use the doorknob to enter the next room to retrieve 
a book that I need, and so forth. This is obviously a much different sense 
of “understanding” than we’re used to. It’s a noncognitive, or precognitive, 
sense of that term. We’re not even explicitly aware of the tool when it’s 
ready-to-hand. We’re rather aware of the task we’re trying to complete, and 
the equipment in a sense disappears (I’m not explicitly aware of the pen 
as I’m taking notes). However, again, Heidegger argues that this is a more 
primordial or fundamental understanding of the thing than the so-called 
scientific, theoretical, or objective view of it.
Now, says Heidegger, we become aware of the real existence and nature 
of equipment when things go wrong in a certain way. That is, for example, 
I’m in the midst of taking notes on Heidegger to write this essay and my pen 
runs out of ink. The work comes to a halt, and I suddenly become explicitly 
aware of the pen, and its role in my project and plans, for the first time. I 
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perceive its character as equipment. In this mode, the tool is what Heidegger 
calls “unready-to-hand.”
There’s a nice example of this contrast between the ready-to-hand and 
the unready-to-hand in Barton Fink. Note that Barton and Ben Geisler’s 
(Tony Shalhoub) secretary have different relationships to their respective 
typewriters. We see the secretary (Gayle Vance) expertly typing letters for 
her boss. She’s not explicitly aware of the machine itself; she’s focused on the 
task she’s been given. For her, the machine is ready-to-hand. Barton, on the 
other hand, is blocked on his wrestling picture, and so we see him sitting 
passively and staring at the typewriter. In this case, there’s nothing wrong 
with the machine itself—it hasn’t run out of ribbon, nor has a key fallen off, 
for example. Rather, because the ideas aren’t coming to Barton, the machine 
is taken out of play. He’s explicitly aware of it now that he’s not using it. He’s 
aware of the role it should be playing in his creation of the script and thus 
in his writing career.
The last step, then, is the movement from the unready-to-hand to what 
Heidegger calls the “present-at-hand.” This occurs when we take the “objec-
tive,” theoretical view of a thing and, for example, weigh and measure it, 
forgetting for a moment its essence as equipment. Heidegger doesn’t deny 
that the scientific or theoretical view of things as present-to-hand is useful 
for certain purposes. What he rejects is the idea that on this view we have 
a better understanding of the thing, that in scientifically observing it we’re 
really getting at its true nature. Rather, as I note, he claims that this view 
is derivative upon our most primordial understanding of equipment as 
ready-to-hand. Further, Heidegger argues, you can clearly derive the pres-
ent-at-hand from the ready-to-hand by ceasing to use things and taking a 
theoretical view of them. However, starting from the present-at-hand, things 
as viewed scientifically and “objectively,” there’s no way to account for how 
those things show up as truly meaningful in the world and in our lives.
Interpretation, Understanding, and Barton Fink
So far I’ve been discussing Heidegger’s novel conception of understand-
ing, which for him is our skillful comportment in the world, our ability 
to expertly use equipment like hammers, doorknobs, and typewriters to 
complete our everyday tasks and long-term projects. However, I haven’t yet 
said anything about his notion of interpretation, which is the stated topic 
of this essay. Note that in our ordinary conception or use of these terms, 
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there’s a very close relationship between understanding and interpretation. 
One might even argue that every understanding is an interpretation and 
that every interpretation is at least based in some understanding (for me to 
understand a text means that I have to interpret it; for me to interpret it, I 
have to have some understanding of it).
In Heidegger’s special use of these terms, there is likewise a very close 
relationship.15 He says, “When something within-the-world is encountered 
as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed 
in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets 
laid out by the interpretation.”16 A piece of equipment, the typewriter, for 
instance, already has its involvement, its role and meaning within the context 
of the secretary’s office, and that involvement is revealed in our understand-
ing of the world, in our skillful comportment in using the machine (when 
the secretary uses the typewriter to type letters for the boss, in conducting 
business, its use and meaning is revealed). Interpretation, then, lays out or 
makes explicit that involvement.17
Above I refer to the workshop as a “meaning-filled context,” because 
in Heidegger’s example it is the network or web of relations in which the 
equipment is constituted. Again, the hammer’s meaning, and therefore its 
existence, is constituted by the role it plays in pounding nails in order to 
make a table or bookcase. This is what David Couzens Hoy is referring to 
when he says,
“Meaning” for Heidegger thus involves the holistic way in which 
something can become intelligible as something in a web of rela-
tions. . . . Independent of the web of meanings, entities are not 
meaningful. . . . In other words, unless objects inhere in an inter-
pretive context, they could not be understood. So they cannot be 
said to have meanings that are prior to and independent of their 
interpretive uses.
The context of meaningfulness is thus what makes it possible to 
interpret something as something. For the most part this context is 
not explicit, but makes up the background of understanding.18
The “web of relations” or the “context of meaningfulness,” in this case a 
workshop, is the “interpretive context” in which the hammer is meaningful 
and in which we’re able to understand the hammer and to interpret it as a 
hammer. To put this another way, if there were no such thing as woodwork-
Heidegger and the Problem of Interpretation in Barton Fink  191
ing and carpentry, and thus no such thing as a workshop, there would be 
no network of relations or interpretive context in which the hammer would 
find its meaning (provided for the sake of the example that we ignore any 
other uses to which the hammer might be put). The hammer would then 
have no meaning or use, and so it would in that case be impossible for us 
to understand and interpret it. It would be like handing a cell phone to an 
ancient Roman gladiator. He obviously wouldn’t know what it was or what 
to do with it.
Okay, so what does all this have to do with Barton Fink?
Here’s my stab at a Heideggerian reading of the movie. Because Barton 
is a Cartesian-like subject, he lives “the life of the mind” and cuts himself 
off, not only from the common man, the supposed wellspring of his inspi-
ration, but also more and more from life and reality itself. Consequently, 
he removes himself from any kind of practical engagement with the world 
and is thus cut off from those networks or contexts of meaning in which 
equipment is understood and interpreted. Consequently, the things around 
him lose their meaning and cease to make sense (like the cell phone would 
for the gladiator). In other words, the elements of the film (like the box or 
the picture) that resist interpretation aren’t supposed to make sense. That’s 
the whole point. Indeed, in interviews the Coens themselves reveal that not 
everything in the movie has a clear-cut meaning: “What isn’t crystal clear 
isn’t intended to become crystal clear, and it’s fine to leave it at that,” says 
Ethan Coen; Joel adds, “The question is: Where would it get you if something 
that’s a little bit ambiguous in the movie is made clear? It doesn’t get you 
anywhere.”19 I’m not suggesting, of course, that the brothers had anything 
like Heideggerian interpretation on their minds as they made the film. 
Rather, they acknowledge that not everything in the film is interpretable or 
makes sense, and I’m using Heidegger to suggest a way to understand why 
those things lack meaning or sense. Again, things in the world must have 
a network of relations, a context for practical engagement (like an office in 
which a typewriter is used, or a workshop in which a hammer is employed), 
in order for them to have sense and meaning. Because Barton lives more and 
more in his own head (symbolized by his hotel room), cut off from reality 
and practical engagement with the world, the things around him cease to 
have sense and meaning. They’re not understandable or interpretable.
This may perhaps be frustrating, since most of us tend to like to un-
derstand and be able to interpret the meaning of everything in the stories 
we experience. However, as I said, my exposition above at least provides a 
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reason why certain things in the film don’t make sense. Further, though the 
film seems dreamlike and fantastical in certain ways, the fact that it contains 
elements that are ambiguous and lacking in sense and meaning makes it 
that much more like real life.
Notes
 My thanks to J. J. Abrams for many very helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this essay.
 1. Critics note, and the Coens confirm, that the character of W. P. Mayhew is at 
least partly based on William Faulkner.
 2. “If Miller’s Crossing offered spectators difficulties of presentation (Who did 
what, and why?), Barton Fink presented them with difficulties of interpretation. Are 
Barton’s horrific experiences in the film’s gothic hotel real? If so, what is in the box 
given him by a serial killer?” R. Barton Palmer, Joel and Ethan Coen (Urbana: Univ. of 
Illinois Press, 2004), 10.
 3. Recall also that Charlie hears things in the hotel (like the “love birds” in the 
room next to Barton) that would seem to be impossible for him to hear, suggesting that 
all of this is occurring in his head.
 4. Note that supposed common man Charlie, who perhaps lives in Barton’s head 
and turns out to be demonic, is rather like Barton’s version of the evil genius (or evil 
demon, as he’s sometimes called). It’s via the evil genius that Descartes comes to grasp 
his own mind as a pure intellectual intuition. Similarly, it’s Charlie who reveals Barton’s 
alienation to him, the fact that he’s trapped inside his own head: “I’ll show you the life 
of the mind!” Charlie yells. My thanks to J. J. Abrams for pointing this out to me.
 5. Daniel 2:1–6 (NRSV, Catholic edition). 
 6. It’s interesting to note that in his Meditation I, prior to his introduction of the 
evil genius, Descartes discusses dreams and wonders whether our entire lives might be 
a dream. If that’s at least logically possible, Descartes argues, then we can’t trust any of 
our sense perceptions to be true or real. This skepticism isn’t quite radical enough for 
Descartes’s purposes, and so he goes on to introduce the evil genius.
 7. I’ll note as I’m writing this, and I’m not making this up or joking, that just last 
night I dreamed of a flying lobster. So, go figure.
 8. In an interview, Joel Coen all but denies that they explicitly meant the sequence 
of events in California to be a dream, but he confirms that they wanted those events to 
be irrational and illogical. He says, “Some people have suggested the whole second part 
of the movie is only a nightmare. It certainly wasn’t our intention to make it a literal 
bad dream, but it’s true that we wanted an irrational logic. We wanted the climate of the 
movie to reflect the psychological state of its hero.” Quoted in William Rodney Allen, 
ed., The Coen Brothers: Interviews (Jackson: Univ. Press of Mississippi, 2006), 49.
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 9. As we’ll see later in this chapter, the essences of things are fixed relatively and 
are conventional. They depend upon Dasein and human agency. That is, a table is a table 
because people use it for that purpose, and for no other reason is it a table.
10. “In comporting ourselves toward an entity as bygone, we retain it in a certain 
way or we forget it. In retaining and forgetting, the Dasein is itself concomitantly 
retained. It concomitantly retains its own self in what it already has been. That which 
the Dasein has already been in each instance . . . belongs concomitantly to its future. 
This having-been-ness, understood primarily, precisely does not mean that the Dasein 
no longer in fact is; just the contrary, the Dasein is precisely in fact what it was. That 
which we are as having been has not gone by, passed away, in the sense in which we say 
that we could shuffle off our past like a garment. The Dasein can as little get rid of its 
[past as] bygoneness as escape its death. In every sense and in every case everything we 
have been is an essential determination of our existence.” Martin Heidegger, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. 
Press, 1982), 265.
11. “The Dasein understands itself by way of its own most peculiar capacity to be, of 
which it is expectant. In thus comporting toward its own most peculiar capacity to be, it 
is ahead of itself. Expecting a possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which 
I myself am. The Dasein, expecting its ability to be, comes toward itself. In this coming-
toward-itself, expectant of a possibility, the Dasein is futural in an original sense. This 
coming-toward-oneself from one’s most peculiar possibility, a coming-toward which 
is implicit in the Dasein’s existence and of which all expecting is a specific mode, is the 
primary concept of the future.” Ibid., 265.
12. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Rob-
inson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 38.
13. “[Heidegger] thinks that we grasp entities as entities in their webs of relations 
with other entities, not as aggregates of perceptual qualities. Thus, we do not first see 
some colors or hear some noises and only secondarily infer that we are seeing or hearing 
a motorcycle. Instead, we first encounter a motorcycle, and only secondarily (if at all) do 
we abstract its properties (perhaps to hear its ‘noise’).” David Couzens Hoy, “Heidegger 
and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles 
Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), 183.
14. To be more precise, this is a common English translation of Heidegger’s original 
German.
15. “Heidegger [insists] that all forms of interpretation in real life and in the human 
sciences are grounded in understanding and are nothing but the explication of what has 
already been understood.” Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed., introduction to The Hermeneutics 
Reader (New York: Continuum, 1988), 35.
16. Heidegger, Being and Time, 190–91.
17. “When I interpret something, I do not add on to an experience an external 
meaning or significance. I simply make clear what is already there. What is already 
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there in the world’s objects is the manner and purpose for which I make use of them.” 
Michael Gelvin, A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and Time” (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1970), 94.
18. Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” 183.
19. Quoted in Allen, Coen Brothers, 58. In regard to their including ambiguous 
and uninterpretable elements in the film, Joel Coen says, “We’re definitely guilty of 
teasing.” Ibid., 94.
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the Past Is noW
History and The Hudsucker Proxy
Paul Coughlin
Well, the future . . . that’s something that you can never tell about. But the 
past . . . that’s another story.
—Moses in The Hudsucker Proxy
When Moses (William Cobbs) utters this phrase in the opening sequence of 
the Coen brothers’ The Hudsucker Proxy (1994), his commentary is intended 
to launch the film’s “story”: Norville Barnes’s (Tim Robbins) rise and fall and 
rise again as the corporate stooge cum genius of Hudsucker Industries. But 
it also establishes a critical element that characterizes all representations of 
the past: their fundamental textual character. History (the past) is a story. 
The postmodern age has decreed that history is something of the present, 
rather than the past: we access history through the texts that define it, the 
texts that conduct it. Linda Hutcheon argues that “there is no directly and 
naturally accessible past ‘real’ for us today, we can only know—and con-
struct—the past through its traces, its representations.”1 Postmodernism 
exposes the human complicity in the construction of history and, as such, 
in the representation of “truth” and “fact.” It is no longer acceptable to con-
ceive of history as pursuing a single linear route, and the possibilities for 
other expressions of the past are now wound up in issues of power, author-
ity, and control. Those who control the means and ordering of expression 
determine our history.
The Hudsucker Proxy is the Coen brothers’ most farfetched film. Ele-
ments of fantasy and wonder abound, culminating with the literal stopping 
of time at the story’s conclusion. It is also a work that references other films 
and filmic styles. The Hudsucker Proxy adopts the generic conventions of 
196 Paul Coughlin
screwball comedy while drawing directly on the works of Frank Capra. It 
is for reasons like these that the works of the Coen brothers are regularly 
criticized as being artificial, empty of meaning, of failing to engage with real-
ity or history and thus ignoring moral and ethical concerns. Emanuel Levy 
condemns the Coens as “clever directors who know too much about movies 
and too little about real life.”2 The Hudsucker Proxy’s mixture of artificiality 
and allusion suggests a disconnection with customary notions of history 
and reality. Yet it is precisely The Hudsucker Proxy’s textual qualities—its 
intertextual cues, generic conventions, use of allusion, and self-reflexive 
narrational tools—that guarantee its engagement with history and “real life.” 
Postmodernism contends that history is a text like any other and as such 
is open to interpretation. History is unstable, and postmodern representa-
tions and theory regard it as a cultural construct. History and fiction are 
discourses, serving to remind us that we name the past as historical facts by 
selection and positioning. And, even more basically, we know the past only 
through its representation, through its traces in the present.
The Politics of Postmodernism
Postmodern theory promotes the notion that the past (history) is in a state 
of constant flux. When quizzed about the postmodern aspects of his and 
his brother’s work, Ethan Coen’s declaration, “The honest answer is I’m not 
real clear on what postmodernism is,” mirrors the confusion that confronts 
much of the critical theory that surrounds the term.3 Coming to grips with 
the notoriously unstable definition of postmodernism is a challenging com-
mission. For many, postmodernism is an extension and repudiation of the 
tenets of modernism, adopting the processes of modernism yet rejecting its 
wish for absolute truths. Others see postmodernism in art as characterized 
by a loss of meaning, the collapsing of typically binary oppositions, and a 
suspicion of absolute truths. Postmodern texts often operate by adopting 
the styles of past representations in order to investigate them, as exempli-
fied in the rampant allusion and widespread referencing that adorns The 
Hudsucker Proxy.
Postmodernism is often criticized as being apolitical, promoting empti-
ness, a loss of meaning, and as such, a waning of history. Hutcheon, however, 
suggests that irony, historical reference, an interest in textual structures, 
and the collapsing of boundaries between art and reality are all typical of 
the processes by which postmodern representations can subvert prevailing 
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views of the world and culture. Hutcheon argues against the contention 
that postmodernism is impotent and ahistorical when she declares “that 
postmodernist parody is a value-problematizing, denaturalizing form of 
acknowledging the history (and through irony, the politics) of representa-
tions.”4 Hutcheon believes that parody is precisely the tool that will unlock 
the frameworks of representation (the tools used to construct stories), and 
it does so by foregrounding and examining the structure and organization 
of texts. The Coens’ application of a screwball comedy design that also 
draws heavily upon the work of Frank Capra in their construction of The 
Hudsucker Proxy demonstrates how self-reflexivity and irony can operate 
to investigate and even challenge accepted representations of the past and 
the ideologies upon which these representations are grounded. Postmodern 
parody imitates an existing work of art that is familiar to its readers and 
reconsiders it with an ironical, critical, or antagonistic purpose. Distinctive 
features of the work are retained but are often mimicked with an antithetical 
intention. Parody changes the texts it imitates, questioning and sometimes 
corroding the ideologies that they convey and challenging the authority of 
historical representation.
A film such as The Hudsucker Proxy foregrounds the nature of history 
as a plural creation. The Coen brothers mix fact and fiction, truth and 
fabrication, the real and the unreal. They construct texts that are at once 
completely in tune with history but entirely fictional. The technically precise 
and culturally astute recreation of America’s Deep South in the 1930s framed 
by Homer’s epic narrative The Odyssey in their film O Brother, Where Art 
Thou? (2000) is a model of postmodernism. The merging of authenticity 
with classic fiction highlights the link between the story structures of both 
fictional and historical representation. James Mottram suggests that when 
the Coen brothers adapt Homer they “are reminding us that fragments 
of literature—like the past itself—exist in our subconscious to be reinter-
preted.”5 Yet to be aware of the structures of storytelling does not require 
an exchange of the real for the unreal; rather, it recognizes that the real is 
always constructed, its temporal plot always “told,” our understanding of it 
a matter of tone and perspective. The manipulation of time is precisely what 
is achieved when Moses stops the clock’s gears (and the narrative action) 
in The Hudsucker Proxy, an act that saves the life of Norville by halting his 
suicide fall mid-plunge. Moses not only disrupts the illusion of continuity 
but also breaks out of character to address the audience: “Strictly speaking, 
I’m never s’posed to do this.” This action reinforces the artificiality of The 
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Hudsucker Proxy as well as demonstrates the way texts are controlled by a 
creator, their trajectory formed and altered at a whim.
Remembering the Past
If, as Hutcheon argues, postmodern texts are preoccupied with history, it is 
also true that they are obsessed with memories. Postmodern film exploits 
the vast resources of the spectator’s remembrances, using memories and 
recollections of the past to construct meaning in the present. Memory and 
reality interconnect in the process of ordering experience. Giuliana Bruno 
claims that Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) constructs an environment 
in which the status of memory has changed from “Proustian madeleines” 
(those somewhat distant, involuntary, and sensory-induced recollections) 
to “photographs,” arguing that the postmodern viewer, like the replicants 
in Scott’s film, is “put in the position of reclaiming a history by means of 
its reproduction.”6 Yet Bruno’s contention is not simply a symptom of the 
postmodern malaise: history has only ever been accessible in its reproduc-
tion, whether it is in the oral narratives of the ancient eras or the literary 
texts that followed. What has changed has been the dominant mechanism 
for reproducing the past. Changes in technology have altered the way we 
access the past, though such changes have not revised the nature of history. 
History is, and has always been, a story.
Since the 1960s Hollywood films have exhibited an increasing stylistic 
self-consciousness, referencing cinema history and quoting from other styles. 
Carolyn R. Russell declares that The Hudsucker Proxy “is the most insistent 
delegate in a progression of films which synthesize the aesthetic past. In virtu-
ally every frame of the film may be recognized what theorist Fredric Jameson 
has termed ‘the imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and 
voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a new global culture.’”7 By 
drawing on Jameson, Russell is arguing that The Hudsucker Proxy must fall 
into the category of the apolitical, for Jameson believes postmodern texts to 
be incapable of engaging with the “real” world and its concerns. But to recall 
past representations does not mean to do so without irony or critical com-
mentary. And surely a film such as The Hudsucker Proxy—blatantly drawing 
from the “dead style” of screwball comedy and from the mythology of Frank 
Capra, which represents the “museum of a new global culture”—operates 
at a critical level with regard to these allusions.
The Hudsucker Proxy’s parody of the screwball comedy and the works 
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of Capra demonstrates a rather acute satire on the values associated with 
each of these representational forms. One of the reasons for the critical and 
commercial failure of The Hudsucker Proxy was that it parodied a genre 
that is committed to romantic ideals, upsetting and alienating the genre’s 
supporters. The Coens are less interested in the emotional connotation of 
convention and more concerned with the memory of pleasure they expect to 
find in their audience’s consciousness. But the Coens deny their audiences 
this enjoyment by taking their film in contrary and subversive directions. 
Joel and Ethan Coen use the genre in order to examine its processes, expose 
its traditional agendas, and highlight its inherent ideologies. The intention 
is not to ridicule the genre but to identify the manner by which the screw-
ball comedy reflects ideology, history, and meaning. The Coens’ modern 
screwball comedy works somewhat like the revisionist western, in which 
quotation, referencing, and allusion can be used to identify ideological and 
social change. The variations between the original and the reworking are 
indexes of changes in attitude toward certain cultural values. The Coens’ 
satirical view, as represented in The Hudsucker Proxy, dismisses many of the 
assumptions made in past representations of the screwball genre and chal-
lenges the values that these assumptions support. Through the use of irony, 
parody, and subversion, the Coens expose these older representations to 
scrutiny and examine the ideologies upon which they were constructed.
The Hudsucker Proxy may at first seem to be a film that is overloaded 
with the components of other film styles, genres, and intertexts, but its al-
lusions are not limited to cinema. The intertextual web is strung in such a 
way that connections are drawn from a series of diverse sources. Early in 
The Hudsucker Proxy, when Norville finally secures employment, he is sta-
tioned in the mailroom at Hudsucker Industries, situated in the bowels of the 
enormous company building. The mailroom is a darkly cavernous chamber 
that extends beyond the line of sight; its walls are lined with a labyrinthine 
arrangement of steel pipes representing the nerve center of a bureaucracy that 
winds its way to the executive offices. Norville’s instructional introduction to 
the mailroom is a litany of double-talk and bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo. The 
scene is an allusion to Brazil (Terry Gilliam, 1985), a film in which a bureau-
cratic slip leads to a series of nightmarish misadventures. Director Gilliam 
constructs a universe that is so belabored with organization that it becomes 
distinctively chaotic, as symbolized by a visual design that is both futuristic 
and primitive. The relationship between The Hudsucker Proxy and Brazil 
can be extended further to include George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
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Orwell’s novel itself deals with a dystopian view of a future society ruled by a 
totalitarian regime. The state’s stubborn reliance on a deficient bureaucracy 
is a major theme that reappears as the central motif in Gilliam’s film. As this 
winds back to The Hudsucker Proxy the connections established through the 
suggestive imagery provide an immediate referent, or cinematic shorthand. 
For Jim Collins this is evidence of the “ever-expanding number of texts and 
technologies” that is “both a reflection of and a significant contribution to 
the ‘array’—the perpetual circulation and recirculation of signs that forms 
the fabric of postmodern cultural life.”8 Postmodern films are replete with 
cinematic allusions that identify the usable past as a means of establishing 
a relationship with history and its various representations.
The Hudsucker Proxy relies on intertextual cues for meaning to be made. 
But it is not merely a film made from the pieces of fictional texts and narra-
tives from popular culture. This is illustrated when the Coens acknowledge 
“legitimate” history in their ironic summoning of the cultural memory of 
J. Edgar Hoover. When Chief (John Mahoney)—the editor of Amy’s (Jen-
nifer Jason Leigh) newspaper—barks the angle on a report about Hoover, 
he proposes the question, “When will he marry?” The contemporary image 
of Hoover details a moral crusader who concealed his own homosexual-
ity and transvestitism in a climate when such a lifestyle was considered a 
moral deviation. The irony generated by the historical setting of the film 
and the viewer’s contemporary knowledge creates a particular intertextual 
connection based upon a double meaning. This example also highlights the 
responsibility of the viewer/reader to complete the text, to exercise its ironic 
component. Intertextuality substitutes the disputed author/text dynamic (in 
which the author is considered to be the sole creator of a text’s meaning) with 
one between reader and text, where meaning resides within the discourse 
of history itself. John Biguenet refers to a verbal exchange in Les Enfants 
du paradis (Marcel Carné, 1945), similar in context to the J. Edgar Hoover 
quip, that recalls Monsieur Ingres’s aptitude for playing the violin—which 
was apparently dreadful (Biguenet suggests an analogy to Jack Benny and 
his fiddling). But Biguenet believes this reference is almost lost on modern 
audiences who know little of this cultural memory: “Unfortunately for Mar-
cel Carné, he hitched his wagon to a dying horse. With each passing year, 
those lines of the film become ever more obscure.”9 And the same applies 
with the reference to Hoover in The Hudsucker Proxy. Its cultural currency 
will inevitably fade as the memory becomes more and more irrelevant to a 
contemporary audience. Notwithstanding, it remains a historical document, 
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a remembrance that constructs a bridge to the past and sets up a reference 
that alternates two perspectives of history: one based in 1959 (the film’s 
setting) and the other in 1994 (the year of the film’s release). Meaning, and 
in this case its apparent irony, is consequently drawn from a history that 
competes with itself.
Intertextuality in the films of Joel and Ethan Coen places a significant 
emphasis on the viewer’s ability to “complete” the text by drawing from an 
accumulation of remembered texts—“the array.” The Coens’ films privilege 
the cine-literate viewer because the majority of references are drawn from 
film history. Barton Fink (1991) depends to some extent on an audience that 
can recognize the characters’ connections to moments and themes in The 
Tenant (Roman Polanski, 1976) and The Shining (Stanley Kubrick, 1980). O 
Brother, Where Art Thou? initially presupposes an understanding of Homer’s 
The Odyssey but also draws on the films of Preston Sturges. And The Hud-
sucker Proxy relies squarely on a knowledge of the screwball comedy genre 
and the films of Frank Capra. However, to not recognize these sources does 
not mean that a viewer will find the Coens’ films unfathomable. And to rec-
ognize only cursory details of the textual allusions may be exactly enough for 
one to engage critically with the material. A knowledge and understanding 
of Capra’s films and his legacy is not limited to those viewers who have seen 
his work. Capra has a prominent cultural position, and it may be enough 
for a spectator to be familiar with television’s The Simpsons (1989–) or a film 
like Hero (Stephen Frears, 1992) or even Mr. Deeds (Steven Brill, 2002) to 
know Capra and his mythology. The vast network of intertextuality is not 
just constructed upon a familiarity with particular key texts but rather with 
all texts that in one way or another refer to myriad other representations.
Every text depends on some prior knowledge of other representations. 
A genre is developed and canonized via the recognition of particular tropes 
and repeated conventions. The Hudsucker Proxy is the Coen brothers’ most 
literal genre film in its recreation of the themes, conventions, and iconogra-
phy of the screwball comedy. Thomas Schatz defines the screwball comedy 
as a genre that supports the status quo even when “it’s espousing enlight-
ened capitalism or enlightened marital-sexual relationships,” and the genre 
is often distinguished by the romantic communion of a disparate pairing 
having overcome initial antagonism. Schatz also maintains that the morality 
of the characters is inspired by conventional ideals: “the hero’s or heroine’s 
traditional values and attitudes are attributed directly to a rural background 
and small-town sensibilities.”10 The application of this limited taxonomy to 
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The Hudsucker Proxy is fairly straightforward: Norville arrives from Muncie, 
Indiana (read small-town America, or “Chumpsville,” according to Amy), 
and falls in love with Amy, who at the outset despises him as a corporate buf-
foon (read initial antagonism) but ultimately falls for his humble and modest 
value system based on humane ideals (read traditional values and attitudes). 
That The Hudsucker Proxy falls so neatly into the category of a genre film is 
significant to the Coen brothers’ parodic agenda. Parody requires the anchor-
ing of the narrative in an identifiable context to cue the spectator to a regulated 
conventional viewing pattern. Once established, the genre’s assumptions are 
challenged using devices rich in irony and subversion, reestablishing textual 
structures (employing the genre’s typical conventions and tropes) in a way 
that favors scrutiny rather than commemoration.
Identity, memory, and history are affected and informed by “the array”; 
our understanding of the world is dependent upon our recycling of remem-
brances and ideas through disparate media. Almost every episode of The 
Simpsons is made up of a series of allusions that seek to parody old television 
programs, previous films, past representational forms, and popular culture. 
For a viewer of The Simpsons, the infamous television debates between 
Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy are remembered through their parody 
in an archived Duff beer commercial. In this commercial Nixon’s legendary 
nontelegenic image is lampooned. But the sequence also carries a satirical 
edge as visual imagery is shown to supersede the mechanics of the demo-
cratic process. The Coen brothers tap into that same vein that recognizes 
that history is accessed through its images and its remembered texts. And 
these memories can provide a site for ironic reworkings that interrogate the 
past, its texts, and their ideologies.
Challenging the Past
Michel Foucault notes that “where there is power, there is a resistance, and 
yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exterior-
ity in relation to power.”11 Foucault suggests that the tools used to maintain 
power are often the same tools used to challenge it. This notion identifies 
the reason why parody is often considered a conservative transgression: 
it works within the parameters of the targeted texts and styles in order to 
criticize and satirize them. Unlike the more artistically bold avant-garde, 
parody uses conventional (conservative) methods of representation to chal-
lenge authority. To recall the past (or history) through its representations 
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not only reminds us of the past but can also challenge its stake to legitimacy 
and authenticity. To question a narrative technique, a narrational tool, or a 
genre’s convention is a challenge to history that is dependent on these textual 
devices for its ordering and existence. Subverting the representations of the 
past is precisely the approach taken by postmodern texts to strip these prior 
works of any pretense that there is a single acceptable history.
The subversive potential of parody presupposes that adopting the 
methods of past texts and frameworks is not the same as endorsing them. 
The Hudsucker Proxy, far from being a mere recreation of the traditions of 
the screwball comedy, is a parody of Capra and his typically maudlin films 
detailing naïve populist tales of social achievement. Capra’s films are often 
recalled as overtly hopeful parables celebrating the ability of humanity to 
overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles. The derogatory term “Cap-
racorn” is regularly applied to his films, the expression carrying with it the 
implication of a rose-colored, idealistic optimism of society and human 
nature that ignores the harsh realities of a quotidian existence. Capra’s films 
advocate values related to the New Deal: compassion for one’s neighbor, the 
notion that happiness does not come from wealth but from social interac-
tion, and the belief that no conflict is unsolvable.
Despite being Capraesque in its production, The Hudsucker Proxy is not 
reflective of the typical values espoused in Capra’s films. In the tradition of 
postmodern representation, the Coens merely install these motifs to then 
subvert them. Like Capra’s hick-in-the-big-city films—Mr. Deeds Goes to 
Town (1936) and Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939)—the Coens’ film 
has “Muncie-boy” Norville arrive fresh off the bus from Indiana. Like the 
characters in these two Capra films—Longfellow Deeds (Gary Cooper) and 
Jefferson Smith (James Stewart)—Norville is then exploited by a vile capitalist 
system that values money above morality. And, as in Capra films, the hero 
of The Hudsucker Proxy eventually succeeds over the perils of corruption. 
Yet, unlike the protagonists of Mr. Deeds Goes to Town or Mr. Smith Goes to 
Washington, Norville is not beholden to any value system nor is he trying to 
expose and overturn corruption. He is a fool whose own ignorance (rather 
than idealism) makes him ripe for exploitation. Norville is not the repository 
of democratic optimism that characterizes Capra’s heroes. Deeds and Smith 
are “little men” battling against an unscrupulous system of venality; relying 
on righteousness and morality, their idealism will endure as a beacon in 
the murky fog of duplicity. Norville, however, is an ambitious but dimwit-
ted business major from a backwoods university. He falls into an executive 
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position as a corporate stooge and then insipidly discards his moral code 
to abuse his newly acquired power. The intertextual relationship between 
The Hudsucker Proxy and Capra is characterized by subversion rather than 
celebration, representing a challenge to Capra’s historical articulations of 
ideology and culture.
Todd McCarthy bemoans The Hudsucker Proxy’s pastiche structure and 
artificial aesthetic: “rehashes of old movies, no matter how inspired, are 
almost by definition synthetic, and the fact is that nearly all the characters 
are constructs rather than human beings with whom the viewer can con-
nect.” He then observes that “[Tim] Robbins calls to mind Gary Cooper and 
James Stewart, but there’s no authentic sweetness or strength underneath 
all his doltishness to make him seem like a good guy the audience can get 
behind.”12 McCarthy’s problem here is that he finds The Hudsucker Proxy to 
be a “rehash” of old movies, only to then point out the very specific distinctions 
between the Coens’ film and those prior texts. McCarthy’s inconsistency—The 
Hudsucker Proxy is just like those earlier films but also specifically different—is 
crucial, as it suggests not that Robbins fails to reflect authenticity but rather 
that authenticity has been subverted. The Coens install a pseudo-Capraesque 
hero to then distort him into an image that suits their critical agenda. The hope 
of the New Deal no longer prevails in the image of the protagonist. Rather, 
the Coen brothers focus on the incompetence exemplified in contemporary 
corporate collapse and failure. The Hudsucker Proxy is a period film (its set-
ting being 1959), but it illustrates the very real concerns of a modern society 
disillusioned by corporate greed and incompetence.
Capra’s films are highly effective in stimulating the interests of mass 
audiences while presenting a sense of “American-ness” and the values of 
democracy in a stubbornly pleasing format and structure. With The Hud-
sucker Proxy the Coen brothers transplant the format of the Capra film to a 
somewhat unwelcome setting, and through techniques involving repetition 
and difference, they scrutinize the common values of the Capra film. The 
protagonists in Capra’s films are sympathetically drawn to maximize viewer 
empathy. Characters such as Longfellow Deeds and Jefferson Smith are 
idealistic and principled; they are symbols of integrity in a world constantly 
imperiled by corruption. The casting of upstanding Hollywood leading men 
Gary Cooper and James Stewart, respectively, confirms Capra’s agenda. 
With The Hudsucker Proxy, Joel and Ethan Coen are less righteous in their 
representation of Norville and more sly about his motives. He does not 
come to New York with the noble intention of political reform but rather to 
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find success in the vibrantly capitalistic system. Smith and Deeds are “holy 
fools,” men whose guileless naïveté beckons exploitation, though ultimately 
their earthy homespun values triumph. But Norville is no holy fool, merely 
a self-centered simpleton. When he “graduates” to the executive floor of the 
Hudsucker organization, he quickly adopts attitudes of superiority, made all 
the more disreputable by his status as a corporate stooge. By disrupting the 
typical order of the Capra universe the Coens also expose what is essential 
to the design of his films and illuminate their elemental ideologies. Capra’s 
films promote an idealized vision of a democratic system that flourishes with 
the simple application of “old-fashioned” values imported from the small 
towns where such tenets typically prosper. But Vito Zagarrio qualifies this 
assessment by noting that Capra’s “populism, sticky-sweet optimism, and 
paternalistic demagogy [mask] a superficial democracy that fades, on close 
examination, into a substantially reactionary attitude.”13 The Coens engage 
critically with the historical setting of Capra’s films—a context conceived 
in the shadows of New Deal politics—by employing postmodern tools that 
reject the conventional desire to fuse the diversity of cultural experiences 
into a single and universal myth. The Hudsucker Proxy promotes the notion 
that the messages of Capra’s films are now irrelevant, their values no longer 
tenable, and a reclamation of their political ideals impossible. The transition 
of values in the films of Capra to those in The Hudsucker Proxy provides an 
index to the changes in values in the political and social climate of American 
culture. The historical investigation in The Hudsucker Proxy resides not in 
the accuracy or authenticity of its setting, design, or positioning of events 
but rather in its examination of the values found in the texts it parodies.
Deconstructing the Past
By adopting the modes of the past the Coens parody their assumptions, ex-
posing their contrivances and making their frameworks transparent. Parody 
is a useful tool for prying open the insularity of canons and exposing the 
constructedness of these typical forms of representation. With The Hudsucker 
Proxy the Coen brothers are adopting a mode of self-conscious storytelling. 
Their use of distancing narrational modes such as voice-over explanations 
in Raising Arizona (1987) and The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001), the direct 
address prologue in Blood Simple (1984) and The Big Lebowski (1998), and 
the rigid application of generic convention in Miller’s Crossing (1990) serve 
to foreground textual construction by calling attention to the “telling” of a 
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story. To insist on exposing the devices of construction immediately cues 
the viewer to the fictionality not only of that text but of all texts. Then, to in 
turn subvert convention demonstrates how all texts, history included, are 
malleable, unstable, and contingent.
The first meeting between Amy and Norville is perhaps the best example 
of the Coen brothers’ attention to exposing the frameworks of construction 
in The Hudsucker Proxy. Amy first encounters Norville in a coffee shop, an 
event that is narrated by two cab drivers, Lou (Joe Grifasi) and Benny (John 
Seitz). The cabbies observe Amy as she undertakes a number of crafty decep-
tions in order to obtain Norville’s attention. It will be her first involvement 
with her “mark” and the beginning of a series of newspaper stories in which 
she will ruin his reputation—a direct allusion to Capra’s Mr. Deeds Goes to 
Town. The Coen brothers are acutely aware that the sequence in the coffee 
shop is a mass of narrative clichés. They seek to satirize the constructedness 
of the classic Hollywood film by drawing the viewer’s attention—through 
the verbal narration of Lou and Benny—to its obvious conventionality. 
As Amy sits down at the counter next to Norville, the cabbies begin their 
interpretation of events:
Lou: Enter the dame.
Benny: There’s one in every story.
The pair of narrators go on to describe every move made by Amy to secure 
Norville’s attention:
Lou: She’s looking for her mark,
Benny: She finds him,
Lou: She sits down and orders . . .
Benny: . . . a light lunch.
Lou and Benny then describe the various schemes and scams employed 
by Amy in her attempt to obtain Norville’s attention and sympathy. When 
he finally heeds Amy’s presence, the cabbies cynically narrate the action in 
perfunctory tones:
Benny: He notices,
Lou: She’s distressed,
Benny: He’s concerned.
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The scene detailing Amy’s swindle is composed of one long take and is framed 
from across the counter using Lou and Benny’s point of view, which mirrors 
the audience’s visual perspective. Lou and Benny are therefore stand-ins 
for the enlightened viewer who is aware of the methods of storytelling in 
the films of Capra that The Hudsucker Proxy mocks. The purpose of self-
reflexivity in postmodern representations is to denaturalize classical modes 
of representation and to expose them as cultural constructions. What is 
significant in this scene is the way Joel and Ethan Coen expose the formulaic 
construction and the suspension of ethics (Amy’s intentions are noble but 
her method is deceitful) that contribute to the pleasing idealism typical of 
Capra’s narratives. The Coens investigate the processes of the social comedy 
with a satirical agenda to study its devices and examine how meaning is 
constructed in relation to ideology. And it is to this point that the Coens are 
not merely revisiting a tired old genre but rather scrutinizing its methods, 
exploring its limitations, and exposing its agendas.
The films of the Coen brothers are ironic in that they must be approached 
at two levels: one that identifies the meaning of the text and the other that 
recognizes the tools that are applied and employed to construct these 
meanings. With The Hudsucker Proxy, the Coen brothers are transparent 
in revealing the means of their own production. The film’s diegetic world 
is paused as Moses the janitor places the handle of his broom into the cogs 
of the Hudsucker building clock in a literal deus ex machina. The result of 
this action in formal terms is beholden to both postmodern representation 
and to the art of parody. Parody is a form that ridicules the assumptions of 
texts and genres by making obvious the elements that conventionally remain 
implicit and hidden in their frameworks. Actors break out of character 
and refer directly to cinema’s institutions in a move that unsettles the text’s 
illusory status, undermining the portentousness of the parodied represen-
tation. The speech Moses gives is ironic in that he addresses it directly to 
the viewer as if aware of the fictionality of the text that surrounds him. The 
dialogue is unpretentious in its affable character and seemingly homespun 
wisdom and also ambiguous in that it hints that even Moses is not sure 
how the story will play out. The character of Moses stands in for skeptical 
spectators who are mindful of the artifice of all texts and thus already find 
themselves one step removed from its conceits. Hutcheon observes that 
“self-reflexivity points in two directions at once, toward the events being 
represented in the narrative and toward the act of narration itself. This is 
precisely the same doubleness that characterizes all historical narrative.”14 
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The Coens are aware of the processes that produce meaning, and, it seems, 
they demand that their audiences be aware of this too.
Foregrounding the tools of storytelling at the surface of a text exposes 
more than simply the methods of production; it also provides an insight into 
conventional modes of expression. Postmodernism invokes a study of history 
as a textual entity in which ideology is apparent in the means of production. 
The use of reflexiveness, such as that exemplified by Moses and his direct 
address and halting of time in The Hudsucker Proxy, is the type of technique 
that challenges the inconspicuous character of fiction and history as implied 
by the realist narrative. An undeniable relationship with history is estab-
lished by the way such distancing techniques direct the viewer’s attention 
to the conventions and latent ideology reflected in the seamlessness of the 
textual design. It is perhaps no wonder that postmodern representations are 
often mistakenly considered to be copies, imitations, plagiarized texts, and 
empty pastiches of older forms. In order to adopt a system that installs and 
foregrounds a narrative structure so as to scrutinize it, these representations 
must reflect the texts they critique. Postmodern interrogation and decon-
struction, whether through artistic representation or critical inquiry, have 
exposed the manner by which meaning is constructed in fiction and history. 
By revealing the modes of production one can investigate how particular 
kinds of representation support values and sustain assumptions that exist 
within a culture. To recognize how history is constructed is to discern how 
meaning is made, how truth is achieved, and how the underlying ideologies 
that compel certain truths to the forefront may be deemed “authentic.”
Where self-reflexivity and historical actuality clash, a study of represen-
tation becomes an exploration of the way in which narratives and images 
arrange how we view our culture and how we assemble our ideas of self, 
in both the present and the past. Postmodern films like those of the Coen 
brothers resonate with a valid and vital critical approach to modern life 
that typically carries a significant political agenda. Their films seek to make 
meaning out of past representations using parody and irony as tools in the 
deconstruction of ideology. As a result, the works of Joel and Ethan Coen 
are often censured for their refusal to engage with the “real,” reproached 
for failing to commit to moral or ethical positions, and chastised for their 
perceived unreality. But it is more likely that the Coens themselves are 
victims of a critical establishment that considers techno-visual documenta-
tion—film and television—to be unworthy conveyers of the past. The Coen 
brothers do know too much about film: they know enough to recognize the 
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conceits of its processes and to detect and challenge the values that these pro-
cesses are designed to sustain. Despite its artificial visual design and hyper- 
affected performances, The Hudsucker Proxy proves to be a text that engages 
in historical inquiry. Through its exploration of the tenets of older forms of 
representation by way of parodic attitudes and ironic inversions, the Coen 
brothers’ film examines New Deal politics, the mythology of small-town 
America, and the realities of contemporary corporate principles and prac-
tices. Not bad for a film that is merely about other films.
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“a homesPun murder story”
Film Noir and the Problem of Modernity in Fargo
Jerold J. Abrams
Winner of two Academy Awards (Best Screenplay and Best Actress, Frances 
McDormand), the Coen brothers’ film Fargo (1996) is a noir detective story 
set in Brainerd, Minnesota, and Fargo, North Dakota, about a working-class 
man gone bad. Jerry Lundegaard (William H. Macy) is an unethical car sales-
man who swindles customers into unnecessary extras like “TruCoat” sealant 
at the last minute of sale. Married to a Martha Stewart–like housewife whose 
father, Wade (Harve Presnell), is wealthy, Jerry is exploding with debt and 
anxiety. Frantically he looks for a way out and finds one. He hires two thugs, 
Carl Showalter (Steve Buscemi) and Gaear Grimsrud (Peter Stormare), to 
kidnap his wife, Jean (Kristin Rudrüd), and extract a ransom from his rich 
and miserly father-in-law. But everything goes horribly wrong when the 
thugs kill first a police officer (after being pulled over for improper plates 
and then trying to bribe him), then two witnesses to the police officer’s 
murder, then Wade, and finally even their hostage, Jean—making Jerry not 
only a kidnapper but an accessory to murder. Enter Marge Gunderson (Mc-
Dormand), chief of police in Brainerd. She is smart, level headed, and very 
pregnant, all bundled up and trudging mightily through the deep snow and 
freezing cold of the Upper Midwest. Hot on the criminals’ trail, she tracks 
down her men: first Grimsrud, while he is shredding Carl’s body in a wood 
chipper, and then Jerry as he tries to skip town.1
Film Noir in the Snow
What sets Fargo apart as a film noir is how it transforms the genre and 
how, in doing so, it uniquely reveals the existential isolation of the human 
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condition within modernity. The tension at the center of modernity, which 
all great noir reveals, is this: civilization’s advance, in the name of libera-
tion from the dark ages of the past, brings with it alienation, social frag-
mentation, and individuation that dissolves first the community, then the 
family, and ultimately even our sense of humanity. To achieve these effects 
of fragmentation, individuation, and alienation, noir is typically set in the 
very modern context of a glass-and-steel cityscape, with its concrete jungle 
and towering buildings that dwarf and isolate the individual. This sense of 
alienation can be enhanced, however, when a director moves the noir story 
out of the modern city and into a more premodern setting—thus alienating 
(even more) the modern characters from their modern home.
One of the first major films to do this was Touch of Evil (Orson Welles, 
1958)—widely regarded as the last of the classic noir films—which enhanced 
the danger of noir by relocating the action from the traditional Los Angeles 
cityscape to Mexico. Fargo uses a similar technique by placing its action 
in the icy reaches of North Dakota and Minnesota, in the middle of a ter-
rible snowstorm—thereby greatly increasing the noir sense of danger and 
alienation. In Fargo, we get that creepy feeling of being in a place that is not 
a place, a sort of nowhere. It is true, of course, that Brainerd and Fargo are 
real cities—hardly nowhere—and there are, in fact, some known cultural 
landmarks within the film, interspersed here and there, but these are few 
in number, and forgettable. What dominates the screen instead is a total 
whiteout, blankness everywhere, with virtually no human effect whatsoever, 
and this serves to reveal our modern existential situation in an entirely new, 
but still very noirish, way.
MacIntyre’s Critique of Modernity
In order to fully understand this effect, however, first we need to know 
something about the problem of modernity. Any of several theories might 
help us in this task, but one seems especially relevant here, namely that of 
contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, particularly the view he 
develops in his major work, After Virtue. The reason is that both MacIntyre 
and Fargo (each in different ways) present a picture of the contemporary 
world in which individual subjects seem to float listlessly in a void, unable 
to communicate with one another, unable to connect.
The key to grasping MacIntyre’s view is what he calls his “central thesis.” 
“A central thesis then begins to emerge,” he writes. “Man is in his actions 
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and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.”2 
This view is quite different from the modern (and fairly common) view of 
human nature as rational agent. But MacIntyre’s definition has an important 
advantage. All cultures tell self-reflective stories about origins and future 
hopes, and this cultural trait not only predates the rise of reason in ancient 
Greece but also, in some sense, is more fundamental because it is more 
formative of human experience: all children must learn stories in order to 
become functioning human beings. As MacIntyre puts it, “Mythology, in 
its original sense, is at the heart of things.”3
In philosophy this idea goes back to Plato and Aristotle, who claimed 
that a culture requires a myth to give it coherence and to help ground the 
ethical and intellectual virtues.4 In ancient Greek times, the myth was Ho-
meric and centered around the gods of Olympus: Zeus, Hera, and so forth. 
But as time transformed the ancient world into that of the Middle Ages, 
Christianity replaced Homeric mythology. Much like Homeric mythology, 
this new story provided a kind of cultural plot, with various characters to 
be played by real human beings. We are these characters. “We enter human 
society,” writes MacIntyre, “with one or more imputed characters—roles into 
which we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order 
to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses 
to them are apt to be constructed.”5 These roles are the roles within a fam-
ily and all the various positions within a society. People learn these roles 
and become integrated into the story—or they do not—and become either 
happy and healthy or misguided and tragic. And once again, these patterns 
of success and failure are all part of the dominant mythology.
But what is not part of the mythology, and what marks a fundamental 
distortion of the story, is the Enlightenment project of progressive modern-
ization. Modernity is such a problem because it reacts against mythology 
altogether and attempts to dislocate humans as pure reason from history 
as narrative. The reasons for this cultural reaction are well known.6 And no 
one would argue that the dominant story of the times did not have some 
serious problems. But rather than fixing it from within, Enlightenment 
thinkers somehow found a way to actually step outside the story—almost 
like characters leaping off the page. Once outside, these characters then 
proceeded to shred the text into little pieces. And with that, the story was 
gone—it just stopped, midsentence, halfway through. The characters then 
quickly declared their own autonomy from the story and their freedom 
to determine their own individual lives. The revolution began with René 
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Descartes (“I think, therefore I am”) and extends up through the existen-
tialists, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, and the current wave of postmodernity.7 
It was Descartes who declared himself an absolute “I” without any context, 
and it was Sartre who, three centuries later, went even further and declared 
the self an absolute “nothingness,” entirely free of context, free of virtually 
all determination whatsoever.8
The problem with all of this is that the post-Enlightenment thinkers 
or “characters” seemed to lose their way. They are now lost and confused, 
wondering what is going on. They don’t know where they are in history, 
and many of the most reflective thinkers, people who should know what’s 
going on, have declared their world meaningless, nihilistic, and absurd. But, 
of course, it is absurd, MacIntyre seems to be saying. The characters have 
destroyed their story, the one thing that could give their lives meaning and 
coherence. And now they (or, rather, we) are suffering the consequences, 
the foremost among them being an increasing sense of isolation, because 
the characters are drifting ever farther and farther apart. Even the most 
basic modes of communication are affected. The once proficient players on 
the Shakespearean stage of the world no longer remember their lines and 
have lost all their cues and any feeling for one another upon that stage—all 
of them “unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words,” 
as MacIntyre puts it.9
The End of Modernity in Fargo
Fargo captures this descent into modernity and postmodernity perfectly, being 
far more than just a “homespun murder story,” as the tagline goes, where “a lot 
can happen in the middle of nowhere.” For the philosophically minded viewer, 
Fargo is a masterpiece study in darkness and nihilism at the height of moder-
nity, set brilliantly against the premodern—almost prehistorical—background 
of a total whiteout, with no cityscape, no culture, barely even a road.
The first scenes of Fargo set the context: the middle of a blizzard that 
looks like it has always been blowing. Few cinematic shots achieve this sense 
of the abyss: no color, no life, no horizon, no bearing up or down, very sin-
ister, very dangerous. The world is blotted out in white. Winds blow from 
seemingly every direction, like a primordial chaos that sucks everyone and 
everything down into its void. And the moment the mind attempts to impose 
some kind of order on the abyss, even the ground appears as a form of flux: 
water only temporally hardened, but which could give way at any moment to 
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swallow the characters whole. Barely anything can live in this violent white 
chasm, and nothing is moving except the Heraclitean flux itself: lifeless, 
soulless, completely inhuman and mechanical—a blur of parts in a whirl, 
without Aristotelian formal causality, without any teleological end. The world 
is reduced to its bare, essential background, a kind of ontological tabula rasa 
upon which human experience can make no lasting impression.
Against this frozen, desolate scenery, the characters appear as products 
of a world that should never have been: wild-eyed contorted monsters, all 
bundled up in layers and Gortex, with gigantic gloves and “moon” boots. 
Like horrified astronauts on a failed mission, they float in a cold and lifeless 
abyss. Director Joel Coen also notes this point, how “everyone [is] bulked 
up, moving in a particular way, bouncing off people.”10 In this way, Fargo 
captures brilliantly the modern idea of Cartesian monadic selves. Each is 
ontologically splintered off from every other, drifting this way and that, 
hovering anywhere without geometrical context. Each one is solipsistically 
trapped inside a self, with access only to individual thoughts—and no real 
capacity to communicate.
In fact, the characters of Fargo speak to one another as though across the 
universe, hoping something gets through, desperate to connect. But virtu-
ally every conversation falls to pieces in a babble of frustration, in exactly 
the same way MacIntyre describes the late modern condition: everyone 
“unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words.” Jerry, for 
example, barely utters a coherent thought throughout the entire film. In 
his meeting with Carl and Grimsrud (at the very beginning), he shows up 
an hour late because of miscommunication. Then the criminals ask about 
the crime, but Jerry makes no sense. So Carl and Grimsrud just give up on 
ever understanding him.
After the meeting, Jerry arrives home to find his icy father-in-law, Wade, 
watching a hockey game. Jean asks Wade if he is staying for dinner, to which 
Wade only grunts back. Jerry (whimpering) tries to talk with Wade about the 
game, but again Wade only offers primate growls, as though Jerry isn’t even 
there (in his own home). Later in the film, after Jean has been kidnapped, 
Marge interviews Jerry twice. In the second interview, Jerry simply cannot 
speak. He just starts spitting out half-sentences and subordinate clauses, 
nothing organized, no subjects and verbs in a row—like a robot whose 
wires have been crossed and who is now melting down from the inside. 
Realizing the malfunction, Jerry simply runs away, much to Marge’s shock: 
“He’s fleeing the interview.”
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A similar breakdown in communication happens with Carl. He virtu-
ally begs his co-criminal Grimsrud for conversation. But Grimsrud says 
nothing.
Carl: Would it kill you to say something?
Grimsrud: I did.
Carl: “No.” First thing you’ve said in the last four hours. That’s a, 
that’s a fountain of conversation, man. That’s a geyser. I mean, 
whoa, daddy, stand back, man. Shit, I’m sittin’ here driving, doin’ 
all the driving, man, whole fuckin’ way from Brainerd, drivin’, 
just tryin’ to chat, you know, keep our spirits up, fight the 
boredom of the road, and you can’t say one fucking thing just in 
the way of conversation.
Still, Grimsrud says nothing, only smokes and stares out the window. Carl 
cannot take it. The pressure is building: “Oh, fuck it. I don’t have to talk either, 
man. See how you like it. Just total fuckin’ silence. Two can play at that game, 
smart guy. We’ll just see how you like it.” Again, Grimsrud says nothing. But 
Carl, against himself, cannot stop talking (he needs it too badly), even to the 
point of affirming in pain his new rule of quietude: “Total silence.”
Desperate for some human connection, Carl phones an escort service 
and takes a prostitute out for an evening at the Carlton Celebrity Room. He 
wants to feel normal: to be out with a woman, enjoy a show, have a drink, and 
then go home with her. But Carl fails with the waiter, who just ignores him 
when he asks for a drink. Then he fails again with the prostitute. She asks him 
what he does, but he avoids the question. Then he asks her about her job.
Carl: So, uh, how long you work for the escort service?
Prostitute: I don’t know. A few months.
Carl: Ya find the work interesting, do ya?
Prostitute: What’re you talking about?
The look she gives him is cold and ostracizing. She thinks he is being con-
descending or ironic. But Carl is really just lonely and actually empathizes 
with this woman. They have things in common: both are in the middle of 
nowhere and stuck in jobs that are immoral and illegal; both are lonely. Un-
like Carl, however, she does not want to connect; that’s not why she’s there. 
So all they can do is have sex. And even that goes wrong, as they are broken 
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apart by the Native American car mechanic and ex-con Shep Proudfoot 
(Steven Reevis), who beats Carl senseless without explanation while Carl 
tries desperately to talk to him rationally (a total failure).
Meanwhile, Marge closes in on her suspects. But seemingly at every turn 
her conversations break down as well. In the middle of the night, Marge 
gets a call from an old school acquaintance (barely a friend), Mike Yanagita 
(Steve Park). On the phone he is loud, ecstatic, and generally “off.” In fact, 
even after realizing he has woken her up, Mike does not want to let her go. 
Nevertheless, Marge, good soul that she is, agrees to meet him for a drink, 
while on her assignment. During their conversation, however, Mike can 
hardly put a sentence together, and just a few minutes into their reunion, 
he completely implodes (weeping).
Mike: Oh, and then I saw you on TV, and I, uh, remembered, ya 
know . . . I always liked you . . .
Marge: Well, I always liked you, Mike.
Mike: I always liked you so much. . . .
Marge: So, Mike, should we get together another time, ya think?
Mike: No. I . . . I . . . I’m sorry! I shouldn’t a done this. I thought we’d 
have a really terrific time. . . .
Marge: It’s okay, Mike.
Mike: You were such a super lady. And . . . I been so lonely. [now 
sobbing]
Marge is baffled. So she goes to get some fast food at a drive-thru, but 
again—the metaphor is plain—she simply cannot communicate. Angrily 
she leans out the window of her car and yells into the speaker, “Hello!” But 
no one answers. Like Mike Yanagita in the preceding scene, Marge is also, 
in her own way, a solitary voice yelling out of the abyss for help and receiv-
ing no answer.
Something similar happens with Marge in the squad car. She has caught 
Grimsrud, and he now sits in the back of the prowler, handcuffed. And it is 
here that we get the conversation that we’ve been waiting for: protagonist 
and antagonist finally meet. Marge initiates: “So that was Mrs. Lundegaard 
on the floor in there? . . . And I guess that was your accomplice in the wood 
chipper. . . . And those three people in Brainerd. . . . And for what? For a little 
bit of money. There’s more to life than a little money, you know. . . . Don’t 
you know that? . . . And here ya are, and it’s a beautiful day. . . . Well, I just 
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don’t understand it.” I think most people probably listen to this conversation 
and love Marge all the more for her seemingly unlimited goodness. But I see 
Marge very differently. I see her as morally good but intellectually vacant; 
instrumentally strategic, but entirely unreflective about the human condi-
tion. In fact, for all of her sweetness and light, I think Marge is actually sort 
of a dark character. Allow me to explain.
Marge has finally come to the end of her detective quest, and now all that 
remains is to nab Jerry (which is easy enough). But here her real detective 
quest has only begun. The questions have changed. Before they were: Who 
killed the police officer? Who killed the passersby? That case is over. But 
now notice how new questions appear in Marge’s mind. Who is this man, 
Grimsrud? Why this? Why here? Marge is plainly bothered. So she asks him. 
But Grimsrud says nothing. She tries to explain to him that there are good 
things in the world that should have deterred him. But again, nothing. It’s 
strange, Marge has this almost childlike innocence about her—as though 
it’s all just so simple and easy to be good and such an awful lot of trouble 
being bad. Of course, Marge isn’t stupid by any means. She just isn’t very 
deep or reflective. Grimsrud may not be very deep either. But the chilling 
look he gives Marge in lieu of a reply says it all. She is good, and he is evil. 
But he can “see,” and she cannot.
We recognize this absence in Marge throughout the film—McDormand 
lets it out bit by bit. But here it comes out clearly, especially in her remark 
about beauty. “And here ya are, and it’s a beautiful day.” The remark is strange 
for two reasons. First, Marge appeals to something even a criminal can un-
derstand. And we know Grimsrud appreciates beauty. Remember that he 
kills his hostage, Jean, for screaming during a soap opera he is watching on 
television. Having no coherent story of his own, Grimsrud immerses himself 
in romances about beautiful people in beautiful places (even if the shows 
are lowbrow and low budget). These are things long gone in Grimsrud’s 
world, or perhaps they never existed at all. But now they provide him his 
only escape in an empty world. What’s more is that Grimsrud, contrary to 
what Carl thinks, does indeed need to connect—and feels just as isolated 
and out of touch with the world as Carl. But, being a criminal, he cannot 
(and should not) trust Carl and knows not to talk openly with him. Only 
cheap and beautiful soap operas, with their tired paint-by-numbers dialogue, 
hold Grimsrud together. So when they are disrupted, in the form of Jean 
Lundegaard screaming mad with a bag over her head, Grimsrud has no 
choice but to kill her—and the ransom be damned.
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In an earlier scene in the same cabin, Carl—having just taken their 
hostage—cannot get the television set to work. Grimsrud sits at a cheap TV-
dinner-style table in clothing that very clearly resembles that of Alex Delarge 
(Malcolm McDowell) in A Clockwork Orange (Stanley Kubrick, 1971). The 
product of a hyper-modern and alienated dystopia, Alex is a murderer and 
a rapist who is deeply sensitive to beauty, especially the classical music of 
Ludwig von Beethoven. The parallel to Grimsrud is obvious. He, too, is deeply 
dualistic. He is a murderer on the one hand but a deeply sensitive soul on 
the other—and his only refuge is beauty. In this scene, there are, however, 
no beautiful soap operas on television, only “snow”—the chaotic scrambled 
mess of black and white pixilation on the screen. Snow blasting about outside, 
and snow blasting about inside—and on both sides, Carl simply won’t stop 
jabbering and yelling nonsense. As he’s banging his fist on the television to 
stop the snow, the camera slowly moves in on Grimsrud to a close-up, while 
soft and sad music plays in the background. We now look into Grimsrud’s 
eyes. There’s an incredible pain there, an incredible isolation, with real fear 
of the world. Grimsrud understands the modern condition—if only margin-
ally (and perhaps better than Alex Delarge). And we understand him. But 
Marge just doesn’t see it. “I just don’t understand it,” she says. In response 
Grimsrud shifts his eyes slowly back to her, breaking once again from his 
cold hard exterior to give her a look that says it all—and one Marge doesn’t 
even notice. If Marge doesn’t understand Grimsrud, he understands her, 
and he understands, too, that she will always remain on the surface of this 
world, without any deep understanding.
Second, and more importantly, Marge’s appeal to beauty is interesting 
because she is just plain wrong. It is not, in fact, “a beautiful day.” Actually, it 
is what most people, I think, would call a terrible day, and Grimsrud knows 
this. It’s Brainerd, Minnesota, in the dead of winter, freezing cold—and 
dangerous by anyone’s account. It’s not the worst day imaginable, but it’s 
pretty bad. So Marge’s claim is simply false: the day is, in fact, horrible, and 
in more specific aesthetic terms, it is what philosopher Immanuel Kant refers 
to as “dynamically sublime,” or violently overwhelming.11 Grimsrud rightly 
recognizes his world as sublime. But Marge cannot see it. She just looks out 
of her blinkered eyes at a world that isn’t there. Nor can she figure out why 
other people, like Grimsrud, cannot see what she sees.
But why does Marge not understand all of this? After all, she is a police 
officer, so she ought to know something more about the nature of crime 
than merely how to follow relatively easy clues to catch a low-end criminal. 
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Perhaps she doesn’t understand the darkness because it’s so far away from 
her—because her goodness is so complete that she might not get it if she 
tried. But for the philosophically minded viewer, this is not enough. And 
perhaps all that can be said in her defense is that her ignorance is at least, in 
some sense, Socratic. Marge knows that she does not know (and she knows 
that she should).
The absence of reflection in Marge becomes particularly evident when 
we contrast her character with its heritage. In terms of the genres of noir 
and detective fiction, Marge is quite unique because she never examines the 
structure of her own mind, or really anyone else’s. All great detectives do 
this because they know that the internal mad labyrinth of the mind mirrors 
the external mad labyrinth of crime. And the detective, being half crimi-
nal—which makes it possible to catch the criminals—knows this isomor-
phism and knows, too, that mastering his (or her) own mind is essential to 
mastering the criminal minds of others. But Marge seems entirely oblivious 
to herself, in particular, and to the human condition, in general—and she 
seems to have little to no interest in studying either.
Her detective analysis remains entirely shallow, almost lifeless. She gath-
ers facts and data and follows the information to the villain. But not even 
once do we suspect she is a philosophically deep detective like Edgar Allan 
Poe’s Monsieur C. Auguste Dupin in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” 
or Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, each of whom analyzes 
both the nature of crime and the structure of their own mad and brilliant 
minds. Marge has none of this philosophical madness, and none of what 
Poe in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” calls “acumen” (philosophical 
imagination), that would allow her to picture herself as the villain and to 
explore the darker reaches of the criminal mind—figuring out what he will 
do next, figuring out where his motivations and weaknesses lie. And we 
never even once see her sink deep within herself, like Holmes or Dupin, 
to lose herself completely in what the philosopher Charles S. Peirce called 
“musement”—searching for the solution to the riddle in the form of a new 
logical abduction.
Immediately after recognizing that she does not understand Grimsrud, 
or the nature of crime, Marge just lets her inquiry drop. Case closed. Noth-
ing more to do except retreat home to a kind of happy ignorance, having 
no interest at all in the criminal profile. A master sleuth, by contrast, would 
never let this go—not something as puzzling as this. The problem should 
plague Marge, as she sits up in bed with her husband Norm (John Carroll 
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Lynch). It should plague her through the night, but it doesn’t. Instead, Marge 
sleeps well and comfortably. She is neither disturbed nor perplexed. 
The main reason Marge cannot engage in this deeper level of detec-
tive analysis is that she is one of us, common folk, unlike, say, a Dupin or a 
Holmes, or a hard-boiled detective, or even James Bond. These detectives are 
always leery of the stable world of love and marriage, family and children. 
Such things would only cloud their judgment, and they know that. So in 
order to maintain their detached sense of objectivity, they stay single and 
cut off from the regular population. But not Marge: she immerses herself 
in the world. She is a loving, caring wife to Norm and a soon-to-be mother. 
She believes in humanity (unlike the noir detective), and she believes the 
world is good. She has real hope for the future, for her baby, perhaps for all 
of us—and, of course, we love her for it.
But we must also struggle with Marge’s lack of depth as she faces the 
darkness of the human soul, in the form of Grimsrud. For we as viewers 
cannot leave things as unresolved as Marge does. Nor can we just look away 
from Grimsrud and Carl, Jerry and Shep Proudfoot, after a simple case is 
solved. And this is the real brilliance of Fargo—how the Coen brothers, right 
at the moment one mystery is solved, shift a deeper mystery back onto the 
viewers, as though they were detectives as well, watching privately in the 
theater, trying to figure out what went wrong with all of these characters. The 
viewer feels compelled at film’s end to pick up the investigation right where 
Marge leaves off and follow the thread through the labyrinth of crime that 
leads from the world of Fargo straight back into the human condition.
The Deeper Crime in Fargo
This deeper case is, to be sure, far more abstract and difficult to solve. But 
there are leads in the works of philosophers of modernity, like MacIntyre. 
Of course, MacIntyre may not think of his books as detective manuals. Yet 
conceiving of them in that way loses nothing of his main point and gains us 
much in simplicity. So, taking some license with MacIntyre’s overall philo-
sophical view, we may consider the modern project on a par with a crime.
It all went down in the seventeenth century. In order to save the human 
condition, Pure Reason climbed to the top of the Ivory Tower and put two 
in the chest of Mythology. What Reason did not know, however, was the 
secret of Homer: that “mythology is at the heart of things.” Reason did not 
know that the two were the same: mythology was the human condition. 
222 Jerold J. Abrams
Reason had, in effect, killed both: the human condition and the myths by 
which it lived. And for a long time, no one seemed to notice. The death was 
slow, and the clues were vague. So it’s only been in recent years that culture 
has begun to examine the crime scene. One of the examinations has taken 
place in that same Ivory Tower, where philosophers like MacIntyre have 
studied the strange indexes of contemporary society: monadic subjects 
floating in an abyss without a story and struggling to communicate but 
failing miserably.
Another examination, and one I think just as valuable, has taken place in 
American cinema, especially the genre of film noir—where, again, monadic 
subjects appear to float without a story and struggle to communicate, all too 
often failing miserably to connect. At the height of this genre tradition, it has 
been the Coen brothers’ film, Fargo, that has taken these themes of social 
detachment, the ontological void, and unscripted babblers to an extreme. 
So, while, on one level, Fargo certainly is a “homespun murder story,” on 
a deeper level Fargo is also a philosophically spun murder mystery, shot 
through with ontological and historical significance, a truly masterful study 
of the crisis of the modern age, in all its coldness, all its isolation, and its 
absence of human connection.
Notes
 I am very grateful to Mark Conard for reading and commenting on an earlier draft 
of this essay, and to Elizabeth F. Cooke and Chris Pliatska for discussions on the films 
of the Coen brothers. Of course, any mistakes that remain are my own.
 1. Throughout the essay, I will use the names of the characters as we know them. 
So, for example, we know Jerry Lundegaard by his first name, Jerry. But we know Gaear 
Grimsrud by his last name, Grimsrud.
 2. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 201.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Plato, for example, argues in The Republic (Books II and II) for a new mythology 
(to replace Homer): the “Myth of the Metals.” This was his own “noble lie.”
 5. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 201.
 6. The causes of the Enlightenment are well documented, for example, the Protes-
tant Reformation, the rise of a reading public with the Gutenberg press (ca. 1450), the 
rise of science, and political problems within the Catholic Church.
 7. MacIntyre writes, “For a self separated from its roles in the Sartrean mode 
loses that arena of social relationships in which the Aristotelian virtues function if they 
“A Homespun Murder Story” 223
function at all. The patterns of a virtuous life would fall under those condemnations of 
conventionality which Sartre put into the mouth of Antoine Roquentin in La Nausée 
and which he uttered in his own person in L’Être et le néant. Indeed the self ’s refusal 
of the inauthenticity of conventionalised social relationships becomes what integrity is 
diminished into in Sartre’s account.” After Virtue, 191.
 8. MacIntyre also writes, “And the self so detached is of course a self very much 
at home in . . . Sartre’s . . . perspective, a self that can have no history. The contrast with 
the narrative view of the self is clear. For the story of my life is always embedded in the 
story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and 
to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present 
relationships.” After Virtue, 205.
 9. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 201. MacIntyre offers two solutions to the problem 
of modernity: “Nietzsche or Aristotle?” Either we go forward with the Enlightenment 
project that began with Descartes and proceeded through Kant and that finds its ultimate 
and logical end in the nihilism and overman visions of Nietzsche, or we return to the 
ancient world of the virtues: we return to the story and finish it up. But either way, we 
cannot stay as we are. MacIntyre argues for the latter.
10. Joel Coen, “Interview with Lizzie Francke,” in Joel and Ethan Coen: Blood Siblings, 
ed. Paul A. Woods (London: Plexus, 2002), 15.
11. Richard Gilmore makes a similar point in “The American Sublime in Fargo.” 
Gilmore writes, “I read the Coen brothers’ movie Fargo as a lesson in the ways of the 
American sublime. I take as my starting point on the sublime Kant’s discussion of it in 
the third Critique.” Gilmore, http://mcrae_tony.tripod.com/american_sublime_in_fargo 
.htm. In Critique of Judgment the philosopher Immanuel Kant distinguishes the beauti-
ful, or that which gives harmony to the mind, from the sublime, or that which over-
whelms and disturbs it. There are two kinds of sublime: mathematical (the experience 
of quantitative infinity) and dynamical (the experience of violent and overwhelming 
force). See Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (1790; Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1987).
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“What kInd of man are you?”
The Coen Brothers and Existentialist Role Playing
Richard Gaughran
Uncertain of All
Filmmakers Joel and Ethan Coen presuppose an absurd world. This state-
ment implies more than casual viewers might imagine. True, many images 
in their films appear at first merely strange, incongruous, or even repulsive. 
An infamous scene from Fargo (1996) comes to mind: hired kidnapper 
Gaear Grimsrud (Peter Stormare) crams the corpse of his partner, Carl 
Showalter (Steve Buscemi), into a wood chipper, strewing his shredded re-
mains across the snow. For what purpose? If Grimsrud wants to dispose of a 
murder victim, he could surely conceive a better plan than this one, which, 
rather than concealing evidence, spreads it widely. We can only conclude 
that Grimsrud, having a corpse on his hands, noticed a wood chipper and 
whimsically brought the two together. Why not?
“Why not?” is the shrug of characters who have concluded that theirs 
is a world without value, devoid of meaning, absurd. The very first words 
ever uttered in a Coen brothers film, the voice-over that opens Blood Simple 
(1984), heralds the world we enter in any of the brothers’ films. It is a world 
divested of value, a world without hierarchies of meaning, a world of stark 
individual freedom:
The world is full of complainers. But the fact is, nothing comes with 
a guarantee. I don’t care if you’re the Pope of Rome, President of 
the United States, or even Man of the Year—something can always 
go wrong. And go ahead, complain, tell your problems to your 
neighbor—watch him fly.
Now in Russia, they got it mapped out so that everyone pulls 
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for everyone else—that’s the theory, anyway. But what I know about 
is Texas. . . . And down here . . . you’re on your own.
We hear these words as we visually encounter the bleak, endlessly flat terrain 
of west Texas. The published screenplay refers to the landscape as “broad, 
bare, and lifeless.”1 A similar landscape provides the backdrop for the Coen 
brothers’ second film, Raising Arizona (1987), though the setting is somewhat 
west of Texas, “‘an Arizona of the mind,’” as Ethan Coen has remarked, and 
the film itself is more broadly comic than Blood Simple.2 The flat, desolate 
terrain of the northern plains figures prominently in Fargo, and in No Coun-
try for Old Men (2007) the filmmakers return to west Texas, with much of 
that film’s action playing out against, again, a desolate landscape. In each of 
these films the setting becomes a character at least as important as any of 
the human characters. In the Coen universe, we’re not always specifically in 
Texas, but we are “down here,” and we are indeed on our own.
In a groundbreaking essay on film noir—a cinematic style that, as 
many have remarked, the Coens have revived and revised in much of their 
work—Paul Schrader says of typical noir settings, “When the environment 
is given an equal or greater weight than the actor, it, of course, creates a 
fatalistic, hopeless mood. There is nothing the protagonists can do; the city 
will outlast and negate even their best efforts.”3 Schrader mentions the city, 
since, as he argues, noir settings are typically urban. Although the Coen 
brothers do feature cities in some films, they, like other neo-noir filmmakers, 
set their works in various locales. Furthermore, their merging of noir style 
with western settings in the films mentioned here exemplifies their genre-
bending and genre-combining tendencies. In any case, the prominence given 
to rural settings in these Coen brothers films generates the same hopelessness 
of which Schrader speaks. Characters act freely, but they do so within an 
uncaring, hostile environment, that is, within the realm of the absurd.
If human beings “enter the new world naked,” as poet William Carlos 
Williams says, “cold, uncertain of all / save that they enter,” an individual 
life remains unfixed and undefined until the individual creates an identity 
by taking action to bring the self into being.4 The existentialist writer Jean-
Paul Sartre has famously encapsulated existentialism in the phrase “existence 
precedes essence,” which means, he says, “that, first of all, man exists, turns 
up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself.” Sartre says 
further, “Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. Such is the first 
principle of existentialism.”5 Robert G. Porfirio, in an important essay that 
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makes connections between existentialism and film noir, puts it this way: 
“Existentialism is an outlook which begins with a disoriented individual 
facing a confused world that he cannot accept. It places its emphasis on man’s 
contingency in a world where there are no transcendental values or moral 
absolutes, a world devoid of any meaning but the one man himself creates.”6
If, however, our efforts are doomed to failure, and if we can refer to no 
fixed human nature in creating ourselves, how do we choose how to act and, 
thereby, what to become? Numerous characters within the Coen brothers’ 
canon dramatize precisely this dilemma. As we shall see, the individual’s at-
tempt to construct a viable identity within a hostile environment emerges as 
a major theme within these films, as does confusion concerning the identity 
of others. Even the titles themselves refer to identity, some obliquely, such 
as Barton Fink (1991), The Hudsucker Proxy (1994), and The Big Lebowski 
(1998), and others quite directly, such as O Brother, Where Art Thou? (2000) 
and especially The Man Who Wasn’t There (2001), the central Coen brothers 
work exemplifying the dilemma of existentialist self-creation.
Albert Camus, the writer who has most pointedly articulated a theory 
of the absurd, explains, particularly in The Myth of Sisyphus, that awareness 
of absurdity grows from the individual’s realization that the mind and the 
world are out of sync. We plan for the future, raise children, erect build-
ings, accumulate possessions, but to what end? We all die. Our best efforts 
are doomed. Eventually, all trace of our existence fades into oblivion. With 
enough time, even the greatest among us will be forgotten. Camus defines 
the absurd in these terms: “It is that divorce between the mind that desires 
and the world that disappoints, my nostalgia for unity, this fragmented 
universe and the contradiction that binds them together.”7
The world offers no clues for us, and “man feels an alien, a stranger.”8 
When one acknowledges this state of affairs, according to Camus, the first 
question is that of suicide. Since life provides no meaning, why live it? Since 
we know our future—death—why not embrace that future now and get it 
over with? Camus, of course, does not recommend suicide but an accep-
tance of our condition—that we are alive and desire to remain so, though we 
cannot. Although we are condemned to death in advance, we revolt against 
this inevitable future. “That revolt gives life its value.”9 Furthermore, since 
death is real—in fact, it is the only reality—there is no eternity for us, yet 
we have freedom within the earthly sphere: “Now if the absurd cancels all 
my chances of eternal freedom, it restores and magnifies, on the other hand, 
my freedom of action.”10
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Characters within the Coen brothers’ films routinely engage in revolts 
against their doomed status. Of course, some do not. In Fargo, for example, 
Marge Gunderson (Frances McDormand), with her husband Norm (John 
Carroll Lynch), still clings to a belief in a priori normalcy, so in the wake 
of a bloodbath she shakes her head in disbelief, saying, “I just don’t un-
derstand it.” Marge Gunderson anticipates the bewilderment of Sheriff Ed 
Tom Bell (Tommy Lee Jones) in No Country for Old Men when he reflects 
on the nihilistic violence he has investigated. Concerning the lack of ap-
parent motive or feeling within the killer of a fourteen-year-old girl, Bell 
says, “I don’t know what to make of that. I surely don’t.” At the film’s end, 
he explains his reasons for retiring from law enforcement: “I feel over-
matched. I always figured when I got older God would sorta come into my 
life somehow. He didn’t.”
Within the Coen canon, the Gundersons and Sheriff Bell stand as ex-
ceptions. Most characters, whether consciously or not, stage revolts against 
their condition. Some of the rebels become nihilistic, such as those who 
adopt the “why not?” shrug mentioned earlier. Sartre refers to this attitude, 
expressed by Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s character Ivan Karamazov (though 
Sartre imprecisely attributes it to Dostoyevsky himself): “‘If God didn’t exist, 
everything would be possible.’ That is the very starting point of existential-
ism.”11 Around the same time Sartre’s words appeared in English, this idea 
found expression in the words of the Misfit, a fictional creation of American 
short-story writer Flannery O’Connor. Because the serial killer of “A Good 
Man Is Hard to Find” finds no reason to believe in God, he concludes, “It’s 
nothing for you to do but enjoy the few minutes you got left the best way 
you can—by killing somebody or burning down his house or doing some 
other meanness to him. No pleasure but meanness.”12
Murdering a partner, having your wife kidnapped or murdered—all 
of this has as little or as much value as anything else. And a wood chip-
per on the premises might afford an amusing way to top off a murder. 
Thomas S. Hibbs says that nihilistic comedy turns inhumane atrocity 
“into quasi-comic expressions of exuberant amoral energy.”13 Yet nihil-
ism does not always manifest itself in physical violence. Attorney Miles 
Massey (George Clooney) of Intolerable Cruelty (2003) is not likely to 
bloody his hands, but he does engage in nihilistic legal maneuvering. 
When offered the bromide that “life is compromise,” he responds, “That’s 
death. Challenge, struggle, and, of course, ultimate destruction of your 
opponent—that’s life.”
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Creating a Self
As the Dude (Jeff Bridges) reminds us in The Big Lebowski, however, nihil-
ism can be exhausting. Nihilistic action, furthermore, while expressing the 
freedom of one individual—the nihilist as murderer, kidnapper, or shyster 
lawyer—denies freedom to others. Many of the characters within the Coen 
brothers’ canon step away from extreme nihilistic destruction, or temper 
their nihilism, by attending to the creation of a unique self. They fashion a 
style or a mask by means of which they can face the abyss.
Some of these self-inventions are consciously designed to deceive others, 
to be sure. John Goodman’s Charlie Meadows in Barton Fink, for example, 
poses as a traveling salesman, when in fact he has nefarious intentions. The 
same actor’s Big Dan Teague does something similar in O Brother. If Maude 
Lebowski (Julianne Moore) can be believed, her father, Jeffrey Lebowski 
(David Huddleston), is not what he seems. The thieves in The Ladykillers 
(2004) masquerade as musicians in order to deceive their landlady. Yet many 
Coen characters adopt a style, an aggregate of gestures, principally in order 
to define themselves, to create an identity.
In his essay on film noir, Schrader, speaking of the valueless universe 
presupposed by noir, says, “In such a world style becomes paramount; it is 
all that separates one from meaninglessness.”14 So it is in the Coen brothers’ 
films. In The Big Lebowski, when Sam Elliott’s character, the Stranger, says, “I 
like your style, Dude,” he is acknowledging that Jeff Bridges’s character has 
invented a self appropriate for a time and place. When the Dude answers, 
“I dig your style too, man. Got a whole cowboy thing goin’, ” he’s returning a 
compliment and greeting a fellow role player, though these characters have 
adopted quite distinct roles. Walter Sobchak (John Goodman), in the same 
film, uses an entire palette of gestures—his obsession with the Vietnam 
War, his profession of Judaism, and so on—with which to define himself. 
Hibbs accurately summarizes the nostalgic nature of Walter’s self-creation: 
“Walter wants to have an identity, to define himself in relation to a way of 
life, a tradition, larger than himself.”15 Donny (Steve Buscemi), however, 
has failed to take on a personal style, whether rooted in the past or not. He 
acts instead as a befuddled chorus for the distinct characters, and so he dies, 
finally reduced to ashes blown by the wind.
Although few Coen characters are as insubstantial as Donny, some 
attempt to squeeze themselves into roles that don’t quite fit. So it is with 
Barton Fink (John Turturro), who imagines himself as a tortured artist 
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advancing high principles within a crass world of commercialism. The pose 
is pretentious, and it reveals ignorance of the surrounding world, the world 
he claims to serve. So he resorts to hero worship, until he is disillusioned 
by the drinking and violent behavior of W. P. Mayhew (John Mahoney). In 
another way, Fargo’s Jerry Lundegaard (William H. Macy) takes on an ill-
fitting role. A car salesman, he assumes the pose of criminal mastermind, a 
mismatch that initiates a series of violent acts.
Hats, Pomade, and Hair Nets
Miller’s Crossing (1990) calls particular attention to characters’ styles. Ac-
cording to Barry Sonnenfeld, the film’s director of photography, Ethan Coen 
said to him, “It should be a handsome movie about men in hats.”16 To be sure, 
in answering an interviewer’s question about the significance of hats in the 
film, particularly the hat blown by the wind as the opening credits begin, 
both brothers later downplayed the significance of the image, insisting that 
hats are not symbols, that there is “no need to look for deep meanings.”17 
Yes, sometimes a hat is just a hat, yet the hats of Miller’s Crossing do have 
significance.18 Besides evoking a period when men habitually wore certain 
styles of hats, the hats function as props in the process of self-creation. And, 
like the biblical Samson’s hair, they correspond to personal power.
One of the film’s early scenes shows us Tom Reagan (Gabriel Byrne) as 
he seeks to retrieve his hat, which he lost gambling the night before. Tom has 
lost more than money; he has lost a part of himself, so the film begins with 
his attempt to piece himself back together. Later Tom tells Verna (Marcia 
Gay Harden) that he had a dream about losing his hat. She romantically 
completes the dream, saying he chased after it and it turned into something 
beautiful. But he corrects her, saying he didn’t go after it: “Nothing more 
foolish than a man chasin’ his hat.” Tom is arrogantly boasting here. We have 
already seen him chase the hat, an action that acknowledges the unfixed, 
fluid nature of identity and the need for vigilance in constructing a personal 
style. Perhaps no scene better illustrates the significance of hats than when 
Leo (Albert Finney) beats Tom, pummeling him down a corridor and two 
flights of stairs, as Tom, rather than fighting back, desperately attends to his 
hat, sometimes losing hold of it and then snatching it again. The scene ends 
with Leo’s contemptuous but simultaneously sympathetic gesture of flipping 
Tom’s hat onto Tom’s chest as he lies beaten and breathless.
Miller’s Crossing is indeed a handsome movie about men in hats. A man 
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with his hat in place feels sure of who he is or, more to the point, feels sure 
of the man he has created for himself. So, when the boxer Clarence “Drop” 
Johnson (Mario Todisco) appears wearing a hat ridiculously small for him, 
Tom makes fun of him, relating hat size to mental capacity, in effect dimin-
ishing the threatening figure’s power. Johnny Caspar (Jon Polito) also relates 
hats to power, complaining that he’s being ill treated and disrespected by 
others, in his complaints continually using the expression “high hat” as a 
metaphor for the condescension he so resents.
To reiterate, these characters implicitly acknowledge that life lacks mean-
ing. Johnny Caspar delivers the first extended speech of the film, comically 
referring to the need for a code of ethics. These are gangsters talking, so his 
insistence is ridiculous, but he does underscore the arbitrariness of moral 
standards: “Now if you can’t trust a fix, what can you trust? For a good re-
turn you gotta go bettin’ on chance, an’ then, you’re back with anarchy, right 
back in the jungle. That’s why ethics is important, what separates us from 
the animals—the beasts of burden, beasts of prey. Ethics.”
Referring specifically to this speech, Carolyn R. Russell says, “Friendship, 
character, ethics, trust, anarchy—these are concepts which are not stable in 
and of themselves but depend for their meaning upon the consensus of their 
‘user’ community.”19 In other words, values are invented, not given, and the 
self lacks unity and definition until the individual constructs a personal style. 
As Sartre puts it, “To say that we invent values means nothing else but this: 
life has no meaning a priori. Before you come alive, life is nothing; it’s up 
to you to give it a meaning, and value is nothing else but the meaning that 
you choose.”20 A belief system, like a personal style, is a work of art: “What 
art and ethics have in common is that we have creation and invention in 
both cases.”21
In The Rebel, subtitled An Essay on Man in Revolt, Camus refers to the 
types of rebellions we’ve been examining under the heading “Metaphysical 
Rebellion.” Particularly apt in the context of the Coen brothers’ films is his 
discussion of dandyism, an attitude, a style, that grows out of romanticism. 
Camus writes, “Much more than the cult of the individual, romanticism in-
augurates the cult of the ‘character.’”22 Camus discusses the dandy, a specific 
kind of “character,” in these terms:
The dandy creates his own unity by aesthetic means. But it is an 
aesthetic of singularity and of negation. “To live and die before a 
mirror”: that[,] according to Baudelaire, was the dandy’s slogan. It 
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is indeed a coherent slogan. The dandy, is, by occupation, always in 
opposition. He can only exist by defiance. Up to now man derived 
his coherence from his Creator. But from the moment that he con-
secrates his rupture with Him, he finds himself delivered over to 
the fleeting moment, to the passing days, and to wasted sensibility. 
Therefore he must take himself in hand. The dandy rallies his forces 
and creates a unity for himself by the very violence of his refusal. 
Profligate, like all people without a rule of life, he is coherent as an 
actor.23
Men obsessed with their hats are indeed living and dying before a mir-
ror, as are any characters preoccupied with appearance. Within the Coen 
canon perhaps the most obvious dandy, at least in the conventional sense, is 
Ulysses Everett McGill (George Clooney), from O Brother, Where Art Thou? 
He is comically obsessed with his hair and Dapper Dan pomade, a brand 
name that suggests the word “dandy,” as does, even more so, the competing 
brand, Fop, a synonym for “dandy.” Everett rejects Fop, however, insisting, 
“I’m a Dapper Dan man!”
Significantly, though he is in the Bible Belt, surrounded by Christian 
culture and religious practice, even performing gospel songs, Everett point-
edly rejects Christian belief. He calls his companions “fools” for submitting 
to baptism. Other Christians he calls “chumps,” and he calls Christianity a 
“ridiculous superstition.” When Delmar (Tim Blake Nelson) says he looks 
forward to “heaven everlasting” as his reward, Everett dismissively (and comi-
cally) remarks, “We have bigger fish to fry.” Everett, like his model, Homer’s 
Odysseus, stands in opposition to the heavens. He is “skilled in all the ways 
of contending,” as the film’s epigraph, from Homer, says. Everett is staging the 
dandy’s rebellion, setting himself up as a rival to God, as Camus explains:
Romanticism demonstrates . . . that rebellion is part and parcel of 
dandyism: one of its objectives is appearances. In its conventional 
forms, dandyism admits a nostalgia for ethics. . . . But at the same 
time it inaugurates an aesthetic which is still valid in our world, an 
aesthetic of solitary creators, who are obstinate rivals of a God they 
condemn. From romanticism onward, the artist’s task will not only 
be to create a world, or to exalt beauty for its own sake, but also 
to define an attitude. Thus the artist becomes a model and offers 
himself as an example: art is his ethic.24
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For Camus, the dandy’s revolt fails in that it starts with awareness of 
absurdity but ends by positing the self as an absolute, betraying the revolt’s 
origins. The dandy “plays at life because he is unable to live it.”25 Further-
more, the dandy denies the values of others, even while requiring others 
as an audience: “He can only be sure of his own existence by finding it in 
the expression of others’ faces. Other people are his mirror. A mirror that 
quickly becomes clouded, it is true, since human capacity for attention is 
limited.”26 As Tom Reagan says to Leo in Miller’s Crossing, “You don’t hold 
elected office in this town. You run it because people think you run it. Once 
they stop thinkin’ it, you stop runnin’ it.”
Camus’s discussion of the dandy’s dependence on an audience for his 
very existence sheds light on a tendency among Coen brothers characters 
to loudly demand recognition on their own terms, in their own language. 
The Dude insists on his invented identity, pointedly instructing David 
Huddleston’s character, “I’m not Mr. Lebowski; you’re Mr. Lebowski. I’m 
the Dude. So that’s what you call me. That, or Duder. His Dudeness. Or El 
Duderino, if, you know, you’re not into the whole brevity thing.” Similarly, 
Everett is a Dapper Dan man, and he is aghast that anyone would think 
otherwise. Even minor characters become adamant, as does, for example, 
the bank robber George Nelson (Michael Badalucco) in O Brother, who 
cannot abide the name “Babyface.”
Not only is the human attention span limited, as Camus says, but also 
some members of the dandy’s audience consciously attempt to negate his 
existence, refusing to applaud his performance, as it were. O Brother, es-
pecially, develops this theme, particularly when Everett tries to resurrect 
his marriage to Penny (Holly Hunter), who has other ideas. His daughters, 
instructed by their mother, tell him he’s no longer their father, that he’s been 
hit by a train: “Blooey! Nothin’ left. Just a grease spot on the L&N.” Unlike 
Penny’s suitor, Vernon T. Waldrip (Ray McKinnon), Everett is not “bona 
fide,” to which he insists, “I am the damn paterfamilias.” The daughters, 
now known by their mother’s maiden name of Wharvey instead of McGill, 
repeat, “But you ain’t bona fide.”
Many characters in Coen brothers films use a similar strategy to dimin-
ish or even dissolve others. In The Big Lebowski, when Jesus Quintana (John 
Turturro) threateningly swaggers before the Dude, Walter, and Donny, Wal-
ter redefines their rival, diminishing his power over them: “He’s a fucking 
pervert, Dude. . . . Your man is a sex offender. . . . When he moved down 
to Venice he had to go door-to-door to tell everyone he’s a pederast.” Simi-
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larly, in Fargo, Carl Showalter denies the authority of a parking attendant 
by mocking his uniform, reminding him that without it he’s nothing. In O 
Brother, Penny, still resisting Everett, answers a bystander’s question about 
his identity by denying one of Everett’s possible roles and assigning him a 
less dignified one: “He’s not my husband. Some drifter. Some no-account 
drifter.” Throughout these films, the numerous challenges to another’s role 
imply that these characters unconsciously understand the provisional na-
ture of identity. If character is artifice, spun from nothing, then presumably 
anyone can be nudged out of an adopted role into one with less power.
The Man Who Wasn’t There
As mentioned earlier, The Man Who Wasn’t There, more than any other 
Coen brothers film, brings these questions of identity to the fore.27 Billy 
Bob Thornton has said that Joel Coen pitched him the role of Ed Crane by 
saying, “It’s about a barber who wants to be a dry cleaner.”28 The remark’s 
irony and self-effacement aside, it immediately announces the theme of 
existentialist role playing. It also provides an apt transition from previous 
films’ obsession with hats, pomade, and hair nets. As Creighton Tolliver (Jon 
Polito) says, “Grooming, my friend, is probably the most important thing 
in business—after personality, of course.” Tolliver himself is quite proud of 
his toupee, made from human hair, a necessary accessory for the role he 
has fashioned for himself.
Crane and his brother-in-law Frank (Michael Badalucco) are style as-
sistants, so to speak, helping others create their identities. However, Crane’s 
first words inform us that he begins the film with no substance of his own, 
that he’s playing an assigned role in life: “Yeah, I worked in a barbershop. 
But I never considered myself a barber. . . . I stumbled into it—well, married 
into it more precisely.” Not having created an identity for himself, he is a man 
who is not there. He is on the earth—smoking cigarettes, cutting hair—but 
merely existing: “Like the fella says, I only work here.”
As if we need more evidence from the Coen brothers that religion pro-
vides no meaning for these lives, Crane as narrator, giving viewers a sketch 
of his life with Doris (Frances McDormand), announces that the couple went 
to church every week. But he immediately undercuts the point by saying 
they went on Tuesdays, for bingo games: “Doris wasn’t big on divine worship 
. . . and I doubt she believed in life everlasting; she’d most likely tell you that 
our reward is on this earth and bingo is probably the extent of it.”
“What Kind of Man Are You?” 237
In a world without value, humans are nothing, are “not there,” until they 
create themselves. And, Crane, not self-created, just “the barber,” is a wisp of 
a man, invisible to others. As Tolliver says when Crane first visits his hotel 
room, “’Course—the barber. I didn’t recognize you without the smock.”
Crane has much in common with one of his literary origins, Meursault, 
of Camus’s novel The Stranger (1942). The two characters, both narrating 
from prison, do so in a deadpan, laconic manner, a tone that flattens events. 
Meursault, after killing a man for no particular reason—“because of the sun,” 
he later says in court—tells an examining magistrate, “I don’t have much to 
say. So I keep quiet.”29 Crane, still introducing himself in his initial voice-
over, says, “Me, I don’t talk much. . . . I just cut the hair.”
Both characters assume, even if unconsciously, a meaningless universe. 
Crane tells us that his marriage was a ho-hum affair, that it took place only a 
couple of weeks after he and Doris met on a blind date. He doesn’t mention 
love or emotional attachment. He merely says that when he asked Doris if she 
wouldn’t like to know him better before marrying him, she replied, “Why? 
Does it get better?” He then adds, “She had a point. We knew each other as 
well then as now.” Likewise, Meursault recounts his response to Marie when 
she asked him if he wanted to get married: “I said it didn’t make any differ-
ence to me and that we could if she wanted to. Then she wanted to know if 
I loved her. I answered the same way I had the last time, that it didn’t mean 
anything but that I probably didn’t love her.”30
Love and marriage lack meaning for these characters, but so does ev-
erything else. Meursault tells us his response to his boss’s suggestion that 
he relocate to a Paris office: “I said yes but that it was all the same to me. 
Then he asked me if I wasn’t interested in a change of life. I said that people 
never change their lives, that in any case one life was as good as another.” 
Later he says, “Everybody knows life isn’t worth living.”31 Early in The Man 
Who Wasn’t There Crane stares down at a boy’s crew cut and asks Frank a 
question that pertains to more than hair: “You ever wonder about it?” When 
Frank asks him to explain, he says, “I don’t know. How it keeps on coming. 
It just keeps growing.” As Crane’s eyes peer down on a boy’s scalp, his mind’s 
eye gazes at the abyss.
Crane feels a faint desire to step out of this meaningless predicament, to 
make something of himself. Hearing Tolliver sing the praises of dry cleaning, 
Crane says he was “locked up in the barbershop, nose against the exit, afraid 
to try turning the knob.” No doubt motivated by a twinge of hurt pride—he 
says knowledge of the affair between Doris and Big Dave Brewster (James 
238 Richard Gaughran
Gandolfini) “pinched a little”—he turns the knob, beginning with blackmail, 
which opens a door to a series of events that lead to the electric chair, despite 
the fact that Crane is innocent of the crime for which he is executed.
Meursault says that pulling the trigger on the gun that killed an Arab on 
a beach “is where it all started,” and, like Crane, he uses the image of a door 
opening. The four extra shots he fires are “like knocking four quick times 
on the door of unhappiness.”32 Both Meursault and Crane rebel against their 
condition, and though they do so with destructive acts (notwithstanding 
Crane’s misguided and futile attempt to manage a music career for Birdy 
[Scarlett Johansson]), they do define themselves and acquire distinct identi-
ties. After killing Big Dave, Crane notices his transformation and contrasts 
himself with the masses of people on the street: “It seemed like I knew a 
secret, a bigger one even than what had really happened to Big Dave, some-
thing none of them knew. Like I had made it to the outside, somehow, and 
they were all struggling way down below.”33
When Big Dave confronts Crane concerning the blackmail, and when 
Frank turns on Crane at Crane’s trial, they both blast him with a rhetorical 
question meant as an accusation: “What kind of man are you?” The best 
answer to the question is that, like Meursault before him, but unlike the or-
dinary citizens of Santa Rosa, Crane, though bewildered, squarely faces the 
absurdity of existence rather than embracing an illusion about the world. No, 
these absurdist antiheroes are not “normal.” In fact, Meursault is convicted 
in part because he doesn’t demonstrate conventional grief over his mother’s 
death. They are honest about the human condition as they find it, and to 
some measure they take responsibility for their actions. Facing his death, 
Crane says, “I don’t regret anything. Not a thing. I used to. I used to regret 
being the barber.” He could have said, like Meursault, “I opened myself to 
the gentle indifference of the world.”34
Of course, killing another human being is no better a way to forge an 
identity than is suicide. Just as Camus addresses the question of suicide in 
The Myth of Sisyphus, he takes on the question of murder in The Rebel. There, 
Camus concludes that rebellion ending in destruction is illogical because, 
for one thing, a killer denies another’s freedom in the name of freedom. Fur-
thermore, rebellion that takes the form of destruction violates the absurdist 
origins of rebellion. Rebellion, Camus says, “in order to remain authentic, 
must never abandon any of the terms of the contradiction that sustains it.” 
The world’s reality is death, to be sure, but the absurd man refuses “to legiti-
mize murder because rebellion, in principle, is a protest against death.”35
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In The Myth of Sisyphus Camus proposes that Sisyphus, condemned 
forever to roll a huge stone up a slope, is the hero of the absurd. Sisyphus’ 
punishment stemmed from “his scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and 
his passion for life.”36 Rather than attempting any of the strategies employed 
by the characters we’ve examined here, strategies that attempt to unify the 
self and the world, Sisyphus never settles the question of the absurd. He 
doesn’t surrender to death or choose an identity that removes him from his 
ongoing rebellion against death. Camus says that “Sisyphus, proletarian of 
the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched 
condition. . . . The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time 
crowns his victory.”37 Or, as the Dude might say, “Fucking Sisyphus. That 
creep can roll, man.”
Existentialism, with its roots in nihilism, struggles to present a coherent 
ethical system. In fiction, however, Camus presents the character Dr. Rieux, 
from his novel The Plague (1947), as his fullest, most concrete moral exem-
plar. Rieux knows that plague—that is, death inherent in life—always prevails 
in the end. But he is also one of those “who, while unable to be saints but 
refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.”38
Although the Coen brothers present numerous characters that create an 
identity within the context of a world without meaning, the brothers remain 
essentially comic filmmakers, so many of these serious issues “take shape 
as somewhat cartoonish.”39 To be sure, many of the absurd characters are 
entertaining and likeable, and even some of the Coens’ nihilistic destroyers 
are attractive for their defiant energy. Admittedly, however, it is hard to find 
a Dr. Rieux among them, or even a Sisyphus, unless we can imagine him 
ceaselessly rolling his stone while singing the theme from O Brother: “I am 
a man of constant sorrow / I’ve seen trouble all my day.”
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BeIng the BarBer
Kierkegaardian Despair in The Man Who Wasn’t There
Karen D. Hoffman
Like so many of the films of Joel and Ethan Coen, The Man Who Wasn’t 
There (2001) concerns itself with the creation of a character, Ed Crane (Billy 
Bob Thornton), as much as with the telling of his story. As the film’s title 
suggests, Ed is notably absent from his own life. In the world without really 
being a part of it, Ed lives in despair. Taking stoic detachment to an extreme, 
Ed displays so little passion and engagement in life that a mere nod of his 
head constitutes a substantial gesture.
As the film progresses, Ed becomes more aware of the problematic ways 
in which he has failed to take control of his own life and to make choices that 
help him define himself as something other than the ordinary barber that he 
regrets being. Growing more reflective toward the end of his life, Ed finds 
himself “pulling away from the maze” and “seeing it whole.” He progresses 
from what the nineteenth-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard 
characterizes as a lower type of despair to a more reflective kind. In search 
of new possibilities for his life and seeking some type of spiritual growth, Ed 
increasingly escapes despair over his minimal earthly attachments. But he 
does not thereby eliminate despair from his life. Instead, Ed comes to possess 
a type of despair characteristic of Kierkegaard’s self of “inclosing reserve.”1 
As a result, the Coen brothers’ black-and-white, film-noir inspired The Man 
Who Wasn’t There can be read as an existential meditation on despair and 
as a depiction of various types of despairing individuals.
Kierkegaardian Despair
To those who consider despair to be the complete absence of hope, it might 
appear that Ed escapes despair by the end of The Man Who Wasn’t There. But 
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Kierkegaard offers a much richer understanding of despair—an understand-
ing that helps to explain both the kind of despair Ed possesses at the end of 
the film and how this despair differs from the despair that characterizes his 
existence in the earlier scenes.
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard defines despair as a misrelation 
of the self.2 Rather than being a feeling or an emotional state, Kierkegaard-
ian despair is an ontological condition in which the self fails to be what it 
should.3 Because humans are physical creatures, we are necessarily temporal 
and finite. There are limits to what we are and to what we can become. But 
because we are also psychical beings, Kierkegaard believes we possess an 
aspect of the eternal and of the infinite—an aspect that allows us to become 
something more than what we currently are. So we are endowed with pos-
sibility and potentiality. For Kierkegaard, the task we face is one of integrat-
ing the finite, temporal, and necessary actualities of who we are with the 
infinite, eternal, and possible beings we might become. It is in synthesizing 
these various aspects of the self and in relating the physical and psychical 
to this synthesis that individuals actualize and become themselves. This is 
what Kierkegaard means in explaining the human self to be “a relation that 
relates itself to itself.”4 Individuals in despair do not successfully integrate 
and relate these differing aspects of themselves. Thus, they are wrongly 
related to themselves.
Kierkegaard devotes much of Sickness to a discussion of the different 
ways in which persons can be wrongly related to themselves, even if they 
do not realize their error. Just as a person can be sick without realizing it, 
especially if there are no painful physical manifestations of the illness, Kier-
kegaard believes individuals can be in despair without realizing the truth 
of their condition. Indeed, Kierkegaard claims that ignorance that one is in 
despair is its most common form.5
Perhaps because of this, Kierkegaard begins his typology of despair by 
discussing the condition without regard to conscious awareness. That is, 
he discusses the way individuals can be in despair whether they realize it 
or not.
Believing as he does that despair is a misrelation of the self, Kierkegaard 
maintains that individuals are in despair if they live as if they lack any of 
the constituents of the self: finitude, infinitude, possibility, or necessity. In 
discussing the person who lacks infinitude, Kierkegaard explains that such 
a person is lost because he or she has become so completely finitized: “Sur-
rounded by hordes of men, absorbed in all sorts of secular matters, more and 
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more shrewd about the ways of the world—such a person forgets himself, 
. . . finds it too hazardous to be himself and far easier and safer to be like the 
others, to become a copy, a number, a mass man.”6 Kierkegaard explains that 
such persons are “ethically narrow” and may mistakenly define themselves 
in terms of their occupation. Because they are so concerned with being 
what others would like them to be, each fails to become the self he or she 
should be. Instead of fashioning this self by thoughtful carving, despairing 
individuals who lack infinitude grind down all their intricate edges, becom-
ing so smooth as to be indistinguishable from all the others.
The person who lacks possibility reveals similar limitations. Kierkegaard 
contends that such a person is either a fatalist to whom there no longer ap-
pears to be any possibility of becoming someone else or a philistine who 
lacks imagination and for whom everything has become trivial. Failing to 
raise critical questions about the future and about the multiple possibilities 
open to the self, this person essentially settles for the most probable future.7 
As we shall see, Kierkegaard’s descriptions of individuals who lack possibility 
and infinitude seem to describe the Ed that viewers meet in the early scenes 
of The Man Who Wasn’t There.
Introducing Ed
Set in 1949, the film opens with the iconic image of Ed Crane’s profession: 
a barber’s pole. Using the first-person voice-over narration characteristic of 
many noir films, Ed explains that cutting hair is not his chosen profession 
and that he has merely married into it. Ed’s brother-in-law, Frank Raffo 
(Michael Badalucco), owns the shop, where Ed “just cut[s] the hair.”
In contrast to Ed, who says very little throughout the film that is not 
communicated through narration, Frank loves to talk. A simple, corpulent 
man whose ambitions appear to be satisfied by working in the shop he in-
herited from his father, Frank “chews the fat” with anyone who will listen. 
Unfortunately for Ed, most of Frank’s ramblings are inane. As Ed puts it, 
“Maybe if you’re eleven or twelve years old Frank’s got an interesting point 
of view.” But, despite Ed’s dislike of his brother-in-law’s constant chatter and 
in spite of his obvious dissatisfaction with his own life, Ed tells viewers that 
he doesn’t complain. Instead, he appears to passively accept the cards that 
his life has dealt him.
It’s not clear in this opening scene whether Ed believes that he has the 
power to change the direction in which his life is going. When Frank reads 
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from the newspaper that “the Russians exploded an A-bomb and there’s not a 
damn thing we can do about it,” he calls attention to the fact that sometimes 
acceptance of an undesirable outcome is the only option.
But sometimes it is not. And the shot that immediately precedes Frank’s 
comment suggests another possibility: changing one’s life and becoming a 
new man. While Ed’s narration explains how Frank inherited the barbershop 
from his father, the camera focuses in on a picture of the paterfamilias. Beside 
the photo, taped to the frame of the mirror, is an advertisement featuring 
a toned man flexing his muscles beside a caption that promises, “Lend me 
fifteen minutes a day, and I’ll prove I can make you a new man.”
Thus, in an admittedly subtle way, the opening minutes of The Man 
Who Wasn’t There not only establish Ed Crane’s dissatisfaction with his life 
but also raise two possibilities for responding to this dissatisfaction: passive 
acceptance or becoming a new man.
As Ed introduces viewers to the more personal aspects of his life, it ini-
tially seems that he will continue to choose the path of passive acceptance. 
His description of his life takes us to his house, which Ed explains is “okay, I 
guess,” largely because it possesses the proper modern appliances: “an electric 
icebox, a gas hearth, and a garbage grinder built into the sink.”
Ed’s wife, Doris (Frances McDormand), is introduced as something of 
an afterthought, almost as if she is just one of the important fixtures in Ed’s 
house. Ed claims that he and his wife know each other “well enough,” despite 
the fact that (as he admits later in the film) they “had not performed the 
sex act for many years.” Ed offers that they attend church once a week but 
admits that it’s usually on Tuesday night, when Doris likes to play bingo. 
Ed, not surprisingly, isn’t “crazy about the game” but is willing to go if it 
makes Doris happy.
Ed is also willing to make Doris happy by having guests over to the 
house, even though he dislikes entertaining. But permitting guests like 
Doris’s boss, “Big Dave” Brewster (James Gandolfini), and his wife, Ann 
(Katherine Borowitz), to sit at his dinner table is apparently as far as Ed 
is willing to go, for he doesn’t actually act hospitably or engage his guests 
in conversation.
Perhaps because of Ed’s quiet aloofness, Doris appears to have shifted 
her romantic interests from her husband to her boss. At Doris’s dinner party, 
it is Big Dave who seems to step into what would otherwise be Ed’s role of 
host, regaling the others with war stories. Even though these are much less 
interesting than Big Dave believes them to be, Doris appears delighted. Her 
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excessively ebullient laughter leads Ed to correctly surmise that there is a 
deeper cause for his wife’s mirth: Doris and Big Dave are having an affair.
Like his response to so many things in the film, Ed’s reaction to his wife’s 
infidelity is rather passive: he tells viewers that he is not “going to prance 
about it, mind you. It’s a free country.” Once again, it seems to be enough 
for Ed that Doris has found something that makes her happy. He seems to 
accept Doris’s affair in much the same way that he passively acquiesces to 
all the other aspects of his life that he doesn’t much like.
The first few scenes of The Man Who Wasn’t There thus establish that Ed 
merely submissively accepts the life that others have more or less chosen for 
him. As viewers soon discover, Ed began dating Doris when someone else set 
them up on a double blind date. Ed married Doris because she thought they 
should wed. He began cutting hair because his in-laws owned a barbershop. 
Even though he does not particularly enjoy his job, he has made no attempt 
to leave. Indeed, despite the fact that he did not actively choose to become a 
barber, he identifies himself with his finite profession and finite possessions. 
His failure to identify himself with anything that transcends these, coupled 
with the implication that these are now concrete realities that must be pas-
sively accepted, suggests that Ed’s initial despair consists of a joint lack of 
infinity and lack of possibility.
When Kierkegaard writes that one who lacks infinitude has “emasculated 
oneself in a spiritual sense,” he seems to have a character like Ed in mind.8 
Ed doesn’t exercise his agency in the world; he passively acquiesces to others’ 
choices. It seemingly doesn’t occur to him that he can choose to be someone 
other than who he has been. He is, as Kierkegaard puts it, someone who 
permits his self “to be tricked out of its self by ‘the others’” and who fails to 
realize that the goal is to take the raw material of the self and grind it into 
one’s unique chosen shape, not to be the everyman who is “ground down 
. . . as smooth as a rolling stone,” pushed along well-trod paths, guided by 
the will of others.9
Ed seems to exist as a kind of everyman who is no one in particular. 
He doesn’t initially even seem aware of the possibility that he can become 
someone else. Living in the world without exercising his agency in it, Ed is 
absent from his own life and seems to lack a strong sense of self. It is only 
after he realizes that Doris is having an affair—and perhaps sees that she 
has actualized a possibility that Ed didn’t realize existed—that Ed is able to 
consider that perhaps he, too, can make choices that will bring his unique 
self into being and cast it into a different future.
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The Possibility of Becoming a New Man
When Creighton Tolliver (Jon Polito) comes to the barbershop for a haircut 
one day, he brings one possibility of a different life for Ed. Explaining that he 
came to town with the hope of convincing a prospective partner to back his 
venture into the potentially profitable business of dry cleaning, Tolliver laments 
that he will have to return home without the requisite ten thousand dollars.
Perhaps because he wears a toupee and comes to the barbershop at clos-
ing, insisting that he be given a haircut, even though the little hair he has 
doesn’t appear to need to be cut, Tolliver comes across as slightly absurd. 
Even so, Ed finds himself considering the possibility of becoming the man’s 
partner. Through his narration, Ed explains that, although his first instinct 
was that “the whole idea was nuts,” perhaps “that was the instinct that kept 
[him] locked up in the barbershop, nose against the exit and afraid to try 
turning the knob.”
At this point in the film, Ed is beginning to acknowledge the possibil-
ity of changing his life and becoming aware of his own need to do so. But, 
because he lacks a sense of himself and his own desires, he seems capable 
only of perhaps taking on someone else’s dreams—in this case, Tolliver’s. In 
the words Kierkegaard uses to discuss the despairing individual who lacks 
possibility, Ed is still “bereft of imagination. . . . He lives within a certain 
trivial compendium of experiences as to how things go, what is possible, 
what usually happens.”10 Ed wants to make a change, but he seems to lack 
the ability to imagine what kind of change he should make and what type 
of self he should cultivate. He lacks a sense of what is possible, much less 
desirable, for him.
So Ed decides to take on Tolliver’s dream as if it were his own. After a 
visit to Tolliver’s hotel room confirms that the businessman needs only a 
silent partner who wouldn’t have to do anything other than supply the start-
up money, Ed initiates his plan to acquire the needed ten thousand dollars 
by anonymously blackmailing Big Dave with a threat to expose the man’s 
affair with Doris. Although Ed laments the fact that obtaining the money 
from Big Dave will “pinch him,” Ed notes that he was being “two-timed” by 
Doris and admits that “somewhere that pinched a little, too.”
Unfortunately for Ed, Big Dave is smart enough to realize that Tolliver 
must have some connection to the blackmail scheme. Although Dave ini-
tially believes that Tolliver himself is the blackmailer, Dave beats the effete 
salesman into admitting that his newly acquired investment capital came 
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from Ed. Big Dave then calls Ed and tells him it is important that he come 
down to Nirdlingers, the store owned by Big Dave’s in-laws. A man of direct 
action, Big Dave could perhaps respect a cuckold who pummeled his wife’s 
lover, but he cannot comprehend one who resorts to blackmail.
When Ed arrives at Nirdlingers, he finds his wife’s lover seated in a dimly 
lit office, his face hidden by darkness. Big Dave proceeds to ask Ed a question 
that the film itself will attempt to answer: “What kind of man are you?”
Declining to answer Big Dave’s question or to provide any explanation 
for his actions, Ed turns to go. But the larger man attacks him, presses him 
against the glass, and chokes him. When the glass cracks, it is as if something 
inside Ed breaks, too. With one swift, passionless, mechanical jab of his arm, 
Ed stabs his wife’s lover in the neck.11 He watches with stoic detachment as 
the violent Big Dave, whose angry attack on Ed has placed the once tidy 
office in disarray, falls to the ground and dies.
Leaving the murder weapon at the scene, Ed returns home to his sleeping 
wife. Passed out from all the alcohol she consumed at the wedding reception 
they attended earlier that day, she does not realize that Ed has even left the 
house. Continuing his narration from the point at which it was interrupted 
by the phone call from Big Dave, Ed details the events that led to his mar-
riage to Doris, seemingly implying that Ed believes the sequence of events 
that surrounded his betrothal is more significant and worthy of reflection 
than his role in the death of Big Dave.12
Ed’s life takes an unexpected turn when Doris is arrested and incarcer-
ated for the murder of Big Dave. When Ed goes to visit her in prison, the 
scene begins with the camera focused not on either of the main characters 
but on the white line that runs the length of the table, separating inmates 
from visitors. Clearly marked “Do Not Reach Across,” the line serves as a 
reminder that, despite their physical proximity to each other, the Cranes 
cannot overcome the distance between them. Ed is in the process of becom-
ing a new man, though not in the way that he had hoped. Though he, like 
viewers, may not yet realize that Doris will never return home, he is aware 
of the new possibility that he may have to live his life without her.
Had the main character been anyone besides Ed, it might have been 
surprising that this scene is so unemotional. Perhaps to call attention to the 
detached character of the Cranes’ encounter, the Coen brothers add to the 
scene another prisoner, a hysterical young woman who rocks back and forth 
and wails continuously in the background as she meets with her visitor. By 
contrast, Ed and Doris remain impassive.
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In his conversation with Doris, Ed does not admit his involvement in 
Big Dave’s death nor does he indicate that he knows why Doris changed 
the records at Nirdlingers.13 He responds to his wife’s offer to reveal why 
she altered the books by saying that she doesn’t have to tell him anything. 
Having no intention of making any confessions himself, Ed also does not 
appear to have any interest in hearing his wife’s. He seems to prefer that she 
follow his lead by remaining silent.
At this point in the film, Ed has taken a step beyond passive acceptance 
of his unhappy life and has attempted to take advantage of opportunities to 
become a new man. Even though Ed’s ventures have not had the intended 
outcome, he has advanced his agency in the world and thereby begun to 
choose to become the kind of person he would like to be. Although one 
could argue that Ed is, at this point in the film, still despairingly bereft of 
imagination about his future (inasmuch as his pursuit of dry cleaning is 
primarily the adoption of another man’s dream), it is important to note 
that Ed at least acknowledges that a different future for himself is possible. 
Even if the possibilities he attempts to actualize only involve the choice of 
one profession (dry cleaner) over another (barber), and even if Ed has not 
advanced beyond thinking of himself in terms of his profession, the mere fact 
that Ed comes to acknowledge the possibility that he can choose to become 
a different man suggests that he may be ready to move beyond the despair 
characterized by a lack of infinitude or a lack of possibility.14
Ed’s Conscious Despair: A Man of Immediacy 
with Some Reflection
There are additional forms of despair that characterize Ed’s life. Kierke-
gaard discusses these in the section of The Sickness unto Death in which he 
considers despair with respect to conscious awareness. That is, Kierkegaard 
considers how despair appears to persons who have enough of a sense of 
self to realize that they are in despair. Such individuals often do not want to 
be the selves they should become; instead, each wants to become someone 
else, to be the self that someone else has chosen.
At the lowest level, despairing individuals who don’t will to be themselves 
have lives characterized by a kind of immediacy. They define themselves by 
things that are external to the self, such as profession, possessions, reputation, 
or appearance. When they are aware of being in despair, they mistakenly 
believe that their condition is caused by the fact that these externalities are 
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not as they would like them to be.15 They see themselves as subject to the 
vicissitudes of fortune and incorrectly conclude that their external change of 
circumstances, rather than their problematic identification of their particular 
self with contingent externalities, is the source of their newly discovered 
despair. So they wait for their situations to change. If a change occurs, an 
individual may slip back into an unconscious despair and pass up an op-
portunity to cultivate a more authentic self. If the situation does not change, 
and if an individual does not advance to another form of despair, such a 
person typically laments that she will never be herself again, “learns to copy 
others,” and “wishes to be someone else.” Thus, the self of immediacy does 
not know himself; he “quite literally identifies himself only by the clothes 
he wears . . . [and] identifies having a self by externalities.”16
There is an absence of any real self here that seems consistent with 
the characterization of Ed early in the film. He is the man who isn’t there 
inasmuch as he doesn’t seem to have any sense of who he is apart from his 
profession and possessions. He has not chosen to be anyone in particular. He 
wants to be someone else, but only in the minimal sense of having a different 
lifestyle and career. He is not yet ready to choose to be a self in the more sub-
stantial sense, which Kierkegaard refers to as the self in its “eternal validity,” 
apart from all the finite attributes and externalities the self possesses.
As the events of the film unfold, Ed arguably embodies the more intense 
despair that Kierkegaard characterizes as immediacy with some reflection. 
Like Ed, a man living with this type of despair tries to sustain himself against 
the ever-changing winds of fortune by using the “relative reflection that he 
has. . . . He does not become apoplectic when the wind blows, as the immedi-
ate person does; reflection helps him to understand that there is much he can 
lose without losing the self. . . . [But] he has no consciousness of a self that 
is won by infinite abstraction from every externality.”17 He still mistakenly 
believes that something finite is the source of his despair. He does not yet 
fully realize that the problem lies within himself and his failure to make the 
choices that will define him. Although he is able to retain his composure 
when events take an unwelcome turn, he mistakenly believes that all would 
be well if the wheel of fortune would simply turn again.
Ed’s Deepening Despair
Ed hopes that the wheel of fortune will turn in the Cranes’ favor when he 
and Frank hire an expensive out-of-town attorney, Freddy Riedenschneider 
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(Tony Shalhoub), to defend Doris. Riedenschneider reinforces Ed’s decision 
to remain silent about the facts surrounding the case: “Keep your trap shut. 
I’m an attorney. You’re a barber. You don’t know anything.” The irony, of course, 
is that Ed knows everything about Big Dave’s death and that, since he hardly 
ever says anything, Ed doesn’t need to be told to keep his mouth shut.
But the film suggests that Ed knows something more important than the 
details surrounding Dave’s death. As he drives down the main street of town, 
watching people as they go through the routines of daily life, Ed experiences 
himself as being not only different from the others but above them. Able 
to see something that remains hidden to those focused on accomplishing 
their present tasks, Ed recalls feeling like he “knew a secret—a bigger one 
even than what had really happened to Big Dave. Something none of them 
knew. Like [he] had made it to the outside somehow and they were all still 
struggling way down below.”
Although Ed is not able to fully articulate what it is that he knows that 
the others do not, his comment about having “made it out” suggests that he 
is no longer trapped in the maze, running the proverbial rat race that still 
occupies the others. The camera suggests as much as the film shifts from 
a shot of Ed languidly driving his car to people who are hurrying to reach 
their destinations. Interestingly, the camera takes on the perspective of 
Ed’s gaze and tracks a woman in a black dress, keeping pace with her, never 
surpassing her. The Coen brothers’ decision to remove the street noise and 
replace it with the indolent notes of a Beethoven piano sonata also serves 
to make the people Ed observes appear to exist in a different relationship 
with time. Ed seems to occupy a different world. It seems he has begun to 
shift from despair of immediacy—the despair that, if they are conscious of 
it, likely affects the people Ed watches in the street—to what Kierkegaard 
calls “despair of the eternal or over oneself. ”
Kierkegaard explains that the despair of immediacy (without reflection) 
and of immediacy with some reflection are different ways of despairing over 
“something earthly.” In both types, the world and the vicissitudes of luck 
are mistakenly believed to be the source of despair. Something earthly has 
gone wrong with one’s life; some external misfortune has been suffered. By 
contrast, an individual who lives in the qualitatively higher “despair of the 
eternal or over oneself ” recognizes that the real problem is not external to 
the self.18 The problem is that such individuals have defined themselves in 
terms of something earthly, that they lack a self that transcends its earthly, 
finite aspects. People who despair of the eternal despair over the fact that they 
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have not developed any eternal aspects of themselves—aspects capable of 
transcending the loss of externalities or changes in fortune or circumstances. 
They lack what Kierkegaard calls the self in its “eternal validity”—the self 
that consists of something more than the contingent aspects of a person’s 
life, such as an individual’s profession, relationships, appearance, talents, 
possessions, fame, or reputation. A career, a love, beauty, talent, and the 
rest can be lost without losing the self. But the person who defines himself 
exclusively in terms of externalities fails to recognize that, because he is 
always more than these things, he can lose them without losing himself. So 
he is in despair over the possibility of losing these external goods (even if 
he has not yet lost them). Once a person acknowledges that he attaches too 
much significance to finite things and that he mistakenly defines himself in 
terms of something external to the self, he moves away from being a man 
of immediacy with some reflection; he shifts from despair over something 
earthly toward despair over his seeming inability to move beyond defining 
himself in terms of earthly, finite things and to instead define himself by the 
eternal aspect of himself. He begins to despair over his lack of an eternal self 
and over his inability to overcome his weakness.19
Alien Encounters
Interestingly, as Ed appears to be shifting away from despair over some-
thing earthly, the film itself introduces a literal and metaphorical other-
worldliness: aliens. These beings are introduced in the next scene of the 
film, when Ann Nirdlinger, Big Dave’s widow, pays a strange late-night 
call to the Crane house. Remaining outside, partially hidden by shadows, 
her features somewhat concealed by the veil that extends from her hat, 
a wide-eyed and unblinking Ann tells Ed that she and her husband had 
an extraterrestrial encounter while camping in Oregon. The encounter 
resulted in Big Dave’s abduction—an event that changed him, such that 
he never touched Ann again. Voicing her suspicions that aliens murdered 
her husband and that the government wants to obscure this fact (“this 
thing goes deep”), Ann proclaims Doris’s innocence. Confessing her hope 
that “perhaps now it will all come out,” Ann warns Ed that “sometimes 
knowledge is a curse.”20
With varying degrees of subtlety, the Coen brothers use images of the 
otherworldly, particularly in the form of extraterrestrials, throughout The 
Man Who Wasn’t There. Considering these images in light of Ed’s inclosing 
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reserve and focus on the otherworldly helps to explain the prevalence of 
literal and metaphorical representations of aliens throughout the film. 
While images of UFOs and the paranoia that accompanies them are 
not unheard of in noir films, the ubiquity of their use in The Man Who 
Wasn’t There might be surprising were it not tied to Ed’s desire to escape 
the world in which he only halfheartedly dwells. When Doris is arrested 
for Big Dave’s murder, Ann’s late-night visit to the Crane house explicitly 
introduces extraterrestrials into the film as part of her explanation of the 
cause of her husband’s death. After Doris’s suicide, Ed sees the article 
“Mysteries of Roswell, New Mexico” in Life magazine. Among the images 
is a drawing of a UFO that resembles the one that Ed sees at the prison 
the night before his execution.
The same issue of Life has, on the previous page, an article about dry 
cleaning, proclaiming it the wave of the future. At the risk of reading too 
much into the connection between dry cleaning and the mysteries at Roswell, 
perhaps the Coen brothers are suggesting that both represent a kind of way 
out for Ed, with dry cleaning indicating a worldly way out and extraterrestrial 
encounters symbolizing an otherworldly escape.
The circumstances of Ed’s subsequent execution continue the imagery 
of aliens. The execution chamber itself has an otherworldly appearance, with 
the electric chair centered in the room against a background, floor, and ceil-
ing of solid white interrupted only by a long, curved window that resembles 
something one might expect to see on an alien spacecraft.21
Throughout the film, the Coen brothers use additional images that are 
reminiscent of flying saucers. The hubcap that flies through the air after Ed’s 
car accident resembles a UFO. So does much of the lighting and many of 
the light fixtures that appear in the film.
In their commentary on the film, the Coen brothers admit that this 
imagery of flying saucers “runs throughout the entire movie.”22 They also 
discuss an interesting scene that was originally scripted to occur between 
the scene showing Ed’s return home after killing Big Dave and the scene in 
which the officers come to the barbershop to inform Ed of Doris’s arrest. 
The Coen brothers explain that they had planned to have Ed lie down beside 
Doris and close his eyes. Then an eerie, alien sound would begin. Next, the 
camera would show Ed on the veranda watching “tiny ant-people” come out 
of an alien spacecraft. After smoking a cigarette, Ed would go back inside 
the house. He would then get a towel, roll it up, stuff it in the crack under 
the door, and go back to sleep.
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Having decided that the intended scene “was just taking the whole 
alien adventure a little too far” and would have been too much of “a Kafka 
break,” the Coens deleted the alien dream sequence and added Ann’s late-
night visit.23
Although the Coen brothers themselves don’t explain the significance of 
the ubiquity of aliens and UFOs in Ed’s story, a case can be made for thinking 
that these were important to include not only because of their connection 
to other noir films but also because they are representations of otherworldly 
things. In a film in which the main character is withdrawn from the world—is 
the man who isn’t there—it seems somewhat fitting to incorporate images 
of entities that are also not at home in this world.
Ed’s Confession
In the next scene of the film, Ed admits to Doris and her lawyer that he knew 
of his wife’s affair and that he killed Big Dave. Perhaps his confession is a sign 
that he is beginning to take responsibility for his agency and actions in the 
world. Interestingly, even though Ed’s story is true, Riedenschneider takes 
it to be just an attempt to provide an alternative but ultimately untenable 
account of the events surrounding Big Dave’s death.
Riedenschneider is not interested in knowing what really happened the 
night Big Dave died. Indeed, appealing to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 
he even attempts to defy the claim that there is a “reality of what happened” 
and suggests instead that there is no fact of the matter:
They got this guy in Germany: Fritz Something-or-other. Or is it? 
Maybe it’s Werner. Anyway, he’s got this theory, you wanna test 
something, you know, scientifically—how the planets go round 
the sun, what sunspots are made of, why the water comes out of 
the tap—well, you gotta look at it. But, sometimes, you look at it, 
your looking changes it. You can’t know the reality of what hap-
pened, or what would’ve happened if you hadn’t-a stuck in your 
own goddamn schnozz. So there is no “what happened.” Looking at 
something changes it. They call it the “Uncertainty Principle.” Sure, 
it sounds screwy, but even Einstein says the guy’s on to something. 
Science. Perception. Reality. Doubt. Reasonable doubt. I’m saying 
that sometimes the more you look, the less you really know. It’s a 
fact. A proved fact. In a way, it’s the only fact there is.
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In their commentary on The Man Who Wasn’t There, the Coen brothers 
admit that they enjoy “writing gibberish” of the kind that Riedenschneider 
speaks here.24 But, despite the incoherence—played for comic effect—of 
much of the attorney’s speech, he does raise a few noteworthy points, one 
of which is that the longer (and perhaps deeper) one looks, the more open 
one might become to alternate interpretations and previously unforeseen 
possibilities. Moreover, reflection upon such possibilities might create or 
restrict an individual’s future options in unknowable ways. In the end, we 
are left with a multiplicity of interpretations about what is possible and with 
competing interpretations of the “facts” that a postmodern view of the world 
suggests we cannot surmount.
Having suggested that there is no fact of the matter but merely conflicting 
interpretations, Riedenschneider explains that he intends to defend Doris 
by providing another interpretation of Big Dave, primarily by questioning 
the latter’s service record. Riedenschneider’s detectives have uncovered that 
Big Dave, rather than fighting on the front lines, had held merely a clerical 
position in the navy shipyards. He did not experience the combat that formed 
the subject of so many of his war stories. No celebrated military figure, 
Big Dave received an honorable discharge after participating in a fistfight. 
Riedenschneider is incredibly pleased: it is now possible for him to argue 
that Big Dave could have been blackmailed by someone who knew that he 
was not the war hero he pretended to be and that this other person—the 
fictitious man who wasn’t there—could have killed him.
Ed’s Continuing Search for a Way Out
Encouraged by the thought that Riedenschneider might be able to “fix” things 
for Doris and “make it all work out,” Ed admits his hope that “maybe there 
was a way out for [him] as well.” Although Ed has begun to move away from 
being the man of immediacy with some reflection and to move beyond the 
despair over something earthly, he has not yet fully given up the hope that a 
reversal of fortune might mitigate his despair. But his hopes now seem to be 
pinned largely on creating possibilities for another person: Birdy Abundas 
(Scarlett Johansson), the daughter of Ed’s friend, Walter (Richard Jenkins). 
It seems to be no accident that when Ed as narrator speaks his words about 
finding a way out, the camera is trained on Birdy. While the exact nature 
of Ed’s interest in the young woman remains unclear (perhaps even to Ed 
himself), Birdy represents youthful potential, someone who has her whole 
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life ahead of her. Believing her to be a “good, clean kid” with a talent for 
playing the piano, Ed is drawn to the idea of becoming her manager. Then 
he could be with her “enough to keep [himself] feeling okay.” He tells Birdy 
that “there are a lot of things that haven’t worked out for me. Life has dealt 
me some bum cards. Or maybe I just haven’t played them right. I don’t know. 
. . . You’re young. A kid, really. Your whole life ahead of you. But it’s not too 
soon to start making opportunities for yourself, before it all washes away. 
. . . I can’t stand by and watch any more things go down the drain. You’re 
young, you don’t understand.”
Anticipating that, once the trial is over, he may be able to become a 
new man by directing Birdy’s career, Ed still hopes for a happy ending to 
his story. He is not prepared for the devastating news he receives: Doris has 
hanged herself using the belt of the dress he brought for her to wear to her 
trial.25 Already somewhat absent from his own life, Ed’s despair escalates 
as he further withdraws from the world, fully becoming the man who isn’t 
there. In his words, “I sat in the house, but there was nobody there. I was 
a ghost. I didn’t see anyone. No one saw me. I was the barber.” A little later 
he admits that he began visiting a medium (Lilyan Chauvin) because he 
found himself “alone with secrets [he] didn’t want and no one to tell them 
to anyway.” Eventually realizing that he was “turning into Ann Nirdlinger,” 
Ed accepts that he “had to turn [his] back on the ghosts, on the dead, before 
they all sucked [him] in.”
Having seen his attempt to make a new life through the dry-cleaning 
venture fail, having lost any possibility of resuming his life with Doris, and 
being unable to escape the world through the medium’s interventions, Ed 
begins to devote himself fully to what he considers to be his one remaining 
chance to become a new man: becoming Birdy’s manager. He arranges to 
take Birdy to San Francisco to play for a professional pianist in the hope that 
she will be able to impress the musician into taking her on as a student. But 
it is not to be. Although Birdy plays the correct notes, her playing is polite, 
formulaic, and uninspired. She has some technique but lacks the requisite 
soul. It is the judgment of the heavily accented professional that “perhaps, 
someday, she can make very good typist.”
Undeterred, Ed vows to find another teacher for Birdy. But it is clear 
that the desire for Birdy to become a concert pianist is Ed’s, not Birdy’s. In 
the ride home, she reiterates a claim she made earlier in the film: she doesn’t 
want a career in music. In fact, she “isn’t sure that [she] wants a career at 
all.” And, if she did, she would “probably be a veterinarian.” Flattered by the 
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intensity of Ed’s desire for her to pursue a musical career, she identifies him 
as “an enthusiast” and, in an attempt to “make him happy,” proceeds to initi-
ate oral sex with him. Surprised by Birdy’s actions, Ed veers into the lane of 
oncoming traffic and then off the hillside. The man who was metaphorically 
seeking a way out literally leaves the road.
A Modern Man? Acknowledging Absurdity
We next see Ed sitting on his porch, apparently awaiting Doris’s arrival home. 
Approached by a man who encourages Ed to embrace “the modern way” of 
life by replacing the gravel in his driveway with pavement, Ed seems unsure 
of how to respond to the unwelcome solicitation. Soon Doris arrives home 
and sends the salesman packing.
Such an odd and ultimately banal domestic scene creates a jarring break 
for the film’s audience, occurring as it does at such an important point in 
the film, when viewers are eager to know if Ed’s car accident has been fatal. 
Indeed, it is not initially clear whether we are seeing Ed in an afterlife or 
witnessing him reflecting on an incident that might have come from his 
earlier life with Doris. Only as Ed regains consciousness do we learn that 
it is the latter.
Despite its seeming singularity, this unexpected scene from his days 
with Doris essentially summarizes Ed’s life: he has been sitting on the porch 
of his life’s proverbial house, marking time, failing to address the various 
possibilities for changing or modernizing his life, waiting for someone else 
to tell him what to do.
This scene also introduces questions about whether Ed is or should 
attempt to be a modern man. These questions recur in the speech Rieden-
schneider gives to the jury as part of his attempt to defend Ed against the 
charge of murdering Creighton Tolliver. The lawyer suggests that Ed is “too 
ordinary to be the criminal mastermind the D.A. made [him] out to be” 
and that “there was some greater scheme at work that the state had yet to 
unravel.” Ed’s narration summarizes Riedenschneider’s remarks:
He told them . . . that the closer they looked, the less sense it would 
all make; that I wasn’t the kind of guy to kill a guy; that I was the 
barber, for Christsake. I was just like them—an ordinary man. 
Guilty of living in a world that had no place for me, yeah. Guilty 
of wanting to be a dry cleaner, sure. But not a murderer. He said 
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I was modern man. And, if they voted to convict me, well, they’d 
be practically cinching the noose around their own necks. He told 
them to look, not at the facts, but at the meaning of the facts. Then 
he said the facts had no meaning. It was a pretty good speech. It 
even had me going.
It is important to note that, even though it is attributed to Riedenschneider, 
this speech is Ed’s summary of his attorney’s salient points. Though the 
ideas might have come from Riedenschneider, the words are Ed’s. Ed sees 
himself as someone who is not a murderer, not the kind of individual who 
kills people. He is just an ordinary, modern man, who, like everyone else, 
wants to be someone else and whose only crime consists of not wanting to 
be the barber.
It is likely that Ed’s synopsis of Riedenschneider’s defense sounds comical 
and slightly absurd because, in retrospect, it appears that way to Ed himself. 
Riedenschneider’s speech may have had Ed “going” at the time of its presen-
tation, but to the Ed who narrates the film as he awaits the electric chair, the 
lawyer’s remarks are all style and no substance. The judge who ultimately 
decides Ed’s fate doesn’t buy “the modern man stuff or the uncertainty stuff 
or any of the mercy stuff either.” And it seems likely that, in the end, Ed, too, 
doesn’t really buy any of these.
Given the many postmodern elements of The Man Who Wasn’t There, 
particularly the emphasis on the multiplicity of interpretations without 
any deeper, underlying meaning, it is tempting to wonder if the repeated 
references to Ed as a modern man are intended to indicate that he is not a 
contemporary man but is instead caught up in the antiquated modernity that 
serves as the setting for typical noir films.26 Perhaps, at the end of his life, 
Ed, the narrator who observes the futility of attempting to live a meaningful 
modern life, moves beyond modernity to become a postmodern man.27
By the film’s end, Ed’s reflections on his life seem to have changed him. 
We learn that he has been recounting his experiences for a men’s magazine 
that has paid him (by the word) to tell his story. Ed explains that he initially 
had trouble figuring out how his attempt to become a new man landed him 
on death row. He “knew step by step” but “couldn’t see any pattern.” But now 
he begins to see his life as a whole: “Now all the disconnected things seem to 
hook up. . . . It’s like pulling away from the maze. While you’re in the maze, 
you go through willy-nilly, turning where you think you have to turn, bang-
ing into the dead ends, one thing after another. But you get some distance 
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on it, and all those twists and turns, why, they’re the shape of your life. It’s 
hard to explain, but seeing it whole gives you some peace.” Apologizing for 
the pain he caused Doris, Ed claims that he doesn’t regret anything that has 
happened—“not a thing.” Although he “used to regret being the barber,” he 
no longer does. Even though he is about to be executed for Tolliver’s murder, 
which he did not commit, Ed doesn’t appear to be troubled by his imminent 
death. He suggests that, although the “twists and turns” of his life might not 
be objectively meaningful, they are the patterns of his life, and they have 
made him who he is.
At the end of his days, the man who wasn’t there for much of his own 
life and who was practically invisible to others for many years has become 
someone being featured in a magazine for all to see. It is tempting to wonder 
if it is partly a result of finally being recognized by others that Ed is able to 
jettison his regret for what might have been. He claims to be at peace as he 
approaches the electric chair under the watchful eye of multiple witnesses. 
The man who wasn’t there ends his life by being the sole focus of all present 
at his execution.
Watched by all, Ed the narrator retains his optimism about the possibil-
ity that, wherever he is “being taken,” maybe things “will be clearer there, 
like when a fog blows away.” He expresses his hope that Doris will be there 
and that he will be able to “tell her all those things they don’t have words for 
here.” But, despite Ed’s hope that he may awaken to a preferable afterlife, it 
seems doubtful that Ed has escaped despair.
Ed’s Deepest Despair: Inclosing Reserve
Rather than having escaped despair, Ed seems, at the end of his life, to 
embody what Kierkegaard calls a despairing self of inclosing reserve—a 
self that is closed off from the world and may “take flight from actuality.”28 
Having acquired some reflection, individuals of inclosing reserve become 
preoccupied with “watching” themselves, and the individual “longs for the 
solitude” that he or she considers essential. Drawing away from “the soothing 
lullaby of social life,” such a person becomes increasingly isolated. Yet, despite 
the isolation and desire to be alone, the individual wishes for a confidant. 
Kierkegaard warns that the greatest danger that a self of inclosing reserve 
faces, particularly if no confidant appears, is suicide.29
In the latter part of the film, Ed seems to be seeking such an intimate. 
Isolated from society (initially by his own choice and finally by his prison 
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cell), Ed repeatedly expresses his desire for someone with whom to share 
his secrets. After Doris’s suicide, Ed visits a medium as part of his attempt 
to find such a confidant in his dead wife. Moreover, Ed’s final narrative 
comment reveals that, even at the film’s end, he has not relinquished this 
desire: he hopes that, in an afterlife, he can reunite with Doris and tell her 
all the things he cannot verbalize here on Earth. Finally, Ed’s decision to 
write his story for the men’s magazine gives his lengthy confession a public 
audience and turns readers (as well as viewers of the film) into anonymous 
confidants.
Importantly, what Ed confides to his audience is not only the knowl-
edge of what really happened to Big Dave and Creighton Tolliver but the 
knowledge that he has gained through his constant reflection upon himself. 
Indeed, perhaps because of the Coen brothers’ decision to use his narra-
tion throughout the film, Ed appears to be watching himself as we watch 
him—or to be watching us as we watch him, imagining how a third party 
would interpret his character. He watches himself as a kind of third party, 
the way a person of inclosing reserve would.
However, in addition to Ed’s desire for a confidant and the fact that he 
spends his days watching himself and reflecting upon himself, Ed displays 
the withdrawal from the world and the desire for solitude that characterize 
the despair of inclosing reserve. He is, ultimately, the man who isn’t there 
because he removes himself from the world. While others still occupy the 
world and are occupied by the business of the world, Ed has pulled “away 
from the maze,” as he explains at the end of the film. As part of his despair, 
he seems to understand the futility of any attempt to find ultimate fulfillment 
in the finite attachments of the temporal world.
Ed does not make the movement of faith that, for Kierkegaard, consti-
tutes the only way out of despair. He ends his life with an inclosing reserve 
that is only slightly mitigated by his decision to tell his story to the world. 
Already withdrawn from an earthly existence, Ed’s attention at the end of 
his days focuses on his hope for an afterlife and for an end to his despair.
The Man Who Isn’t There
During the course of the Coens’ ninth film, the character of Ed Crane under-
goes a qualitative shift in his despair that Kierkegaard’s typology of despair 
helps to explain. Beginning as a man of immediacy, suffering from a lack of 
infinitude and possibility, Ed’s initial despair stems from his identification of 
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himself with the externalities and contingent circumstances of his life. Pas-
sively acquiescing to others’ choices, Ed is the man who isn’t there because 
he exercises no agency in his own life. By the film’s end, Ed has begun to 
seize the possibilities presented to him and to make the choices necessary 
for creating himself as his own man. But as Ed gains a greater sense of self 
and as he becomes more reflective, he also becomes more aware of the 
meaninglessness of many finite things. He comes to see that no finite things 
can provide any ultimate satisfaction. So Ed begins to withdraw from the 
world and becomes a man of inclosing reserve. Although he now has a self, 
he once again becomes the man who isn’t there.
Notes
 I am grateful to Mark Conard for his numerous helpful suggestions and thought-
ful editorial remarks.
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29. Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, 63–67. Kierkegaard adds that having a con-
fidant is one of the most successful ways for a person of inclosing reserve to fight an 
impulse to commit suicide.
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thInkIng Beyond the faIled 
communIty
Blood Simple and The Man Who Wasn’t There
R. Barton Palmer
Ransacking the Museum of Dead Styles
In the manner of a flamboyant postmodernism eager to ransack for re-use 
what Fredric Jameson has termed the “museum of dead styles,” the neo-noir 
films of the Coen brothers offer a rich vein of allusion to both classic film 
noir and the hard-boiled fiction (especially that of James M. Cain) that was 
noir’s principal narrative and thematic source.1 Jameson asserts that post-
modernist cultural production is inevitably empty, with “energetic artists” 
cast adrift in a kind of intellectual and social weightlessness, being forced 
to wear the “masks of extinct mannerisms.”2 Postmodernism may well, as 
Jameson suggests, foreclose the possibility of originality in the neo-romantic 
sense. And yet, with Peter Brooker, we may well see older styles and artistic 
movements as anything but extinct, as making available in fact a different 
form of newness that might result from “the practice of an imaginative re-
making which edits, echoes, borrows from, recomposes and ‘refunctions’ 
existing narratives or images.”3
Suitably transformed, what has been borrowed can then “work in a 
different medium with an invigorated social and artistic purpose.”4 Such 
indeed is the use the Coens make of noir texts. Their postmodernism does 
not accept Jean Baudrillard’s pronouncement that postmodernist art, hav-
ing “deconstructed its entire universe,” leaves artists like them with only 
the bleak prospect of “playing with the pieces.”5 In three films, the Coens 
imaginatively remake two of James M. Cain’s novels, The Postman Always 
Rings Twice (1934) and Double Indemnity (serialized 1936, published in 
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book form in 1943), but the connection to hard-boiled America’s most 
famous novelist is deepest and most interesting not in Fargo but in Blood 
Simple and especially The Man Who Wasn’t There. These films can hardly 
be understood properly apart from the literary sources of which they are 
essentially re-compositions.
Such extended allusiveness may be explained, in part, by developments 
within the film industry, particularly the emergence of a young, cine-literate 
viewership eager for the self-congratulatory experience of discovering, iden-
tifying, and enjoying references to honored texts of a bygone age. Because of 
this niche audience, nostalgic evocations of the cultural and cinematic past 
are common enough in the commercial and independent films that have 
become such an important area of Hollywood production since the 1980s, 
and the Coens in particular are certainly noted practitioners of this film type. 
With its black-and-white cinematography, its imitation of noir chiaroscuro 
visuals, and its authenticating references to late 1940s American society and 
culture, The Man Who Wasn’t There proudly proclaims its reconstruction 
of both a bygone era and that era’s “mannerisms,” while Blood Simple offers 
a contemporary updating of the complex, violent, and ultimately tragically 
self-destructive criminal scheming that is the most prominent element of 
Cain’s narratives.6 So much is obvious—and is meant to be. Set in a small 
northern California town (Cain’s fiction makes use of similar locales), The 
Man Who Wasn’t There is filled with references that advertise the Coens’ 
“knowingness” and that are to be decoded only by the cognoscenti. For ex-
ample, secondary characters in the Coens’ film bear the unusual surnames 
(Nirdlinger, Diedrickson) by which Double Indemnity’s notorious femme 
fatale is known in the book and screen versions, respectively, of the story.
What has not been well recognized, however, is the way in which Blood 
Simple and The Man Who Wasn’t There also rework and “re-function” more 
central elements in The Postman Always Rings Twice and, to a lesser degree, 
Double Indemnity, in order, somewhat paradoxically, to give vigorous voice 
to one of the novelist’s key themes: the failure of community that engenders a 
desperate yearning for connection to others (the more spiritual side of Cain’s 
scandalous foregrounding of the erotic force in human relations). These 
two Coen films, paradoxically enough, extend through complex gestures 
of restructuring and updating Cain’s analysis of the socio-psychological 
malaise affecting Depression-era America. The result is that, in some ways, 
Blood Simple and The Man Who Wasn’t There, especially when understood 
as a diptych, are more Cainian than the fiction upon which they draw so 
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substantially. Blood Simple offers a penetrating reading of Cain, dramatiz-
ing how the relentless and transgressive pursuit of self-interest, because it 
poisons human relations, inevitably proves suicidal. The instrumentaliza-
tion (or objectification) of others and the miscommunication that mars 
personal relations lead to fatal misunderstandings, always a dark hazard in 
an inscrutable world.
If this is the Cainian problem, then The Man Who Wasn’t There stages a 
movement (itself inadequate, but that is perhaps beside the point) toward its 
utopian solution. This deepening of consciousness, though denied by Cain to 
his characters, is intriguingly framed by a web of references (further evidence 
of directorial “knowingness”) to novelists who were themselves influenced 
by Cain. The film engages deeply, and critically, with two French works of 
philosophical fiction. The first, Albert Camus’s The Stranger (1942), draws 
directly on Postman, like the Coens’ own films. The second, Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
Nausea (1938), treats the evolution of consciousness that comes from the 
hard-won perception of life’s apparent randomness. Like Roquentin, Nausea’s 
antiheroic protagonist, the Coens’ Ed Crane (Billy Bob Thornton) is dis-
tressed by a spiritual malaise, in his case an obsession with the human abject, 
the hair that, neither dead nor alive, it is his job as a barber to cut and then 
discard. The desire to escape from the messiness of human physicality leads 
him to formulate a scheme for self-improvement à la Cain. And yet this plan, 
fed by money he blackmails from Big Dave Brewster (James Gandolfini), 
the man engaged in an affair with his wife Doris (Frances McDormand), is 
quickly defeated by unforeseen developments over which Ed has no control, 
thus failing to lead to what he imagines would be a less defiling way of life. 
His plans are to enter the emerging dry-cleaning business—all chemicals 
and no polluting water. Instead, much like Camus’s character Meursault, Ed 
soon finds himself with no choice but to kill Big Dave in self-defense when 
the man tries to murder him after learning Ed is his blackmailer. He walks 
away from the scene of the crime undetected.
The killer, in spite of himself, is initially spared the consequences of his 
actions as his wife Doris is mistakenly prosecuted for the murder. Numbed 
by the absurdity of these developments (he tries to confess to the crime 
but is not believed), Ed now senses himself possessed of a knowledge that 
somehow places him beyond the realm of everydayness in which others 
seem mindlessly stuck. In voice-over, he comments on a scene of his fellow 
citizens scurrying through the town center: “All going about their business. 
It seemed like I knew a secret—a bigger one even than what had really 
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happened to Big Dave, something none of them knew, like I had made it to 
the outside, somehow, and they were all still struggling, way down below.” 
Though both Ed Crane and Cain’s protagonist produce retrospective nar-
ratives that trace the events leading them to existential dead ends, Cain’s 
heroes never manage such an escape from solipsism. They are never free 
from the powerful desires that move them, never manage to move “outside” 
the entanglements caused by their transgressiveness and scheming. Ed’s 
sudden movement of consciousness owes more to Camus. As he dramatizes 
in The Stranger (and discusses at greater length in The Myth of Sisyphus 
[1942]), the realization of death’s inevitability and arbitrariness strips the 
world of obfuscating romanticisms, revealing it to be foreign, strange, and 
inhuman, indifferent to human hopes and unaccommodating of any at-
tempt to endow it with transcendent meaning. Like Ed, the absurdist finds 
himself living a life parallel to others, inhabiting their world but refusing to 
share with them the protective mythologies of everdayness, of an existence 
not lived in the continuous knowledge of unpredictable, unreasonable, and 
inevitable extinction.
Like Meursault, Ed comes to sense that others are engaged in a struggle 
(those motions necessary to sustain life) whose true significance—that it 
has no significance beyond itself—escapes them. But while Meursault is 
satisfied with being misunderstood by others, as he is during his trial, and 
actually looks forward to the uncomprehending hatred they will express at 
his execution, Ed is filled with a desire for human connection in some better 
world beyond the grave. Cain’s two novels, and The Stranger, end with their 
male protagonists desperately disconnected from the world and facing im-
minent death, while Roquentin moves beyond human contact (dramatized 
in his final failed attempt to persuade the “Self-Taught Man” to accept the 
meaninglessness of existence) toward an artist’s self-imposed isolation.
The Man Who Wasn’t There, in contrast, concludes with a wish for the 
restoration of the community whose absence leads to the suicidal war of one 
against all. This is a political, perhaps moral, point implicit in Cain’s analysis 
of the evident failure of modern society to produce bonds that satisfy and 
sustain. It is also a point common to the so-called hard-boiled writers in 
general who portray an America in which, as Sean McCann argues, “civil 
society can no longer contain private desire.” This profanation of the liberal 
ideal could only be healed, McCann suggests, by a reassertion of “public 
values over private interests.” But this is a thoroughgoing social reformation 
whose manner of unfolding these novelists, especially Cain, cannot begin 
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to conceive, as they fail to provide a literary equivalent to the state social-
ism envisioned by Roosevelt’s New Deal.7 On the contrary, Cain’s novels 
call into existence fictional worlds dominated by those who can imagine 
bettering themselves only by betraying or destroying those to whom they 
are joined by bonds of loyalty, service, and communitas. The concept of the 
public sphere, at least in the sense of reformable state institutions, has no 
purchase in his version of America.8
The Marks of Cain
The place of James M. Cain in American culture, W. H. Frohock has no-
toriously remarked, is defined by two perhaps contradictory propositions: 
“that nothing he has ever written has ever been entirely out of the trash 
category” and that “an inordinate number of intelligent and fully literate 
people have read him.”9 Similarly, Joyce Carol Oates complains that “there 
is always something sleazy, something eerily vulgar and disappointing in 
his work.” And yet, doubtlessly intelligent and fully literate herself, Oates 
argues for the importance of Cain’s fiction for the insights it offers into its 
eager readers in the cultural climate of the 1930s and 1940s, especially the 
two novels The Postman Always Rings Twice and Double Indemnity. It is, she 
says, the “archetypal rhythms” found in his treatments of a failing American 
dream that claim our attention.10 Frohock offers a similar explanation for 
an extended analysis of what belongs in his view to the subliterary category 
of popular trash, declaring that Postman is “distinguished” because it has 
much to tell us about the “literary climate in America circa 1934.”11 It was 
an era fascinated by the story of “the man under sentence of death” (Oates) 
or, more precisely, of the hero trapped “in a predicament from which the 
only possible exit is the infliction of physical harm upon some other human 
being” (Frohock).12
Considered irredeemably vulgar in his own country because of his 
treatment of sex (which Cain finds, as Gregory Porter puts it, “primal, foun-
dational, structurally and ontologically indispensable”), the novelist found 
more appreciative readers in France.13 There, readers saw in his works not 
only the vaguely Nietzschean (or perhaps social Darwinist) perception that 
the pursuit of power ensures that “violence is man’s lot” (a view of human 
nature that Cain perhaps owes to literary naturalism) but also the convincing 
portrayal of the irredeemable alienation of the ordinary man from social 
and political structures. Postman became, according to Camus, an important 
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inspiration for The Stranger. Though Camus, like Sartre and many French 
intellectuals of the era, was fascinated by Cain’s depiction of an energeti-
cally self-destructive transatlantic culture, he was also one of the many who 
profited from the revolution in form that the novel had effected.14
What Cain did was to displace the detective from his role as protagonist. 
Instead, he made the criminal the source for what, as Richard Bradbury puts 
it, is nothing less than “an examination of motivation.” This analysis, because 
it is delivered by a narrator fated to die for his crimes, “eliminates the pos-
sibility of a return to normality” and provides “no informing intelligence 
within the text which returns the reader to the realm of external and rational 
explanation.”15 With The Man Who Wasn’t There’s exclusive narrative focus 
on Crane, mediated by his voice-over (which often plays over sequences 
outside the narrative, properly speaking, that illustrate the narrator’s general 
points or provide backstory), the Coens provide a cinematic equivalent to 
Cain’s obtrusive narrators. In their film, too, there is no return to the external 
from the subjective.16
What this narrative method does offer is the opportunity to portray, 
as Camus realized, the main character’s evolution in consciousness, which 
can be represented in content but also embodied in verbal style. Camus’s 
Meursault verbalizes not only his own unthinking passage through a series 
of experiences (which is all he can come to know directly, uninterpreted 
by the various constructions that social mythologies impose) but also the 
conclusions he might draw from them. In fact, an act of unthinking and 
almost autonomic violence forces him to accept responsibility for the way 
he has lived and to contest both the character and the narrative that those 
in the justice system fabricate for him. Here Camus brilliantly expands and 
deepens the evolution in consciousness that Cain invents for two criminal 
narrators.
Influenced by such transatlantic admiration, a longstanding critical 
tradition would claim Cain and the other “tough guy writers” of the 1930s 
and later for modernism, disputing the claims of writers like Oates and 
Frohock that his books are trash or sleaze.17 But Cain has continued to 
fascinate more than just the critics who see his characters as following a 
vaguely existentialist path toward self-understanding, however limited, and 
inevitable destruction in a world indifferent to their fates. Political readings 
of the two novels have also proven compelling. For Sean McCann, the failure 
of Frank Chambers and his lover Cora to make a life for themselves in Post-
man indicts the “absence of popular voice and civic freedom,” for what does 
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not appear to be restored, as it always is in the classic detective story, is that 
sense of “a stable order that can survive violence and abuse.”18 For McCann, 
Postman and Double Indemnity limn the discontents of an uncivil society 
as yet unreformed by New Deal liberalism; the protagonists in each case 
“cannot contend with a bureaucratic and commercial order—represented 
by courts, laws, insurance companies, and roadside restaurants—indifferent 
to its survival.”19
In the manner of polemicists like John Steinbeck and the proletarian 
novelists of the 1930s, Postman and Double Indemnity reflect the pessimism 
and anomie that characterize their era.20 Frank Chambers in Postman is 
the rootless, economically marginalized working man of the Depression, 
attracted by the freedom of the open road and the possibility of endless ad-
venture but searching for something to give his life meaning. The narrative 
is set in motion by a sudden, physically disturbing, irresistible onslaught of 
primal eroticism, as Frank becomes bound, against his will, to the beautiful 
wife of his erstwhile employer, Nick, while she in turn rejects the husband 
she finds physically disagreeable for the muscular, aggressive adventurer. 
Needing the older man’s money and property to support themselves, Cora 
and Frank plot to kill Nick in an attempt to make a life together that even-
tually fails when Cora is killed riding in Frank’s car (reenacting the fate the 
couple make Nick suffer).
In an ironic miscarriage of justice, Frank is convicted and executed for 
her murder. Charged initially with the faked accident that kills Nick, Frank 
and Cora had been saved from prison or the electric chair because Nick 
(unbeknown to them) had been insured against accidental death by three 
insurance companies, who, facing the prospect of significant loss, connive 
to get Cora (who had confessed to the crime) a plea bargain on a much-
reduced charge. This trick is masterminded by their public defender lawyer, 
Katz, who works the system in order to line his own pockets. In the second 
trial, however, no one stands to benefit from Frank’s acquittal, though Katz 
is pleased enough to take as his fee, as Frank observes, “the $10,000 he had 
got for us, and the money we had made, and a deed for the place.”21
Walter Huff in Double Indemnity, in contrast, seethes with a discontent 
that belongs to the more prosperous and settled wartime years (when the 
serialized story was issued as a novel in 1943, it became an instant success). 
A successful insurance salesman who lives a secure and comfortable bachelor 
life, Huff, like Frank Chambers, experiences his own version of amour fou, 
falling in lust with Phyllis Nirdlinger, the wife of one of his customers. This 
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couple likewise plots to kill the inconvenient husband, mostly to collect a 
huge sum on his accident policy, although they do not actually need the 
money to make a life for themselves, something they could surely manage 
through an easily obtainable divorce. Walter, as he reveals, has been plotting 
for some time to turn the business for which he works to his own advantage: 
“One night I think up a trick, and get to thinking I could crook the wheel 
myself if I could only put a plant out there to put down my bet. That’s all. 
When I met Phyllis I met my plant” (Double Indemnity, 129). Knowing that 
insurance companies almost always succeed in defeating those who would 
defraud them, Walter nonetheless wants to put down his bet, risking his life 
in the process. Success has given him what John T. Irwin appropriately calls 
an “intellectual pride, a professional’s sense of superiority” that numbs him 
to the likely consequences of what he plans.22 In Walter’s own metaphor, he 
is a croupier at the roulette table from which his employers (to whom he 
feels superior in cunning and audacity) take all the profits. This resentment 
tempts him to beat his bosses at their own game, as he tries to make the 
system work to his advantage, much as Katz does in Postman. This desire for 
self-assertion and self-advancement, as Irwin observes, was one with which 
Cain’s readers could readily identify: “One not uncommon resentment for 
American working men is the sense of being a wage slave, of being at the 
beck and call of that dumbbell at the office or the plant, a sense of economic 
dependence often experienced not just as a curtailment of personal freedom 
but as an impairment of masculinity.”23
Though there are important differences between them, the two novels 
stage the failure of the energetic, self-reliant, and anomic protagonists to 
make places for themselves in a society dominated by established orders (the 
criminal justice system in Postman, the insurance business in Double In-
demnity). If, as Jopi Nyman argues, the “ideology of individualism” depends 
on the possibility of self-fulfillment, then those who are excluded from the 
inner sanctums of civil society are bound to feel “increasingly insecure and 
disillusioned.” These feelings are especially intense for Walter, who, unlike 
Frank, is in on the trick (that insurance depends on your betting on what 
you do not want to happen) but deprived of the opportunity for indepen-
dent action and profit taking that Katz enjoys.24 Nyman, I think, identifies 
a central element of Cain’s novels (and of hard-boiled fiction more gener-
ally) in asserting that such characters “believe in the existence of a better or 
different world in which the masculine individual is properly appreciated 
and rewarded.”25
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Neither Frank nor Walter ever quite escapes the narcissistic self-concern 
that motors their desire for a society that better answers to their needs for 
inclusion and self-satisfaction, and this absence is strongly felt by Cora 
as well—if not by Phyllis, whose resort to violence is more substantially 
pathological and, arguably, an end in itself. A similar distressing drama of 
failed community, poisoned by bad faith, misunderstanding, and petty but 
terribly destructive venality plays out in both Blood Simple and The Man Who 
Wasn’t There. The latter limns a similar version of early postwar America 
in which these same terrible failings are all too evident. But that film also 
imagines the possibility of their utopian transcendence. Unlike Visser (M. 
Emmet Walsh) in Blood Simple, the dysaffectual Ed Crane of The Man Who 
Wasn’t There manages to break free from his initial acquiescence to a world 
that reduces him to numbed silence.
Emptied of his urge for self-improvement, Ed voices a desire for com-
munion with Doris, the unfaithful wife he had barely known and who had 
killed herself out of disappointment with her lover, who turns out to be not 
a daring war hero and entrepreneur but a lying “big dope.” Ed’s dying wish 
is that he and Doris will meet again beyond the grave. In a form of expres-
sion he cannot yet conceive of, Ed hopes that together they might finally 
see clearly, “like when a fog blows away,” what their experiences have been. 
Cain’s characters show no interest in pursuing such mutual understanding. 
Awaiting his appointment with the electric chair, Frank has a different hope, 
asking for his readers’ prayers: “send up one for me, and Cora, and make 
it that we’re together, wherever it is” (Postman, 106). Walter and Phyllis, 
in contrast, seeing that there is no escape from an avenging law, reject any 
expectation that the erotic might somehow be transformed into an eternal, 
spiritual reconnection: “‘There’s nothing ahead of us, is there Walter?’ ‘No, 
nothing’” (Double Indemnity, 214). Their streetcar, the one named desire, 
ends at the cemetery. Phyllis plans to “meet my bridegroom. The only one 
I ever loved,” whose earthly form is that of the shark following the ship on 
which they are escaping (215). Finishing his narrative, Walter too keeps 
“thinking about that shark” and the final plunge off the side of the boat he 
will take with his erstwhile beloved (215).
A Chilling Horatio Algerism
Cain engages with the deeper elements of the national culture, David Mad-
den argues, by dramatizing in Postman the collision of “two central dreams 
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of the American experience—unrestrained mobility and respectable seden-
tariness—and two views of the American landscapes—the open road and 
the mortgaged house.”26 If in the western what brings these visions of an 
ideal life into collision is the masculine urge for self-assertion, staged in the 
temporary frontier that opens up between the village and the wilderness, 
in Cain’s reformulation of the foundational national binary the “civilized 
self ” is “degraded” and “primitivized” by the violent eruption of irresistible 
physical attraction.27 This erupting desire makes irrelevant conscious wishes 
such as Cora’s urge “to amount to something” (Postman, 82) and Frank’s 
determination to avoid settled life and its constraining responsibilities. The 
irony, of course, is that the only meaningful connection experience makes 
available is one that leads inevitably to the characters’ destruction.
If he discovers that he cannot take Cora on the road with him (for she 
hates the uncertainties and shabbiness of the tramp’s life), she in turn learns 
when visiting her sick mother that Frank cannot honor the commitment 
he has made to manage the restaurant, as he takes off for Mexico with an-
other woman when opportunity presents itself. Together, they kill the man 
whom Cora finds repulsive (if a solid, reliable provider), but Frank cannot 
take Nick’s place though he comes to occupy his bed and take charge of 
his business. A more thoroughgoing antiestablishmentarianism dominates 
Double Indemnity, which repeats yet decisively alters the formula developed 
in Postman. Driven by a self-destructive desire to defy the foundations 
of civilized life (the claims of family, the strictures of the law, the code of 
professional behavior), Walter and Phyllis, unlike Frank and Cora, never 
even consider how they might make a life together. Thrown together with 
Phyllis’s daughter Lola, for whom he quickly develops a deepening affection, 
Walter can at least imagine a different relationship with a woman (loving 
kindness) and a life not energized by a perverse and suicidal fascination 
with transgression.
In effect, Double Indemnity splits Postman’s complexly dangerous woman 
into two one-dimensional characters: one a pathological killer devoted to 
the purposeless accumulation of property, the other an eminently sensible, 
well-educated, and unworldly gamine who throws Walter over for a young 
man pursuing his PhD. The Coens imitate this doubling in The Man Who 
Wasn’t There, with Ed’s wife, Doris, who is eager to make a better life for 
herself regardless of the pain it might cause others, contrasting with Birdy 
Abundas (Scarlett Johansson), the teenage daughter of one of his custom-
ers, whom Ed thinks is a prodigy because the Beethoven sonatas she plays 
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bring him a kind of spiritual peace. (The salvific power of music, we might 
note in passing, is yet another reference both to Cain, who pursued an early 
career as a singer and studied music his whole life, and to his fiction; musical 
performers, mostly failed ones, are prominent features in his novels Mildred 
Pierce and Serenade.)28
In Double Indemnity, an assertiveness entirely indifferent to the suffer-
ing of others rather than amour fou determines the object of the criminals’ 
desire. Frank and Cora want each other, but Walter and Phyllis are hooked 
on the thrill of instrumentalization, the power they can deploy to reduce 
others to objects, as they plot to transform her unsuspecting husband into 
the considerable sum denominated on his insurance policy, in one stroke 
defying conventional morality and, they hope at least, forcing the defrauded 
company to cough up a huge and legitimate payment. In Postman, by way of 
contrast, the insurance business controls the justice system (an indication 
that the interests of capitalism trump those of liberal democracy), dispos-
ing of the fates of Frank and Cora to its own best advantage. The doomed 
couple’s scheme to acquire Nick’s goods succeeds (if only temporarily) not 
because they plan and execute the perfect crime (as Walter and Phyllis do) 
but because they unknowingly exploit a weakness in the companies’ unfore-
seen and unfortunate exposure to loss.
What interests the Coens in these dramas of self-improvement (which 
are nothing less than ironic versions of the national rags-to-riches myth of 
unimpeded self-fashioning) is not the central focus for which Cain is so justly 
famous. That focus, as Porter so aptly puts it, is the erotic: “it’s desire and 
desire alone that makes the narrative world ‘show up,’ bringing its objects 
into a dreamlike focus and elaborating the rhythm of its unfolding.”29
Blood Simple, it is true, does begin with the love that suddenly erupts 
between Ray (John Getz) and Abby (Frances McDormand), as she flees the 
jealous violence of her husband Marty (Dan Hedaya), at whose small-town 
Texas roadhouse Ray works as a bartender. But the force of the erotic is only 
briefly invoked and soon left behind as the film explores two related, Cainian 
motifs: every murder for profit, no matter how well planned, is somehow 
fatally flawed; and every scheme of this kind requires a partner, but success 
means that the erstwhile partners become, potentially at least, each other’s 
worst enemies, possessed as they are of potentially deadly knowledge.
Informed of Abby’s betrayal and Ray’s perfidy by Visser, the private 
detective he has hired to follow them, Marty fails to force Abby to return 
home. Enraged and humiliated, Marty then tells Visser to murder the 
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adulterous couple, but Visser fakes their deaths (flashing doctored photo-
graphs of the sleeping couple), collects his ten-thousand-dollar fee from a 
credulous Marty, and then, though they are in the man’s office, shoots his 
surprised client with Abby’s revolver. He thus collects a fee for a murder he 
does not commit and kills his ostensible partner, pinning the crime on the 
intended victims and thereby covering his tracks (an interesting variant on 
what Walter and Phyllis have in store for each other after disposing of her 
husband). Visser, however, soon discovers his plan’s fatal flaw. Marty had 
secreted the doctored photographs in his safe, handing the detective back an 
envelope with a cardboard sign (the client, it seems, had his own plans for 
self-protection from his erstwhile employee, making sure he had evidence 
of Visser’s involvement in the crime). Visser eventually concludes that Ray 
and Abby have taken the photographs and are intending to use them against 
him. So, ironically enough, he feels forced to kill the two of them after all. At 
this he fails. Though he manages to gun down Ray, Visser is himself killed 
by Abby with the same revolver he had used to shoot Marty, an ingenious 
reworking of the doubling, backtracking patterns that are such a notable 
feature of Cain’s fiction.
“The world is full of complainers,” Visser asserts in voice-over as the film 
begins, his world-weariness identifying what seems to be a philosophy of life 
Cain would endorse, “but the fact is that nothing comes with a guarantee.” 
If the Russians, he later explains, manage to avoid the war of all against all, 
it is at the price of success, for no one earns more than “fifty cent a day.” In 
Texas, however, “you’re on your own,” and he is thus announcing the war of 
all against all. Despite this freedom of action, the possibility of success is slim 
at best, he admits, for “something can always go wrong,” even for those who, 
like him, have the guts to face the worst. His own plans are clever, perhaps 
ingenious (recalling Walter’s elaborate plot to impersonate Nirdlinger on a 
train trip, while Phyllis drives her husband’s body to dump at the spot on the 
tracks where Walter will jump off harmlessly, leading the police to think that 
the hapless victim died from the fall). In the end, however, Visser is undone 
by obsessive thoughts of insecurity, which are, of course, quite justified. He 
imagines the worst but misreads the threat he actually faces (Ray and Abby, 
though they have come by chance to possess the incriminating photographs, 
do not understand what they mean). And so Visser ironically brings on his 
own death, killed by a woman he tries to murder even though neither has 
anything to fear from the other.
The film ends with a brief dialogue between the oddly opposed pair 
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(who have never actually met), and this darkly humorous exchange clears 
up a central misunderstanding when it no longer matters. To Visser, dying 
behind the bathroom door through which she has just shot him, Abby says, 
“I’m not afraid of you, Marty,” showing him that the adulterous couple was 
not planning to blackmail or expose him. Even at this moment, Visser (the 
schemer who naturally knows more than his victims) is ignorant of the 
whole truth. Visser had not actually killed Marty. Finding the man shot 
by Abby’s gun in his own office, Ray had concluded that she had shot her 
husband, and, in an attempt to save her from detection, he had removed 
Marty’s body, only to discover the man still conscious, in which state he 
buries him in a cornfield. Ray assumes that Abby killed Visser, and thus 
he fails to explain to her clearly what he has done. Abby’s puzzlement at 
his behavior makes her mistrust him and thus not turn off the light in the 
room they share when he says they are being watched; this gives Visser 
the chance to kill Ray. In the manner of Postman and Double Indemnity, 
Blood Simple stages a drama in which relationships are either exploitative 
(Marty and Visser) or poisoned by mistrust (Abby and Ray). Tellingly, 
no scene in the film includes all four main characters, their physical and 
psychological disconnection from one another belying the web of ties that 
bind them fatally, as it turns out.
What Kind of Man Are You?
If the erotic, Cain’s principal subject, plays only a minor role in Blood Simple, 
it is even less important in The Man Who Wasn’t There. Big Dave and Doris, 
it is true, are involved in an affair and they do formulate a scheme for self-
promotion, but it involves only the most bourgeois of white-collar crimes and 
does not help separate them from that core structure of American society, the 
nuclear family. No impeding husband is to be removed by a violent murder 
meant to appear an accident; only a bit of money is to be taken from a busi-
ness successful enough to stand the loss. With the aid of his ace bookkeeper 
Doris, Big Dave has embezzled enough money from the department store 
he manages for his wife’s family to finance a second outlet, an “annex” that 
he will control directly, answering to no one, and where Doris will enjoy 
a promotion to comptroller. Though he does not know it at the time, Ed’s 
crime closely mirrors that of his own victims. He too is dissatisfied with his 
position working at the pleasure of his wife’s family (her brother owns the 
barbershop), and when a customer, Creighton Tolliver (Jon Polito), discusses 
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his proposal to begin a dry-cleaning chain, Ed volunteers to be his partner. 
Needing ten thousand dollars to become the silent partner in the business, 
he immediately decides to blackmail Dave, out of anger at the man’s betrayal, 
which furnishes him with the necessary dirty secret, for Dave stands to lose 
everything if his wife learns the truth. But if Dave’s desire for professional 
advancement is thoroughly conventional, Ed’s is not, motivated as it is, in 
large part, by an inchoate, Sartrean disgust.
A key scene in Sartre’s Nausea records Roquentin’s recall of the “nausea 
of the hands” he endured when handling a stone, a feeling of disgust at its 
strangeness and overwhelming presence, the “being” it possesses beyond 
his understanding of it through a conventional category. Similarly, Ed is 
summoned into the bathroom one night, where Doris is enjoying a long 
soak. She asks him to shave her legs, a task he sets about with mechanical 
professionalism. In his voice-over, he remembers thinking, “It was clean. No 
water. Chemicals.” Doris is appreciative. “Love ya, honey,” she coos. Perhaps 
Ed resents being at her beck and call (as he is, in a sense, also in his work). 
Perhaps he is angry at the strange intimacy of this encounter, with its com-
plete lack of erotic charge, knowing in some sense he is preparing Doris’s 
body for her next assignation with Dave. Perhaps he is tired of barbering, 
the polluting touch of harvested hair and soapy water. Ed does not say, but 
his narrative cuts immediately, with no explanation offered, to him knock-
ing on Creighton Tolliver’s door to draw up the partnership agreement. The 
defamiliarizing moment in Nausea, we might recall, also leads to a nagging 
dissatisfaction and, eventually, a drastic change as Roquentin determines 
to abandon his intellectual project (writing a biography of the long-dead 
Marquis de Rollebon) in order to live more fully in the present.
At first, Ed’s scheme works well, but he soon learns that there is no pure 
form of life beyond the defiling, physical presence of others (interestingly 
enough, the plan to turn to dry cleaning would still leave him in the busi-
ness of dealing with the filth and waste of his fellows). Big Dave pays up, Ed 
hands the money over to Creighton, but things fall apart when Dave learns 
the truth and attempts to kill Ed but is killed himself, an act for which Doris 
is arrested and arraigned. About to be acquitted, or so her hotshot lawyer 
predicts, Doris kills herself for reasons that are not immediately apparent (Ed 
will find out from the coroner some time later that she was pregnant with 
Dave’s child). Ed’s spiritual crisis deepens as he feels himself an increasingly 
absent presence, not noticed by the ordinary citizens he moves among. In 
a subjective shot, Ed moves among a crowd, none of whom meet his gaze; 
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indeed his image seems superimposed on a world that excludes him: “When 
I walked home, it seemed like everyone avoided looking at me, as if I’d caught 
some disease. This thing with Doris, nobody wanted to talk about it; it was 
like I was a ghost walking down the street. And when I got home now, the 
place felt empty. I sat in the house, but there was nobody there. I was a ghost; 
I didn’t see anyone; no one saw me.”
At the beginning of his narrative, Ed had affirmed that “I never con-
sidered myself a barber.” But now he admits that “I was the barber,” the 
one who is absently present, cut off from meaningful connection to others. 
If, in The Stranger, Meursault, because of his involuntary act of violence, 
finds himself embroiled in judicial proceedings that attempt to formulate 
a coherent self for him, bizarrely reading his lack of demonstrated sorrow 
at his mother’s funeral as a sociopathic indifference to others, Ed finds 
himself delivered by his success (yet ultimate failure) at blackmail to free-
dom from his scornful, indifferent wife and her he-man paramour. And, 
yet, as he reminisces, “everything just seemed ruined.” If Ed’s movement 
in consciousness is archly Sartrean, the still-unfolding skein of events in 
which he becomes embroiled, set in motion by Big Dave’s fulfillment of 
his demand, is vintage Cain.
Reflecting on his career, Cain found an intellectual, perhaps even an 
existential pattern in his fiction: “I, so far as I can make sense of the pattern 
of my mind, write of the wish that comes true, for some reason a terrifying 
concept, at least to my imagination. I think my stories have some quality 
of the opening of a forbidden box, and that it is this, rather than violence, 
sex, or any of the things usually cited by way of explanation, that gives them 
the drive so often noted.”30 Forbidden boxes, Pandora’s especially, contain 
not only what we wish for but also the consequences we cannot imagine 
or refuse to contemplate. If he initially sought the splendid isolation of dry 
cleaning (a goal he attains metaphorically with the deaths of Big Dave and 
Doris), Ed soon attempts to reverse what he has set in motion. A visit from 
the coroner informs him that Doris was pregnant when she hanged herself, 
confirming the point that her lawyer makes that the more you look, the less 
you see, that the only certainty is uncertainty itself.31 Silent most of his life, 
Ed now feels the desire to talk, for he is “alone, with secrets I didn’t want and 
no one to tell them to anyway.” So he consults a medium, hoping somehow 
to establish communication with Doris: “Well, first she told me that my wife 
was in a peaceful place, that our souls were still connected by some spiritual 
bond, that she had never stopped loving me even though she’d done some 
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things she wasn’t proud of.” Concluding that his “spiritual adviser” is merely 
a phony, Ed then resolves to turn his back on “the ghosts” and turn toward 
the living. Telling Birdy that he can’t stand by and “watch more things go 
down the drain,” he wants instead to nurture her career as a pianist and 
make a living as her manager; this would keep him close to the music he 
finds soothing. But the San Francisco concert virtuoso Ed engages to judge 
Birdy’s work says she has no talent, and the young woman confesses to a 
greater desire, in any case, to train as a veterinarian. The new life comes to 
an even more decisive end when, on their journey by car back home, Birdy 
attempts to perform oral sex on him and Ed, surprised and upset, crashes 
the car, seemingly resolving the plot in an obvious homage to Postman as 
he awakens in the hospital to learn he’s being arrested for murder. Ed thinks 
Birdy died in the crash, but she survived with minor injuries. So of what 
crime is he accused?
In Postman, because Cora’s death in a car crash is similar to the one 
that killed Nick, the prosecutor and the jury at Frank’s trial are convinced 
that he planned to eliminate her from the beginning, so that he could keep 
the money and the restaurant for himself. Frank is convicted, basically, for 
the coincidence of the two accidents in which he is involved, accidents that 
proved fatal to those whose deaths would profit him. The “second ringing” 
in The Man Who Wasn’t There isn’t the crash itself but what the police learn 
by chance while Ed is unconscious. Like Frank, who is convicted for Cora’s 
“murder” but in a sense is punished for Nick’s death, Ed pays for his original 
crime though he is convicted of a murder he did not commit, a death, in fact, 
of which he was ignorant until informed by the police. Big Dave, we learn, 
had been approached by Creighton in regard to the dry-cleaning proposi-
tion but had turned him down. When a blackmailer requests an amount 
identical to that of the funding needed for the dry-cleaning enterprise, the 
distraught businessman concludes that the blackmailer must be Creighton, 
whom he then beats fatally, but not before learning that Ed was the one 
who gave Creighton the ten thousand. When the police find Creighton and 
his car submerged in a nearby pond, the justice system proceeds to draw 
conclusions as mistaken, but perhaps as poetically just, as those arrived at 
by the prosecutor and jury in both Postman and The Stranger: “Inside his 
briefcase were the partnership papers I’d signed showing that I’d given him 
ten grand. For the district attorney that made it fall into place: I’d gotten 
Doris to steal the money, the pansy [Creighton] had gotten wise somehow, 
and I’d had to kill him to cover my tracks.”
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Because the whole truth is hardly exculpatory (Ed would have to confess 
to killing Big Dave), his attorney sees no reason why it should be told. He 
pleads instead that Ed is simply “an ordinary man, guilty of living in a world 
that had no place for [him], guilty of wanting to be a dry cleaner, but not of 
murder.” Echoing the court’s condemnation of Meursault in The Stranger, 
Ed’s judge determines just the opposite, that he is a “menace to society, 
a predator on his own wife, his business associates, on an innocent girl.” 
But Ed resists the false portrait, concluding as he contemplates execution 
that “I don’t regret anything. . . . I used to regret being the barber.” What 
is apparent in the film’s ending, as it is in the final pages of The Stranger, is 
the contrast between the distorting constructions society puts on human 
behavior for its own comfort and convenience and what the first-person 
narration has revealed about the two protagonists. Society finds it easier to 
present Ed as a “menace” and a “predator” than to conceive of him, as the 
lawyer more correctly does, as an ordinary man for whom the world made 
no place, all of which lead him to a modest scheme for self-improvement 
that goes terribly wrong because it veers into a world where it fatally collides 
with other schemes (those of Creighton, on the one hand, and Doris and 
Big Dave on the other). The ten thousand dollars that Big Dave and Doris 
embezzle from his wife, that Ed then blackmails Big Dave for, and that the 
police find in Creighton’s car—the money for which these four characters all 
compete unsuccessfully—stands for the zero sum of opportunity in postwar 
America, the cause of the war of one against all that the film traces. But that 
is a truth that the justice system cannot acknowledge, preferring instead to 
condemn the individual deemed monstrous for subverting law and social 
convention.
Twice in the film Ed is confronted, first by Big Dave and then by his 
brother-in-law and fellow barber, with a question that goes to the heart of his 
ordinariness: “What kind of man are you?” How could such an apparently 
placid conformist decide to blackmail his wife’s lover, knowing that the payoff 
might ruin the victim? How could the man who was for years silently cutting 
the hair at the chair next to yours use his wife to embezzle her employer 
(as the brother believes, at least) and then murder an accomplice suddenly 
turned opportunistic predator? Ed has no answer. Why he has done what he 
has done falls into the category of “the things I don’t understand” that, Ed 
hopes, will become clearer in whatever it is that waits for him “beyond the 
earth and sky.” What he does come to know, like Meursault and Roquentin, 
is how the pieces of his life can be seen as constituting a meaningful pattern. 
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“Seeing it whole gives you some peace,” he says, his words playing over the 
fleeting vision of a flying saucer that veers close and then shoots off, sug-
gesting a possible path of transcendence toward that place where, reunited 
with Doris, the two might begin to speak about “all those things they don’t 
have words for here,” restoring something of the community that in this 
re-composed Cainian world seems irretrievably lost.
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